

CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT
PhD THESIS

Academic Year 2013-2014

RAJIV MAHER

**What influences Community Positions towards nearby Mining
Projects: Eight cases from Brazil and Chile**

Supervisor: Donna Ladkin

June 2014

**This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctorate in Philosophy**

© Cranfield University 2014. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the written permission of the copyright owner.

Abstract

This thesis looks at the influences and dynamics of community positions towards nearby mining projects in Brazil and Chile from an affected communities perspective. This subject is important because even after many initiatives and guidance aimed at helping companies to obtain good community relations, also known as a social license to operate (SLO), conflict in many mining community contexts is still prevalent today. In considering this, the thesis draws from Stakeholder, Resource Dependence and Social Movement Theories to help explain community positions towards these mining projects.

The field research includes multiple stakeholder interviews from case studies of eight different mining affected communities in Brazil and Chile which are categorized into groups of higher or lower conflict. The main findings are that the more independent from mining a community is the greater the likelihood of conflict and the more independent type of communities perceived the mining projects as threats to their independence. The lower conflict communities were more economically dependent on their nearby mining projects. My findings also indicate that these more independent communities' collective mobilization to resist such projects is nullified by influence strategies employed by mining companies via initiatives such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) that can serve as co-optation and lead to divisions within communities.

The findings of this thesis call into question the validity of CSR-related notions such as an SLO from an affected communities perspective. An SLO implies community power; however, the research from the community perspective indicates that community power is not a constant or unchallenged. When countered by mining companies and the State, community resistance is broken down and community positions change. The scenario of mining company community relations set in a globalized world is dynamic and ever changing due to the various influences directed to and from affected mining communities.

I propose a model which suggests that in situations of high interdependence between mining company and local community, stakeholder theory holds true. In these cases the vast array of social responsibility-related practical guidance literature on gaining good community relations is valid. Where a community is more independent and collectively resists the mining project, the company will use countermobilization, CSR, co-optation and obstruction strategies to obtain a resistance free environment in which to conduct mining activity.

The research contributes to stakeholder and resource dependence theories as well as to related practitioner literature on community relations and business and human rights by problematizing these theories and guidance. Specifically, the findings question the idea that CSR and best practice community relations lead to a win-win situation. In many cases implementing CSR exacerbates community conflict and divisions and is ultimately more irresponsible than responsible. The literature does not sufficiently consider the complexities of power imbalances between company/State and community in a globalized context and how this affects community relations and conflict from a community perspective. Further research should be conducted around the dynamics of

influence strategies employed by State, company and community in the realm of development and human rights.

Acknowledgements

My PhD research has consumed my life over the past three years and this has meant many sacrifices mainly to all other aspects of my life. The PhD journey has been life changing in terms of how I view and understand new phenomena. Such a new perspective on life is priceless and invaluable and therefore I have a list as long, if not longer than this thesis of people to thank for allowing me this wonderful opportunity. As my PhD was researched in three different languages it is only just that I make some comments in the native language of the acknowledged. In no order of particular importance I should thank Professor Donna Ladkin for her immense patience, goodwill and hours of dedication in reviewing my multiple drafts. Without Donna's supervision I would not be at this stage of my PhD, not even near.

I would also like to thank the enormous generosity of Professor David Grayson and the Doughty Centre for Corporate Responsibility who through the late Nigel Doughty were able to fund my PhD. Without this kind funding my PhD would not have been possible. I also owe a big thank you to the guidance shown by Professor David Grayson and Professor Mark Jenkins in reviewing my work every year to ensure it met the required standard for progression.

Outside of Cranfield I also owe huge gratitude to my parents who have had to put up with me staying at home still in my mid-thirties and for all the other help they have given me throughout the four years of Mres and PhD. This support was essential.

I would also like to thank my boss Allan Lerberg Jørgensen at DIHR for being so flexible and understanding with me in final months of the PhD.

Portugués

Quero te agradecer também Flávia por tudo que voce fez para mim durante tres anos sei que fui ingrato e nao te prestava a atencao que voce merecia. Sem sua grande ajuda eu nao estaria aqui a punto de entregar a tese. Muito Obrigado.

Tem tantas pessoas no Brasil nas comunidades e nas mineradoras que me ajudaram com minhas pesquisas que nao dá para agradecer a todos. Né posso mencionar seus nomes completos para assim respeitar a confidencialidade. Mas preciso agradecer muito a Eloisa e a sua familia para me ter ajudado demais com minhas entrevistas e ficado em sua casa sem sua ajuda eu nao teria conseguido tantos dados interessantes, além disso eu me diverti demais com voce, sua familia e amigos foi inesquecível; a Flávia por ter me ajudado sempre e tanto com minhas perguntas chatas toda hora; e a pessoal da Anglo American Nickel e na Kinross Paracatu. Em fim gostaria agradecer desde o fundo do meu

coração a todas as pessoas de Paracatu, Mariana, Barro Alto, Conceição de Mato Dentro e Pedra Branca em Amapá pela ajuda. Desejo a todos vocês muita sorte nas suas lutas pela justiça.

Castellano

Ahora me toca escribir en Castellano ya que tantos Chilenos me han ayudado con mi investigación. En especial a la comunidad Diaguita en el Valle de Huasco como Marlene y la señora Clementina quienes me ayudaron muchísimo con mi trabajo y para sentirme bien en su casa. También agradezco a la gente de la OLCA y al Comité de la Defensa de Caimanes que también me ayudaron muchísimo con mi trabajo. Kinross de Chile que también siempre mantuvieron sus puertas abiertas para recibir mis tantas preguntas desde el 2009 sin perderse la paciencia. La familia Barton que siempre me dieron un cuarto para dormir durante mis viajes de investigación en Santiago. En fin hay mucha gente más a quien podría nombrar para agradecer pero lamentablemente no queda más espacio así que le agradezco a todos los Chilenos quienes colaboraron con mi doctorado y están en mi corazón. Les digo que no paren con la lucha por su justicia como pueblo y seres humanos. En cuanto más organizados sean más eficaces serán con sus luchas y objetivos.

The past three to four years apart from making me hugely unpopular with family and friends has also given me the opportunity to travel around South America and to take part in intellectually stimulating conferences such as Egos and make new friends. Throughout these travels I was able to meet fascinating people who undoubtedly helped shape my research focus, thinking, articulation and logic as much as reading the literature. Therefore I am immensely appreciative of all the constructive feedback I got at formal conferences and even in cafés and bars from fascinating people I met whilst discussing my research. In short conducting the PhD research has been an eye opening experience and journey into people, how they cope with significant threats to their ways of living, and how they make decisions based on ethics, values and/or financial gain and the expense of others. It was quite a humbling experience and meeting the hundreds of people I did in the fieldwork has been invaluable for my own personal development.

This thesis is dedicated to ALL that have helped me in the past four years. I hope this thesis can go some way towards helping improve the lives of those under threat from the advances of *Progress and Development*.

ABSTRACT	2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	4
1.0 INTRODUCTION.....	15
1.1 ANTECEDENTS TO MINING COMPANY – COMMUNITY CONFLICT	15
1.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF MINING COMPANY/COMMUNITY RELATIONS: A SOCIAL LICENCE TO OPERATE FOR MINING COMPANIES	21
1.2.1 The role of the company as manager in gaining an SLO	25
1.3 <i>Practitioner guidance and stakeholder literature</i>	27
<i>Table 1 Principles of good and respectful community relations for an SLO.....</i>	<i>30</i>
1.4 <i>Mining sector attitudes towards gaining good community relations.....</i>	<i>32</i>
1.5 <i>Thesis structure</i>	<i>39</i>
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW	42
2.1 <i>Introduction</i>	<i>42</i>
2.2 HOW DOES STAKEHOLDER THEORY ADDRESS AN SLO FROM LOCAL COMMUNITIES?	43
2.2.1 <i>General Stakeholder Literature Review from a Community Perspective</i>	<i>44</i>
2.2.2 The Community as a Powerless Actor within Stakeholder Theory	46
2.2.3 The Community as a Powerful Actor against Mining Companies.....	49
2.2.4 – Critique of the SLO – Definition and assumptions of community power	51
2.2.5 Political CSR and the Role of the State as a Critique of Stakeholder Theory	56
2.2.6 (UN) Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights – an answer for responsible business in a globalized world?.....	59
2.2.7 <i>Extractives sector – community relations academic and practitioner literature</i>	<i>62</i>
2.3 <i>Resource Dependence Theory – Explaining Mining Company and Local community influence strategies.....</i>	<i>64</i>
2.4 SOCIAL MOVEMENT-RELATED LITERATURE.....	75
2.41 Social movements from a Community versus project siting perspective	79
2.42 <i>Social identity-related theories</i>	<i>82</i>
2.43 <i>Literature review of the community perspective on mining company/community relations and conflict.....</i>	<i>85</i>
2.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	96
Table 2 – Summation table of main academic publications reviewed which focus on large corporate projects – community relations/conflict.....	100
3.0 METHODOLOGY	107

3.1 PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE.....	107
Table 3 Combinations of Ontological and Epistemological Categories (Adapted from Blaikie, 2007) ..	109
3.2 METHODS USED IN RELEVANT AND SIMILAR RESEARCH	110
3.3 MY RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	111
3.31 Choosing Case Sites	112
3.4 DATA COLLECTION	115
3.5 DATA ANALYSIS PROCESS	119
Table 4 – 3.51 Excerpts from 12 quotes to show coding and aggregate theoretical dimensions.....	125
4.0 FINDINGS – CASE STUDY CONTEXT DESCRIPTIONS	128
Table 5 – Different manifestations of conflict at higher and lower conflict mining communities.....	129
Table 6 – Matrix of Independence and Conflict Levels of the Eight Mining communities	130
Table 7 Current Mining and Community Consultation policy and legislation affecting case studies.....	130
4.1 HUASCO VALLEY CONTEXTUAL CASE STUDY	133
4.11 Huasco Valley Background	133
Image 1 – Map of Huasco Valley within Chile.....	134
Image 2 – Huasco Valley.....	135
4.12 Timeline for large scale mining in Huasco Valley.....	136
4.13 Key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society sectors.....	137
Market.....	137
4.14 Economic Activity in Municipality of Alto del Carmen	137
Table 8 – Number of people employed by agriculture and mining in the Huasco Valley, 2010.....	138
4.15 Corporate strategies for engaging with the local community.....	138
4.16 Community strategies towards Pascua Lama	141
Image 3 – Parish Church with anti mining mural painting in Alto del Carmen, Huasco Valley.....	143
Image 4 – Close up of Mural of “Before and After” Pascua Lama on the main Parish Church of Huasco Valley in Alto del Carmen	144
Image 5 – Centre of Alto del Carmen in Huasco Valley slogan “Pa\$cua Lama Bread for Today – Hunger for Tomorrow.....	145

4.2 CONCEIÇÃO DE MATO DENTRO – CONTEXTUAL CASE STUDY	151
4.21 Timeline for Minas Rio Mineduct project in Conceição de Mato Dentro region	152
4.22 Key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society sectors.....	153
Market.....	153
4.23 Economic Activity in Municipality of Conceição de Mato Dentro.....	153
Table 9 – GDP amount per economic sector in Conceição de Mato Dentro, 2011	154
4.24 Corporate strategies for engaging with the local community.....	154
Image 6 – Location of Conceição de Mato Dentro in Brazil	158
Image 7 – View of Conceição de Mato Dentro.....	158
Image 8 – Invitation to public hearing to discuss alleged impacts to Passa Sete River and Waterfall by Anglo American	159
4.25 Community strategies towards Anglo American.....	159
Image 9 – Invitation to public hearing with protest t-shirts against mining	162
4.3 CAIMANES - CONTEXTUAL CASE STUDY	164
4.31 Los Caimanes and El Mauro tailings dam Timeline.....	166
4.32 Key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society sectors.....	167
Market.....	167
4.33 Economic activity in Caimanes.....	167
4.34 Corporate Strategies with the local community.....	168
Image 10 – El Mauro tailings dam.....	170
4.35 Community strategies towards Pelambres.....	170
Image 11 – Caimanes Defence Committee member blocking access route to mine.....	172
Image 12 – Anti Pelambres message in Caimanes Street.....	173
4.4 COLLA COMMUNITY CONTEXT	174
Image 13 – Location of Kinross Gold Maricunga Mine in Region III of Chile	175
4.41 Timeline of Colla Community – Kinross Gold	176
4.42 Key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society sectors.....	177
4.43 Economic Activity for Los Colla	177
4.44 Corporate engagement strategies with the local community.....	178
4.45 Community strategies towards Kinross Maricunga.....	180
Image 14 and 15 – Mining vehicles leaving dust plume by Colla houses	181
Image 16 – Myself with Colla member at his house next to access road to mine	182
4.6 PARACATU COMMUNITY CONTEXT	183

4.61 Timeline of Morro de Ouro mine in Paracatu	184
4.62 KEY STAKEHOLDERS FROM THE MARKET, STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY	185
Market	185
4.63 Economic activity in Municipality of Paracatu	186
Table 10 – GDP per economic sector in Paracatu, 2011	186
4.64 Corporate engagement strategies with the local community.....	186
Image 17 – Map of Paracatu in Brazil.....	190
Image 18 – Satellite view of Paracatu and Morro de Ouro mine.....	191
4.65 Community strategies towards Kinross.....	191
Image 19 – View of Paracatu’s Muncipal Chamber.....	193
4.7 MARIANA COMMUNITY CONTEXT	194
4.71 Proposed reactivation of Mina del Rey in Mariana.....	194
4.72 Timeline of Reactivation of Mina del Rey in Mariana	195
Image 22 – Two colonial churches in Mariana	197
4.73 Key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society.....	197
Market	197
4.74 Economic activity in Municipality of Mariana	198
Table 11 – GDP per economic sector in Mariana, 2011.....	198
4.75 Corporate engagement strategies.....	198
Image 23 – View of Future Mine from Mariana.....	200
4.8 PEDRA BRANCA DE AMAPARÍ COMMUNITY CONTEXT	201
4.81 Timeline of Mining near Pedra Branca de Amaparí.....	201
4.82 KEY STAKEHOLDERS FROM THE MARKET, STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY	202
Market	202
4.83 Economic activity in Municipality of Pedra Branca de Amaparí.....	202
Table 12 – GDP per economic sector in Pedra Branca de Amaparí, 2011	202
4.84 Corporate engagement strategies.....	203
4.85 Community influence strategies towards Anglo American.	204
Image 24 – Map of Pedra Branca de Amaparí in relation to Brazil.....	205
Image 25 - view of a typical street in Pedra Branca.....	207
4.9 BARRO ALTO COMMUNITY CONTEXT	208
4.91 Timeline for Anglo American in Barro Alto	208
4.92 KEY STAKEHOLDERS FROM THE MARKET, STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY	209
Market	209

4.93 Economic activity in Municipality of Barro Alto	209
Table 13 – GDP per economic sector in Barro Alto, 2011	209
4.94 Corporate engagement strategies.....	210
4.95 Community influence strategies towards Anglo American	211
Image 26 – Map of Barro Alto in relation to Brazil	212
Image 27 – Aerial view of Barro Alto.....	213
TABLE 14 - SUMMARY OF CONTEXT CASES.....	215
5.0 FINDINGS ANALYSIS	222
5.1 INTRODUCTION.....	222
TABLE 15 – FINDINGS ANALYSIS OF HUASCO VALLEY.....	224
TABLE 16 – FINDINGS ANALYSIS OF CONCEIÇÃO DE MATO DENTRO	229
TABLE 17 - FINDINGS ANALYSIS OF CAIMANES.....	237
TABLE 18 – FINDINGS ANALYSIS COLLA DE RÍO JORQUERA	240
TABLE 19 - FINDINGS ANALYSIS – PARACATU	243
TABLE 20 – FINDINGS ANALYSIS MARIANA.....	251
TABLE 21 - FINDINGS ANALYSIS PEDRA BRANCA.....	254
TABLE 22 – FINDINGS ANALYSIS BARRO ALTO.....	256
5.2 Historical context – High Conflict cases.....	259
5.3 Historical context – Low Conflict cases	262
5.31 Summary.....	266
5.4 Mining company influence strategies for attaining SLO.....	268
Table 23 – mining company influence strategies and community response strategies according to mining cycle stage at higher conflict communities	271
Table 24 – Mining company influence strategies and community response strategies according to mining cycle stage at lower conflict communities	277
5.5 Discussion of mining company influence strategies and historical and community contexts.....	280
Table 25 - Comparison between higher conflicts and lower conflict communities in terms of dependence, mining company influence strategies and Ability to mine without Community Resistance.....	284
5.2 Historical context – Higher Conflict cases.....	285
5.3 Historical context – Low Conflict cases	288

5.3.1 Summary	292
5.4 Mining company influence strategies for attaining an SLO	294
Table 26 – Mining company influence strategies and community response strategies according to mining cycle stage at higher conflict communities	297
Table 27 – Mining company influence strategies and community response strategies according to mining cycle stage at lower conflict communities	303
5.5 Discussion of mining company influence strategies and historical and community contexts	306
Table 28 – Comparison between higher conflict and lower conflict communities in terms of dependence, mining company influence strategies and ability to mine without community resistance.	309
6.0 DISCUSSION	311
6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	311
6.2 Stages of mining company – community relations throughout the mining cycle	313
6.3 Independence and Dependence as determinants of conflict.....	317
Diagram 1 – Model of how community dependence levels on mining affects company/community relations.....	322
6.4 The importance of social movements theory for understanding community conflict	322
6.5 How CSR and Stakeholder theories fit with the findings.....	324
6.6 Corporate influence to create community dependence	325
6.7 Corporate influence strategy to obstruct critical voices	326
6.8 EXTENDING EXTANT THEORY.....	329
6.9 NEW THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION	330
7.0 PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTION – IMPLICATIONS FOR HOW MINING ACTIVITY SHOULD BE GOVERNED	334
7.1 Recommendations for States.....	334
7.2 Recommendations to mining companies.....	340
8.0 CONCLUSION.....	346
8.1 FURTHER RESEARCH	349
8.2 LIMITATIONS.....	351

8.3 FINAL REFLECTION.....	352
REFERENCES.....	354
APPENDIX A.....	370
APPENDIX B.....	490
APPENDIX C	495
APPENDIX D – SOCIO-ECONOMIC-HISTORIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT COMMUNITIES WITH COMPANY AND COMMUNITY INFLUENCE STRATEGIES.....	497
APPENDIX E - INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS AND REFLECTIONS	504

Tables and Images

<i>Table 1 Principles of good and respectful community relations for an SLO.....</i>	<i>31</i>
<i>Table 2 – Summation table of main academic publications reviewed which focus on large corporate projects – community relations/conflict.....</i>	<i>101</i>
<i>3.11 Table 3 Combinations of Ontological and Epistemological Categories (Adapted from Blaikie, 2007)</i>	<i>110</i>
<i>Table 4 – 3.51 Excerpt of 12 quotes to show coding and aggregate theoretical dimensions</i>	<i>126</i>
<i>Table 5– Different manifestations of conflict at higher and lower conflict mining communities.....</i>	<i>130</i>
<i>Table 6 – Matrix of Independence and Conflict Levels of the Eight Mining communities</i>	<i>131</i>
<i>Table 7 Current Mining and Community Consultation policy and legislation affecting case studies.....</i>	<i>131</i>
<i>Image 1 – Map of Huasco Valley within Chile.....</i>	<i>135</i>
<i>Image 2 – Huasco Valley.....</i>	<i>136</i>
<i>Table 8 – Number of people employed by agriculture and mining in the Huasco Valley, 2010</i>	<i>139</i>

<i>Image 3 – Parish Church with anti mining mural painting in Alto del Carmen, Huasco Valley.....</i>	<i>144</i>
<i>Image 4 – Close up of Mural of “Before and After” Pascua Lama on the main Parish Church of Huasco Valley in Alto del Carmen</i>	<i>145</i>
<i>Image 5 – Centre of Alto del Carmen in Huasco Valley slogan “Pa\$cua Lama Bread for today”</i>	<i>146</i>
<i>Table 9 – GDP amout per seconomic sector in Conceiçao de Mato Dentro, 2011.....</i>	<i>155</i>
<i>Image 6 – Location of Conceiçao de Mato Dentro in Brazil</i>	<i>159</i>
<i>Image 7 – View of Conceiçao de Mato Dentro.....</i>	<i>159</i>
<i>Image 8 – Invitation to public hearing to discuss alleged impacts to Passa Sete River and</i>	
<i>Image 9 – Invitation to public hearing with protest t-shirts against mining</i>	<i>160</i>
<i>Image 10 – El Mauro tailings dam</i>	<i>171</i>
<i>Image 11 – Caimanes Defence Committee member blocking access route to mine.....</i>	<i>173</i>
<i>Image 12 – Anti Pelambres message in Caimanes Street.....</i>	<i>174</i>
<i>Image 13 – Location of Kinross Gold Maricunga Mine in Region III of Chile</i>	<i>176</i>
<i>Image 14 and 15 – Mining vehicles leaving dust plume by Colla houses</i>	<i>182</i>
<i>Image 16 –Myself with Colla member at his house next to access road to mine</i>	<i>183</i>
<i>Table 10 – GDP per economic sector in Paracatu, 2011.....</i>	<i>187</i>
<i>Image 17 – Map of Paracatu in Brazil.....</i>	<i>191</i>
<i>Image 18 – Satellite view of Paracatu and Morro de Ouro mine.....</i>	<i>192</i>
<i>Image 19 – View of Paracatu’s Muncipal Chamber.....</i>	<i>194</i>
<i>Image 20 – View of Mariana</i>	<i>194</i>
<i>Image 21 – Two colonial churches in Mariana</i>	<i>197</i>
<i>Image 22 – View of Future Mine from Mariana.....</i>	<i>198</i>
<i>Table 11 – GDP per economic sector in Mariana, 2011.....</i>	<i>198</i>
<i>Image 23 – Map of Pedra Branca de Amaparí in relation to Brazil.....</i>	<i>201</i>
<i>Table 12 – GDP per economic sector in Pedra Branca de Amaparí, 2011</i>	<i>203</i>
<i>Image 24 - view of a typical street in Pedra Branca</i>	<i>206</i>
<i>Image 25 – Map of Barro Alto in relation to Brazil</i>	<i>208</i>
<i>Table 13 – GDP per economic sector in Barro Alto, 2011</i>	<i>209</i>
<i>Image 26 – Aerial view of Barro Alto.....</i>	<i>212</i>
<i>IMAGE 27 – AERIAL VIEW OF BARRO ALTO.....</i>	<i>213</i>
<i>TABLE 14 - SUMMARY OF CONTEXT CASES</i>	<i>215</i>

<i>TABLE 15 – FINDINGS ANALYSIS OF HUASCO VALLEY.....</i>	<i>224</i>
<i>TABLE 16 – FINDINGS ANALYSIS OF CONCEIÇÃO DE MATO DENTRO.....</i>	<i>229</i>
<i>TABLE 17 - FINDINGS ANALYSIS OF CAIMANES.....</i>	<i>237</i>
<i>TABLE 18 – FINDINGS ANALYSIS COLLA DE RÍO JORQUERA.....</i>	<i>240</i>
<i>TABLE 19 - FINDINGS ANALYSIS – PARACATU.....</i>	<i>243</i>
<i>TABLE 20 – FINDINGS ANALYSIS MARIANA.....</i>	<i>251</i>
<i>TABLE 21 - FINDINGS ANALYSIS PEDRA BRANCA.....</i>	<i>254</i>
<i>TABLE 22 – FINDINGS ANALYSIS BARRO ALTO.....</i>	<i>256</i>
<i>Table 23 – mining company influence strategies and community response strategies according to mining cycle stage at higher conflict communities</i>	<i>271</i>
<i>Table 24 – Mining company influence strategies and community response strategies according to mining cycle stage at lower conflict communities.</i>	<i>277</i>
<i>Table 25 - Comparison between higher conflicts and lower conflict communities in terms of dependence, mining company influence strategies and Ability to mine without Community Resistance.....</i>	<i>284</i>
<i>Table 26 – Mining company influence strategies and community response strategies according to mining cycle stage at higher conflict communities</i>	<i>297</i>
<i>Table 27 – Mining company influence strategies and community response strategies according to mining cycle stage at lower conflict communities.</i>	<i>303</i>
<i>Table 28 – Comparison between higher conflict and lower conflict communities in terms of dependence, mining company influence strategies and ability to mine without community resistance.....</i>	<i>309</i>
 <i>Diagram 1 – Model of how community dependence levels on mining affects company – community relations.....</i>	 <i>322</i>

“What is needed is more research on ethnographies of resistance from the perspective of those whose lives are rapidly becoming unsustainable because their livelihoods are disappearing as a result of industrial expansion. Perhaps these stories may enable us to envision sustainability from multiple perspectives and to imagine different paths to reach that elusive goal.” (Banerjee, 2011 p.729)

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Antecedents to mining company – community conflict

My research aims to empirically identify the important factors that influence community positions and relations towards nearby mining sector-related projects by examining closely eight communities situated near mining operations in Brazil and Chile. This is important because as mining activity has increased in the past two decades in Latin America, it has been accompanied by increased social and environmental conflict at the mining sites and communities. This increase in mining, oil and gas exploration has largely been a result of the neo-liberal nature of advice and conditions placed on loans and aid made to Latin American countries during the 1980s by institutions such as the World Bank and countries such as the USA. As a result Latin American countries view mining and its revenues as important for growth and development, and hence one way to reduce poverty (Haalboom, 2012). The neo-liberal dominant paradigm, especially since the 1980s, has pressured governments to privatize their State services and companies for more efficiency. This has led to the decreased role and power of the State and consequent increased power of corporations in a developing world context (Berry, 2003; Prieto-Carrón et al., 2006; Banerjee, 2008; Scherer et al., 2009; Haalboom, 2012).

In these developing countries multinational corporations are less regulated and seen as necessary for growth and development by developing nation States who are, as a result, increasingly more dependent on them. Corporations have therefore, for good or bad

become “corporate citizens” engaging in social issues traditionally the responsibility of States, and this has “blurred the lines” between the roles of the State and large corporations (Scherer et al., 2009). Therefore with regard to extractive sector companies in Latin America, the responsibilities and expectations are even greater in order to respect the lives and wellbeing of local communities near mining operations.

Publications have been produced by practitioner consultants, NGOs, international organizations and mining companies themselves (as discussed later in this chapter and the literature review) which aim to provide solutions for extractives sector companies to gain good community relations and contribute to local development and hence avoid conflict. Nonetheless, these publications have not had the expected positive impact on mining company/community relations as conflict between these groups is currently prevalent throughout the world.

In this section I set the scene of my research problem and thus justify its importance for study. I will finish the introduction by stating my research question. In this chapter I focus on how the plethora of practitioner-related literature offers solutions for mining companies, community relations and conflict. Despite this wealth of guidance material there still appears to be daily conflict due to mining in Latin America and consequently costly delays for the mining companies. I argue that one of the reasons that this advice has not worked is that it is very company focused, based on a stakeholder theory perspective, which infers that companies can manage their stakeholders for strategic gain or legitimacy (Freeman, 1984).

Latin America is an important region in which to study this phenomenon due to its recent emergence as a major player in mining. According to KPMG Peru and ICMM (2012) Latin America is the world’s leading region for mine exploration, attracting 28% of

mining-related investment in 2012, and 25% of the world's production. In particular, in Chile, the mining industry is one of the main industries that spurs the economic and social development of the nation. The Chilean mining industry represented 19.2% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010, a rise of 24% compared to the previous year. Mining exports accounted for 65% of the country's total exports, which reached US\$67.9 billion (PWC, 2012). It is clear, therefore, that Chile as a nation is reliant on mining for its economy and development.

In the case of Brazil, the other country considered in my research, this giant nation has substantial mineral deposits and is one of largest mineral producers and exporters in the world. The mining industry in Brazil contributes about 4% to the country's annual GDP, which is around US\$100 billion. However, exports of iron ore, mainly to China, remain the largest source of growth for the export sector (PWC, 2012). Though less dependent upon mining than Chile, this activity clearly has a growing importance for Brazil.

Multinational extractive sector companies increasingly tend to operate in the developing world in socially and environmentally vulnerable locations, where local communities are impoverished and lack basic infrastructure (Gifford et al., 2010; Kemp, 2010). Extractive industry company relations with local communities in places such as Brazil and Chile are further complicated by the impact of their operations on the local environment and communities, as highlighted by Jenkins and Yakovleva (2006): *"the discovery, extraction and processing of mineral resources is widely regarded as one of the most environmentally and socially disruptive activities undertaken by business"* (p.272). According to the NGO First Peoples Worldwide (2013), indigenous people occupy 20% of the world's land, which possesses 80% of the worlds' remaining biodiversity. Therefore extractive sector projects have a high chance of applying to mine for resources on indigenous people's lands. With extractive sector activities come negative impacts

such as displacement of people, environmental impacts such as pollution, health impacts and loss of cultural heritage.

Such conditions and impacts have led to situations of conflict between mining companies and their local communities whether they be indigenous or not in the developing world as studied by academics such as Kapeleus, 2002; Crawley and Sinclair, 2003; Jenkins, 2004; Imbun, 2006; Kemp et al., 2006; Eweje, 2007; Idemudia, 2007; Bebbington et al., 2008; Calvano, 2008; Gifford and Kestler, 2008; Garvin et al., 2009; Zandvliet and Anderson, 2009; Bruijn and Whiteman, 2010; Duarte, 2010; Gifford et al., 2010; Kemp 2010; Newenham-Kahindi, 2010; McAdam, 2010; Banerjee, 2011; Urkidi 2012; Kraemer et al., 2013; and Prno, 2013. The conflict in these empirical research publications is summarized as being down to divergent world views and a lack of meaningful communication or engagement between both sides.

Mining companies operate with a neo-liberal capitalist world view whereby maximizing profits is seen as a significant objective (Banerjee, 2001; Calvano, 2008; Jenkins, 2004); however, for a local indigenous community more value is attached to nature and environmental conservation because their lives and livelihoods depend on the environment, or, in the case of a non-indigenous but poor communities, they may value most the health, education and well-being of their family members which could be directly put at risk from mining operations.

Such a perspective is supported by writers such as Calvano (2008) who focused on conflict between companies and communities in the extractives sector, and point out that *“Neither side can understand the other’s point of view because each sees the greatest good through the lens of their respective values”* (p.799). Similarly, Jenkins (2004) explains how different ways of thinking and making sense of the world can lead to a

rupture in company/community relations: *“Companies often see a situation framed in scientific fact, whereas many of the communities that they perceive themselves to be part of base their view on beliefs and perceptions. This may be of particular relevance to indigenous peoples, where radically different world-views may clash with corporations’ scientific ‘development’ rationale.”* (p.26).

Therefore the assumption (which is made more explicit by the practitioner guidance literature) is that mining companies should consult and take into consideration community perspectives in order to avoid conflict and foster good relations. However, one should ask whether just consulting with communities who have irreconcilable world views, such as those of indigenous peoples, can lead to better relations. This underlying conflict is a question this thesis also hopes to address.

Conflicts between local communities and mining companies have also become frequent as companies are forced to extract minerals closer to human settlements after having depleted mineral resources in more remote areas of the world. Driven by increases in demand for minerals such as gold, iron ore and copper, and commodity prices, mining activity has proportionately risen along with the changing political economy as highlighted earlier where developing nation economies have been advised by international financial lenders such as the World Bank to open and liberalize their economies and exploit their nature resources in order to grow and develop.

This has especially been the case in South America, where not a week goes by without some sort of mining and local community-related conflict taking place, as I have observed over the past three years as a subscriber to weekly newsletters from the Observatory of Mining Conflicts (OCMAL in Spanish) and No a La Mina (No to the Mines in English). OCMAL reported more than 150 active mining conflicts in Latin

America, most of which began in the 2000s (OCMAL, 2010). As reported in September 2013 in the Peruvian financial newspaper *Gestión*, the Peru country director of McKinsey & Company consulting services, Lino Abram announced at a conference that two-thirds of mining projects approved with an Environmental Impact Analysis (EIA), which implies State and a degree of community approval, are delayed due to social conflict. (Manrique, 2013). This is a highly significant statistic, as it shows that despite obtaining legal approval to construct mines, companies are still highly likely to face social conflict, which impinges on their ability to work. I will refer back to this later in this chapter and throughout the thesis. Also in Peru, mining-related community conflicts account for the majority of all national social conflicts (Defensoria del Pueblo, 2013). Finally, as reported by Banerjee (2011), indigenous protests at the proposed opening up of the Amazon rainforest to activities, including mining, resulted in violence and the killing of more than 50 civilians by Peruvian security forces.

It is clear that mining activities can have many harsh negative impacts on local communities, including fatalities. However, the financial value of mining has also been made evident to the national economies of Brazil and Chile. The companies mining in the communities where I conducted my research have market capitalization in the billions. Anglo American have a market capitalization of over US\$32bn; Kinross Gold over US\$5.5bn; Barrick Gold over US\$19bn; Antofagasta Minerals over US\$13bn; and Vale have the highest at over US\$83bn (Yahoo Finance 21st September, 2013). Therefore these companies wield a substantial amount of financial power and also generate huge sums of money. These large market capitalizations also demonstrate the amount of financial wealth mining companies amass from their core activity of mining. Therefore in order to continue making these huge amounts of money to satisfy their shareholders and cover other costs, it is imperative that the large mining companies can mine their resources as efficiently as possible and with minimal community and government disruption. In other words it is imperative from a company perspective that a mining company is accepted by its local community so it can be allowed to operate without disruption. Any conflicts

have negative financial implications for the mining companies who, as shown by the market capitalizations, need to produce vast amounts of minerals to remain competitive.

In terms of this research, the aim is to understand what is driving these conflicts and, where possible, driving cases of good mining company/community relations. There is substantial conflict in this context of mining and communities, despite the many practical publications aimed at mining companies to help them secure good community relations, as well as consultants specializing in the topic. Thus this problem merits further academic research to understand from a community perspective, as opposed to the already well researched mining company perspective, why and how communities resist or accept nearby mining projects.

1.2 The importance of mining company/community relations: A social licence to operate for mining companies

Ensuring conflict is kept to a minimum is important for all actors involved. For local communities, poor relations with large mining companies or conflict can mean social upheaval and in general can have social, political, and economic implications for these communities, their cultures, livelihoods, environments and wellbeing (Banerjee, 2011). For the mining companies, conflict can result in significant damage to their operations, reputations and ultimately their bottom line profits which risks future investment by shareholders (Franks and Davis, 2011).

The pressure and expectations from local communities, civil society and even the private sector itself means that extractives sector firms need to maintain good relations with their local communities in the developing world in order to gain a social licence to operate – otherwise referred to as ‘legitimacy’ in the academic literature. According to Kapeleus (2002) a social licence to operate (SLO) is imperative in order for firms to grow and open

new operations around the globe with government and local community consent. Achieving good and positive relations with local communities is therefore a highly significant business imperative in itself. This argument also implies that communities are the holders or owners of the SLO which therefore implies a certain leverage of power for the communities.

There is now a need for mining companies to gain this non-legally required SLO within the communities they operate, in addition to the environmental and mining licences needed, to avoid potentially costly conflict and negative reputational impacts (Prno and Scott Slocombe, 2012). A social licence exists when a mining project is seen to have the broad, ongoing approval and acceptance of society to conduct its activities (Boutilier et al., 2011; Prno and Slocombe, 2012). Therefore an SLO is essentially about community perceptions around a company's acceptability (Boutilier et al., 2011). As reported by Prno and Scott Slocombe (2012), other authors have even stated that gaining an SLO is one of the most significant challenges mining companies now face (e.g., Deloitte Global Services Limited, 2010; Ernst and Young, 2011; Joyce and Thomson, 2000 in Prno and Scott Slocombe, 2012). The difficulty of gaining an SLO is a challenge confronted by most mining companies in Peru, despite gaining a legal licence to operate, as pointed out earlier from the quote by the head of McKinsey & Company Peru who claims two-thirds of mining companies face social conflict after obtaining environmental permits (Manrique, 2013). In summary, as proposed by Prno and Scott Slocombe, (2012) the SLO is also inherently complex, intangible and subjective.

With regard to the financial implications of mining company/community conflict, Davis and Franks (2011) have conducted empirical research via interviews with mining company executives to understand the costs of gaining an SLO for mining companies. Based on their interviews, Davis and Franks (2011) claim that a world-class mining project with capital expenditure of between US\$3-5bn would lose around US\$20m per

week due to delayed production in Net Present Value (NPV) terms, in terms of lost productivity should there be conflict with the local community. Even at the exploration stage, a mining company would lose US\$10,000 per day in terms of wages and idle machinery while conflicts prevent further exploration work. The most frequent costs identified by Davis and Franks (2011) on SLO-related conflicts were linked to staff time spent on risk and conflict management, and disruption to production.

A local community collective class action lawsuit in the Northern Huasco Valley of Chile managed to cease operations of the country's largest gold mine recently. In Chile in April 2013 the State authorities fined Barrick Gold with the highest financial punishment in the country's history of US\$16m for environmental pollution in the Andes mountains. The largest gold mine project in Latin America in Peru, called Conga, operated by major shareholder Newmont Mining, has been on hold for over a year due to conflict and violence over its contested impacts on the community. This cease in mining activity is costing Newmont Mining substantial amounts of money over a long period of time. According to Banerjee (2011) a survey of 15 projects in India representing an investment of £31bn has been halted by massive protests and resistance movements. Finally, as mentioned earlier, two-thirds of all mining projects in Peru undergo delays after obtaining legal environmental licences to operate. According to the country director for Peru, Lino Abram, Peru loses up to 1.5% of its GDP, 200-300,000 direct jobs and 500-700,000 indirect jobs as a consequence (Manrique, 2013).

Prno and Slocombe point out that even though an SLO may be granted or issued by society as a whole (e.g., governments, communities, the general public and media), *“local communities are often a key arbiter in the process by virtue of their proximity to projects, sensitivity to effects, and ability to affect project outcomes. The power to grant (or withhold) an SLO has thus enabled some mining communities to become particularly influential governance actors in the mineral development process”*. (2012, p. 347). In

summary Prno Slocombe (2012) claim that communities have the decision making power to grant or withhold an SLO.

Boutilier et al. (2011) further add that an SLO can be withdrawn or withheld by a community from the nearby mining project, as shown by the above-mentioned examples from Latin America and India. According to the consulting firm “General Wealth” an SLO is an enormously valuable corporate asset of public trust in a business (General Wealth website). Therefore according to the authors outlined previously the assumption can be inferred that the SLO is a resource held by local communities that can be awarded to or withheld or withdrawn from nearby mining projects. However other commentators such as Escobar (2011) and Banerjee (2011), arguing from a political economy perspective, would question whether post-colonial indigenous communities in Latin America exist in true democracies where these people can make free choices and decisions around offering or withdrawing an SLO.

Hence from a practitioner stakeholder management perspective, the local community is considered an important and salient stakeholder within the mining sector context (Prno and Scott Slocombe, 2012) unlike for most other industries and companies. The SLO literature, however, can at best be described as “emerging” (Prno and Slocombe, 2012); indeed at two recent extractives sector meetings, a head of social performance of a leading oil and gas multinational jested whether anybody really understood what SLO meant. However, despite this apparent significance attributed to the community actor by the SLO literature, it is also evident that the company is seen to be playing the dominant role of managing both the situation and stakeholders, as will be further discussed in the next section. As such, the grave assumption made by Prno and Slocombe (2012) that local communities are the arbitrators to grant to and withhold the SLO from mining projects should be questioned and analyzed in deeper detail with empirical data, as this thesis aims to do.

1.2.1 The role of the company as manager in gaining an SLO

However, gaining an SLO is not as straightforward as obtaining an environmental licence for mining, where the mining company only needs to show how it would address and mitigate any environmental impacts from its operations. An SLO inherently involves building human relations with a local community and is therefore more complex both in nature and to obtain. As stated by the Business for Social Responsibility's (leading global CSR advisory firm) head of extractives sector advisory services at Nestor and Springer (2013), engaging with nearby communities can be the hardest part of all mining activity further highlighting the importance of gaining an SLO.

*"It's often said that the hardest part about opening a new mine isn't getting the raw materials out of the ground, it's **managing** the complex relationship with the communities living above the ground near the mine". (BSR website, 2013).*

The use of the word managing (in bold) is worthy of comment as it implies that mining companies should take a dominant role in the relationship with communities and "manage" relations with them similarly to the way they would manage their business and employees, as also argued by Banerjee (2008) who posits companies want to manage their stakeholders. It is this mentality, underscored in the practical guidance literature of viewing local communities as subjects to be managed, that could perhaps explain why conflicts still occur.

Civil society groups such as Friends of the Earth have campaigned against what they deem to be irresponsible behaviour by extractives sector firms. Even pro private sector organizations such as the World Bank, along with the mining industry, have declared that "proper management of relations with communities is going to be the biggest challenge in the next ten to twenty years" (McMahon, 1998, p. 10 in Kapelus, 2002 p. 280). This quote being over 15 years old appears to have come to fruition now in 2014.

An important part of gaining good community relations and an SLO is also related to providing good CSR for and investment in local communities, which has traditionally been considered the role of the State and government. However, now with the rise of corporate power and decrease of in State power in the neo-liberal dominated world, companies are expected to take on certain State responsibilities for the people (Berry, 2003; Newell, 2005; Prieto-Carrón, 2006; Banerjee, 2008). Nonetheless practical solutions being offered for avoiding community conflict and improving relations are very much from a company perspective, which places companies in charge of community dialogue, engagement and CSR.

This implies that companies have the solutions to this conflict if they treat the local communities with more respect and importance. This, however, avoids the importance of understanding these conflicts from an affected community perspective, as recommended by Banerjee (2011). Communities adjacent to large projects or being faced with this likelihood are regarded as “powerless” (Berry, 2003). The power is understood to lie between the State and the corporation (Berry, 2003; Newell, 2005; Prieto-Carrón, 2006; Banerjee, 2008). Despite efforts to improve community relations via CSR, this approach sometimes leads to an increase in conflict and sometimes improved community relations with other community groups (Newell, 2005; and Haalboom, 2012). The limitations of CSR for gaining an SLO are concluded by Newell (2005) as:

*“CSR can work, for **some** people in **some** places, on **some** issues **some** of the time”*
(p.556)

Newell (2005) also argues that there is no one-size-fit-all solution for CSR as each community context has its own specific nuances. However, as claimed by Anguelovski (2011), little is known about the perceptions of local communities towards these

community relations and CSR initiatives, or on community motivations for continuing to resist corporations. This is a question I hope my research will address. The practitioner literature does not emphasize how (mining) companies could instead learn from and collaborate with stakeholders, taking a more humble position and therefore striving for consensus, as opposed to a premeditated goal of gaining an SLO.

The importance and challenge of gaining an SLO therefore is clear, assuming an SLO exists. In the following section the chapter explains the practitioner guidance offered to mining companies in order to gain this SLO and avoid conflict with their nearby local communities. However, it is worth mentioning that this guidance material has not had the desired effect, as the real life examples of conflict with local communities and mining companies mentioned previously demonstrate.

1.3 Practitioner guidance and stakeholder literature

Multinational mining companies are well aware of the financial and reputational pitfalls losing an SLO can have on them. The main organization that the multinational mining companies funded to help guide them towards obtaining good community relations was the International Council for Mining and Metals (ICMM) in 2001. The ICMM's mission is to help improve the sustainable development performance of its 21 large mining company members. The inception of the ICMM really began as far back as 1999 *“when the global mining firms accepted at the highest level that their sector was facing significant problems in reputation, sustaining profits, access to new assets and maintaining investor and employee confidence”*. (ICMM website accessed 2nd September, 2013).

A quick review of the ICMM website reveals that there are well over 100 publications ranging from guidance documents, toolkits and newsletters on the topic of good

community relations for the mining sector. There are many other organizations and consultancies also dedicated to this topic of improving mining company community relations for an SLO and a shared value or win-win solution both for mining company and community in terms of development and overall benefits. Such organizations include Business for Social Responsibility (BSR), World Bank Group and its private investment arm International Finance Corporation (IFC), International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) World Resources Institute (WRI) and even academic centres such as The Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining (CSRMI) at the University of Queensland, Australia. However, it is beyond the scope of this research to compile an exhaustive list of all the various organizations involved in this subject of extractive sector company community relations and conflict, as the list would be extensive.

The above-mentioned actors offer practically-based publications and experience with mining companies around what is needed for an SLO from local communities in a developing world context, often in Latin America. Furthermore the various multinational mining companies also have their own in-house sophisticated community relations or sustainability policies, strategies and toolkits. This extensive number of organizations and initiatives dedicated to helping mining companies gain an SLO and foster good community relations underlines the importance of this subject. However, communities still oppose and resist mining projects, as shown by the examples of continuing community conflict given earlier in this chapter. Therefore it should be argued that these many organizations and initiatives are either committing mistakes or failing to understand important issues in the sphere of mining company community relations.

As an example of a company which seems to try to implement the kinds of suggestions offered by these publications, Anglo American (one of my case study companies) is internationally renowned for its community relations and development which it manages via its globally acclaimed 297 page Socio-Economic Assessment Toolbox (SEAT). In

2012 the International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) awarded Anglo American with their annual Corporate Initiative award for its community engagement via SEAT; Business in the Community (BITC) the UK's leading CSR organization was also awarded Anglo American for being a "Commendable Company" for its work with local communities amongst other sustainability-related areas; Barrick Gold is listed on the prestigious Dow Jones Sustainability World Index (DJSI); and Kinross Gold, Pelambres and Vale similarly have robust community relations and sustainability focused policies and communications.

Yet it is worthwhile pointing out that these four companies face public criticism by civil society groups and their local communities for their negative environmental and social impacts and mining operations at Anglo American's Minas-Rio project. They have repeatedly been requested to be stopped from continuing by State officials and ceased mining at least once in 2012 due to community complaints. Similarly, Barrick Gold's Pascua Lama project has also ceased mining since April 2013 as a result of community legal action against the mine. This community resistance serves to further support the claims and criticisms made against the effectiveness of CSR programmes on communities by authors such as Newell (2005), Prieto-Carrón (2006), Banerjee (2008) and Haalboom (2012).

A brief review of this practitioner and extractives sector company guidance can be summarized by the following "good and respectful neighbour" principles needed for an SLO and good community relations, as shown in Table 1:

Table 1 Principles of good and respectful community relations for an SLO¹

- Create a good community relations policy based on the principle of “being a good neighbour.”
- Identify the key stakeholders in the communities including those most likely to be impacted on by the mining projects.
- Enter into frequent dialogue and consult in an open and transparent manner with the key community groups to understand their concerns and needs.
- Negotiate a way to collaborate together in local development projects, including a Benefits Agreement for framing and implementing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) with the local community.
- Monitor and track community engagement and relations (including having a grievance/complaints mechanism)
- Partner with community organizations, local government and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to contribute to local economic development and other sustainability-related projects.
- Build capacity of the local stakeholders in different areas such as administering tax revenues from mining, technical skills for gaining employment, or for starting and running their own small businesses.

The above points summarize the advice provided by the practitioner and company literature for mining companies to gain their SLO and contribute towards local

¹ Compiled from publications such as Anglo American’s “Socio-Economic Assessment Toolbox”; ICM’s “Community Development Toolkit”; BSR’s “Six Ways for the Extractives Sector to Improve Stakeholder Engagement”; IFC’s “Stakeholder Engagement: A Good Practice Handbook for Companies Doing Business in Emerging Markets”; Canadian Government’s “Building the Canadian Advantage: A Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Strategy for the Canadian International Extractive Sector” and Zandvliet and Anderson’s (2009) “Getting it Right, Making Corporate-Community Relations Work”; and Ruggie (2011) “The corporate responsibility to respect human rights: an interpretive guide.”

sustainable development. These guidance points for obtaining good community relations can be found in publications by ICMM, BSR, IFC, World Resources Institute, Government of Canada's CSR Strategy (Zandvliet and Anderson, 2009). In relation to academic literature these above-mentioned principles are closely linked to stakeholder theory. This link will be explored in more detail in the literature review.

This plethora of good community relations, investment, SLO and human rights guidance literature should therefore be called into question regarding its effectiveness. The policies and guidance seem robust on paper and in theory; however, in practice they are not making a significant difference, as seen from the examples of conflict and violence around the world in mining communities.

My research addresses the gap in understanding what drives mining company community relations and also conflict from a community perspective. Clearly the practitioner guidance literature is not having its intended effect. One of the reasons for this can be attributed to the attitude the mining sector and its consultants have towards local communities. There is a belief, as shown by the previously mentioned practical guides, that communities who resist and are against nearby proposed mining projects can and should be convinced and negotiated with to reconsider and accept these projects if mining companies follow and implement this guidance. In short all this guidance material and CSR-related advisory services do not question the gaining of community consent for an extractives project. The assumption is that communities should be convinced to see the benefits of a responsible extractives project that will benefit all and have minimal negative impacts on their lives. Once persuaded, then companies should work with these communities in line with the practical guidance to improve relations.

One could even coin the term “Responsible Neo-Colonialism” to describe this phenomenon of “friendly domination”, whereby locals must accept a (sometimes foreign) invader in the form of a large extractives operation who will dig or explode a large hole in their natural environment (which often involves clearing trees, flora and fauna, using huge quantities of local water supplies and bringing hundreds or thousands of mainly male manual labourers from other regions to the work on this extractives project) to extract natural resources and/or minerals with further impacts on the local environment and health. However, the big difference is that this is now deemed to be responsible by the company and the State, as the company in turn promises to be as respectful and a good neighbour as possible with its management of the environmental impacts and for consulting the community on a regular basis to hear their concerns whilst giving economic benefits back to the community in the form of CSR. In short if extractives projects are not wanted by the majority of local residents, yet imposed on them even with promises of doing so in the least harmful way with a sweetener of generous local economic investment, it can be classed as a situation of “friendly domination and imposition offering unwanted gifts”.

In the following section I provide a further analysis of this issue of attitude and its importance in explaining why conflicts with local communities continue. This argument was also given by Owen and Kemp (2012) and Jenkins (2004) who states the extractives private sector world view is that of free market capitalism where no group such as government, communities or NGOs should impede the “free development of mining operations or the pure market logic that everyone must benefit from such activities.” (p.26).

1.4 Mining sector attitudes towards gaining good community relations

One should therefore take the focus away from the company perspective to a lived experience of community actors in order to understand why mining company community

relations are still strained after such an effort to improve them (Banerjee, 2011). There are a number of factors, including the attitudes and blind spots of the private sector and their consultants that offer an important explanation as to why conflict still exists with local communities and why companies still cannot obtain their SLO.

All the practical guidance literature cited above aims to help extractive sector companies gain good community relations and an SLO, with the assumption that many communities are initially sceptical of new mining projects in their area. Advocating the use of engagement and dialogue to understand community needs and then to invest in income generation activities and working in partnership with communities, these guides argue that it is possible to overcome conflict and gain an SLO. In other words this can be interpreted as corporate influence strategies. This stems from a belief held by the mining sector that their projects and the private sector will have an overall benefit for a community (Jenkins, 2004), in particular an economic benefit. This view was also reinforced by my several years of working at IFC and with mining company executives.

This problem of attitude is illustrated by the recent words of the Rio Tinto Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the world's third largest mining company speaking on a video on the ICMM's website stating *"the most important challenge facing the firm is **convincing** their local communities that the company's mining operations are a benefit to them"* (ICMM, 2011).

The previous quote by the CEO of Rio Tinto implies that the topic of power is important for understanding these mining company community relations and conflict. The mining companies seem convinced they are absolutely right with their world view which consists of mining for economic growth and that communities just need to be educated and hence persuaded to also appreciate this world view. This is indeed the dominant hegemonic

world view that represents ever-increasing growth and economic development (Berry, 2003).

Another example of this attitude of self-righteousness and determination shown by the mining sector that communities should and will accept mining is reflected in the recent debate between ICMM and indigenous people's NGO, First Peoples Worldwide. The debate is framed around the subject of FPIC which is the acronym for Free Prior and Informed Consent. The main debate existing between mining companies and indigenous peoples and their advocates is how consent is given. The above statement by the Rio Tinto CEO about "convincing" communities that mining is good for all of them is indicative of the mining sector's position on this debate. The mining sector is advocating the importance of **consulting** communities about how to mine in a way that is most respectful to their lives, but it is not asking them for their **consent** as to a final decision about whether or not to go ahead with a mining project. This position of consulting as opposed to asking for consent is indicative of the dominant and hegemonic world view in society whereby companies and States place more importance on economic development, growth, jobs and tax revenues over the objections to having a new large project located nearby to a community, who represent a minority within the country. This point was also made by the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human rights (which will be analyzed later in the literature review) and where the section referred to just such a situation of community consultation and the lack of consent as a form of intended "responsible neo-colonialism".

In June 2013 ICMM published a position statement elaborating this point. Nonetheless soon after the June 2013 ICMM statement, First Peoples Worldwide NGO gave their official response, which I shall now discuss in greater detail as it explains why indigenous communities in general would feel aggrieved, despite mining companies consulting, engaging, partnering with them, being transparent and even generous with

benefits. It is worth mentioning though that such grievance and resistance to new mining projects is not exclusive to indigenous peoples, and that non-indigenous communities are also sometimes opposed to newly proposed nearby mining projects, fearing the environmental and social impacts they would bring. Such communities are often referred to in derogatory terms by the press, media and pro-business groups as NIMBYs (Not In My Back Yard). This term refers to groups usually non-indigenous who are against the construction of large projects, such as mining, energy or infrastructure ones that would negatively impact on their lives, and therefore object to having them in their back yard. The difference with an indigenous community's objections to a large mining project being sited in their "back yard" is their concern that such a development could negatively impact on their culture and therefore identity as a people. For the non-indigenous people the complaints revolve more around the negative impacts on their (rights to a) particular quality of life.

In short it is about having the power and autonomy to decide whether a life changing mining project can enter their territory and make irreversible changes to the community's identity, culture, way of life and/or quality of life regardless of whether they are indigenous or not. The following extensive quote is taken from the First Peoples Worldwide's response to ICMM's (2013) position statement on Indigenous Peoples and Mining. In reference to ICMM's position statement, First Peoples Worldwide claims:

"ICMM's new policy paper contains no substantive steps to improving relations with Indigenous communities. Its commitment to FPIC is at best tentative and ambiguous. The document uses language that is meant to sound empathetic and accepting but in actuality still maintains that a mining company has the right to enter indigenous territory and begin a potentially highly-destructive project with no regard to nor responsibility for ensuring the rights of the Indigenous Peoples of the land.we need an approach that puts Indigenous People's rights and human rights, not profit, at the forefront. Stop

with the smokescreens, ICMM – indigenous people deserve Free, Prior, and Informed Consent, which comes with the right to say no”. (First Peoples website, accessed 3rd September, 2013).

In short this debate between the mining sector and indigenous peoples demonstrates the power struggles between mining companies and (indigenous) communities over land and territory use. The debate refers to who holds and grants the final decision over mining projects – the mining company and State, or the community living in the territory? The discussion also points to the important factors of power and sentiment as explaining why community relations may be strained and an SLO so difficult to obtain.

Though the previous section has highlighted cases of conflict and violence, most mining company/community relations are without such high levels of conflict. Is this because of the practical guidance/stakeholder theory having been implemented effectively? Are lower levels of conflict with communities the result of good dialogue, stakeholder engagement, partnership, social investment, and trust and transparency with the communities, as espoused by the practical guidance? Or are the explanations for mining company community relations rooted in more structural hegemonic and power-based theories? Thus I would like to understand what determines the difference between higher and lower conflict communities. Authors such as Frooman (1999) posit that power is decided by levels of dependence or independence; I therefore state my research question as follows based on the above contextual analysis:

What influences community positions towards nearby mining company operations?

In summary, so far in this introductory literature review we have set the historical and political economy contexts of the phenomena of this research. In other words, explained how due to the introduction and dominance of a neo-liberal economic system at the

international level, multinational mining companies have increasingly started to mine near established indigenous and non-indigenous communities in Latin America backed by the host States such as Chile and Brazil.

The increased corporate power in Latin America has been accompanied by greater expectations of responsibility including duties which have traditionally been associated with the State. In the case of the mining companies, the responsibilities are around contributing to the development of their local communities, and at the very least leaving them better off than how they found them. However, due to the nature of mining and its severe physical and psychological impacts on the community there has been substantial conflict between company, State and community groups, in particular in Latin America.

Hence there has been a plethora of practitioner guidance material on helping mining companies avoid costly conflicts with local communities and on enhancing their contribution to local economic development. The underlying assumption in this literature is that by consulting communities, mining companies can improve relations and their contribution to local development (often via CSR). The other notable aspect of the mining company – community literature (both practitioner and academic) – is the vast bias of analysing this phenomenon from a company perspective, as opposed to from a community one (Banerjee, 2011).

The introduction then continues to detail the financial importance of gaining an SLO for mining companies using empirical examples of mining projects that lost millions of dollars due to conflicts with the local community. However, the chapter also highlights the complexity in gaining an SLO. It also shows how the SLO and practitioner guidance is very company-focused with regard to managing its stakeholders via CSR initiatives in

order to obtain an SLO, as opposed to collaborating and learning from them for a more consensual relationship.

The chapter then questions the effectiveness of corporate policies and international standards or guidance on gaining good community relations due to the number of conflicts involving communities. One possible reason for this is due to the lack of guidance surrounding gaining local community consent for a new mining project. The only international norm that exists is the FPIC (Free Prior and Informed Consent) regarding indigenous peoples only. Nonetheless the interpretation of this standard is questionable with the mining sector's main CSR body understanding the word Consent more as Consultation.

The underlying issue between these mining company/community conflicts and relations relates to power imbalances. From a company perspective the objective is to be a responsible actor only once and after the project has been given its legal licence from the State to commence. The term introduced earlier as Responsible Neo-Colonialism is relevant for such a context as mining projects are imposed on communities without their consent and ability to make decisions on them or even reject them outright. As such it would appear communities (whether indigenous or non-indigenous) are powerless.

I propose to review the ensuing academic literature review guided by the following questions which are based on the above discussion of the challenges surrounding mining companies and nearby mining communities:

- How does stakeholder theory address and explain levels of mining company community conflict and relations?
- How can social movement-related theories help us understand levels of mining company community conflict and relations?

- How can resource dependency theory help us understand levels of mining company community conflict and relations?

1.5 Thesis structure

In order to address these questions, the thesis is organized as follows:

Literature review

This chapter begins with an analytical discussion around how stakeholder theory addresses the issue of an SLO. It questions how much power communities actually have against mining companies and the State. Next the chapter considers Resource Dependence Theory for explaining mining company and local community influence strategies. The chapter ends with a review of how social movement theory, resource dependence and stakeholder theory have been used with empirical studies to demonstrate how communities have been able to mobilize and resist against high impact extractive sector projects.

Methodology – Ethnographic Case Studies

- A methodology chapter that explains how I researched eight case studies of mining communities in Brazil and Chile using ethnographic field research. I interviewed those from multiple perspectives including local community residents, local politicians, mining company executives in some communities, the church, civil society actors and external knowledgeable actors. I chose the eight case studies based on my access to data, prior knowledge and their relative levels of conflict with the mining companies.

The main questions I asked my interviewees concerned the reasons for their perceptions of the mining company or mining community. I also asked about perceptions of relations between the mining company and community. I further enquired about their views on the enabling factors for community resistance or a

lack of resistance, where perceptions were negative regarding the nearby mining project.

Once interviews were conducted I transcribed them and followed this up with two rounds of coding in search of the major themes. After several times of rereading the transcripts, together with additional reading, I decided to analyze the data according to macro or institutional levels and at the community/meso level. Further reflection, discussions and research led me to use resource dependence theory as well as social movement-related concepts as the theoretical lens for analyzing and explaining the findings data.

Findings

- The data revealed that there were two groups of cases in terms of conflict: four communities with higher and four with lower levels of conflict with the nearby mining company. In the cases where conflict was higher, the communities had more of a history as an independent people with livelihoods in agriculture. This had not changed much from the past to the present day. Mining in this regard represents a threat to their way of life as independent people and further threatens to make them dependent upon the extractives sector. The communities are strongly opposed to this latter option. As they are economically independent from the mining company, they are able to collectively voice their grievances about and resistance to the mining projects operating in their valleys. When assisted by external civil society groups, lawyers and State justice departments, the communities are able to fight back against the mining projects.
- However such resistance from higher conflict communities has proved troublesome, as mining companies are able to employ an array of influence strategies based on stakeholder theory, such as CSR. Such strategies co-opt, manipulate and divide communities making it difficult for them to withhold an SLO from the companies. Instead the situation is dynamic, ever-changing including the positions of community, government and even companies.

Discussion

- These changes in position are related to levels of dependence and independence from mining. The more independent communities are able to remain, the more likely they can resist mining projects. The more communities accept CSR and collaborate with mining companies, the more dependent they become on the companies and thus lose their SLO. In essence what the literature on Stakeholder and Resource Dependence theory and SLO assumes, mistakenly, is that for communities to actually have an SLO they need have real power to continuously exercise and wield. My research shows this was not the case, as power levels vary based on corporate and State influence strategies, together with the resources and allies available to more independent communities.

In the following chapter the analysis positions the research question in relation to the existing academic literature, with a particular focus on the literature concerning social movement, resource dependency and stakeholder theories, and other publications on the subject of mining company/community relations and conflict.

2.0 Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter I aim to briefly recap on the importance of my phenomenon of research to society and business. The chapter commences with a review of CSR/Stakeholder theory literature which argues that corporations can create win-win situations for themselves and for stakeholders. The practitioner guidance literature on how extractives sector companies can gain an SLO has its roots in stakeholder theory and thinking. Therefore the CSR and Stakeholder theory literature deserves a critical analysis to understand how it explains community – company conflict and how companies can lose their SLO at the local level or in other words find themselves in a conflict situation with the local community. The guiding question for this sub section of the review will be around how this stakeholder or CSR literature explains gaining or losing an SLO, or (acceptance or conflict) with local communities. The review takes the perspective that to date the literature has been very company-centric, based on a CSR/stakeholder theory perspective that envisages companies managing their stakeholders. Despite this wealth of guidance material for gaining good stakeholder/community relations there still appears to be daily social conflict between mining projects and local communities in Latin America and also therefore costly delays to the mining companies.

The review then moves from stakeholder theory to analysing resource dependence theory. Min-Dong (2011) argues the most common approach to explaining stakeholder influence is based on a combination of stakeholder theory and resource dependence theory. The central idea is that a corporation's social behaviour is influenced by its relations with various stakeholders, and the flow and direction of the influence is determined by the degree of resource dependence between the corporation and its stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995; Frooman, 1999; Jones, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1997; Rowley, 1997).

Following on, this chapter uses social movement-related theories to highlight a flaw in stakeholder-related theories to show under what mechanisms certain community groups are able to mobilize against nearby large infrastructure projects including mining. However, the analysis concludes that social movement-related theories are not able to explain why the majority of groups are unable to mobilize against their target organization, which they accuse of being responsible for their grievances. For this the review turns to resource dependence and stakeholder theories to underline their importance in explaining why certain communities are not able to mobilize against nearby mining projects. The analysis thus alludes to how stakeholder, social movement and resource dependence theories should complement one another in the context of understanding community relations and conflicts with large nearby projects. As a conclusion, it would appear that mining companies, aided by the State, try to dilute local social movement, and any resistance offered by them, by trying to manipulate and control them to induce their dependency on the mining projects, i.e. in terms of employment and CSR.

The following section critically reviews practitioner and academic literature on stakeholder theory, with a focus on the community actor, and discusses why extractive sector companies fail at gaining an SLO at the local level and furthermore what they can do to gain community acceptance and avoid conflict with nearby local communities.

2.2 How does stakeholder theory address an SLO from local communities?

The subject of mining company/local community relations can be positioned within the business/society academic literature and in particular stakeholder or CSR literature. This is because the topic deals with decisions, behaviour and activities on the part of

companies that go beyond legal compliance. Gaining local acceptance from communities, otherwise known as an SLO, is not legally binding; however, it is desirable from a reputational perspective as well as from a financial and production one for mining companies (Davies and Franks, 2011). Societal expectations of companies' social responsibilities to their local communities have increased, along with the rise in the importance of sustainable development (Prno, 2012). Indeed it can be asserted that the wealth of practitioner guidance for CSR and the community (such as that offered by ICMM, IFC, BSR and others) based on the extensive stakeholder theory literature is testimony to the importance of the community actor within the extractives sector. Stakeholder theorists such as Mitchell et al. (1997) also claim the community as a primary stakeholder group.

It can be posited that both these aforementioned practitioner and academic literatures are based on the main definition of stakeholders outlined by Freeman (1984), that organizations should pay special attention to all those actors who can affect them and who are affected by them. In the case of mining this would include the local community due to the impacts of the mining activities of this group and of the group's ability to cause damage to a mining company's reputation and production via protests, roadblocks, violence and legal action. This section begins with a critical review of the more general stakeholder literature from a community relations and SLO perspective. The following section provides an analysis of the more specific academic publications on the extractives sector/local community relations and conflict, including papers by Prno and Slocombe (2012); and Prno (2012).

2.2.1 General Stakeholder Literature Review from a Community Perspective

Stakeholder theory is regarded to have been proposed as a strategic management theory by Freeman in 1984 (Freeman, Wicks and Parmar, 2004) in the hope that organizations considering the interests of their stakeholders would do well. Freeman, widely considered

the founding father of stakeholder theory, defines a stakeholder as “*any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives*” (1984: 46). Stakeholder theory can be understood as an alternative to stockholder theory whereby firm’s main objective is to maximize short term shareholder returns at all costs (Laplume et al., 2008).

Laplume et al. (2008) reviewed the contents of stakeholder theory literature spanning 16 years and found the major themes within it to be (1) definition and salience, (2) stakeholder actions and responses, (3) firm actions and responses, (4) firm performance, and (5) theory debates. The last point considers questions such as the normative foundations of stakeholder theory, the problems of stakeholder theory and with which theories stakeholder theory competes. The least covered theme in the literature is that of stakeholder actions and responses, which signals the lack of attention given to the stakeholder perspective.

Margolis and Walsh (2003) reviewed 30 years of publications on business and society by organizational scholars in which they confirmed the instrumental orientation of the business/society or stakeholder literature. The practitioner and even academic literature is dominated by the instrumental or “win-win” argument fuelled by influential thinkers such as Michael Porter, that businesses should only do CSR and pay attention to their stakeholders on the condition that this benefits and adds value to the business. The implication of this, which is not mentioned in the literature is that business should not focus on societal problems with communities if they do not deem them as material or relevant to their business. Companies and communities may diverge in their views around the impacts of a mining project and additionally so if this is a salient issue. What is considered irrelevant for a mining company may possibly be seen as salient for a mining affected community in terms of impacts.

Mitchell et al.'s (1997) publication appears to be an influential text for present day practical guidance around stakeholder relations (Banerjee and Bonnefous, 2011; Min-Dong, 2011). Mitchell et al. (1997) argue that stakeholders should be identified and categorized according to their power (valued resources), legitimacy (socially accepted and expected) and urgency or salience (with their claims) with regard to their relationship with the organization. However, authors such as Greenwood and Van Buren (2010), Van Buren (2010) Banerjee and Bonnefous (2011) and Min-Dong (2011), have criticised this widely used stakeholder identification framework for not considering power imbalances amongst stakeholders or even stakeholder power at all. Therefore one of the areas which is less explored in stakeholder theory is the diverse power that different stakeholders have.

Taking a more normative view, Phillips (1997) argues that companies must account for stakeholders impacted on and be "Fair" to them. The proposed solution by Phillips (1997) is for mutual economic gain situations where there is Interdependence between organization and stakeholder, where all concerned win instead of a situation of mutual exclusiveness. However, such a proposition does not consider conflicts where a stakeholder group may not wish to even consent to being affected by stakeholders such as between mining companies and local communities. Some mining communities may not even wish to cooperate for mutual gain, such as via CSR practices. Obtaining mutual gain in places where communities are negatively impacted on simultaneously does not equate to respecting fairness in a consistent manner, as outlined by Phillips (1997).

2.2.2 The Community as a Powerless Actor within Stakeholder Theory

Banerjee and Bonnefous (2011) reported an empirical case concerning nuclear power plant managers to prove that only the business case in stakeholder engagement achieves sustainability-related changes. Therefore where engaging with NGO stakeholders meant a loss to the business, the nuclear power plant refused to concede to these external groups.

Banerjee and Bonnefous (2011) argue that the power plant also manages its stakeholders those who are allies, and contains adversarial NGOs by co-opting and manipulating them. Hill and Jones (1992) had also observed how managers will attempt to diffuse and dissolve stakeholder power at all times to make these groups more dependent upon the company and hence providing the company with more power. This begs the question as to whether it would be possible for mining companies to also co-opt and manage their local communities in order to secure their local SLOs.

As a further criticism of stakeholder theory, Van Buren (2001) extended Phillips' (1997) concept of fairness by adding terms of consent and participation to this definition. Furthermore Van Buren (2001) also emphasizes the significance of power in determining how an organization would treat a stakeholder. Greenwood and Van Buren (2010) point to the major gap in stakeholder theory of not addressing issues of power. Van Buren (2001) and Greenwood and Van Buren (2010) thus posit that these differences in power between corporations and stakeholders explain the divergences in perceptions between a powerful organization and its less powerful stakeholders in terms of their relations and interactions with stakeholders.

This is a salient point in the context of mining companies and local communities for providing an understanding as to why communities may hold negative sentiments towards nearby mining projects despite the efforts by these companies with social responsibility programmes to help with community relations. Greenwood and Van Buren (2010) additionally call for stakeholder theory to pinpoint these power imbalances, research their effects and offer suggestions for their remediation. Such a proposal would be pertinent to the present research in the context of mining company/community relations.

Greenwood and Van Buren (2010) analyze Phillips' (1997) paper on the Principle of Fairness and importantly claim that this principle's main contribution is that it addresses the needs of stakeholders who are affected by the firm but who are unable to affect the firm themselves, or in other words low-power and highly dependent stakeholders as termed by Mitchell et al.'s (1997) classification. Authors such as Mitchell et al. (1997) Van Buren (2001) and Greenwood and Van Buren (2010), suggest that such weaker and powerless stakeholders hold legitimate claims against organizations; however, they require the support of a more powerful actor such the State, an NGO or the benevolence of a company itself to defend them and their grievances.

In terms of consent, authors such as Van Buren (2001) and Greenwood and Van Buren (2010), who argue from a Rawlsian justice perspective, call for companies to gain the consent of their low power stakeholders to their participation. Based on the principle of fairness, stakeholders, such as low paid employees and local communities, often pick up risks from corporations and do not receive the full value of their sacrifices to ensure the company can be profitable. In such situations of corporate free-riding, companies should be obliged to seek each stakeholder's consent in proportion to its contribution to the company's success. However, from a local community's perspective, calculating or arriving at an understanding of the proportion of its contribution to the collective success of a nearby mining project is not a simple task, as opposed to that of low-wage employees manufacturing a certain product. This therefore raises further questions about what is considered to be fair within mining company/local community relations.

The stakeholder-related literature reviewed also views the community stakeholder as weak and powerless, though with a legitimate claim (Mitchell et al., 1997; Van Buren 2001; Greenwood and Van Buren 2010). This literature further affirms that companies have a moral obligation to listen to the "weak" but legitimate community actor and even gain its consent. However due to the community actor's fragility it would need to be

defended by another stronger actor, organization or the government/State. In the context of the UN Guiding Principles (UNGPs), the global standard on business and human rights (Ruggie, 2011), it is suggested that companies must listen to the community and other marginalized actors affected by operations; however, and importantly, the UNGPs do not make any reference to gaining their consent for any business operations. Therefore it could be argued that in practice companies are not being asked to gain consent from weak though legitimate stakeholders for the existence of their operations. Not gaining community consent from the outset could be the cause for poor relations and conflict between company and community.

Overall, the stakeholder theory literature has been criticised by Banerjee (2011) for not dealing directly with the prickly issue of what should be done when shareholder wealth is created at the expense of certain actors whose welfare has been harmed in the process of business activity. In short, as argued by Banerjee (2011), 50 years of CSR and stakeholder research has done little to understand the outcomes of CSR for society as the focus has been on the business case.

2.2.3 The Community as a Powerful Actor against Mining Companies

However, not all academic research theorizes the local community as a weak and low-power stakeholder group. There are academic publications by authors on mining company/community conflicts where companies have lost the ability to operate either temporarily or permanently. Authors such as Berry (2003), Sharma and Henriques (2005), Bebbington et al. (2008), Bruijn and Whiteman (2009), Urkidi and Walter (2011), Prno (2013) and Kraemer et al. (2013), point to instances where communities have managed to withhold their local level SLO via protests and hence create a (temporary) cease in operations. Prno and Slocumbe (2012) in their paper “Exploring the origins of the ‘social license to operate’ in the mining sector: Perspectives from governance and sustainability theories” state that the community actor holds many of the characteristics in

Mitchell et al.'s (1997) stakeholder identification classification, i.e. to be seen as an important actor necessary for a corporation's success in fulfilling its objectives of profit maximization and growth. This claim is in contrast to much of the stakeholder theory literature.

As stated earlier there were over 150 mining/community-related conflicts in Latin America in 2010 (OCMAL, 2010) and this number has not appeared to decline since. This would indicate that the community actor is not as weak, vis à vis neighbouring development projects, as is theorized in the stakeholder literature. However, in defence of stakeholder theory commentators, such as Mitchell et al. (1997), Van Buren (2001; 2010) and Greenwood and Van Buren (2010), communities can attract the attention of companies if they are defended via more powerful actors, such as by civil society actors, the State, or lawyers, which may be the case in these multiple numbers of mining-related conflicts in Latin America.

The SLO-specific literature, though nascent and emerging, points to several instances of communities withholding their SLO by way of protests, roadblocks and anti-mining campaigns. Slocombe and Prno (2012) posit that the blurring of boundaries between the governance roles of the State and civil society has strengthened the community voice in a mining context:

“As a result of these shifts, the boundaries between the public, private and voluntary sectors have now changed and distinctions between civil society and the state have blurred (Rhodes, 1997). These shifts are especially relevant to the emergence of SLO, as they have helped enable the voices of mining affected communities to become much more influential in mineral development decision making and political processes” p.349

Unfortunately Slocombe and Prno (2012) do not go into detail of the mechanics of how mining affected communities are able to become so influential in ceding an SLO to mining companies. They also emphasize that the emergence of a new sustainable development paradigm which has helped increase the number of civil society organizations in the mining sector is a key factor for giving more voice to affected communities. In addition, new legal rights given to indigenous communities in the context of Canada has also helped in this regard. Slocombe and Prno (2012) further refer to general instances where mining affected communities can slow down or stop mining projects operating; however, the authors do not provide specific or sufficient detail on how this unfolds. Such a question is of particular importance, given the relative power and wealth a mining company (backed by the government) has over a local community.

2.2.4 – Critique of the SLO – Definition and assumptions of community power

The SLO concept has been described as “inflated” by Owen and Kemp (2012). The SLO notion has received significant criticism by more critical academics such as Owen and Kemp (2012); and Parsons et al (2013) for its vague definition and its frailty in addressing power imbalances between companies and communities in reality.

The empirical paper by Prno (2012) is deserving of particular analysis due to its main research question, which seeks to uncover the underlying influencing factors of the issuance or non-issuance of an SLO by local communities to nearby mining projects, similarly to this present literature review and thesis. Prno (2012) also compares two apparently high and low mining company/community conflicts (the two higher conflict communities are in Peru and Papua New Guinea and the lower conflict communities in the USA and Canada). However, Prno (2012) only conducted empirical field research on the lower conflict communities in North America. Prno’s (2012) main findings include: (1) context is key; (2) an SLO is built on relationships; (3) sustainability is a key concern

for communities; (4) local benefits and public participation play a crucial role; and (5) adaptability is needed to confront complexity.

Prno's (2012) publication is emblematic of the underlying and unaddressed dilemma within the practitioner guidance, as well as extractives/community relations case studies in academic literature. This dilemma revolves around the level of importance given to the community context (and perspective) in determining its issuance of an SLO versus the ability of a mining company via its community relations/investment strategy, as well as its personnel relations, to persuade the local community for its consent and SLO. This underlying contradiction can be observed implicitly in Prno's (2012) publication as the author placed "community context" as the first explanatory factor for understanding why a community offers or withholds an SLO. However, in the following four findings the author provides instrumentally focused recommendations on how mining companies can gain an SLO.

Prno (2012) does not address a key question of what happens when pitting findings on the importance of context against implementing his following four recommendations. For example, Prno (2012) argues that each mining project and community has its own social, cultural and economic particularities that determine whether an SLO is issued or not. Prno (2012) further uses the case of the proposed Tambogrande Mine in Peru as an example where the community rejected mining, as its expected impacts were incompatible with their rural livelihood and also due to the influence of civil society organizations who encouraged local residents to oppose the mine. However, Prno (2012) does not address the question of whether a mining company implementing the authors' following four recommendations (points two to four: building sound community relationships; addressing sustainability; provisioning local benefits and public participation; and being flexible), as did the two North American mines, would also ensure an SLO at the other two higher conflict communities in Peru and Papua New

Guinea, where the SLO was in doubt. This extractives sector literature also does not address this question explicitly, i.e. whether an SLO can be obtained when using all the recommended and vanguard community relations guidance, such as that outlined by Prno (2012) and organizations such as ICMM, IFC and BSR.

It should also be noted that the SLO concept is not without its flaws, mainly pertaining to its conceptual definition and the fact that scant research on the subject has been conducted to date. According to Prno (2012) questions around what it actually means to have an SLO still remain unanswered; in other words, how does one know they have an SLO? Mining company executives have sometimes remarked that they only understand when they do not have an SLO and are unable to know when or if they actually have one. Further still, as argued by Owen and Kemp (2012); and Parsons et al (2013) is that there are gaps in the knowledge around what level of community support is required to know if an SLO has been issued (i.e. does majority support suffice)? Who within the community can supply the SLO? How should dissenting stakeholders and viewpoints be dealt with? Does a lack of conflict equate to a SLO? The SLO literature ignores this sensitive debate. The findings from Parsons et al's (2013) interviews with mining company management demonstrate that the SLO cannot be granted or withheld as such. Instead the SLO consists of messy processes of communication and negotiation, and exists on a dynamic continuum.

Parsons et al (2013) also critique the SLO on its lack of addressing power imbalances in practice between companies and affected communities. Based on interviews with mining company management Parsons et al (2013) argue *"Social licence discourse may involve a shift in power relations, therefore, but structural forces inherently constrain that shift. Companies may portray some stakeholder concerns as more legitimate than others. To some extent, then, dissent can be marginalised, and a social licence can exist as long as relations are manageable"* (p.87, 2013).

The point of using management discourse to capture the subjects of community relations and CSR under the popular concept of an SLO is also a critique leveled by Parsons et al (2013) who argue that this only weakens dissenting voices and gives more control to management by placing the theme within corporate reputation and public relations.

This point is also echoed by Owen and Kemp (2012) who argue that the SLO term is used by the extractives sector to disguise or silence oppositional voices. Owen and Kemp (2012) continue to posit that the SLO does not entail companies in understanding the “other” but stays very much with the company centric paradigm of the corporate “self”. Indeed mining companies rarely agree voluntarily towards community consent before commencing with a new project that will affect them, which demonstrates how little power these extractive sector actors are willing to share with local communities (Owen and Kemp, 2012).

Owen and Kemp (2012) in addition point out that when there is a lack of visible conflict and disapproval within a community towards a certain project this could be down to cultural reasons and also the suppression and fear of security forces and violence should they manifest their grievances and protest. Again the issue of power imbalances underlies this criticism of the SLO. Even in instances where there is community conflict and the SLO looks in jeopardy mining projects are still able to continue to operate (Banerjee, 2011; and Owen and Kemp, 2012).

Owen and Kemp (2012) end their paper by underscoring the importance of understanding where company motives differ from communities’. According to Owen and Kemp (2012) mining company decision-making is motivated by profit maximization and control of risk. This mentality as a consequence leads to a focus on the business case for conducting any voluntary social related initiatives. In other words if the mining company sees no

short term gain in the activity it will unlikely engage in the socially responsible activity or project, such behaviour can be regarded as irresponsible and also highlights the ethical weakness of the SLO concept. Instead of conceptualizing the SLO as binary we should consider it in terms of levels of a SLO which is in constant change argued Parsons et al (2013).

Answers to these questions will help advance the study of the SLO and lead to a better appreciation of the opportunities and challenges associated with its implementation. This present study may shed light on what an SLO is and how a company might be more sensitive to where they are in their journey to gaining one. Though legitimate criticisms have been made towards the SLO concept by authors such as Owen and Kemp (2012); and Parsons et al (2013) this present thesis deals more specifically with stakeholder theory which is more established and broader than the SLO concept. As claimed by Owen and Kemp (2012) the underlying foundations and philosophical underpinnings of the SLO concept have not and most likely cannot be established. As such this thesis will focus more on making a contribution to stakeholder theory.

An important issue to address within the literature, for the research of this thesis, is to understand exactly how much power local communities have towards their nearby mining projects? According to some stakeholder theorists, such as Mitchell et al. (1997), Van Buren (2001; 2010) and Greenwood and Van Buren (2010), communities have legitimate though low power. Authors such as Sharma and Henriques (2005) and Prno and Slocombe (2012) on the other hand argue that communities do indeed have power to disrupt company operations via roadblocks and protests. Nonetheless it should be noted that even stakeholder literature authors such as Mitchell et al. (1997), Van Buren (2001; 2010) and Greenwood and Van Buren (2010), concur that communities, only via a more powerful actor such as the State or an NGO, could in fact affect a company and therefore become a more powerful or salient stakeholder.

However stakeholder theory has been criticized for its shortcomings and lack of ability to theorize company/stakeholder relations in today's much more globalized world, since stakeholder theory was conceived in 1984 by Freeman and later significantly developed in the 1990s by other management scholars.

2.2.5 Political CSR and the Role of the State as a Critique of Stakeholder Theory

Commentators, such as Phillips et al. (2003), recognize the limits of stakeholder theory in terms of providing an understanding of the topics of human rights abuse and environmental destruction, claiming these questions lie outside stakeholder theory. Stakeholder and CSR theories make the assumption that businesses operate in the context of strong States who have the capacity to enforce laws and regulate corporate behaviour for societal good (Scherer et al., 2009). However, in this current climate of globalization and a dominant neo-liberal economic system where markets are deregulated and State responsibilities are privatized, it has been argued that governments' ability to enforce and regulate business conduct for societal good has been lessened. States no longer have the capacity to enforce and regulate business conduct for the societal good (Banerjee, 2008; Scherer et al., 2009; Jensen and Sandstrom, 2011).

Due to the privatization, deregulation and a smaller State that transfers more responsibility to multinational corporations, stakeholder theory loses its relevance in today's global world and, as such, Jensen and Sandstrom (2011) label globalization as stakeholder theory's "blind spot". This phenomenon is also creating "blurred lines" between State and business (Scherer et al., 2009) as they both work in unison especially in the developing world in the pursuit of development and growth. Globalization therefore creates much more complexity in the issue of business and community relations due to there being more actors with overlapping and interconnected roles (Jensen and Sandstrom, 2011) in terms of development and wellbeing. For example to illustrate the

complexity of the main actors involved in the context of a mining company and a local community in Latin America, one would have to consider the bank or financial institution financing the mining project which is often a multilateral international organization such as the World Bank, the mining company itself, the host nation State of the mining company (usually in the developed North), the receiving State of the mining project, national and local government as well as international, regional, national and local civil society organizations with divergent ideologies, amongst others.

Due to this complexity that globalization and a free market approach has created, multinational corporations should see it as their corporate responsibility to undertake certain public responsibilities of the State when operating in areas of limited and weak State presence (Jensen and Sandstrom, 2011). Moreover, multinational corporations are able to exploit this weak State regulation to their advantage for doing business at lower cost, such as paying very low wages, spending less on environmental impact protection measures, and paying much lower taxes. As developing world societies have fewer social, health and environmental provisions and less external regulation due to corruption and a weak functioning State, companies are able to exploit these loopholes by paying lower costs and taxes, thus maximizing profits even more (Banerjee, 2007; Jensen and Sandstrom, 2011).

Because of this exploitation of a weaker regulated society, thinkers such as Phillips et al. (2003) argue that multinational corporations have a moral obligation to be socially responsible and fulfil certain developmental needs in a developing country context. As outlined earlier in the introduction section, the private sector has started to accept this responsibility, and act on it as a corporate citizen (Scherer et al. 2009). Specifically regarding the mining sector, the largest mining companies have created their own self-governing social responsibility member initiative, ICMM, for community relations and social responsibility purposes. However, the difference between policy rhetoric and

performance, with regard to the treatment of and benefits to local communities, is highly apparent (Newell, 2005; Banerjee, 2008). Moreover understanding the local community perceptions on mining companies and their CSR and community relations attempts has largely not been studied, especially from a stakeholder theory perspective.

The role of the government regarding the community and their welfare is a contradictory one according to Berry (2003) from his research into an environmental justice conflict between the siting of a chemicals plant in a low income African-American community in Louisiana, USA. On the one hand the government is expected to represent the best interests of its voters in the community; however, on the other hand the government also considers the overall good and development of the nation State, which can be in conflict with the wellbeing of the local community, such as the negative impacts of a particular mining operation starting near residents. This is often why conflict occurs, and this contradiction is also a crucial and central underlying question in my research.

In particular, globalization reveals the simplicity in the theory's boundary conditions and how these boundaries make it difficult for both mainstream and narrative alternatives to stakeholder theory to provide credible and useful answers to two central stakeholder questions: Who gets to define what a stake and a stakeholder are and where do the corporation's responsibilities begin and end? – Jensen and Sandstrom (2011).

Berry (2003) also criticises stakeholder theory, in that stakeholder theorists have not yet adequately conceptualized the community as a primary agent, despite making most of the lists of primary stakeholders. Similar to Newell (2005), Berry (2003) argues that different stakeholders have different powers at different times. One attempt by the international community to recognize the corporation as a political and global actor with more responsibilities to those it impacts upon, in other word with regard to human rights

impacts, is that of the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights.

2.2.6 (UN) Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights – an answer for responsible business in a globalized world?

Perhaps the most robust and universal guidance that has come out for companies to respect their local communities was in June 2011 when the United Nations (UN) endorsed the UNGPs for Business and Human Rights. After years of debate as to whether this UN framework should be legally binding, since 2011 the UN has also entered into this debate of corporate responsibility. Concerned with the many adverse human rights-related impacts from the private sector on society, employees and the supply chain, the UN Human Rights Council endorsed the UNGPs on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) in 2011. According to Professor Ruggie the UNGPs are the global standards of practice around business and human rights (Ruggie, 2011). The importance of the UNGPs was further compounded by the European Union who, in 2013, decided that Nation States would develop plans to implement the UNGPs at a national level, and the UK government duly launched its national implementation plan in September, 2013 via an official presentation by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs William Hague (Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, 2013).

The main relevance of the Guiding Principles for companies is ‘Pillar Two’, known as “the corporate responsibility to respect” all human rights and to remedy any adverse human rights impacts (UN Human Rights Council, 2013). The special representative from the UN, Professor John Ruggie, stated clearly in 2008 that social responsibility acts by companies cannot substitute or replace a lack of respect of the human rights of local communities, employees and other stakeholders, therefore implying these guidelines as the absolute minimum companies should be doing with regard to their duty to respect those they affect, such as communities and workers:

“Furthermore, because the responsibility to respect is a baseline expectation, a company cannot compensate for human rights harm by performing good deeds elsewhere”. (p.5).

However, the UNGPs are what is known as ‘soft law’ or, in other words, voluntary guidelines and therefore are not mandatory or even legally binding. Pressure is still mounting though from the UN and other civil society groups towards companies implementing the UNGPs, especially for the extractives and apparel and textiles sector companies. Some large extractives companies, such as Shell, Rio Tinto and Total, have been working with specialist human rights advisory organizations for assistance on implementing the UNGPs. The UNGPs like much of the other corporate responsibility guidance available recommends creating a policy and then consulting with potentially affected stakeholders or Rights Holders so that the company can plan to minimize all negative human rights-related impacts.

Whilst the UNGPs in their Operational Principles section make brief mention around the possibility of training community members in the joint monitoring and participation of efforts to minimize human rights impacts, the main emphasis is for the principles to be implemented and operationalized from a company perspective, as opposed to the perspective of those affected. As such the UNGPs can be regarded as having a company centric paradigm.

Furthermore the UNGPs do not pose any significant challenge to corporate power or power imbalances by requesting companies to gain consent of affected parties by their operations. Instead the UNGPs are very much compliance-focused with the aim of companies mitigating and/or managing impacts on people in order to fulfil their corporate responsibility duty to respect. The emphasis on compliance with human rights and treating them as indicators or Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) obscures the process in striving for compliance. For example there may have been strategies of influence employed by the companies, State and other actors in gaining compliance. For example it

has been reported by indigenous NGOs at conferences on this topic that companies “buy” the signatures of indigenous community members to obtain their consent under the ILO169 law. In addition companies may also use co-optation strategies such as CSR benefits to communities in order for them to accept a certain level of environmental impact, which is still high and harmful to their standard of living and livelihood. As a consequence this would allow the company to claim they jointly identified and mitigated environmental impacts. The UNGPs make no mention of the elimination of human rights impacts as such an argument would also have direct implications with reducing corporate power to operate whilst transferring power to the affected groups such as communities.

Nonetheless, in 2013 and 2014 there continued to be weekly reports of human rights abuses, implicating mining companies around the world, which call into question the effectiveness of such new, soft laws or guidance for companies to respect human rights. Despite counter-arguments by practitioners that the UNGPs need years to show any improvements on the ground towards affected groups, the fact that these principles are very much a continuation of previous voluntary CSR-related standards and guidance, such as the UN Global Compact, ICMC Community Development, IFC Stakeholder Engagement which have been around for and used by corporations for the past ten years already, provides further support for authors such as Newell (2005) and Banerjee (2007).

This notion of either being able to directly or indirectly affect a company’s SLO was theorized by Frooman (1999) in his seminal paper bridging stakeholder influence strategies with resource dependence theory, as will be analyzed in the final part of this section.

Banerjee (2008) further criticizes stakeholder theory from a power perspective referring to the notion of stakeholder management as a form of colonialism by companies, arguing

that those who do not tow the corporate line are either co-opted or marginalized. It is worth reminding ourselves of the quote by Jenkins (2004), that the current world view for mining is that no group such as government, communities or NGOs should impede the “free development of mining operations or the pure market logic that everyone must benefit from such activities.” (p.26) a view which Owen and Kemp (2012) also subscribe to..

Such a situation I refer to as “Responsible Neo Colonialism”. The subsequent analysis of four publications with their empirical case studies from a mining community relations/conflict focus put into perspective the power or lack of power communities have, from a social movement theory, in resisting and also showing how corporate influence strategies attempt to manage, co-opt and marginalize their local communities. This demonstrates the simplicity of stakeholder theory in explaining business-affected actor relations. Related to power and dependence it is worth discussing the theory of resource dependence and in particular stakeholder influence strategies as delineated by Jeff Frooman (1994).

2.2.7 Extractives sector – community relations academic and practitioner literature

Academic scholars have also researched and published on this same topic of mining company/community relations and conflict. The academic literature on large extractives sector company relations and conflicts with nearby communities is not well established and very much emerging without a clear theoretical foundation. There are no more than 50 published peer reviewed papers on this subject, and moreover many of them are a-theoretical, in other words of a descriptive nature. These papers also mainly take the form of singular case studies focusing on conflicts generated by the environmental impacts perceived by communities. The main theories authors have used in management publications to explain the findings of their research in an extractives sector/community

relations context, include cross-cultural-related theories (Crawley and Sinclair 2003; Lertzman and Vredenburg, 2005), legitimacy theory (Gifford and Kestler (2008); Idemudia, 2007); and identity work theories (Bruijn and Whiteman (2009); Kraemer et al., 2013) to explain the difficult relations and conflict between extractives sector companies and local communities. With the exception of the identity work papers, the other authors take a more firm-centric view, arguing that the explanation of mining company community relations lies within the mining companies and their own organizational identities, cultures, strategies and leadership. What these different theoretical perspectives fail to capture is the importance of the local community context and perspectives.

With the exception of Bruijn and Whiteman (2009) and Kraemer et al., (2013) the remaining 13 publications are quite descriptive and company-focused in their explanations of these antagonistic relations between resource extractive companies and local communities. Furthermore, the authors do not go beyond using notions of grievances, injustices and weak community relations management systems by companies to account for these conflicts, poor relations and hence the lack of an SLO.

Many of the publications, such as those by Jenkins (2004), Eweje (2007), Idemudia (2007), Garvin et al. (2009) and Duarte (2010), simply point to the facts of divergent world views or value systems between extractives companies and their local communities for explaining conflict and therefore do not offer more robust theorizing. With the knowledge from previous field research in mining communities that perceptions and relations with companies can be mixed and range between positions of conflict and positions of mutual admiration, I argue that these publications are not sufficient in helping to answer the review question of explaining what factors lead to gaining or not gaining an SLO from a local community.

By maintaining a sole company focus for explaining and understanding these relations and conflicts between the extractive sector and local community, the authors are taking a similar stance to the practical guidance literature. The authors of these publications are implying that all the answers and solutions rest with the mining companies and their behaviour, management systems, personnel, policies and strategies. Such a vision neglects the community context which may be very much against the mining company's proposed project in the community, regardless of how much the mining company changes its behaviour or even world view. The next sub-section considers some explanations and solutions proposed by academic and practitioner guidance, specifically on the subject of extractives sector and SLO conflict.

2.3 Resource Dependence Theory – Explaining Mining Company and Local community influence strategies

King (2008) puts forward that a company's autonomy is limited by its dependence on certain stakeholder groups to sustain certain resource bases (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Firms that benefit from their corporate reputation might be held hostage by their dependence on this source of success.

Frooman (1999) provides support for the argument by Banerjee (2008) that organizations attempt to manage stakeholders. The difference being that Frooman (1999) does not question or pass moral judgement on the assertion that companies need to manage their stakeholders, in contrast to Banerjee (2008) who labels this as stakeholder colonialism. Therefore Frooman (1999) claims it is important to understand not just how organizations manage their stakeholders but also how stakeholders, who in the case of this research are the community actors, attempt to influence companies.

Frooman (1999) argues that using an unmentioned assumption about stakeholder theory is the inherent conflict between management and stakeholders. He asks the valid question about why a manager should be concerned with stakeholder theory if relations were healthy and stable with all stakeholders. Therefore he chose to bridge stakeholder theory with resource dependence theory to account for more structural and power-related factors affecting company/stakeholder relations. As such his paper could be seen as a response to the critique in earlier sections around stakeholder and CSR theories being too company focused and not taking into account stakeholder influence and perspectives. Nevertheless Frooman (1999) has as the aim of his work to help organizations manage their stakeholders better to avoid conflict and therefore provides evidence on more critical perspectives, such as Banerjee (2008) who claim companies want to co-opt and pacify dangerous and opposing stakeholders.

Resource dependence theory was developed and widely attributed to Pfeffer and Salancik's seminal publication in 1978 (Frooman, 1999; Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) who proposed that organizations were not self-sufficient and in total control of their destiny, and as such needed to recognize their external environment as a source for being controlled and affected by other actors (Frooman, 1999; Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). The following quote highlighted by Frooman illustrates the argument around the control that actors in the external environment can have over an organization:

"Because organizations are not self-contained or self-sufficient, the environment must be relied upon to provide support. For continuing to provide what the organization needs, the external groups or organizations may demand certain actions from the organization in return. It is the fact of the organization's dependence on the environment that makes the external constraint and control of organizational behavior both possible and almost inevitable" (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978 p.43 in Frooman, 1999 p.195).

Frooman (1999) proceeds to claim that it is the dependence of firms on external stakeholders for resources that gives these actors leverage over them, and vice versa. In the case of a community, it would be their reliance on a mining company for resources such as jobs, income and livelihoods, that would make them dependent on the company. The environment makes firms susceptible to external constraint and control by stakeholders. From Pfeffer and Salancik's quote above it is possible to see how resource dependence has similarities with the SLO argument adopted by practitioners within the extractives and CSR sector. As argued by authors such as Boutilier et al. (2011) and Prno and Slocumbe (2012), mining affected communities influence the SLO of nearby mining projects by creating conflict. The numerous examples cited earlier of the hundreds of extractive sector-related conflicts with communities in Latin America also underscore how the external environment, such as local communities adjacent to mining companies can be a constraint and influence their behaviour by causing disruptions to mining operations and being a reason for having CSR/community relations strategies.

Frooman's (1999) model of stakeholder/organization resource dependency based on the work by Pfeffer and Salancik in 1978 can be argued to offer an explanation to the question of why certain mining communities mobilize for the purposes of influencing the behaviour, or even the existence, of the nearby mining companies. All mining communities have some sort of grievance (often similar ones related to environmental and health impacts) about mining inflicted impact and moreover these same communities also partly hold and issue the critical SLO resource the mining firms need so they can operate conflict free. According to Frooman (1999) and resource dependency theory, if a stakeholder group holds a resource that is critical to an organization (such as an SLO or acceptance to do business without conflict in the case of this research) then this stakeholder group can make legitimate claims to the organization as it can control the supply of this vital resource.

However, in order to know if the local community has sufficient power to deny issuing an SLO to a mining company, it is necessary to verify both that the mining company is dependent on the local community *and* that the local community is not dependent on the mining company. Power is therefore defined in relative terms, i.e. the local community has power over the mining company if the mining company is more dependent on the local community relative to the local community's dependence on the mining company (adapted from Lawler and Yoon, 1995 in Frooman, 1999). Following on, Pfeffer and Salancik posit that *"when the net exchange between organizational entities is asymmetrical, some net power accrues to the less dependent organization. This power may be employed in attempting to influence or constrain the behavior of the other more dependent organization"* (1978, p.53 in Frooman, 1999).

Central to resource dependence theory is the notion that a firm's need for resources provides opportunities for others to gain control over it (Frooman, 1999), such as local communities in mining areas. Stakeholders providing resources to a firm are considered to have two general forms of control over a firm: firstly, determining whether the firm receives the resources (an SLO in this case) it needs; and secondly, deciding if the firm can use the resources or SLO in the way it desires.

Frooman (1999) further elaborates on resource dependence theory to propose his own stakeholder influence strategies which he calls withholding and usage: *"Withholding strategies are defined quite simply, then, as those where the stakeholder discontinues providing a resource to a firm with the intention of making the firm change a certain behavior"* (p.199). Withholding in the context of this research could mean physical disruptions to the mining operations by community roadblocks and protests to cease operations. Usage strategies could include a media campaign led by the community together with NGO actors, or legal action led by lawyers/NGOs and/or politicians to cease mining operations.

Such a behaviour change in the context of mining companies would include respecting local community human rights, the local environment, impacts from mining, water and land access, a more generous sharing of benefits, social cohesion and cultural beliefs and disparities between the distribution of benefits and risks (similar to the main mining-related community grievances reported by Kemp et al. (2010)). The ultimate behaviour change in the context of mining would be accepting demands by the community for a complete shutdown of the mine if communities withhold their SLO. In this circumstance local communities would not be requesting the mining companies to change their conduct but to cease mining activities and just leave the land permanently, as was the case with the Esquel gold mine in the Argentine Patagonia in 2003 and Vedanta mining in India, 2013. Froomean (1999) uses examples of employees withholding labour by striking and of catalyzing consumer boycotts. Importantly he states that the mere threat of using withholding (or any of the influence strategies) may be as effective a tool for influencing firm behaviour as the actual use of the strategy.

This point about threat is highly relevant for my research as it is what drives mining companies to implement CSR-related programmes and community relations, as I have been told frequently by mining company executives and consultants. Indeed many mining companies consider their local communities as an important aspect of their risk management and mitigation; mining giant Anglo American refers to relations with their local communities as “*mutually dependent*”.

Mutual dependence between a mining company and local community would infer the employment of usage strategies. According to Froomean (1999), usage strategies are those in which the stakeholder continues to supply the resource, or SLO in the context of my research, but with conditions attached. In the case of a mining community, the locals may try to negotiate better benefits sharing, employment opportunities, and reduced

environmental, cultural and/or human rights impacts from the mining company in order to continually offer their SLO. However, the mining company would also be aware that the community is equally dependent on them for their own welfare in terms of employment, tax revenues and income generation; therefore the community does not leverage as much power to mobilize against them as a whole (though certain factions who are not so directly dependent on the mine may engage in collective mobilization) and completely cut off the SLO. Therefore in such negotiations neither the mining company nor local community would have all their demands or desires fulfilled as there would need to be compromise from both parties.

The main difference between both strategies, as posited by Frooman (1999), is that a stakeholder who employs a withholding strategy, is prepared to sever the flow of resources to a firm, via protests and litigation, whereas an actor similar to a local community that employs a usage strategy is not willing to cut off the SLO it grants to the nearby mining project; instead it is likely to try to negotiate better terms and conditions such as lower environmental impacts and more social responsibility. The fact that a stakeholder is able to simply walk away from the relationship with the firm with no harm to itself gives the threat of this action even more credibility, as seen in the mining sector. This industry experiences hundreds of community conflicts, in Latin America alone (OCMAL, 2010), where the communities do not wish to give the mining companies their SLO and furthermore would like them to leave their territory.

Mining companies are not able to source the SLO from another stakeholder in a different location, which means they are dependent on this specific local community stakeholder group. However, in my research I have seen instances where mining companies in Chile and Brazil will recognize a more distant urban community as its main community stakeholder over the nearby indigenous or rural community which was threatening to take away its SLO. Such a practice fits in with resource dependence theory as it shows the

organization using co-optation or alternative means strategies to reduce its dependence on one actor and secure the resource from another source which it can then control more (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005)

In other situations, however, such as one in which the stakeholder and firm are mutually dependent, the stakeholder will not be in a position to walk away from the relationship (Lawler and Bacharach, 1987; Williamson. 1979, 1983 in Frooman, 1999). In such a situation the well-being of each will be linked to the other, so each will do well only by considering the needs of the other (Frooman, 1999). Such a situation can be compared to the relationship between a company and a trade union, though both are adversaries in terms of wage demands and conditions, both parties ultimately cannot survive (temporarily) if the other were to close down and/or disappear.

Frooman (1999) then finishes his article by discussing a typology of influence strategies and resource relationships. One of his main arguments is that stakeholders who are dependent on the firm but where the firm is not dependent on them need to use indirect strategies to influence the firm, for instance by leveraging other stakeholder groups and allies such as consumers with whom firms have a high dependency relationship, as shown in the following quote:

“I define indirect strategies as those in which the stakeholder works through an ally, by having the ally manipulate the flow of resources to the firm (by either withholding or usage)” (p.198).

Frooman (1999) ends his paper with four propositions related to indirect and direct stakeholder influence strategies over the firm:

“Proposition 1: When the relationship is one of low interdependence, the stakeholder will choose an indirect withholding strategy to influence the firm.” (p.202).

“Proposition 2: When the relationship is marked by firm power, the stakeholder will choose an indirect usage strategy to influence the firm.” (p.202).

“Proposition 3: When the relationship is marked by stakeholder power, the stakeholder will choose a direct withholding strategy to influence the firm.” (p.202).

“Proposition 4: When the relationship is one of high interdependence, the stakeholder will choose a direct usage strategy to influence the firm.” (p.202). This is related to the four Lower Conflict cases.

Based on the stakeholder theory, SLO literature and mining communities’ conflicts news stories, one can suggest that local community actors when allied with other groups such as national and international NGOs, lawyers, State actors (such as justice and regulation departments) can hold power over the mining companies, and hence the mining companies are to an extent dependent or hostage to these multiple actors.

In rural communities where mining is a new, developing industry, one can state that these groups are independent in terms of livelihoods and therefore are not dependent upon the nearby mining projects. Therefore Proposition One where there is low-interdependence would be appropriate for such situations. In cases of conflict or a desire to withhold the SLO, a local community would have to partner with an ally presumably such as a lawyer, civil society organization or receive support from the state in order to resist the nearby mining project’s SLO.

Finally, in communities where mining has a longer history and the residents are dependent upon the industry for jobs, incomes, livelihoods and their quality of life, one would affirm that Proposition Two is most pertinent. This is where the mining company would hold the power and the local community would need to rely on its benevolence or

on an external ally such as an NGO or local government for benefits such as community investment or other CSR-related benefits in exchange for its SLO. However, the mining company would be aware and calculate that in this situation the community would be unlikely to withhold the SLO and enter into conflict, and moreover doing so even via an external partner would be counter to their community livelihood needs and desires.

What is clear is that for the local community as a whole to withdraw or withhold their SLO, besides being independent from the nearby mining projects they must engage in some sort of collective action and behaviour. Furthermore, as signalled by stakeholder theory, even SLO authors will need the assistance of external actors such as NGOs, the state and lawyers in order move up the power league of stakeholders and be heard by companies for their legitimate demands. In other words communities would need to take an indirect influence strategy in accordance with Frooman (1999).

Alternatively, communities that are dependent upon mining will want to offer their SLO or goodwill in exchange for certain benefits from the nearby large mining projects, e.g., CSR, sustainability, community investment or community development, amongst other terms. A large mining project near a community in the developing world would in many cases represent the main economic activity and actor in the locality, and therefore at the very least the municipal government (if not local residents as well) would demand some form of benefits sharing or redistribution of profits locally, such as employment, training or additional social investment in exchange for an SLO, in addition to the legal licence to operate.

This is the case with large mining companies in whichever location they operate. These more mining dependent communities would need to partner with the very same mining companies and other mining friendly NGOs (often hired by the mining company) and the

local government to identify, request and collaborate in the delivery of their community benefits often known as CSR, community development or investment. At most these communities could show their anger in small collective groups at the nearby mining companies only to request more or different CSR, thus making this a usage strategy in line with Froomean's (1999) typology. In such cases these more dependent communities would be primarily after negotiation, not for turning off the supply of an SLO.

As a consequence it is pertinent to analyze (see the next section) how social movement theory addresses both more independent and more mining dependent communities on how they can successfully and unsuccessfully create change collectively. More specifically to this research it would mean how or under what dynamics communities can come together as collective groups to reject and resist mining; and secondly how they can negotiate better community investment or CSR benefits from large nearby developments.

However, resource dependence theory being a structural natured theory has been criticized for the lack of corresponding empirical research conducted. This is the reason why authors such as Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) have claimed resource dependence theory has been sidelined as an effective metaphor explaining organizational behaviour and not treated as a theory in its own right.

It is also noteworthy that the resource dependence theory was developed in a company context and in particular within the mergers and acquisitions field. Such a context is very different from that of the current research topic and therefore may be regarded as a limitation of this research. Nonetheless Froomean (1999) adapted the theory specifically in the stakeholder conflict context and Henriques and Sharma (2005) carried out empirical research using Froomean's 1999 resource dependent based theory of stakeholder influence. The aforementioned authors test Froomean's (1999) model of withholding and

usage strategies via quantitative research on company reports and some company questionnaires based on managerial perception.

However, the research employed no stakeholder interviews or questionnaires. Henriques and Sharma (2005) importantly claim the local community and civil society groups can withhold critical resources such as an SLO via roadblocks and questioning the legitimacy of forestry companies. However, this assumption was not supported by a rationale of how exactly communities can take away the SLO from forestry companies and in addition for how long this SLO is to be withheld. Considering the research was based on secondary reports and managerial perceptions only, it would seem understandable that Henriques and Sharma (2005) did not shed more light on these questions, which this present thesis will hope to do for the mining communities under research. The following section considers social movement theory's treatment of the community actor.

2.4 Social movement-related Literature

This thesis also considers the social movement-related literature as it provides a more detailed level of analysis of collective action by aggrieved groups towards dominant societal institutions who call for some sort of social and political change. King (2008) uses social movement theory to explain how stakeholders are able (or unable) to influence corporations. He states that though social movement theory was developed primarily to focus on collective action against the State, many of the key insights from this theory can shed light on understanding stakeholders of the firm, and this would consequently include the community actor.

In his paper, King (2008) provides support to the critical thinkers of stakeholder theory by confirming that firms and the State need to manage their stakeholders. He thus argues from a perspective which intends to help companies manage their stakeholders should the latter attempt to collectively mobilize against the former.

This current section of the chapter uses King's (2008) publication to delineate social movement theory's treatment of the community actor as the author tries to bridge stakeholder and social movement theory by analyzing corporate stakeholders through a social movement lens. This is the closest the social movement literature comes to addressing the community stakeholder.

King (2008) takes Frooman's (1999) work further to understand how secondary stakeholders can influence corporations via social movement theory. King (2008) criticises stakeholder theory for its firm-centric view of stakeholders that fails to consider stakeholder action. King (2008) also acknowledges the work of Frooman (1999) in his stakeholder influence strategies work, however criticises it for its resource dependence perspective which King (2008) says is too structural and does not do justice to the level

of the community, in particular to the collective action that is needed to influence firms and is assumed as a given by Frooman (King, 2008).

In short, social movement theory moves the emphasis of analysis from the manager's perspective to the external settings of collective action outside the corporation (King, 2008). As argued by King (2008), a social movement perspective of corporate stakeholders complements the current literature examining stakeholder strategies of influence (e.g., Frooman, 1999; Hendry, 2005) by focusing on the collective action needed to attract managerial attention. He finishes by suggesting stakeholder scholars should take inspiration from social movement scholars and pay more attention to particular historical instances of stakeholder influence and its consequent effects on management.

Collective action is necessary for secondary stakeholders such as local communities to exert pressure on nearby mining projects as these communities' members lack resources individually (King, 2008). Moreover, it takes the community as a whole and a vast majority to withhold the SLO or create significant levels of conflict for a nearby mining project.

In contrast to resource dependence and stakeholder theorists, social movement theory analyzes the processes of collective action which is regarded as important for understanding collective behaviour (King, 2008). Collective action does not always occur, despite high levels of individual grievances and motives for action against a private sector company (Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003). Social movement theorists McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996), provide three main explanations why some groups are able to overcome obstacles and engage in collective action against a corporation, known as the political process model:

1. Mobilizing structures
 - a. Organization strength
 - b. Resource endowment
2. Corporate (political) opportunities, and
3. Framing processes.

However, it should be mentioned that not all social movement theorists agree with this political process model. For example, Snow and Benford (2000) and Jasper (2010) criticize the highly structural, macro- and resource-focused arguments used by political process proponents such as McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow as ignoring the importance of culture, emotions and a sense of injustice for the mobilizing of social movement. Snow and Benford (2000) and Jasper (2010) further contend that dismissing the “why” of social movement, in favour of “how” social movements mobilize, fails to provide a full and accurate picture of the phenomenon of collective action. Jasper (2010) correspondingly makes the main call of his paper for social movement literature to reflect and devise a theory of action, which is currently lacking.

In line with this argument proposing a more meso or ground level perspective on social movements Cefai (2007) in Jasper (2010) presents ethnography as the surest way to understand the situations in which humans make sense of their world.

Berry (2003) makes a poignant assertion around the challenges facing a community mobilizing against the siting of a large industrial or extractives project. A community in such a situation is not only fighting a specific, proposed development but is also fighting general societal values and norms. It requires a powerful community to alter traditional power dynamics between themselves, government and industry to achieve regulatory and behavioural change that is more beneficial to the local community. Understanding the

phenomenon of social movements from both a structural and micro level perspective is essential to understand why and how certain communities are able to mobilize against nearby mining projects and why other communities are not capable of such a feat.

According to sociologists McAdam et al. (2010) the social movements and contentious politics literature is the best place to analyze community responses to infrastructure projects (which have also created large environmental and social impacts similar to mining) as it is fundamentally concerned with the workings of emergent collective behaviour. Nonetheless the social movements literature has paid almost no attention to the subject of social movements opposing infrastructure projects in emerging markets.

As mentioned earlier, political scientists and structural sociologists have considered the most important driving factors for successful social movement to be access to financial, human and political resources. Indeed some proponents such as McCarthy and Zald (1997) have gone as far as to argue that all societies have sufficient feelings of discontent; they need the right organizations with political resource and power to supply them in order to become social movements and create the desired change. Thus one could extrapolate that without these resources, organizations and leaders' groups are prohibited from mobilizing. According to Min-Dong (2011) stakeholders monitoring companies need institutions to legitimate and strengthen their claim. Without institutional legitimacy and support for stakeholders' claims, it is very easy for large firms (such as mining companies) to dominate the stakeholders. Therefore, stakeholders often depend on the power and legitimacy based in institutions.

This powerful claim is evident in the empirical research on mining company/community conflict in the works of Bebbington et al. (2008), Bruijn and Whiteman (2009), Cabrejas (2012), Kraemer et al. (2013) and Urkidi and Walter (2011), where the importance of an

external organization to help the local community with resources was a highly important factor for mobilizing the community against the mining company.

However, since the 1980s, authors such as Snow (1986), Gamson (1992) and Jasper (2010) have called for more socio-psychological factors to be included within frameworks to explain why social movements form and succeed (point III in King's 2008 framework). Such factors, commonly referred to as "framing", include a sense of grievance, injustice, threats to identity and ideologies (Snow and Benford, 2000). These factors have also been referred to as "threats" (McAdam et al., 2010) or "demand factors of mobilization" (Klandermans, 2004). According to Mannarini et al. (2009), the following six factors are highly influential in communities mobilizing against unwanted infrastructure projects in order of importance according to Mannarini et al (2009): sense of injustice, community involvement, the perception of the existence of a vast majority in the community favouring mobilization, group identification, place attachment and collective efficacy. Indeed, in the social movements framework provided by King (2008) earlier in this chapter, the subject of framing was stated as an essential element of social movements theory.

2.41 Social movements from a Community versus project siting perspective

Two significant social movements-related publications are those by McAdam et al. (2010) and McAdam and Boudet (2012), which both focus on oil and gas pipeline sitings, thus similar to the mining context. The former examine the causal factors of mobilization efforts against the siting of 11 oil and gas pipeline projects across the developing world by using archival data only. The latter used fieldwork interviews to make a comparative analysis of the reasons behind different mobilization levels from USA communities facing the construction of Liquidified Natural Gas (LNG) terminals in their proximity; the methodology for this research was fuzzy set analysis and therefore not ethnographic. Fuzzy set analysis for multiple case studies leans more towards structured interview

analysis using statistical measurements with minimal community residents' perspectives, as depicted in McAdam and Boudet (2012).

In McAdam and Boudet's (2012) research on 20 American communities facing the construction of LNG plants, as well as McAdam et al.'s (2010) findings of community mobilization in 16 different developing world countries against the construction of 11 oil and gas pipelines, the authors found that in most cases communities did not manage to mobilize or vent their frustrations and grievances. McAdam and Boudet (2012) also stress the importance of understanding why so many "communities at risk of mobilization" do not mobilize against such heavy environmental impact projects and criticize current social movement authors for focusing on the very rare instances of successful collective action. McAdam et al. (2010), McAdam and Boudet (2012) and Klandermans in a personal communication in 2012, argue further that this lack of mobilization by "at risk of mobilization groups" is overlooked by the literature and needs further understanding and theorizing.

As proposed by McAdam and Boudet (2012) this present thesis also intends to study the variation in community responses to the mining operations to allow the phenomenon of interest to move from successful social movement to "mobilization attempts" or, more accurately, "communities at risk of mobilization." p.409. After all, as stated by Zald and McCarthy (1977), all groups have grievances about some issues, however very few take collective action to address them. This is a question this present research aims to address by researching cases of mixed and low conflict/good relations with nearby mining projects in Brazil and Chile.

Despite the majority of the social movements literature not addressing the area of communities at risk of mobilization, that are facing environmental impacts from large

industries such as mining projects, authors such as McAdam et al. (2001), (2010) and McAdam and Boudet (2012) posit that social movements literature is best placed to study this phenomenon because it essentially deals with emergent collective behaviour. Such collective behaviour is at the crux of communities who take a collective position against a nearby mining project. Therefore this present thesis uses the lens of social movements literature and social identity-related theories to analyze my phenomenon of research regarding community positions towards nearby mining projects, and in particular using the above-mentioned relevant publications for theoretical grounding.

Another relevant social movements-related publication is provided by Walsh et al. (1997). These authors set out with the objective of researching, via telephone interviews and questionnaires, what factors contributed to incinerator location sitings across the USA,. They concluded that the main factors prevalent in communities where incinerator plans had been defeated were that they were always supported by country-wide activists – not just at the local level. Secondly, having access to influential local politicians was also a great aid in the community's resistance; this was also corroborated by Shriver and Kennedy (2005) in their research on an American mining community, and by McAdam and Boudet (2012) in their oil pipeline siting study. These conclusions support the more structural arguments around the importance of resources for communities to be able to mobilize.

Further relevant examples include Devlin and Turbino (2012) who suggest reasons why the community of Itabira, an urban city in the State of Minas Gerais, Brazil (the same state where two of my case studies are located) mobilized and de-mobilized against plans for mining very nearby. Abers (2007) wrote about how external agents such as academics were a crucial factor in creating a collective identity for building a social movement in two Brazilian communities facing large dam constructions. A final subsection of the

literature is that of the social identity domain, which also speaks much more about the framing concept, at the more individual/micro levels.

2.42 Social identity-related theories

At a more meso/community level, the thesis also draws on social identity theory within a social movements literature context to help explain at a community level what is driving the positions and sentiment towards nearby mining projects. Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) posit that social identity is a “*set of mutual understandings regarding the unique characteristics that distinguish (members) from nonmembers*” (p. 208). Social identity is defined as the features that make a group unique from any other (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) propose that groups who value their common identity more than their shared interests are more likely to mobilize against a focal organization.

On the other hand, Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) continue to posit that individuals belonging to various groups with competing interests are less likely to engage in any action against an organization; for example, a local community resident may not protest against the environmental pollution from a nearby mine if s/he also receives CSR-related benefits from the mine, as protesting in this case would be self-defeating. The links to the higher structural argument of resource dependency theory, as put forward by Frooman (1999), are clear to see in this example where the recipient of CSR can be seen to have a level of dependence on the mining company and therefore would have their position compromised should they openly protest against any negative impacts.

In a similar line of argument, Gramlin and Freudenburg (2006) make an interesting contribution from their research into the divergent perspectives of communities in Louisiana and California towards nearby coastal oil exploration platforms. They argue

that historical, biophysical and social factors explain the different responses of these coastal communities and stress the need for “*multiple-factor explanations, as opposed to single-factor explanations*” of these types of phenomena (p.486). To summarise, communities in Louisiana were much more accepting of the oil industry on their coast because local fishermen had historically enjoyed a good relationship with the sector, which had also provided employment. Due to the geography of the Louisiana coast, the visual impacts were limited and even more so due to the fact that few people actually live on the coast. Most people in Louisiana, who have one of the lowest education levels in the USA, had a family member or friend working in the oil industry nearby – referred to as the “social multiplier effect” by Gramling and Freudenburg (2006) – and so therefore also approved of the sector.

In California much of the opposite was true. Historically the oil sector had never been present, and people who lived on the coast did so to enjoy the scenery and unspoilt nature. The biophysical nature of the Californian coast, differently from that of Louisiana, meant that the oil platforms would be highly visible. Thirdly, the Californian population is one of the highest educated nationally and near the coast the main employer is the tourism and recreational sector (Gramling and Freudenburg, 2006). The importance of the industry or sector historically in the community was also a key factor reported by Bebbington et al. (2008) and McAdam and Boudet (2012) in their respective studies. These arguments also have an explicit link to the dependency thesis, that when a community member has a level of dependency on the mine and when the mine simultaneously holds the same degree of power over this community member, then mobilization attempts are nullified. Therefore the social movement and social identity literature should take into consideration the dependency theory, as posited by Frooman (1999).

However, as reminded by King (2008) in his review of the social movement's literature, groups may share common beliefs and grievances about a corporation's responsibility to its constituents, but without mobilizing structures they lack the means to transform those sentiments into action and influence. He argues that both the macro-institutional and meso-community levels are highly important in understanding the levels at which groups mobilize. McAdam et al. (2001) also argue that it is more at the meso-community level where social movement can be triggered and therefore this level needs more ethnographic research, which is my chosen methodology.

This literature review concludes by offering an analytical review of several empirical academic publications set in the context of mining-affected communities, and relations and conflict with nearby mining projects. The following publications also demonstrate the importance of the community perspective in the context of mining company/community conflicts: Bebbington et al. (2008); Bruijn and Whiteman (2009), Urkidi and Walter (2011) and Kraemer, Whiteman and Banerjee (2013). These empirically based publications demonstrate the importance of a critical CSR perspective on how the mining companies approach community relations as an explanation for why relations turn negative and companies lose their SLO. These publications also combine elements of stakeholder theory from the mining company perspective and elements of social movement theory to illustrate how the mining-affected communities have attempted to mobilize against nearby mining projects. This leads to an assertion that instrumental CSR and stakeholder theory, and its translation into practitioner literature, is not the panacea it claims to be in resolving stakeholder conflict and gaining a clear SLO simply by considering and engaging with aggrieved local community members.

2.43 Literature review of the community perspective on mining company/community relations and conflict

I begin by discussing the work of Bruijn and Whiteman (2009) who write about an indigenous Peruvian community – the Machiguenga tribe – and their position regarding the construction of a gas exploration plant on their land. This tribe's traditional way of life within the flora and fauna was threatened by this large extractives project. An external NGO helped strengthen their identity as an indigenous people through workshops and educational materials, which led to the community uniting to resist the gas project even more for the sake of their collective identity. The strengthening of a collective community identity with the support of an external NGO actor in order to resist a mining project is not contemplated by the above-mentioned literature from the mining sector or stakeholder theory. This is an important aspect for explaining and understanding the conflict and resistance to the gas-mining project in Peru.

Bruijn and Whiteman's (2009) main argument and claim is about how the Machiguenga people's identity work was triggered by false promises made by the Camisea gas project and persistent negative environmental impacts on the livelihood and culture of this community. Moreover, Bruijn and Whiteman (2009) argue that the Machiguenga people's identity work was instigated by an organization established by themselves known as the Comaru. Upon seeing environmental damage to their land and unethical behaviour from company representatives, as well as increased migration of men to their territory to look for work at the project, the Machiguenga people through their Comaru organization began a process of identity work or strengthening.

The Comaru organized several workshops for their people to learn and become aware of the international legislation, their rights as an indigenous people, and the organizations and NGOs that would defend their rights as indigenous people. In my own experience in neighbouring Chile I discovered a very similar picture with an indigenous community of

a mining company. Learning how their cultures are valued outside their countries, in particular in the western and developed world by NGOs such as Survival and Friends of the Earth, and international organizations such as the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), helped to revitalize and consolidate their identities. As later put forward by Bruijn and Whiteman (2009) this example of “glocalization” led to increasingly strong rejections of the mining project, culminating in their refusal to participate in consultation meetings and the community statement that they would no longer engage in talks with the company as they were now in total opposition to the project.

Bruijn and Whiteman (2009) conclude, “*a deeper understanding of the process of local identity work, across the individual, community and collective regional level, improves our understanding of how unwanted natural resource development affects Indigenous cultures*” (p.489). Their conclusion only goes a little way towards answering this thesis’ main phenomenon of interest, i.e. what influences local communities in their position regarding nearby mining projects. Bruijn and Whiteman’s (2009) final remark in their paper is “*Future research is needed to explore if and how identity work helps us unravel the causes of blockades, kidnapping, and forcible closure of oil and natural gas production*”. (p.493). I aim to expand on Bruijn and Whiteman’s (2009) recommendation for further research with my own research, by considering how identity affects community positions towards nearby mining projects in Brazil and Chile.

However, what is lacking from Bruijn and Whiteman (2009), with regard to the present research interest, is a discussion around structural level power dynamics and mobilization, such as how the Camisea gas project company reacted to the Machiguenga people’s resistance. Did the mining company use an influence strategy including social responsibility programmes, and what was the counter-response by the Machiguenga

people to this? The following two papers by Urkidi and Walter (2011) and Kraemer et al. (2013) address more fully the complexity of these mining company/community conflicts.

The publication by Urkidi and Walter (2011) builds on two previous publications by Urkidi on the Pascua Lama mining conflict in the Huasco Valley in Chile, which is a case study this present thesis intends to study. In Urkidi and Walter's (2011) publication, they discuss two mining community conflict cases (though not comparing and contrasting them) of Pascua Lama in Chile and Esquel in Argentina. The research was conducted in an ethnographic and qualitative manner after Urkidi had remained in the Huasco Valley for weeks in 2008 trying to understand the different community positions towards Barrick Gold's Pascua Lama project. The article discusses how environmental justice claims of participation, recognition and distributional justice were more salient from the community perspective over time. Urkidi (2008) takes an even more process focused approach by discussing how the social movement against Pascua Lama developed using a timeline to tell the story.

The main findings presented in Urkidi and Walter (2011), which are relevant to this thesis research in terms of understanding mining company community relations and conflict from a community perspective, include how Barrick Gold did not provide acceptable participation for the local community in discussing Pascua Lama at the project stage. Urkidi and Walter (2011) argue that Barrick Gold only offered the Huasco Valley the opportunity to participate in local consultations about the proposed mining project before they published their Environmental Impact Analysis (EIA). However, once Barrick published their EIA it was clearly too overly technical and extensive for the local community to understand. Barrick Gold gave a short time frame for receiving comments and those who gave feedback to the mining company were aggrieved that these were not taken into consideration and were ignored, according to the interviewees. It therefore seems that Barrick Gold had tried to follow the guiding principles of gaining an SLO, as

mentioned earlier, by consulting the local community and being transparent. However, they were not very cooperative in actually helping the community to comprehend the EIA nor did they allow much time for or even take on board the suggestions from local concerned residents, which suggests that the mining company was not sincere in its intentions from the outset.

Urkidi and Walter (2011) go on to state that the Huasco Valley community was divided in its resistance to Pascua Lama. At the EIA stage, OLCA, an external NGO from Santiago, also began to participate much more in the community resistance, offering advice and support for tackling Barrick Gold's Pascua Lama mining project. Furthermore, within the local community the indigenous group, known as the Diaguita people, was not resisting the mine, together with the non-indigenous community groups; the Diaguita instead were insisting on litigation, lawyers and the legal process to stop Pascua Lama from materializing this project. According to Urkidi and Walter (2011) this was an example of the desire for recognition. To add further complexity, Barrick Gold had won over some of the Diaguita community with their generous CSR initiatives and were in fact dictating the Diaguita identity to the Diaguita people and promoting indigenous leaders in order to manage and manipulate the community to its advantage:

“The company has brought in professionals from other parts of the country to conduct workshops on the ‘traditional’ Diaguita crafts, essentially inventing a nonexistent Diaguita culture and denying the ethnicity of our community. They have raised false leaders, who are now attending meetings with the company and the media, discrediting the real leaders of the community and creating irreconcilable divisions between community members and their neighbours. All these actions have led to confusion and they have weakened the identity of the Diaguita Huascoalinos.” (Letter to Canadian parliament by the Diaguita Huasco–Altino Agricultural Community, May 2009.) (p.689)

The main argument Urkidi and Walter (2011) continue to make is how the community tried to frame the anticipated negative impacts from Pascua Lama into a broader and international scale in order to win more support in response to the co-optation tactics of Barrick Gold. The community used arguments and frames such as Barrick paying little tax, the lack of democracy in the licensing process for the mine and the close relations with politicians that Barrick Gold supposedly enjoyed. At the international level the community framed its discourse around the alignment with climate change and water depletion. The Pascua Lama mine has now been suspended since April 2013 (over a year) due to an order issued by the Chilean courts of justice who based their decision on the irresponsible management of toxic chemicals by Barrick Gold. The previous theme about how Barrick Gold manipulated the Diaguita people's identity and how external actors and NGOs entered the community resistance movement provides a linkage with the next publication to be highlighted, that of Kraemer et al. (2013).

Kraemer et al., (2013) focus their publication on the community and social movement resistance against a proposed bauxite mine in India in the area where the Dongria Kondh tribe lives; they present their findings in a unique process style with a timeline of interrelated relevant events. Their data are based on ethnographic field research with dozens of community interviews over a period of weeks in India, similarly to the research informing Bruijn and Whiteman (2009) and Urkidi and Walter (2011). In a more explicit way than Urkidi and Walter (2011), Kraemer et al. (2013) argue that stakeholder theory fails to capture the complexities of mining company community conflicts mainly because of the counter-mobilization tactics employed by firms to co-opt and destabilize anti-mining resistance movements. This would also include what Barrick Gold allegedly did with regard to manipulating the Diaguita people's identity, as reported by Urkidi and Walter (2011). In the case of Kraemer et al. (2013) the Vedanta Resources mining company was able to co-opt the local community leader, Jika who was leading the local resistance and mobilization against the planned mine. Vedanta Resources did so by offering to pay Jika education scholarships to study abroad, once Jika had accepted he

left the community and even appeared on videos stating the importance of the mine for the community's development. Furthermore Kraemer et al. (2013) also recount from their field research how people related to Vedanta Resources, such as suppliers, employees or recipients of CSR, used intimidation and threatening techniques on the local community members who were opposed to the mine. The lines between CSR and counter-mobilization, as Kraemer et al. (2013) refer to such corporate influence strategies, became more blurred when some members of a youth club funded by Vedanta Resources' CSR programmes beat up local anti-mining protesters with cricket bats sponsored by the mining company. In addition to violent incidents, there was also the alleged linking of the mining company to the death of a leading opponent in a car crash. Vedanta Resources also funded several local developmental NGOs to co-opt the local community by offering capacity building benefits, and disseminate the message that mining would offer positive economic and social impacts to the local community. These tactics also overlap with some of those outlined by Urkidi and Walter (2011) in their case of Pascua Lama in the Huasco Valley in Chile. Vedanta Mining in India as with Barrick Gold in Chile have also been ordered to suspend operations since late 2013 due to community conflict and rejection of the mine.

Another factor Kraemer et al. (2013) highlight as being significant in the community mobilization against the nearby mining project is that of external, including international, NGOs (some that also worked on the side of the mining company). As in the cases of Bruijn and Whiteman, and Urkidi and Walter, it seems the external actor's role is imperative in mobilizing the local communities against unwanted nearby mining projects.

The fourth and final case study for analysis is that of Bebbington et al. (2008) who set out to answer how social movement affects the development and livelihoods of rural territories in Peru and Ecuador using mining projects as the context in their work. They use archival data to put forward their argument as opposed to direct fieldwork in the two

communities on which they report. They also discuss the complexities of these social movement dynamics affected by internal and external issues such as power and leadership struggles with and amongst other organizations and actors, including the mining companies. Bebbington et al.'s (2008) publication is highly relevant to the present research phenomenon because it takes a longitudinal or historical perspective on major events in the mining company community relations; however, it also compares and contrasts two different case studies in a mining context. This is what the present research aims to do though this time using multiple case studies.

Bebbington et al. (2008) firstly analyze the case of MYSA in Cajamarca, Peru, the largest gold mine in Latin America jointly owned by the largest gold miner in the world the US-based Newmont Gold, the Peruvian mining company Buenaventura and the World Bank's IFC that has a 5% stake in the company. MYSA first faced opposition from the rural communities which were expected to be most affected by this new proposed mining project. However, these rural community associations did not have clear aims and in general were considered to generally want better terms and conditions in their treatment, compensation and social responsibility benefits from MYSA. Therefore the mobilizing structures (King, 2008) were weak in this rural community. Around the same time as some publicly visible environmental violations of the mine, MYSA finally succeeded in persuading these rural community associations to accept their social responsibility programme's benefits. Once this became known by the public in the local community and the nearest urban communities, it de-legitimized the rural associations' credibility and power. As a result of this acceptance of collaboration with MYSA, the social movement resistance towards the mine soon moved from rural to urban organizations. The urban movement was more intellectual and academic focusing on the environmental impacts of the mine and therefore taking a more hardline approach against the mine. The urban social movements in general did not want to see the mine developing at all in the region (Bebbington et al., 2008).

In July 2004, when the central government gave MYSA authorization to restart exploration in Quilish there were immediate protests. *“Confronted with a situation in which its “social license to operate” seemed increasingly in the balance, MYSA withdrew its request for permission to explore in Quilish.”* (Bebbington et al., 2008, p.3012).

However, as this conflict grew in Cajamarca many different actors with differing aims and objectives joined the mobilization. Therefore as posited by Bebbington et al., (2008) the social movement against MYSA had no coherent proposal for an alternative livelihood to mining. Though MYSA had stopped trying to mine in Quilish, it had continued to grow in other parts and at the same time, as a response to the urban community mobilization, increased social responsibility and local purchasing spending by six or seven fold, which, it can be argued, began to create dependency from the communities on the mine and thus give power or leverage to MYSA over the community and essentially an easier SLO. In addition, MYSA was claimed to be involved in intimidation against activists and any others willing to resist the mine (Bebbington et al., 2008), in a similar vein to the counter-mobilization of the mining company that Kraemer et al. (2013) uncovered in India.

However, in Bebbington et al.’s (2008) second case study of the Cotacachi community facing a nearby mining project in Ecuador, the findings contrasted with those in Peru. In this case external actors, such as US-based NGOs, became aware of these plans to mine in the area before any action by the mining company. The international NGOs communicated this information to local actors in Cotacachi which led to a gradual process of social mobilization opposing the proposed future mine.

Environmental NGO, Acción Ecológica, together with local community actors in Cotacachi then began raising awareness around environmental issues and making

communities aware of the costs mining can bring and moreover on how to effectively mobilize and oppose the mine. In time the community took a hard line against the mine as they had also been funded by Acción Ecológica to visit other mining sites in Ecuador and Peru. The social movement against mining included an NGO, two youth groups, a vocal priest, an ecotourism entrepreneur and environmentalist, and a community-based organization in the areas most affected by the nearby proposed mining project (Bebbington et al., 2008). This community was evidently stronger in terms of resource endowment and mobilizing structures than the Cajamarca community in Peru. This multiple actor and well-focused social movement organization was able to persuade the Cotacachi local government to pass a municipal ordinance declaring itself an “ecological canton” which meant that mining would not be permitted there. The mining company in Cotacachi was without any political allies, unlike in the case of Cajamarca (Bebbington et al., 2008).

Together the social movement organization and the municipality invested substantially to develop alternative and new economic possibilities such as organic coffee production, handicrafts, and community managed ecotourism. The justification for this work was the idea that *“we are convinced that, if we are to block mining, we must offer practical productive alternatives... that generate employment.”* (Bebbington et al., 2008 p.30). This was unlike what had happened in Cajamarca in Peru. Cotacachi therefore was not dependent upon the nearby mining company as it had its own organic livelihood, unlike in the communities in Cajamarca in Peru and arguably in the Huasco Valley in Chile, as reported by Urkidi and Walter (2011) or in India as argued by Kraemer et al. (2013).

This important situation had, according to Bebbington et al. (2008), made it more straightforward for the community movement organizations to maintain a shared and coherent environmental agenda in Cotacachi. The mining company in Ecuador was also much smaller than MYSA in Peru and therefore was not able to engage in serious

counter-mobilization using social responsibility-related tactics to gain support and diminish opposition, unlike MYSA who had won over their opponents with jobs and funding.

Bebbington et al., (2008) also point to the macro structural level for an important explanation, i.e. Ecuador is much more hydrocarbons focused and has a nascent and small mining industry, whereas in Peru the government decided some years ago that they would develop and grow via mining. The Peruvian State sponsored MYSA to come into Peru to mine for gold and was the first new multinational mining company after many years to be given such permission. The mining opponents in Cajamarca were against the joint alliance of MYSA and the national government (Bebbington et al., 2008).

Therefore it seems that a more united community with a strong identity and its own livelihood, as also shown by Bruijn and Whiteman (2009), helps in preventing unwanted mining projects and essentially an SLO for mining companies. The fact that MYSA is currently suspended due to violence, also demonstrates that questionable ethical behaviour such as counter-mobilization, aggressive social responsibility spending and intimidation of opposition actors does not bode well for the long term.

It is also worth pointing out that Cotacachi was in the international limelight for having one of the first indigenous elected leaders who was making radical changes to the local economy in line with ecological practices. This also attracted many NGOs and volunteers to the canton, and so increased financial and technical resources available for resisting the mining project. To this day the mine at Cotacachi has not commenced operations despite attempts to do so since 1996. Nonetheless the Ecuadorian government has partnered with the Chilean copper company Codelco, the largest copper mining company in the world, to mine the area around Intag and they have now started to explore the area. This also

lends support to the idea that the situation of conflict and an SLO can change over time. At the time of writing and publication in 2008, Bebbington et al. claimed mining had been stopped in Intag due to community resistance. However, in 2014 the Ecuadorian government, together with Chilean mining company Codelco, have aggressively returned and started explorations and in April 2014 the leader of the community resistance in Intag was arrested by the police and put in chains on a charge of inciting disturbances. This example also shows the power of the State/Business nexus in dealing with community resistance to such projects and also weakens the importance attached to the SLO. In other words despite there not being an SLO in Intag, the Ecuadorian State is still able to push ahead with mining exploration for the mining company, that in turn has also been using corporate influence strategies and CSR to gain some local support by those least affected by the mining project (Zorilla, 2014).

In addition, the mining operations in Cajamarca, Peru have been suspended due to excessive violence (though at the time of Bebbington et al.'s publication in 2008 it was still operating) adding further evidence to the importance of temporal considerations of legal licenses to operate, conflict, relations and mining within communities as these change. All these elements present further questions around the importance of the SLO concept by itself, in isolation. As shown in these cases there may or may not be an SLO; however, a mine can be functioning or not contradicting the SLO.

In short Bebbington et al. (2008) via their Ecuador case study and Bruijn and Whiteman (2009) argue that a strong, well organized and coherent social movement within the affected community can explain overall anti-mining positions. On the other hand, when communities are fragmented by differing aims they are more susceptible to counter-mobilization tactics of large and powerful mining companies and can therefore be co-opted and manipulated as in Cajamarca (Bebbington et al., 2008), in India (Kraemer et al., 2013) and in the Huasco Valley in Chile (Urkidi and Walter, 2011).

The above four empirical case studies from Peru, Chile and India provide substantial evidence that stakeholder theory and the practitioner guidance material for mining companies are not sufficient for these firms to gain community acceptance and avoid local conflict and hence are insufficient to explain the positions communities take in relation to mines. The cases highlight the importance of understanding the specific contextual factors within the communities and of mining company actions or influencing strategies for gaining a deeper insight into company/community relations. The papers by Urkidi and Walter (2011), and Kraemer et al. (2013) help in understanding the phenomena of mining companies' influence strategies, such as counter-mobilization, manipulation, divide and conquer, as well as the potential for CSR initiatives with the local community to influence community positions. Therefore they are alluding to the concept of power relations between the mining company (and State) and the local community.

This chapter finishes by offering some concluding remarks on the importance of dependence and social movement-related theories for my research question.

2.5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks

It is worthwhile finishing this section with an argument supplied by Bebbington et al. (2008) on why communities may mobilize in the context of mining, which implicitly links dependency theory with social movements in a relevant mining context for my research. They state “*At the same time, threats to livelihood might also elicit mobilization motivated by the cultural and psychological losses that might arise when livelihoods are disarticulated*” (p.2995). The authors here claim that communities can mobilize when they feel their livelihoods and culture are threatened, or in other words as I argue their **independence** is placed in jeopardy from mining. As a conclusion, I argue mining companies backed by the State try to dilute local social movements and resistance by

trying to make these same community groups more dependent upon them, despite their adamant public claims to make local communities as self-sufficient as possible. As such this would make the communities less independent and more dependent on the mining sector. It would also offer an important understanding of the reasons driving mining company community relations or conflict.

Mining as an activity causes high levels of environmental and social disruption to local communities as I observed from my field research, past practitioner experience and as also reported by Bebbington et al. (2008), Jenkins (2004) and Kemp et al. (2010). Most community residents with a mining operation located nearby have good reason to complain about excess dust, noise, traffic, cost of living, social problems, migration, water depletion, water pollution and lack of benefits sharing by the mining companies. As argued by Zald and McCarthy (1977) all groups in society share grievances about certain issues or topics; however, very few take collective action to address them. This begs the question therefore of why communities experiencing social and environmental impacts from nearby mining projects do not take any collective action against them whilst other communities do take such group action against the mining companies when the impacts are quite similar in nature.

The debate between social movements, stakeholder and dependency theory was highlighted by King (2008) who posits that both stakeholder and dependency theories are unable to account for providing further insight and details into how collective action occurs against an organization. Therefore social movement theory is the most appropriate for helping to understand how groups such as communities or NGOs may collectively take action and influence a company.

However, after analyzing in this chapter some of the literature from authors such as Bebbington et al. (2008), Gramling and Freudenburg (2006), Kraemer et al. (2013), McAdam and Boudet (2012), Rowley and Moldoveanu, (2003) and Urkidi and Walter

(2011), it becomes apparent that social movements and social identity theories fail to recognize the power that the target organization or institution holds, which can in turn subdue the ‘at risk of mobilization group’ and/or become dependent on this target organization, therefore nullifying any real collective mobilization or resistance.

Using their power to create the dependence of local communities in order to operate would be a highly favourable outcome for mining companies and the State. However, it is also a gamble for them to begin operating where there is no overall community consent or SLO and attempt to wield their power with CSR- and manipulation-related strategies to create local community dependence and some sort of acceptance. It seems from the case of the Huasco Valley, as reported by Urkidi and Walter (2011), that this was indeed the case. Their data are from around 2008 and I intend researching in the Huasco Valley in 2012-2013 to learn how this strategy of nullifying local community mobilization via creating dependence has worked for Barrick Gold.

I hope to address the question of why certain communities mobilize against their nearby mining projects whereas others do not, by assessing how important stakeholder influence strategies, dependency and social movement-related theories and any others may be in providing a credible explanation. Therefore (one of) my main intended contributions is to explore how communities mobilize and resist nearby mining projects in Brazil and Chile. Is there a difference in a more self-sufficient community in terms of how they are able to mobilize against mining-related grievances compared with a more mining dependent community?

As argued by Banerjee (2011), in order to answer questions around levels of community relations and conflict in a mining context, researchers must visit places of resistance, of protest, and livelihood struggles. *“Instead of seeking more answers to the same questions*

we should be asking different questions. A critical research agenda will not seek answers about whether corporate social responsibility improves profitability but instead ask why are communities in different parts of the world protesting against corporations and governments, why are they willing to give up their lives for their struggle (Banerjee, 2011, p.341). The theories of resource dependence, social movements and social identity will help in answering these aforementioned questions.

In addition Banerjee (2011) also calls for researchers to understand the power dynamics between different actors in the contested space of business – community conflict. This is because such conflicts, according to Banerjee (2011), take place in the *“larger political economy of development involving complex power relations between market, state and civil society”* (p.723). This is an important gap in the literature which this thesis aims to address. A final quote from Banerjee (2011) sets the platform for this research:

“What is needed is more research on ethnographies of resistance from the perspective of those whose lives are rapidly becoming unsustainable because their livelihoods are disappearing as a result of industrial expansion. Perhaps these stories may enable us to envision sustainability from multiple perspectives and to imagine different paths to reach that elusive goal.” (Banerjee, 2011 p.729)

To finish this literature review Table 2 is a summation of ten main academic papers on large corporate projects/community relations and conflict reviewed previously. The table synthesizes the papers according to how they report on the strategies taken by the company or State to gain community acceptance; the level and type of community dependence on the (proposed) project; and thirdly the mechanics and dynamics of any collective or social movement (including identity) from the community in relation to the (proposed) project:

Table 2 – Summation table of main academic publications reviewed which focus on large corporate projects – community relations/conflict

Author(s)	Year	Industry Sector	Type of Re-search	State and Corporate influence strategies	Community dependence – independence levels	Social movement/identity perspective	Outcome of conflict (in May 2014)
Walsh	1997	Waste Incinerators in USA.	Archival with some telephone inter-views	Nothing	Nothing	Structural - Needed countrywide support from other organizations as well as political support.	Most of the sitings were successful and communities did not succeed.
Berry, G. R.	2003	Chemical Plant in Louisiana, USA – Japanese – Shintech Inc.	Archival data	<p>Strong political backing.</p> <p>Promises of jobs and \$300m of local economic development and investment.</p> <p>Co-opting of local community committees.</p>	<p>No mention of this mainly because it is about a siting project. However, the chemicals company and government allude to the future of the town as dependent upon the arrival of Shintech.</p>	<p>Structural - A strong well organized community able to connect with other important governmental agents, academia and NGOs was essential for success. Using racial environmental justice as the main framing.</p> <p>“The success of the anti-Shintech coalition would not have been possible without sophisticated legal and political maneuvering (centered on environmental justice considerations) that wedged the federal government in the form of the EPA between Shintech</p>	The plant was not built in Convent, Louisiana due to the success of the community social movement.

						and local and state government elites and agencies” (p.25).	
Lertzman and Vredenburg	2005	Forestry, Canada	Case study with interviews and Archival data review	Company approached indigenous community to be equal partners and decision makers on Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forestry Practices.	The indigenous community appear not to be dependent on the forestry project. However, there is no mention of the native communities’ livelihoods.	Reports a success story of the Nuu-Chah-Nulth elders who had been protesting coming together with scientists and management to a consensus in a decision making panel overseeing the management of the logging project.	Logging still continues.
Shriver and Kennedy	2005	Uranium mining, Picher, Oklahoma USA	Field Research	State supported one community group who wanted relocation.	One group is socially dependent on the community due to cultural, historical and family ties.	Having the support of the governor gave financial and media backing to a group who wanted relocation.	The town was shut down by the government and the community relocated.
Bebbington et al.	2008	Mining projects in Peru and Ecuador	Archival data	State backed foreign mining company projects in Peru and Ecuador. In Peru the gold mining company negotiated with rural community opposition to begin collaboration on CSR and other investment projects. Companies used CSR	In Peru part of the rural community decided to accept social responsibility projects from the mine. This created a level of dependence. In Ecuador however, the community purposely focused on ethnic tourism to avoid dependence on the proposed mining	In Peru a group of local urban intellectuals united to lead collective resistance against the mine and State. In Ecuador the resistance started when a US NGO went to the community to mobilize local resistance. The election of a local indigenous Mayor was an important figurehead and leader for the social movement against the	The gold mine in Peru is suspended. The copper mining project in Ecuador is now in the exploration phase. The outcomes of both mines have reversed since the publication of this paper in

				<p>and local economic development and jobs discourse to gain local community acceptance.</p> <p>In both Ecuador and Peru, State security forces clamped down hard on demonstrators resisting the respective mining projects.</p>	project.	<p>mining project. The mayor wanted to implement a strong indigenous culture in the community. This in turn attracted more interest of foreign NGOs to help with the resistance.</p>	2008.
Bruijn and Whiteman	2009	Gas extraction, Camisea, Peru	Field research	<p>CSR, offer of jobs as well as intimidation of indigenous peoples to relocate.</p>	<p>A minority of the local community accepted jobs in the mining project, however also were vocal in their concerns of the impacts from the mine on their culture and identity.</p>	<p>Foreign NGOs and an organically created community organization mobilized the Machiguenga people to strengthen their identity and rejection of the gas mining project.</p>	<p>The mine was given approval for expansion further into the Amazon jungle where there are uncontacted tribes. A Peruvian legal NGO is currently suing the Peruvian government for this decision.</p>
McAdam et al.	2010	11 Oil and Gas pipeline sitings across develop- ing	Archival	<p>No focus here.</p>	<p>Not relevant to the paper.</p>	<p>Overall found that size and expected impact of project influenced mobilization.</p> <p>Moreover, found that when communities were given an opportunity to voice</p>	<p>All the pipelines have gone ahead</p>

		regions				concerns such as in consultations this led to conflict and protest as it was an ideal opportunity.	
Urkidi and Walter	2011	Gold mine, Huasco Valley, Chile	Field research	<p>Claim that Barrick Gold did not consult meaningfully with the community. The EIA report was too technical for most to comprehend and therefore objected to the mining project.</p> <p>The mining company used CSR and financial incentives to win over local support, which also divided the local community.</p> <p>Barrick accused of imposing its own idea around the local indigenous community identity, history and culture with the aim of gaining acceptance.</p>	<p>Some, a minority in the local community, were dependent upon CSR. The local government was becoming dependent on this investment and taxes. However, few jobs went to the Huasco Valley community.</p> <p>The local community is dependent on water for their livelihoods, and water was at threat from the mining project.</p>	<p>The local community was able to benefit from a national environmental justice NGO called OLCA who took their cause as their flagship campaign.</p> <p>OLCA were able to project this conflict to an international stage, framing it under the issue of climate change and environmental injustice from multinational corporations.</p> <p>OLCA also helped to mobilize the local community in its resistance to the mining project.</p>	<p>At the time of publication in 2011 the Pascua Lama mine was still in the construction stage. Since in April 2013 the mine has been suspended by the Chilean justice courts on environmental grounds and remains until today, i.e. September 2014, suspended.</p>
Slocombe	2012	A Mine in each of Peru, Papua New	Field research at the mines in USA and	Red Dog mine, USA has partnered with local native community organization with the mine. The native	At the two North American mines the communities were partners with the respective mining	The two North American mines had established collective indigenous community organizations who negotiated with the	There have been no changes since the publication of this paper in 2012. The mine

		Guinea, Canada and USA	Canada and archival for Peru and Papua New Guinea	<p>community shares in profits, jobs and CSR from the mine. Also has a decision with the managing of impacts from the mine.</p> <p>Minto Mine, Canada also partnered due to laws with local native community who participate in decision making over running of the mine. Mine provides jobs and CSR benefits. Management of the mine seen as open and responsible. Community relations perceived as strong leading to trust.</p> <p>Tambogrande, Peru – the Canadian mining company proposed local development and minimum environmental impact as a way to gain an SLO. However broke promises.</p> <p>OK Tedi, Papua New Guinea – BHP Billiton did not understand the local culture, context or</p>	<p>projects and therefore dependent on them.</p> <p>In Peru the community was not dependent on the mining company as it had its own livelihood based on agriculture.</p>	<p>mining companies by themselves.</p> <p>However, the US, Peruvian and Papua New Guinea communities worked with civil society actors at times of conflict. This was most prevalent in the Peru case where the community worked together with local, national and international NGOs to help resist the proposed mining project.</p> <p>The affected community in Papua New Guinea collectively took the mining company to the courts of justice in Australia, which led to a community victory in calling for better and more expensive environmental protection from the mine. This led to BHP Billiton selling its majority share in the project.</p>	<p>in Peru was rejected and abandoned. The mine in Papua New Guinea continues, as a State owned mine without BHP Billiton. Both mines in North America operate as usual.</p>
--	--	------------------------	---	--	--	--	--

				communicate well with the local community.			
Kraemer et al.	2013	Mining in India	Field Research	<p>Vedanta mining is claimed to have used CSR as a weapon to counter mobilize against community resistance. The paper claims the mining company was linked to intimidation, violence, threats to local opponents of the mine.</p> <p>The authors also allege Vedanta mining co-opted the well-known local community resistance leader who was the face of their campaign, by offering to pay for his education.</p>	The paper makes one mention of how the community is dependent upon the forest and agriculture resources, threatened by the mine.	Focused on local, national and international movements against the mine. How the interactions between the three levels of groups created friction, tension and mistrust of the others. Seems that the local grassroots movement did not invite all the national and international activists to become involved and saw their participation as a hindrance.	The mining project was actually suspended by the Indian justice courts in late 2013 and remains shut due to community objections (after the publication of this article).

The synthesis from Table 2 shows that only the publications by Bebbington et al. (2008), Urkidi and Walter (2011) and Slocombe (2012) cover all three aspects of corporate/State influence strategies, community dependence and social movements/identity. Only the publication by Urkidi and Walter (2011) was completely based on empirical field research in the mining community. Moreover none of the ten papers explicitly focused on the issue of community dependence on or independence from mining as it relates to corporate/State influence strategies and community resistance. Indeed the three papers that did cover the subject of community dependence on or independence from the mining projects do so within their general case study background context sections. The only paper that takes a detailed process perspective around the interactions and dynamics between the mining company and State influence strategies and the community/NGO responses is the single case study of Kraemer et al. (2013). The articles by Bebbington et al. (2008), Urkidi and Walter (2011) and Slocombe (2012) cover the interactions between both company/State and community/NGO in much less detail and at a higher level as they were based on archival data (with the exception of two of the four case studies researched by Slocombe, 2012).

As a result of this literature review the empirical research will be guided by the following topics:

- The mining company and State influence strategies to gain acceptance from the affected local communities from multiple actor perspectives
- The level of community dependence or independence from the mining project from an affected community perspective
- How affected communities mobilize to resist or collaborate with the nearby mining projects

3.0 Methodology

3.1 Philosophical perspective

All research inquiries and researchers have paradigms around the nature of the world they are to study. These paradigms tell researchers where they sit in the world and of the different relationships within it (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Paradigms are based on beliefs and should be accepted as the faith and choices of researchers just as religious beliefs are widely accepted. Indeed there is no way of verifying the truthfulness of a paradigm, as can be shown by the continual philosophical debates for thousands of years (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). The research paradigm, according to Blaikie (2007) contains assumptions about how researchers understand social reality and consequently how it should be studied.

The research paradigm refers to the *ontological* and *epistemological* assumptions that the researcher holds. This means discussing the assumptions around the nature of social reality (ontology) and a similar set of assumptions about the way in which knowledge of this reality is created (epistemology) (Blaikie, 2007). In order to be as transparent as possible with my research it is important that I reveal my assumptions around how I make sense of social reality as this will inevitably affect the decisions I make surrounding the collection of data and their analysis. There are a number of different ways of understanding different ontological and epistemological positions; however, I am drawing on Blaikie's framework as the author compares and contrasts the various different and divergent positions from positivism to constructivism. Doing so allows me to show how my philosophical perspective compares and contrasts with that of others who may also conduct similar research and in a similar context.

Blaikie (2007) categorizes six different ontological assumptions (as shown in Table 3 which he has based mainly on the work of Bhaskar (1978 in Blaikie, 2007)). The major

distinction that can be made between the positivist/realist and relativist ontologies, (the idealist ontology is often referred to by other thinkers as interpretivist) is that positivist theories in general argue that both natural and social entities exist independently from the activities of the human observer. A positivist also believes in research, which can discover the objective and independent truths, whereas an interpretivist on the other hand believes that each individual has their “own” truth or reality perspective, which is influenced by their social contexts, thus making reality a subjective construction (Guba and Lincoln, 1994).

An inductive approach to research on the other hand is less structured and not linear, and as mentioned earlier, is recursive in nature where the researcher pedals back and forth between the data, themes and research question (Ely et al., 1997). Researchers taking an inductive or grounded theory approach usually have no set theory or only a vague idea of theory on which they are basing their empirical research, as they hope their findings will “speak to them” about where their theory contribution lies. It also works contrary to the deductive approach as it is more bottom-up, whereby the researcher works from observations towards theory building (Burney, 2008).

Table 3 Combinations of Ontological and Epistemological Categories (Adapted from Blaikie, 2007)

Ontology	Objectivism	Subjectivism	Falsification	Neo-Realism	Constructionism	Conventionalism
Positivist (Shallow Realist)	X					
Conceptual Realist		X				
Cautious Realist			X			
Depth Realist				X		
Relativist or Interpretivist					X	
Subtle Realist						

Using the above framework and explanation, it should be possible to argue around the appropriate ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying my PhD research interest. As noted in the introduction section, I am interested in understanding community positions towards nearby mining projects in Brazil and Chile. These are evidently not

tangible objects that can be studied and are in fact subjective phenomena. In other words I could study this subject objectively in a more positivist manner; however, I have chosen to be more involved and conduct the research in a more ethnographic style by being closer and even trying to experience the phenomenon of my research in order to better understand it. In order to ascertain what factors influence the positions community members take towards nearby mines, I, as a researcher, will have to engage extensively with different community and mining company actors in order to ascertain the different interpretations of why communities behave the way they do towards mining companies.

It is therefore clear that my ontological and epistemological assumptions, according to the framework offered earlier, would fall categorically under Relativist or Interpretivist Constructionism respectively thus also ensuring coherence between both types of theoretical assumptions. In the following section I continue to discuss further my choice of research methods for obtaining data for my PhD research.

3.2 Methods used in relevant and similar research

The subject of community conflicts with nearby large projects such as in the extractives sector, energy, natural resources and related infrastructure, has received substantial attention from academic literature at a theoretical level but more so at an empirical level. Furthermore, due to the plethora of consultants and international organizations, such as the World Bank and the United Nations, who work on trying to resolve large extractives sector, natural resources and infrastructure-related community conflicts, there exist extensive amounts of guidance, policies and report publications on the topic. The media also has dealt with this topic substantially from a Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) perspective to a development-related question in developing regions.

The relevant theoretical papers include: Jenkins (2004) who specifically examined CSR and mining/local community conflicts; Calvano (2008) who provides a framework for

analyzing company/local community conflicts; Bebbington et al. (2008) who explain the factors which led to a more successful community resistance to mining in an Equatorial mining community case study in contrast to a Peruvian one; and McAdam et al. (2010) who, through secondary research, attempt to explain why certain communities in certain countries mobilized against oil pipelines and why others did not in developing world regions. All four publications were researched with desktop archival data and without field visits.

3.3 My research methodology

Having outlined earlier the different methodologies used by other similar and relevant works, and moreover in coherence with my chosen ontology and epistemology (interpretivist and constructionist respectively), I decided to use multiple ethnographic case studies as my methodology, given the kind of understanding I was seeking to uncover. Edmondson and McManus (2007) argue that “methodological fit” is necessary to enhance the ability of research in answering its question. They argue that in less mature fields of organizational research, where less is known, that more exploratory qualitative methods would prove fruitful as opposed to the use of positivist quantitative methods, mainly because qualitative methods allow the researcher to gain more in-depth explanatory data to aid in creating an understanding of certain nascent phenomena in the field.

Indeed prominent sociologist McAdam argues, in McAdam et al. (2001; 2010) and McAdam and Boudet (2012), that ethnographical research is best suited to uncover the underlying mechanisms that trigger communities and groups to mobilize against large nearby projects. Therefore unlike any of the previously mentioned publications, I aim to address this gap and research the question around what influences communities to take the positions they do towards nearby mining projects by comparing eight cases via exploratory and in-person qualitative fieldwork. I take such an approach in the hope of building on the current theoretical explanations offered by authors such as Bebbington et

al. (2008), Jenkins (2004), Özkaynak et al. (2012) and Urkidi (2008; 2010) as to what factors influence community positions around nearby mining projects.

The term ‘ethnography’ is used interchangeably with the terms ‘participant observation’ and ‘fieldwork’ (Delamont, 2004). Ethnography is a form of qualitative research and hence corresponds to my stated ontology and epistemology of interpretivist and constructionist respectively, and also aligns well with an inductive research strategy. In addition, ethnography, through spending lengthy amounts of time in the field talking to various relevant informants from different and often competing perspectives (anti-mining and pro-mining), helped me gain a deep understanding of the ways they (community members) construct their social realities, and explain their positions towards the nearby mining projects. By employing ethnography, I was also able to use my five senses to make sense of the relations between company, community and the key issues.

Authors such as Sandelowski (1986), Silverman (2000) and Lincoln (2002), who write on the topic of quality in qualitative research, argue that there is no and should be no prescribed method for qualitative researchers making inclusion or exclusion assessments or attaching weightings to the data. Researchers should instead aim to be as transparent as possible and leave an audit trail regarding the decisions and actions they took right from the start of the research up until the data interpretation. In the following section I outline in a transparent manner how I chose the different case study sites, followed by collection of data and their subsequent analysis.

3.31 Choosing Case Sites

To begin with I give a brief overview of the justification of the selection of my case studies to add important context to understanding the assessment criteria I used for the collated data. I chose multiple case studies, eight in total and this afforded me the luxury of using “polar types” as per Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) “*A particularly important*

theoretical sampling approach is “polar types,” in which a researcher samples extreme (e.g., very high and very low performing) cases in order to more easily observe contrasting patterns in the data” (p.27). According to them using such polar types also allows researchers to identify the different central constructs and relationships within the phenomena being studied.

Therefore I had decided, whilst in the UK, that I would research cases with high levels of conflict, mixed levels between conflict and good relations, and apparent good mining company community relations.

I based my selection of the eight case studies on desktop Internet research, to see which suitable case studies were available in terms of conflicts and supposed best practice cases in Brazil and Chile, and conversations with industry and academic contacts who have worked with this mining company/community context in Brazil and/or Chile. Second, in terms of consideration, I was gaining access to data, but initially I was only willing to visit communities where I could interview company executives as well as local community actors. However, in the case of high level community conflicts in the public sphere, mining companies were reluctant to collaborate with me and eventually I was not able to speak to representatives from Barrick Gold and Pelambres regarding their respective mining projects for my research. I chose Brazil and Chile as my two countries for case studies mainly due to my previous experience of working and living in both countries, my fluency in Spanish and Portuguese and therefore understanding their contexts better than those of other nations. In addition, both countries are important players in the mining industry, Chile for copper and Brazil for iron ore.

I made contact with senior management at the Canadian mining company Kinross Gold, who I knew from my previous research since 2008 and who agreed to speak to me in both their mining operations in Chile and Brazil. In Brazil their operations are in the city of

Paracatu in the Minas Gerais State, and this mine is the largest opencast gold mine in the country. The head of community relations at Anglo American Brazil invited me to their then northern iron ore operations in Amapa State, having told me it was better not to visit Conceição de Mato Dentro as “there is not much to see or research there as everything is at the construction stage” (Personal communication). I eventually visited a rural community in Conceição de Mato Dentro in early 2013 after discovering interesting secondary data and hearing from other community members within the Minas Gerais State of the importance of the conflict at Conceição de Mato Dentro; it is indeed the largest mining project in the world consisting of a 525km mine duct to a port.

Additionally in Brazil I visited two other mining communities, that of Mariana a city in Minas Gerais State where I was told by an academic in sustainability, based at the Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto’s School of Mining, that there was conflict and contention around the proposed construction of a nearby mine by Brazilian multinational Vale and secondly around Barro Alto in Goiás State where Anglo American had won an award by the prestigious national Exame business review for its best practice in community relations.

The remaining two communities I researched were Los Caimanes and Huasco Valley in Chile. I chose both these communities due to their high levels of media coverage and campaigns against their respective mines. The case of Huasco Valley versus Canadian Barrick Gold is the most famous mining conflict in Chile. In the case of Los Caimanes, it is less well known; however, this humble community itself has managed to attract significant social media attention for its conflict with the Pelambres mine (part of London-listed Antofagasta Minerals).

Gaining access to the community perspective was much easier, especially in the communities of conflict. I still nevertheless, made several attempts to gain company

perspectives from Antofagasta Minerals and Barrick Gold on their respective communities in Chile, and also those of Vale and Anglo American in Brazil; however, only Anglo American agreed to meet me, though for the Conceição de Mato Dentro case I was only able to obtain access to their London headquarters management. I also importantly met and conversed with many knowledgeable experts who were not directly related to my case studies and these include industry consultants, academics, national government officials, and mining company officials from companies whose communities I did not research and also mining community members from communities where I was unable to visit. Speaking to external experts helped in confirming and checking my knowledge, theory building and ultimately adding to the validity of my data.

3.4 Data Collection

For each of the eight case studies, I collated data from a variety of data sources. At first I researched the weekly newsletters on mining company community conflicts in Latin America to identify the main three higher conflict communities based in Brazil and Chile. I already had contact with Kinross Gold and the Colla community case study I had begun to research two years prior to the PhD for another research project in northern Chile. The Colla community had taken Kinross to the courts of justice for the environmental and physical impact they were causing to them and their livestock. The Colla had also created roadblocks against vehicles going to the mine in protest at the dust plume they create, the chemical spills and the roadkill of Colla livestock.

For Huasco Valley, Conceição de Mato Dentro and Caimanes I began my research by reading online media and press articles on the conflicts from local, national and international sources as well as watching many different videos of the conflicts. These videos included documentaries by national and international filmmakers who interviewed local protagonists to tell the stories through their eyes as well as accompanying protesters against the mine and visiting the mine itself, speaking briefly to mining company

representatives. I also referred to all the mining company websites to understand their perspectives and communications on local community relations.

It was evident from these weekly newsletters, blogs, videos and other Internet sources that they had consistent episodes of conflict over months from several years back. Such episodes of conflict included:

- Street protests and manifestations
- Legal court cases
- Public assembly meetings
- Involvement of activist civil society organizations in denouncing irresponsibility of the mining companies and projects.

Once I had selected the four higher conflict communities, I began to make contact with authors of the blogs, articles, reports, university dissertations (in the case of Huasco Valley) and documentary films to see if I could speak to them about their views on the reasons behind the current state of company/community relations. Secondly I also asked these knowledgeable experts for contact details of local community leaders and protagonists whom I could contact for my field visits. At the Colla community I already had collected relevant data previously; however, it was important to follow-up on these data with more specific interview questions gleaned from my literature review.

In terms of the four lower conflict communities, there was less publically available data, such as Internet blogs, reports, articles and videos, as there was in essence less conflict in these communities. Paracatu and Mariana (the two higher conflict communities within the lower conflict category) have critical blogs from community members, especially Paracatu which also has at least four Masters level dissertations on the mining community/conflict and related video documentaries such as the “Mountain of Blood” a play on words of the gold mine’s name – Gold Mountain.

The Table in Appendix A lists the different actors I interviewed from the different communities, length of time spent in each community, whom they represent, which case study they are from, the main context and topic of the conversation and questions asked, the date and approximate duration. The interviews with mining company executives are highlighted in blue. The final section of the table shows interviews with actors who are not based specifically in any of the eight case studies; however, I considered them as knowledgeable experts on my research question and therefore their opinions and views have been valuable in understanding and analyzing my data. I spent between 4 and 28 days in each of the eight mining communities when conducting my research. As argued by Fetterman (1989) in Creswell and Miller (2000) “working with people day in and day out for long periods of time is what gives ethnographic research its validity and vitality” (p.128).

Such engagement or extended fieldwork (Johnson, 1997) allows the researcher to gain more in-depth and multiple perspective views from participants to help confirm or disconfirm issues and explanations, in addition to understanding their meanings, sense making and social worlds. I also argue that theoretical validity is enhanced as a result of spending extensive periods in the field, as I did.

In general I always asked my interviewees their views on the following. The questions are based on the literature on social movement and social identity (for a more specific account of questions please refer to the Table in Appendix A):

- The nearby mining company
- Community relations with the mining company
- Why they felt the way they did towards the mining company
- Why they believed the community felt and acted the way it does towards the mining company

- Why they believe mining company community relations are the way they are
- Views around community identity

Along with face-to-face interviews in the communities, constant participation and observation, I was also able to conduct activities around participant drawings on three different occasions with mining company executives and local community residents.

As shown in the Table in Appendix A, I conducted over 220 interviews and held conversations with over 500 people in total with multiple actors including local community residents, local government, mining company executives, relevant practitioners, academics and leaders from communities affected by mining, which I did not visit. In all eight of my case studies I accessed an array of local community perspectives and was also able to gain the mining company perspectives (shaded in blue) for seven of my eight case studies, the exception being for the Huasco Valley where conflict is very high with Barrick Gold and Goldcorp.

However, as shown in the final section of the table, I also attempted to ascertain the views and knowledge of experts such as practitioner/consultants working in the field of mining company community relations in South America, other mining company community relations executives, NGO representatives who focus on mining community conflicts, other mining community leaders and academics who have researched social movement and/or mining company community relations in Chile or Brazil. This final group of interviewees served to strengthen the robustness and validity of my data and conclusions and using such a group is recommended by authors such as Lincoln (2002), Sandelowski (1986) and Silverman (2000). In the following section I continue to discuss how I initially analyzed and made sense of my raw data collected from the field.

3.5 Data Analysis Process

In the following section I offer a step-by-step process of how I analyzed the data. A selection of transcriptions of interviews from all eight communities is located in Appendix E. Due to issues of page and space limitation in this thesis it is not possible to include all transcriptions and my reflections of interviews.

The interviews were transcribed after the first field research visit to three communities. I was able to audio record and also made immediate summaries and my sensemaking within 48 hours of the interviews (which I shared with my supervisor).

Once transcribed, I read the different scripts and accounts from the various actors twice in order to become more familiar with the stories. As I read them over I engaged in first order coding where I was making a note of the most common and salient themes and arguments my interviewees were making with regard to my questions (See Appendix B for an example.) I coded these six salient and recurring themes largely as being:

- a. The community's perception and image of the nearby mining project,
- b. An assessment of the mining company's community relationship,
- c. Environmental, social and economic impact from mining on the community,
- d. History of the mine,
- e. Community identity, and
- f. Mining company influence strategies on the local community.

I next attempted a second level of analysis after having coded these three different sets of case study interviews, by categorizing the views according to mining company or community perspectives on themselves and each other.

However, during my second field research visit to my fourth community, the Huasco Valley in Chile I was able to fully appreciate the difference between this case and the two Brazilian cases of Paracatu and Pedra Branca, and the similarities with the Colla community and Caimanes case in Chile. My main conclusion from this comparison was around the importance of the community level of analysis for understanding why they were able to mobilize or not against the nearby mining projects. It was clear that grievances were widespread at all the mining communities where I had been researching; however, at some such as Huasco Valley, Caimanes and Colla, communities were able to transform their grievances into resistance to the mines, whereas at Paracatu and Pedra Branca the complaints remained as verbal perceptions. My research question had now evolved into explaining this difference in the reaction of mining communities to grievances felt from their respective nearby mining projects.

This implied the familiarization of a new literature field – that of social movements, social identity, NIMBY and contentious politics to help guide my interview questions in this second round of field research. The kind of open-ended questions I was now asking to guide my in-depth conversation included:

- Which factors help you to contest the mine as a collective? Or What prevents you from reacting collectively to the mine's impacts and Why?
- What factors would help you mobilize better against the mine?
- As a community do you have a collective or individual identity?
- Have you always taken this position towards the mine?
- How would you describe your identity as a community?
- What is the ideal solution to your main mining-related grievances?

For the second round of field research I revisited Paracatu in Brazil, the Colla community in Chile and in addition visited Huasco Valley and Caimanes in Chile as well as Mariana and Conceição de Mato Dentro in Brazil for the first time. Again, due to the ethnographic nature of this research not all interviews could be recorded and these were treated more

as opportunistic, improvised conversations as I walked through the communities, unlike the more formal interview procedure where interviewees had arranged a time to meet beforehand and consented to being audio recorded. In cases of conversational type data I would record immediate reflections and summaries of the interviews later the same day.

From this second round of more focused interviews I once again transcribed (See Appendix E) the many hours of audio recordings, together with the immediate journal interview summaries for those interviews I was unable to record. I then tried to make sense of this new data together with the older data and, influenced by the social movements literature I had simultaneously been reading, decided to initially analyze by using four different levels: Institutional, Community, Mine and Individual level. Each of these had a total of 25 sub-factors for understanding my data, and each related to community positions around nearby mining projects (see Appendix C).

My aim with these categorizations was to be able to compare influential factors for company/community relations between cases of conflict and non-conflict. I present my data in terms of displaying the different 25 factors which are colour coded into four different strengths of influence, the darkest blue as “Highly Influential”, medium blue as “Moderately Influential”, light blue as “Not Influential” and the light blue with red outer borders and white font represents factors that are “Absent and Highly Influential”. This final factor refers to a situation where the value is judged to be low or absent, such as community leadership or external agent support; the fact that these are low or non-existent is deemed to be highly influential in explaining community positions towards the mine.

At the same time as trying to make sense of the transcribed interview data I was also conducting other activities to maximize validity. In an attempt to maximize the validity of assessing my data I employed specific strategies or criteria for demonstrating qualitative

validity, such as leaving an audit trail (see Table in the Appendix A), member checks when coding, categorizing, or confirming results with participants, and peer debriefing.

I therefore shared my understanding of the interviews with key interviewees from the community and mining companies after transcribing, reading and making sense of the data. The purpose of these follow-up emails, meetings, phone calls and even presentations to mining company executives, was to confirm that my understanding really represented the views and realities of my interviewees, and furthermore these conversations allowed for further relevant questions to help sharpen my understanding of my research question. Authors such as Blaikie (2007) refer to this idea of confirming sensemaking from interviewees as “reverse translation”. After repeatedly reading through these data to make sense of them and to identify emergent themes based on the social movement, social identity and communities at risk of mobilization literature, I devised a framework through which to present my data and interpretations.

Nonetheless it is worth mentioning that my research strategy, data collection and interpretation was not a linear process. As proposed by Eisenhardt (1989) and Morse et al. (2002), qualitative research such as mine is iterative rather than linear, where I cycled back and forth between design and implementation to ensure coherence and logic among question formulation, literature, data collection strategies, and analysis.

However, in conversation with my PhD panel and others since, such as at the Egos conference where I presented my data analysis, it became clear that these factors, though interesting, do not really reveal the richness of what is going on in each case study. Such an identification of different factors at different levels that explain community positions towards nearby large projects has, to my knowledge, never been published. To do that, a more process oriented lens had to be engaged with, one that would really pick up the interaction of the different socio-economic-historical factors and the process by which

conflict came to be, or did not. In other words as stand-alone factors, the data did not justify the extensive data available for a deep understanding.

The conclusion I came to was that the concept and theory of resource dependence for stakeholders as presented by Frooman (1999) was the core concept that explained the differences why communities were able to mobilize and create conflict for the nearby mining projects. Furthermore, the different socio-economic-historical factors mapped from my data also helped explain the level of community dependence on the nearby mining companies theory. Again, I conducted follow-up member checks with my key informant interviewees from mining communities, companies and external knowledgeable experts, to hear their opinions on the idea of the importance of dependence.

In order to combat issues of bias and enhance validity, as with the first round of research visits, I sensed data were representative and valid when there was a saturation of hearing similar responses from at least five different interviewees.

In order to further address questions of validity and researcher bias in terms of the main emergent codes identified, two of my interview transcripts were “blind coded” by an academic from a Cranfield University management school. This independent coder was not aware of the emergent codes that had already been identified. He identified most of the same first order codes as I and my supervisor had done, which can be argued as further strengthening the validity and addressing researcher bias in data interpretation.

Table 4 lists excerpts of nine specific quotes from the interviews, along with their relevant first order codes. It also demonstrates the rationale and sensemaking for integrating first order codes into second order codes. Finally the table shows the aggregate theoretical dimensions emerging logically from the second order codes. This

analysis was done by a constant iterative process that involved linking the data with theory and the rationale is self-explanatory, as shown in Table 4.

Table 4 – 3.51 Excerpts from 12 quotes to show coding and aggregate theoretical dimensions

Quote	First Order code	Second Order code	Aggregate theoretical code
<i>“we used to make well known cheeses, biscuits and sweet pastries here.....mining is not part of what we do, we have cows and our land, and are happy with that, but mining impacts on all of this. We also used to really enjoy going to the waterfall and playing in the water but we can’t do that anymore as they have destroyed the waterfall, which is the highest in this State, for mining.”</i> (Interviewee code H1, Community Leader)	Negative impacts from mining to local environment to local culture. Land, environment and culture important for community.	Importance of history and ecology for collective identity. Corporate irresponsibility. Incompatibility of mining with local identity.	Collective identity. Stakeholder theory not exercised by mining company. Stakeholder theory not relevant from community perspective.
<i>“I brought up my kids perfectly well without the help of Anglo (American) so why would I need them to help raise my grandchildren? We don’t need them here for their help. We are well and better off without them here causing great impact to our lives.”</i> (Interviewee code H2, Maroon Community Resistance Leader)	No need for mining. More costs than benefits from mining.	Independent identity. Corporate irresponsibility	Resource independence from mine. Stakeholder theory not exercised by mining company.
<i>“As a young child I grew up seeing the mine, it is all I have ever known. Everyone my age or younger here does not know a Paracatu without the mine, so it is not a foreign body to us like it might be in other communities where a new mine is being</i>	Community accustomed to mine.	Mine is part of local historical identity.	Level of community dependence exists on

<i>built.” (Interviewee code C1 Anastasia – Daughter of local politician and local resident)</i>			the mine.
<i>“That mining tailings dam is polluting the valley and many of us grow crops, avocados, courgettes, watermelons...so that dirty and polluted water from the dam will contaminate our crops and then who is going to buy them when they hear they come from Caimanes? Pelambres are offering lots of money to the municipality for us to have better public services if we accept then we become dependent on them! Then Pelambres will be able to do as they please with us and we will be dependent on them without our crops and livestock.” (Interviewee code D1, Los Caimanes Community Defence leader Carlos)</i>	<p>Negative impacts from mining project.</p> <p>Disingenuous mining company</p> <p>CSR as influence strategy and co-optation of local community.</p> <p>Caimanes want to remain independent from mining company.</p>	<p>Corporate irresponsibility.</p> <p>Community dependence on crops.</p> <p>Mining project a threat to community livelihood from crops.</p>	<p>Resource independence from mine.</p> <p>Stakeholder theory not exercised by mining company.</p> <p>Mining company desire to create community dependence.</p>
<i>“I’ve already taken part (in their social responsibility programmes) and I was able to see and I was able to be up close...(Kinross) is very deceitful... they pretend to do lots of capacity building social responsibility to make people more independent but in truth they just make people become more in need of their help; instead of teaching them to fish they give them a chewed up fish.” (Interviewee code C6, Local Cultural and Entrepreneur leader, Paracatu)</i>	<p>Disingenuous mining company</p> <p>CSR as influence strategy and co-optation for local community.</p>	<p>Corporate irresponsibility</p>	<p>Stakeholder theory not exercised by mining company.</p> <p>Mining company desire to create community dependence.</p>
<i>“....crazy about finding local community residents willing to participate in their CSR and social investment projects. They sent social and psychological assistants to go knocking on everybody’s doors to see what information they could find out so they could manipulate them and also try to get them involved in their social projects.” (Interviewee code E2, Community leader and elected local politician).</i>	<p>Disingenuous mining company</p> <p>CSR as influence strategy and co-optation for local</p>	<p>Corporate irresponsibility</p>	<p>Stakeholder theory in action</p> <p>Mining company desire to create community</p>

	community.		dependence.
<p><i>"...that bishop was clearly paid by Pelambres - he was a Pelambrino! He said that Pelambres was willing to pay we eleven hunger strikers and our families generous compensation but we said NO! Again they are always trying to divide us and make us fight amongst ourselves. We insisted we will only accept a deal if it is for everyone in Caimanes! And we will not let them tell us who can and cannot be our leader!"</i> (Interviewee code D1, Carlos, local community activist in Defence Committee, Los Caimanes)</p>	<p>Disingenuous mining company</p> <p>CSR as influence strategy and co-optation for local community.</p> <p>Community leaders' bravery and determination.</p>	<p>Corporate irresponsibility</p> <p>Strong collective identity as resistance against mining company.</p>	<p>Stakeholder theory not exercised by mining company.</p> <p>Example of necessary ingredient for social movement.</p>
<p><i>"Yes its mainly due to the social mobilization department from the State public prosecution that has brought us together to resist the mine"</i> (Interviewee H1, Community leader, Conceição de Mato Dentro)</p>	<p>Need external actor help to resist mining project.</p>	<p>External resources for community mobilization.</p>	<p>Social movement theory in practice.</p>
<p><i>"We are totally united and speak with one voice only. They (the mining companies) try to divide us but we are strongly united and organized. We have formal meetings at our community centre"</i> (Interviewee code B1, Colla community President)</p>	<p>United and well-organized community.</p>	<p>Strong collective identity.</p>	<p>Social movement theory in practice.</p>

The above description of the different steps I took within the data analysis process shows how the process was not linear and that there was substantial cycling back and forth between data and literature (Eisenhardt 1989) and the constant refining of the research question as a result. However, as arduous as this task was it has been worthwhile, considering the final output of a focused and specific research question that addresses a gap in the literature.

4.0 Findings – case study context descriptions

In this findings section I will present contextual descriptions of each of the eight communities I researched so that the reader can gain a better idea about the locations I later analyze and discuss. These case studies will be organized around a timeline; current mining and consultation policy in each region; key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society sectors; non-mining economic activity in each region; corporate strategies for community engagement; and community strategies towards the respective mining projects, before commencing with the first contextual case study of the Huasco Valley. The findings lead to classifying the eight communities into two groups of higher conflict and lower conflict communities and argue that the former is less dependent upon mining than the latter; the lower conflict communities also do have objections towards their nearby mining projects. Table 5 justifies the classification of the eight communities into higher conflict and lower conflict communities. As argued by Zald and McCarthy (1977) all societal groups hold grievances of some sort on certain issues or topics; however, very few take collective action to tackle these grievances. When communities do organize together and take collective action this can manifest itself in conflict, and the kinds of conflict in the context of presenting the research are shown in Table 5.

Table 5 – Different manifestations of conflict at higher and lower conflict mining communities

Higher conflict communities (Huasco Valley, Conceicao de Mato Dentro, Caimanes and Colla) – withholding SLO strategies	Lower conflict communities (Paracatu², Mariana, Pedra Branca and Barro Alto) – SLO strategies
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community-led litigation against mining companies. • Multiple street protests. • Mining project access road blockade protests. • Intense national (and international) social media campaigns against the nearby mining projects (except Colla). • Anti-mining documentary films (except Colla). • Anti-mining company street art and graffiti in the local community (Huasco Valley and Caimanes). • Boycotts of mining company social responsibility initiatives (Huasco Valley and Caimanes). • Hunger strike (Caimanes). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Individual or small group level negotiations with mining company over social responsibility benefits, environmental impact mitigation and more employment. • Scarce and sporadic protests aimed at specific events such as electricity power shortages, a fairer share of economic benefits or proposal of new mining project. • Lower level social media campaigns against nearby mine (Blogs for Paracatu and Mariana). • Higher presence of mining company communication and public relations in nearby communities. • Higher participation by local community in social responsibility and capacity building-related initiatives.

Table 6 below plots the eight different communities in a two by two matrix depicting their respective levels of independence/dependence and conflict. For example it is evident that Huasco Valley has the highest conflict levels and is mainly independent from the nearby mining project. However, the Colla community is the most

² I have included Paracatu as a lower conflict community for this table, though for my analysis I keep it as an isolated hybrid case characterised by high levels of grievance and low levels of conflict.

independent yet conflict levels are lower. The four lower conflict communities are also the most dependent on their nearby mining projects. One can infer from this matrix that there exists a correlation of some sort between independence and conflict levels in the eight mining communities within this study.

Table 6 – Matrix of Independence and Conflict Levels of the Eight Mining communities

	Independent	Dependent
High Conflict	Huasco Valley CMD ³ Caimanes Colla	Paracatu Mariana
Low Conflict		Pedra Branca Barro Alto

This section provides more of a focus and detail on certain case studies, due to their complexities. For example the Huasco Community case study will be the most extensive due to the many different dynamics around the conflict there, whereas at Pedra Branca in Brazil there is much less to report on in terms of community relations with the mining company. All names used from hereon are fictitious to respect the confidentiality of the interviewees. I start with the case of the Huasco Valley below.

Table 7 Current Mining and Community Consultation policy and legislation affecting case studies

Brazil – Conceição de Mato Dentro, Paracatu, Mariana, Pedra Branca and	Chile – Huasco Valley, Caimanes, Colla Community
--	--

³ Conceição de Mato Dentro

Barro Alto	
<p>Brazil has a national Mining Code (Código de Mineração in Portuguese) which dates from 1967 when the country was still a dictatorship.⁴</p> <p>A new mining code is currently being discussed by the Brazilian congress. The new code should be passed later in 2014. Civil society actors have criticized the present proposals of a new Mining Code by the Brazilian government for its lack of substance on social and environmental aspects. Activists argue the proposals for a new mining code are far too focused on the economic aspects of mining.</p>	<p>Chile's free market based economy is highly dependent on (copper) mining exports. The free market economy was imposed during the military regime of Pinochet, which foresaw mining as its central industry. In order to push for this mining focused goal the military regime passed the Organic Constitutional Law on Mining Concessions (1982) and the Mining Code (1983). Nonetheless neither of these laws speak about consultations with affected communities (Bastida et al., 2005).</p>
<p>Brazilian law requires a RIMA (Environmental Impact Report) on all proposed construction or extension projects (Gomez et al., 2006). However there is no explicit mention of consulting communities throughout the RIMA process. The legislation requires applicants to write their EIA report in a comprehensive format for local community residents to read. The RIMA legislation also allows the local government to hold a public hearing for</p>	<p>The Environmental Law 19.300 passed in 1994 requires all projects of high impact to undertake an EIA. Such EIAs should be made available publically for the communities to give comments and expect answers. However, community consultation is not legally required unless projects would affect indigenous peoples.</p>

⁴ See http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Decreto-Lei/Del0227.htm
See <http://www2.camara.leg.br/camaranoticias/noticias/MEIO-AMBIENTE/451188-AMBIENTALISTAS-CONSIDERAM-RETROCESSO-O-PROJETO-DO-NOVO-CODIGO-DE-MINERACAO.html>

<p>potentially affected community residents to voice their concerns; however, this is not legally required in all cases. In short, proponents of large project proposals such as mining are not required to consult local communities (Gomez et al., 2006).</p>	
<p>ILO 169 ratified in 2002 – Right for indigenous and tribal peoples to be consulted, informed and engaged freely prior to deciding on a project that could impact on them.</p> <p>This would only affect the case of Paracatu as it has Maroon people living next to the mine; however they were not consulted. In general the implementation of ILO 169 in Brazil has been criticized by human rights experts ⁵</p>	<p>ILO 169 ratified in 2008 – Right for indigenous and tribal peoples to be consulted, informed and engaged freely prior to deciding on a project that could impact on them.</p> <p>The only community within the researched case studies that was able to use ILO 169 was the Diaguaita community in the Huasco Valley who managed to halt the licence permit application for Canadian mining company Goldcorp. The Diaguaita community claimed they had not been consulted and did not give their consent to constructing a gold mine in their territory.</p>

⁵ <http://www.ihu.unisinos.br/entrevistas/512272-convencao-169-da-oit-o-descaso-brasileiro-entrevista-especial-com-carolina-bellinger>


4.1 Huasco Valley contextual case study

4.11 Huasco Valley Background

The Pascua Lama project is owned by the Canadian multinational mining company Barrick Gold, considered to be one of the largest gold miners in the world. Pascua Lama is located on the border of Chile and Argentina, in the Frontera district at an elevation of 3,800 to 5,200 metres. Pascua Lama is one of the world's largest gold and silver resources with nearly 18 million ounces of proven and probable gold reserves 1,676 million ounces of silver contained within the gold reserves, and an expected mine life of 25 years. Annual production in the first full five years of operation is expected to average 800,000-850,000 ounces of gold and 35 million ounces of silver (Barrick Gold website).

The mining project is also located in the municipality of Alto del Carmen, which is situated in the Huasco Valley in Northern Chile the research focused on the community closest to the project in Alto del Carmen. In the province of Huasco, 66,491 people live of whom 48,040 are concentrated in the capital, Vallenar (Urkidi, 2010). The community of Alto del Carmen, with a population of 4,840, is completely rural; almost 70% of the houses are adobe buildings and 75% of the working population has not completed standard schooling (Urkidi, 2010).

Image 1 – Map of Huasco Valley within Chile



Adapted from Urkidi (2010)

The Huasco valley runs transversally to the Andes, is very deep and has steep slopes. In just 80 km it goes from 674 m above sea level at the village of Alto del Carmen to 5400 m at the highest point of Pascua Lama (Urkidi, 2010). This part of the Atacama desert has largely remained unscathed by mining activity compared to further north which has become obliterated and completely dried up, as argued by my interviewees from the local community and as I was able to see for myself whilst visiting the city of Copiapo 200km north of the Huasco Valley. The people of Alto del Carmen still work in small farms growing food for their own consumption and maintaining herded livestock, mainly goats. 80% of the farming lands are used by small-scale farmers. (Urkidi, 2010).


Image 2 – Huasco Valley



Source: Own photography

According to Standen (2011), the Huasco Valley community has a very strong attachment to the valley, which in turn is closely linked to their identity as a people. In particular, the water from the river Huasco that is sourced from the top of the Andes mountains is of great importance to the community's way of life either as rural peasant farmers or large scale commercial agriculture businesses mainly growing and exporting grapes.

4.12 Timeline for large scale mining in Huasco Valley



4.13 Key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society sectors

Market

- Barrick Gold
- Goldcorp
- Local wealthy landowners and farmers

State

- Chilean justice courts
- National government Ministry of Environment
- Ministry of Mining
- CONADI – National body for Indigenous Peoples’ Development
- Municipal government of Alto del Carmen

Civil Society

- Local community residents’ associations
- Alto del Carmen parish church clergymen and nuns
- Agricultural cooperatives
- OLCA – Santiago based Environmental justice activist organization
- Protest Barrick – Canada based anti-Barrick Gold activist organization
- Environmental justice lawyers representing community

4.14 Economic Activity in Municipality of Alto del Carmen

According to the Municipal statistical report in 2012 there were zero numbers of residents in the Alto del Carmen community working in mining in 2010. Nonetheless 60% of the municipality earned its living from agriculture⁶. Therefore from an economic livelihoods perspective the community of the Huasco Valley is dependent on agriculture and completely independent from mining. Table 8 below shows these figures.

6

http://reportescomunales.bcn.cl/2012/index.php/Alto_del_Carmen#Indicadores_econ.C3.B3micos

Table 8 – Number of people employed by agriculture and mining in the Huasco Valley, 2010

Industry	Number and Percentage employed
Agriculture	522 – 60%
Mining	0 – 0%

Source: Municipal statistical report, 2010

4.15 Corporate strategies for engaging with the local community

In 2005 Barrick Gold decided to buy the silence of one of their main critical opponents, the Water Vigilance Board who signed an agreement with Barrick Gold in June 2005. The Board, made up of mainly large wealthy farmers who had been opposed to Pascua Lama due to the impacts on their grape crops, agreed not to oppose the project upon receiving US\$60 million over several years in compensation for potential impacts from Pascua Lama to their water supplies, and US\$5 million for constructing a small reservoir.

According to Barrick Gold's CSR website www.barrickbeyondborders.com the mining company focused on helping with training for skills and employment in the Huasco Valley. According to the website the then president of Barrick Gold South American claimed "Right from the beginning, we have respected the Diaguita and their ties to the land," Igor Gonzalez, president of Barrick Gold South America. "We opened up the channels of communication and invited members of the community to discuss issues, to openly ask questions and to work together with us on the Pascua-Lama project." (www.barrickbeyondborders.com)

In 2006 Barrick Gold claim to have spent US\$7.9m on local purchasing in the Huasco Valley. Other initiatives towards the local community according to the www.barrickbeyondborders.com website include:

- Funding a local hospital for its upkeep since 2006.

- By end of 2007 Barrick expected to inject US\$16m into the local community and identify 700 potential suppliers.
- From 2006 Barrick also offered training course for farmers and also course in Diaguita pottery and handcraft.
- Controversially Barrick Gold also provided legal support to local community residents who claimed to be Diaguita to gain official recognition as Diaguita people by the Chilean State as this would qualify them as indigenous peoples in eyes of the State and international law.
- Together with NGOs such as América Solidaria Barrick planned to build 700 homes for low-income people in the community and improve schools in an effort to alleviate poverty, this plan known as the Atacama Commitment was endorsed by the UN Global Compact.
- After gauging that they were losing community support and being attacked in the press Barrick decided to publish a letter on their website endorsing the support of six community leaders from the Huasco Valley. In August 2007 Barrick uploaded a letter signed by six different neighbourhood associations underscoring their support for Barrick and Pascua Lama operating in the region. However it is important to note that only one of the neighbourhood representatives who signed the letter of approval was from the Alto del Carmen municipality in the Huasco Valley. This representative is also on the Water Vigilance Board, the group that receives US\$6m from Barrick Gold. The other five representatives who signed the mentioned letter of approval are from the town of Vallenar and Huasco which is even further away near the coast.
- In 2009 Barrick published a Special Report on the [barrickbeyondborders](http://barrickbeyondborders.com) website which underlined the community consultation and dialogue the company claims to have undertaken: “An extensive door-to-door information campaign was organized, with staff visiting residents and providing information. They held nearly 1,000 meetings and dozens of open houses in Chile’s Atacama Region and in Argentina’s Iglesia and Jáchal districts. Members of the Pascua-Lama team talked, they listened and answered questions, engaging with government officials and regulators, academics, scientists, environmentalists, industry associations, media and the public.

Formal consultations took place over 15 months in Chile and 20 months in Argentina.”

- In 2009 Barrick Gold announced later there would be a community water monitoring programme for local residents to independently test the water quality themselves.
- In 2010 Barrick stated it planned to improve the aesthetics of Alto del Carmen and the Huasco Valley in general to help the community development and promote tourism.
- Barrick donated computers for low-income residents in the Huasco Valley to learn computing skills.
- In 2012 Barrick reported that via the Water Vigilance Board fund they had invested US\$15m in improving water supply to the local community mainly by paving the water canals.
- Barrick had spent US\$70m by 2011 in building new roads to the Pascua Lama to not disturb the local communities with their heavy mining traffic.
- By late 2012 Barrick had provided internet and phone access to 150 isolated residents in the Huasco Valley.
- Barrick opened a grievance mechanism system for the Huasco Valley communities so they could make complaints and also increase interaction and community relations.
- Barrick reported on further joint community monitoring of water tests with El Corral community in the Huasco Valley.
- The biggest development of all reported on the Barrick CSR website is the latest news from 29th May, 2014 that Barrick Gold have agreed with a majority of local Diaguita communities to cooperate and collaborate on joint monitoring of impacts and eventually for benefits sharing. As stated on the website: “After six months of dialogue, Barrick has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with 15 Diaguita indigenous communities in Chile’s Huasco province, where the company’s Pascua-Lama project is located.

As part of the agreement, Barrick will make technical and environmental information about the project available to the communities and will provide financial resources and materials required to support analysis of this

information. This will allow the communities to study and better understand the project, its impacts and its environmental controls.

The agreement will see the formation of a technical committee with representatives appointed by each party, and an independent mediator.

“We believe this agreement will form the basis of a new relationship with Diaguita communities, one based on transparency, openness and trust,” said Eduardo Flores, Barrick’s Executive Director in Chile. “Earning that trust will take time, and it will require consistent engagement and commitment. We’re confident that Pascua-Lama is on that path.” (www.barrickbeyondborders.com 2014).

It should also be mentioned that according to the community respondents Barrick Gold began to heavily deaccelerate their local CSR benefits and investment once they realized they did not have community acceptance. One example of this was the ending of providing free wi-fi internet access to the communities near Alto del Carmen the main village in the Huasco Valley.

Overall it would appear that Barrick defended its strategies by using the argument it was in compliance with all national legislation and even went beyond by adhering to internationally regarded best practices regarding community engagement.

4.16 Community strategies towards Pascua Lama

The Pascua Lama project from the outset has divided the Huasco Valley community, especially since Barrick Gold have promised jobs, benefits and general improvements to development to the community. As a result most of the the community started out in the early 2000’s protesting against the proposed mining project. However, by the current day a majority of the community neighbourhood associations in the valley have signed a memorandum of understanding to collaborate with Barrick Gold in jointly understanding the impacts from the mine.

After years of prospecting during the late 1970s, Barrick Gold applied for mining and environmental licences to the Chilean government in 2000 to mine Pascua Lama. Local councillor Lionel Fonseca studied the plans and was horrified at what the impact would be on the local water sources. Lionel told a local nun to read these plans also. The nun was so shocked that she involved the local Catholic church to mobilize and educate the local community about the potential negative harm to their lives and water that could come should Barrick Gold be granted their licences. The nun mobilized the local clergymen and church who started to give masses on the riverbed to symbolize and show to the local community the importance and sacredness of their water supply and moreover how they should protect it from the threat it was facing from pollution and depletion that would be caused by Pascua Lama in the future. This created a ripple effect with more local residents curious to learn more about Pascua Lama and those men who had worked in high altitude mining elsewhere in Chile in the Andes mountains also began to disseminate their technical knowledge and experience of the negative environmental impact of mining to water sources, which increased concerns across the Huasco Valley.

Lionel Fonseca also contacted Santiago based environmental justice NGO OLCA in 2000, who in turn decided to take this challenge as their main cause for justice. Therefore OLCA and the church began educating the local community by framing the arrival of Pascua Lama as a direct threat to their way of life and identities. Between 2001 and 2003 the local church, OLCA and several community leaders including Lionel Fonseca were able to educate, raise awareness and mobilize the local community around the impacts of the Pascua Lama mining project on their lives. This involved painting public walls and the church with anti Pasua Lama slogans and painting the local church's façade depicting the valley now and before as a peaceful and beautiful place and then below showing a hellish image of what the valley would turn into if Pascua Lama was given the go ahead. (See images II and III) In addition OLCA organized screenings of other mining conflicts with communities from around Latin America so the Huasco community could learn about how other regional neighbours were dealing with similar problems. In short OLCA, the church and local leaders had framed the conflict around the banner of water and how Pasuca Lama represented a direct threat and incompatibility with the local livelihoods and culture,


in other words that Pascua Lama would kill the Huasco Valley. Some of the public mural slogans include “water is worth more than gold” and “Pascua Lama is bread for today but hunger for tomorrow” (See image IV). This education and awareness raising that had been provided to a community mainly made up of peasants was clear to see when I spoke to several elderly residents who spoke to me about global climate change, the involvement of George Bush in Barrick Gold and how according to them the CEO of Barrick Gold Peter Munk had stated that “hunger has a price and that if Chilean want to eat they have to pay the price of their glaciers”. This last comment has infuriated many of the local community.

Image 3 – Parish Church with anti mining mural painting in Alto del Carmen, Huasco Valley



Source: Own photography

Image 4 – Close up of Mural of “Before and After” Pascua Lama on the main Parish Church of Huasco Valley in Alto del Carmen



Source: Own photography

**Image 5 – Centre of Alto del Carmen in Huasco Valley slogan “Pa\$cu
Lama Bread for Today – Hunger for Tomorrow**



Source: Own photography

In 2005 Barrick Gold decided to buy the silence of one of their main critical opponents (Urkidi, 2010), the Water Vigilance Board who signed an agreement with Barrick Gold in June 2005 to monitor and improve the water supply to the rest of the valley. The Board, made up of mainly large wealthy farmers who had been opposed to Pascua Lama due to the impacts on their grape crops, agreed not to oppose the project upon receiving US\$60 million over several years in compensation for potential impacts from Pascua Lama to their water supplies, and US\$5 million for constructing a small reservoir. According to my interviewees and also to Urkidi, (2010), the agreement was another important turning point and political opportunity in the conflict and the development of the social movement, mainly because the main economic power who had been together with the anti-Pascua Lama movement had now changed sides and the group opposing Pascua Lama was consequently much weaker in terms of power and resources.

Despite this loss of a strong ally in the fight against Pascua Lama, the movement increased their street protests in the Huasco Valley against the mining project with there being 2,500 participants in the largest street manifestation; also via the Internet OLCA was able to disseminate and escalate the conflict to an international level. This led to Canadian anti-mining NGOs such as *StopBarrick* and *Mining Watch Canadian* offering their support and inviting local Huasco leaders to speak at Barrick's Annual General Meeting in Toronto and at universities about the Huasco Valley conflict. There were also anti-Pascua Lama street protests in London, Cambridge and Barcelona and the international press and filmmakers were also covering the story. A local newspaper poll in the *Diario Chañarcillo* in late March 2005 had shown the overall local community rejection rates to be at 97%; nonetheless many locals were beginning to become despondent and disillusioned knowing that the decisive and legal powers over Pascua Lama's future were held by government, and it appeared that government and Barrick Gold were united in their desire to mine in the Huasco Valley.

However, in late 2006 the Chilean government authorized Pascua Lama but on the basis that Barrick would not touch the glaciers. There were immediate mobilizations and protests; however, shortly after the community became despondent. Though the majority of the community disapproved, they were also resigned to the fact that their government had the final decision, despite the constant attempts by OLCA to create more protests.

Barrick Gold on the other hand stepped up their CSR and community relations campaign by sending many sociologists and anthropologists to engage with the local community in a bid to improve relations. According to my interviewees as well as Salinas (2007), Urkidi (2008) and Standen (2011), Barrick Gold were proactively seeking to become an integrated important cultural actor in the Huasco Valley by sponsoring shows, concerts and other events for the local community; further, Barrick Gold entered into partnership with the Chilean government's Ministry of Health to fund US\$10m in local health-related projects as part of its Atacama agreement.

However, according to my interviewees, as the trust had been broken before with lies from Barrick regarding the glaciers and other impacts from Pascua Lama, many in the local community despite its very basic schooling and low income levels were not interested in receiving “breadcrumbs”, as they referred to them, in the form of CSR in exchange for giving their acceptance or SLO to Barrick Gold. Barbara, a Diaguita leader and Chilean government official also explained that despite low literacy levels amongst the community, they have a tendency not to trust outsiders. Despite the majority of the residents at the Huasco Valley being against Pascua Lama, Barrick Gold were still able to convince a minority of the benefits of the mining project.

Furthermore, Barrick engaged in what could be considered as a manipulative strategy after identifying that their supporters were of Diaguita origin, as were most of the other inhabitants of the Huasco Valley. According to my interviewees from the community, OLCA and external experts, Barrick Gold worked on building good relations and trust with a group of Diaguita people and also took them to meetings in Toronto to demonstrate an SLO by the Diaguita people (even though this group was not representative of the community as a whole).

Barrick Gold helped strengthen the leadership of members of the Diaguita group with whom they had good relations so that they could publically defend the mining company with a legitimate voice. Barrick were accused of creating their own Diaguita leaders who did not have any legitimacy within the established Diaguita community in the valley (Urkidi, 2010). Barrick Gold also realized that in 2006 the Chilean government was going to officially recognize indigenous people and empower them with additional rights about determining how their territory is used as well as offering certain social benefits to them. It was therefore in Barrick’s interests to enjoy good relations with the Diaguita local community and make this public.

Historical reasons are relevant in explaining this as the Diaguita have systematically been lied to and cheated over hundreds of years by different foreign colonizers such as Incas from Peru, Spain and the Chilean State. The mining company published a

book in 2009 on the Diaguita Identity with the help of a well-regarded anthropologist. The book claims, amongst other things, that the Diaguita people's true historical identity is that of miners and that becoming farmers is more of a recent livelihood. Meanwhile, according to all my local community interviewees (Interviewee codes E1-4) Barrick Gold was not adhering to the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) requirements and had partially destroyed the glaciers which had in turn led to reduced water levels in the rivers (which Barrick Gold attributes to global warming). Barrick Gold were also not managing their cyanide in a responsible manner in the mountains having spilled some and also accidentally spilled huge amounts of human excrement from their mining operations into a river down in the valley.

In 2008 the Chilean government signed the International Labour Organization (ILO) Treaty 169 to protect indigenous peoples. This treaty gave indigenous peoples the final say on any large projects to be constructed near them. In April 2012 the Diaguita community in Huasco valley defeated another Canadian mining company – Goldcorp and its gold mining project El Morro – using ILO169, which gave them renewed strength and conviction they could still oust Barrick Gold.

In late 2012 a well-known national environmental lawyer Luis Sanchez approached two Diaguita leaders at the Chilean House of Congress where they had presented their case of injustice for five minutes to Senators, and in which they explained that Barrick Gold had diminished the glaciers and reduced significantly their water supplies. Sanchez, an accomplished lawyer who has successfully defended other indigenous peoples against large hydroelectric and thermoelectric coal power stations in Chile offered his services to the people of Huasco Valley in order for a commission should they win compensation. The Diaguita leaders Barbara and Sandra accepted Soto's offer.

This decision to accept lawyer Sanchez by a few Huasco valley leaders brought to the surface latent tensions, divisions and mistrust within the Huasco Valley community. The community residents such as Lionel Fonseca allied to OLCA and the local

Church were and remain very much against this idea of having Luis Sanchez defend their battle. The argument from this group is of “No Negotiations” with Barrick Gold, that Pascua Lama must be stopped and never accepted. Therefore as per this faction, if the group led by Barbara and Sandra accepted compensation from Barrick Gold, this would give the multinational *carte blanche* to do as it pleased and would lead to the Valley’s destruction. The group led by OLCA and Lionel Fonseca see lawyer Sanchez as only interested in gaining financial compensation and not concerned about the environment of the Huasco Valley.

However, Barbara and Sandra visited all the different official neighbourhoods in the Huasco Valley giving speeches along with two other allies of the communities asking for their approval and signatures to accept Luis Sanchez to represent them in the Chilean courts. The main discourse used to frame their argument was that their first and foremost objective was for mining operations to cease. However, they were also realistic that this may not be possible as it would be them versus the world’s largest mining company and the Chilean State. Therefore they wanted compensation for the damage already incurred from Barrick Gold. They had spent ten years marching and protesting along with OLCA against Pascua Lama and achieved nothing whilst Barrick had been destroying the glaciers and depleting water supplies that was now causing conflicts between neighbours over the amounts of water they can use to irrigate their land. In their view OLCA make a living off the mining conflict and therefore have no desire for the conflict to end.

Eventually Barbara and Sandra obtained enough support from the local community for Luis Sanchez to represent them. By late 2012 Barrick were in financial difficulties with Pascua Lama and received a fine for financial irregularities. In April 2013, Luis Sanchez submitted his request to cease operations at Pascua Lama which was accepted by the Chilean justice along with the self-admittance by Barrick Gold of their failure to comply with environmental regulations surround cyanide management. In May 2013, Barrick Gold received the highest environmental fine in Chilean history of US\$16m for environmental irregularities in particular for non-compliance with the responsible management of cyanide at the mining site and their mine remains

suspended until today over one year later at the time of writing this thesis in June 2014.

In late May 2014 as reported earlier by the Barrick Gold website the mining company signed a memorandum of understanding with 15 communities in the Huasco Valley lead by Sandra and two lawyers including Luis Sanchez to work together with Barrick in jointly identifying environmental impacts of Pascua Lama to the valley. This idea is very much steeped in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human rights, which calls for identification of impacts to human rights ideally conducted in a joint initiative between project and community. Furthermore such an agreement could lead to benefits sharing with the 15 neighbourhood associations just as feared by the groups staunchly opposed to the mine.

Local councillor Orlando who had been together with Sandra in 2012 now moved positions and started a campaign and social movement on Facebook and in the valley called “Creating Valley” denouncing this new agreement between Sandra and Barrick Gold. As a result those opposing the mine lead by Orlando have been marching and protesting again in the community. The Bishop of Copiapó a city 200km away also sent a letter showing his support for those against negotiating with the mine due to the environmental risk.

The result of this agreement has been to further divide the community of Huasco Valley, in fact this division in its strategy for dealing with Barrick Gold has been indicative of the community strategy towards Barrick since the company’s announcement of its arrival to the valley in 2000.

4.2 Conceição de Mato Dentro – contextual case study

According to Anglo American's website the Minas-Rio project, currently under construction is a mining project in Brazil that will have an initial production capacity of 26.5 million tonnes of iron ore for export. With an investment of over US\$5.5 billion, the project includes an iron ore mine and a processing unit in the region of Conceição do Mato Dentro Minas Gerais State, and will have the longest pipeline in the world, at over 525 km long, pass through some 32 municipalities. (Anglo American website).


The Minas-Rio mining project was actually bought the Brazilian iron-ore giant MMX in 2007 and later sold to Anglo American in 2008. MMX is a national Brazilian mining company owned by a well-known and polemical Brazilian oil, gas and mining magnate Eike Batista who was the wealthiest man in Brazil until 2012 and one of the richest in the world.

One of the main controversies surrounding the conflict of this case is that of the location. Conceição de Mato Dentro is considered the eco-tourism capital of Minas Gerais State in Brazil. It is a small historical municipality with colonial buildings dating back 300 years and a population under 18,000 people. Conceição de Mato Dentro is in the Espinhaço Reserve between the endangered Atlantic Forest and the Cerrado and has the State's highest waterfall. (See Image VI).

The main economy and subsistence of the local community in Conceição de Mato Dentro is from small-scale farming, dairy production and eco-tourism. Therefore the arrival of the largest mining project in Brazil if not the world has caused great concern with much of the local community in terms of the environmental and social impacts to the town and region of the arrival of thousands of mining workers and of the physical mining activities.

Imagine V shows the project's location in relation to Brazil and the State of Minas Gerais.

4.21 Timeline for Minas Rio Mineduct project in Conceição de Mato Dentro region



4.22 Key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society sectors

Market

- Anglo American
- MMX
- Hotels, diners, private landlords
- Eco-tourism hotels

State

- Ministry of Mining
- State public prosecution office
- Minas Gerais State politicians Rogério Correia and Padre Joao
- Municipal government of Conceição de Mato Dentro and surrounding villages

Civil Society

- Local community residents' association - REASA
- Local community social movement against mining duct – Atingidos pelo Mineiroduto
- Maroon residents
- GESTA – Federal University of Minas Gerais socio-environmental justice research group

4.23 Economic Activity in Municipality of Conceição de Mato Dentro

According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics the municipality of Conceição de Mato Dentro was heavily dependent on the service sector as opposed to agriculture or heavy industry (including mining). 63% of the GDP of the municipality derives from services; this supports the community views that the region is dependent on eco-tourism and not mining. Agriculture represents 20% of the GDP and Industry such as mining accounts for the least at 17%. Therefore from an economic livelihoods perspective the community Conceição de Mato Dentro is dependent on eco tourism

and consequently rural conservation and seemed independent from mining in 2011. Table 9 below shows these figures.

Table 9 – GDP amount per seconomic sector in Conceicao de Mato Dentro, 2011

Industry	GDP amount and percentage of local economy
Services (including tourism)	91,932,000 reais (63%)
Agriculture	28,758,000 reais (20%)
Industry (including Mining)	25,109,000 (17%)

Source: Municipal statistical report, 2011⁷

4.24 Corporate strategies for engaging with the local community

Compared to Barrick Gold's Pascua Lama mining project the Minas-Rio mineduct, one of the largest and most expensive mining investments in the world surprisingly has scarce data available from Anglo American about their community engagement and CSR. Nonetheless using community summaries and the limited information available from desktop research the following can be put forward.

The corporate strategies for Anglo American are associated by the local community to those of the previous owners MMX. According to my interviewees, their blog sites and from public hearings I watched online the environmental licencing process was fraught with suspicion, a lack of transparency, and alleged political favours so that Eike Batista's MMX could obtain the necessary permits for mining. Almost as soon as MMX had been awarded the licenses just one year later Anglo American successfully bought the Minas – Rio project from Eike Batista for US\$ 5.5billion. It could be interpreted that MMX had done the difficult and more dirty work for Anglo American to have the largest iron-ore mine project in the world.

7

http://www.cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/grafico_cidades.php?codmun=311750&idtema=125&search=minas-gerais|conceicao-do-mato-dentro|produto-interno-bruto-dos-municipios-2011&lang=_EN

Community representatives explained that MMX's initial strategy to gain entry to the area was fraught with manipulation and murky dealings. Several community members as well as GESTA, an academic centre which researches extractive company – community conflicts in the region, of how in 2007 one of Batista's representatives arrived in Conceição de Mato Dentro making enquiries into the possibility of buying up land for horse breeding and farming. Unsuspecting local community residents helped him and sold the representative land, though became suspicious once they noticed how much the representative had bought. Soon after all was revealed that the land had been bought for mining and not agriculture related activities. (GESTA, 2013).

Interviewees and desktop research of videos as well as documents by GESTA (2013) claim that human rights abuses started to happen (from the time of MMX and later Anglo American). Such abuses include intimidation to sell land, to evict long-standing residents from their land, constant blasting and detonations of land near residents' homes, polluting rivers and water supplies, destroying the local waterfall *Passa Sete* and in general not listening to the affected communities. The community argues that large scale mining is not compatible with their agricultural way of life that requires clean access to water. Image VII shows the environmental impact of Anglo American's mining activities to the Passa Sete waterfall and the river. Image VII is also an invitation to a public hearing to discuss Anglo American's alleged human rights abuses.

GESTA and other Human rights organizations denounced the above to the Business and human rights resource centre in 2013 to which Anglo American replied in December 2013 with a position statement available online at <http://www.business-humanrights.org/Links/Repository/1023845/jump>. The mining company argued that the Minas-Rio mining project is properly regulated by all Brazilian authorities for its impacts and therefore in compliance with all legal duties and requirements. Anglo American also acknowledges the Minas-Rio mineduct is complex and impacts communities. In the statement Anglo American also refutes all claims that it has interfered in any gatherings or social movements discussing the mine (Anglo

American, 2013). Indeed it worth highlighting that Anglo American does not apply its award winning SEAT (Socio-Economic Assessment Toolbox) to the communities affected in Conceição de Mato Dentro, the reason being due to the magnitude of impacts at this project as signaled to me by an unnamed Anglo American employee who wished to remain off the record with that comment.

With regards to the claims about forced evictions from land and questionable resettlements of communities Anglo American respond that *“The company emphasizes that it has never used coercion or practiced any violent and/or illegal acts in negotiation processes with land owners. When the removal of landholders has been necessary, such action has always been preceded by a court order and carried out in conjunction with authorities, according to legal guidelines.*

Anglo American has a Land Management Program that respects local and World Bank standards. Negotiations are individual and not collective, as contained in the Land Negotiation Program approved by standing authorities. All resettled families receive social-psychological and livelihood creation support including agricultural capacitation for 3 years after their move”. (Anglo American Statement, 2013).

One of the other main grievances of the communities in Conceição de Mato Dentro is that not all those who are impacted by the construction of the mineduct are recognized as affected by Anglo American. In fact Anglo American only recognizes two communities as impacted. The company’s response is that the identification of impacted communities is carried out by Brazilian government authorities called Copam and that Anglo American only provide some oversight in this identification process. Once again the mining company uses the argument of being in legal compliance to defend its community engagement position.


Nonetheless it should be mentioned that Anglo American have invested considerably in the urban area, as a senior manager from the company explained to me for example having spent millions of dollars on restoring a colonial church and building a

technical training centre for locals to build capacity in mining and construction skills. Furthermore the mining company has developed its programme to purchase and source as much as possible from local vendors and suppliers. In specific as stated in the Anglo American position statement (2013) the company has invested in the following:

- “Preservação”, an Environmental Education Program which benefits 9,100 students and 910 teachers, from 49 schools in the community.
- Construction and remodeling of Health Units and Hospitals in Conceição do Mato Dentro, Dom Joaquim and Alvorada de Minas, including training to medical professionals.
- Local labour development programmes, resulting in a US\$12 million investment in the qualification of professionals in Conceição do Mato Dentro to enable them to find jobs at the project and more widely.
- A partnership with Reprolatina, a sexual health NGO, through which 30,000 people have benefited from either programmes designed to raise awareness or certify sexual health professionals.
- The Mover Program, which provides professional training and qualifications, with lectures, workshops, “mobile” trainings in a bus and via a web portal.
- Promova, a Local Supplier Development Program, which aims to generate 8,000 jobs by 2015.

In summary it would appear Anglo American legitimize and defend their actions and position by stating their compliance and collaboration with Brazilian State authorities, legislation and with international organizations abiding by international norms and best practices

Image 6 – Location of Conceição de Mato Dentro in Brazil



Source: Google Maps

Image 7 – View of Conceição de Mato Dentro



Source: <http://www.alugueldevansbhmg.com.br/passeios-e-aventuras/aluguel-de-van-para-conceicao-do-mato-dentro-mg/>

Image 8 – Invitation to public hearing to discuss alleged impacts to Passa Sete River and Waterfall by Anglo American



Source: Supplied by anonymous community activists

4.25 Community strategies towards Anglo American

In general the urban community of Conceição de Mato Dentro who have hotels, guesthouses, restaurants and other businesses were in general in favour of the mine especially before the commencing of construction. The reason for this positive outlook was related to the anticipated financial returns and profiteering. Indeed inflation in the town has risen by several thousand percent according to my interviewees in terms of housing and accommodation (interviewee codes H1-3).

However, the majority of the community who live in rural areas and even some of the urban dwellers today are very much against the Minas Rio project due to the adverse human rights, social and environmental impacts mentioned earlier. Two well educated up to university level community leaders, Fernanda and Paula tried hard throughout 2010 and 2011 to find organizations, lawyers and political leaders that could help them however, they believe the power of Anglo American and the mining project was so great that most of those they consulted for assistance were co-opted in declining. According to Fernanda and Paula for a lawyer or politician to defend their case against a mining project of this magnitude would mean career suicide. Fernanda and

Paula were though able to enlist the enthusiastic support of GESTA, the academic centre for environmental conflicts based at the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais. The director of GESTA a professor with a PhD in Sociology from the UK has been very involved in this resistance against Anglo American's Minas-Rio project.

However it was the Ministry of State Prosecution (MSP) who are independent of the government and have, since early 2012 with limited financial resources via their Social Movements and Mobilization department helped strengthen the collectiveness of Conceição de Mato Dentro's rural communities that are most affected by the mining project.

Fernanda and Paula approached the MSP in 2012 seeking help to defend their rights against the environmental impact from the mine, against alleged land grabs, fairer compensation from being resettled to new houses in other areas and for supposed intimidation by Anglo American security personnel. Through the MSP's special Minas Gerais State Office of Inclusion and Social Mobilization (CIMOS in Portuguese), attached to the Attorney General of Justice, CIMOS aims to promote dialogue and coordination between the Prosecutors, public institutions and civil society organizations. Its line of action for those purposes is: Public Hearings; Community mobilization and coordination; Procedures for Implementation and Promotion of Social Projects ministerial recommendations, mediation, lectures, events, meetings, studies, research and reflections (Cimos, 2013).

During early 2012 two officials from the local CIMOS visited the affected rural communities of Conceição de Mato Dentro to learn about the grievances and issues facing the communities regarding the Anglo American mine construction. The community explained that they were not able to dialogue effectively with the mining company as they would always refute all claims or injustice and negative impacts. Therefore the representatives of CIMOS suggested the community create a local association to monitor the impacts and moreover, to meet regularly to discuss the important issues. The reason being, as per my conversation with CIMOS

representative Marco, was in order to create a more solid, collective and united local community identity which would in theory help to get more answers and responses from Anglo American. This local association, which has been formalized, is called REASA (in Portuguese). REASA meet periodically with community members and other government officials they also invite Anglo American representatives who do not always attend. In these meetings they discuss the monitoring of environmental, social and human rights impacts (REASA, 2013).

Another important element of the conflict between community and Anglo American is the validity of an independent report compiled by an organization call Diversus into mapping affected communities from the proposed mine and understanding community perceptions. At a meeting between the community and Anglo American (known as Anglo Ferrous locally) on the 10th June, 2010 it was decided by the MSP that Anglo American should finance the research and reporting of an independent study into the affected communities of the Minas Rio mining project. The 365-page report was released in 2011 and came to the conclusion that the environmental, social and cultural impacts on the communities would be severe and moreover that nine different communities would be affected. The response from Anglo American was to refute these claims and argue via their own second diagnostic research that only two communities would be impacted. Therefore only these two communities in Conceição de Mato Dentro should be engaged and compensated. This difference in opinion over who is impacted is at the core of the conflict between community and Anglo American.

Since the publication of the Diversus study and Anglo American's decision to only recognize two communities as officially affected by their operation the groups resisting the mine have called themselves the "Atingidos pela Anglo American" (the Affected by Anglo American). Since mid-2011 the "Atingidos" have been holding frequent highly charged and emotional public hearings at State assemblies in Minas Gerais. These hearings are transmitted live over the internet and also stored on video websites such as YouTube. Image VIII is an invitation to a public hearing by the Atingidos to discuss the alleged Human rights violations by Anglo American. The T-

Shirt on the left side translates as “We are all affected” (written in a bloodied effect) and naming the different communities which Anglo American does not recognize.



Image 9 – Invitation to public hearing with protest t-shirts against mining

Source: Supplied by anonymous community activists

The opposition to Anglo American from the Conceição de Mato Dentro community enjoyed a temporary victory in June 2012 for three months when the Brazilian State ordered Anglo American to suspend all activities as it had been brought to the authorities attention by the community that there were ancient pre-historic caves in the proposed mining site. Since September 2012 mining activity has recommenced, though with certain government and State officials calling for the suspension of the mine in Conceição de Mato Dentro at the public hearings. In October 2013 it was reported by one of Brazil’s main financial news source Exame that Anglo American

are hoping to sue Eike Batista for around US\$1 billion for having sold them the Minas-Rio project with many lies such as having agreements with landowners willing to sell their property as well as all the licenses needed. This has cost Anglo American an additional US\$6 billion. I would further argue that the consistent community resistance from Conceição de Mato Dentro is also a factor contributing to Anglo American's irritation with this mining project.

4.3 Caimanes - contextual case study

Los Caimanes is a very small rural community located in a remote and cut off part of Northern Chile 250km (160 miles) north of the capital Santiago. Caimanes has only a population of 1700 and lies in the fertile Valley of Pupío, most of the community make use of the fertile ground to grow crops such as avocado, courgettes, water melons and others for sale and to make their living. Most locals say they are descended from indigenous peoples though through the years they have forgotten about these traditions.


The road to Los Caimanes is full of winding curves along the mountains and valleys once the vehicle leaves the main Chilean north-south highway. Los Caimanes is a small village like community which one can walk around easily by foot. Many public services are lacking in the community such as basic sanitation and drainage systems. I stayed there during a very cold period of weather and constantly felt the cold even in my small accommodation room. Many men spent their days drinking in one of the few bars from Friday night until Sunday evening and it was common to see intoxicated men stumbling around the main street.

As Los Caimanes is so remote and isolated the community has a strong sense of collectiveness, there is no police presence or other public services one would expect in a community of this size. However, since 2005 plans to build the largest tailings dam in Latin America known as “El Mauro” just 8km from Caimanes has led to community divisions, high levels of grievances and conflict internally and with Pelambres mining company responsible for the dam. El Mauro dam holds 2060 million tons of water and mining waste, and is over double the height of the London Eye (Sargent, 2013).

The main community concerns regarding the dam surround the risk of the dam collapsing in an earthquake, water pollution, its use of local water supplies, and the impact on local agriculture. "El Mauro" is constructed on the same tectonic plate as

the biggest earthquake ever recorded in 1960, which measured 9.5 Richter. Local experts claimed that if the dam collapses the community will have just minutes to escape. To construct the dam underground water flows were diverted, leading to an 80% loss of water in the valley. This has had severe impacts for local agriculture, life in general and culture. It has meant the local community cannot drink the water on tap as they believe and as shown by scientific tests the water is polluted with harmful toxins from El Mauro dam. Image IX shows the dam.

4.31 Los Caimanes and El Mauro tailings dam Timeline



4.32 Key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society sectors

Market

- Pelambres (Antofagasta Mining PLC)

State

- Ministry of Environment
- Head of College of Physicians
- Federal Police

Civil Society

- Local community residents' Defence Committee
- France Libertes – French social justice NGO
- Red Ambiental del Norte – Chilean environmental justice NGO
- London Mining Network – UK based mining affected communities NGO
- Two different lawyers defending Caimanes community against Pelambres

4.33 Economic activity in Caimanes

Los Caimanes is an isolated village with a floating population of between 800 -1500 at any time of the year. It does not have its own municipality or elected government councillors, instead the village belongs to the municipality of Los Vilos. However, as the small coastal town of Los Vilos is located 47km away down from the valley or a one hour car journey the aggregated economic activity data for Los Vilos is not accurate for specifically describing los Caimanes economic activity.

However, in accordance with those interviewed in Caimanes for this research (Interviewee code D1) most residents work evenly between supplying services to other nearby mining projects (not El Mauro dam) and working in agriculture. As such the community of Caimanes though fairly dependent on mining is not dependent on El Mauro dam for their economic livelihoods.

4.34 Corporate Strategies with the local community

Since 2005 Pelambres mine planned to build one the largest tailings dams in South America. From the outset Pelambres faced community opposition to the proposed project due to fears around safety. Pelambres response was to fight the conflict in the courts with a community leader and landowner Vicente Ulloa. In 2006 Vicente Ulloa won the court battle and Pelambre's response via its owners the Luksic family (Chile's wealthiest family) appealed and made an out of court offer for settlement and purchase of Vicente Ulloa's land.

In 2007 Vicente Ulloa and his lawyer did a deal for US\$24m with Pelambres mine to sell his land for El Mauro tailings dam. This lead to a deep division with Caimanes community which still exists up until the present day. Indeed it should be stated that Pelambres attempted continuously to hold dialogue and negotiate with the Caimanes Defence committee throughout 2010 and 2011, however no agreements were reached.

Pelambres entered into negotiations and dialogue with Claudio and his defence committee in 2009. Pelambres' strategy was to pay for resettling the whole of Caimanes to a new location safe from El Mauro tailings dam. However as Claudio explained to me (and in many press reports):

*"Our people have lived here for over 500 years they (Pelambres) have to move away and close down here! They want to send us away and pay for new homes but if they do then they owe us compensation for that and to **all** of us, not just to some"*
(interviewee code, Community leader, D1 p.)

By mid 2010 the dialogue had not advanced much and were full of heated arguments between both parties. Pelambres sensed they were not welcome in Caimanes. The village was painted in anti-Pelambres graffiti and slogans with several houses flying black flags to show their collective mourning at the plight of Caimanes. Therefore Pelambres CSR strategy was to remain low key, and the only programme was the sponsoring of a children's football tournament and the offering of free wi fi internet to

Caimanes. In 2012 Pelambres also financed the building of a sewage system for Caimanes via the municipality for several million dollars.

Pelambres decided to take a lawsuit against Claudio and his lawyers for “illegally” blocking their payment of the US\$5m donation to the rest of Caimanes in mid 2010. Pelambres also ordered for a change of community leadership and did not want to continue in talks with Claudio and the other leaders. Pelambres claimed openly as per my interviewees and in Chilean newspaper *The Clinic*’s article that Claudio and his co-leaders were after personal economic gain and therefore they wanted a change in community leaders.

In order to show their anger 11 local community residents including three Caimanes Defence Committee members (not including Claudio) barricaded themselves in a school in September 2012 and went on hunger strike. Pelambres’ next strategy was to send in a bishop from the region to the school to act as negotiator with between mining company and community.

In general Pelambres strategy towards the accusations and claims made at them by the community and NGOs around the safety of the dam and its impacts to local water sources has been that of negation. Pelambres categorically denies that their talings dam is polluting the local water sources with dangerous inhumane toxins despite tests and reports by the Chilean College of Physicians. Instead Pelambres has used the Chilean Ministry of Health to prove the contrary and even sent a representative of the Ministry of Health to Caimanes community to drink local water in front of the community to substantiate his claim.

The strategy of denial and acquittal of all accusations of negative impacts made by communities and civil society actors is also heavily employed by Pelambres. In addition Pelambres also utilizes the argument of being in compliance with legislation and working together with the government.

Image 10 – El Mauro tailings dam



Source: Colectivo audiovisual de registro de la memoria histórica de Caimanes

4.35 Community strategies towards Pelambres

Back in 2004 the then community leader Vicente Ulloa anticipated the worst for Caimanes when becoming aware of Pelambres' proposed tailings dam just 8km away. Vicente, the main landowner of where El Mauro was to be built defended the community by taking legal action against Pelambres and taking part in various street protests and marches against the proposed mining project. In 2006 Vicente Ulloa was successful in his legal challenge against Pelambres mine, which is owned by Chile's wealthiest family, the Luksic.

In 2007 Vicente Ulloa and his lawyer did a deal for US\$24m with Pelambres mine to sell his land for El Mauro tailings dam. Vicente decided also to donate a sum of around US\$1m to the Caimanes community leaders. This sudden change caused outrage amongst much of the community who felt betrayed, and what was a very closely knit community quickly became divided up until today with one side taking the other to court over accepting the donations from Vicente Ulloa.

A new neighbourhood committee was born in 2007 lead by one very passionate, expressive and vocal leader called Claudio Fuentes. Along with his other co-leaders equally as courageous they decided to mobilize the community against Pelambres mine. These leaders were also trade union leaders at mining companies so had the knowhow of how to mobilize groups. Claudio and his supporters are very active at engaging the national and international media. There are many video reports and articles by national and European journalists of the group's struggles and resistance on the internet.

As noted during the field visit to Caimanes the majority of the community are with the Caimanes Defence Committee and against Pelambres mining company. However, the community is now divided as a minority still hopes to inherit part of the generous donation promised by previous leader Vicente Ulloa. The new community leaders have also taken a much more direct and aggressive approach towards mobilizing against Pelambres, For example the leaders often block the main access road to the mine with burning tyres (See image IX) to protest and request for more mineral water for the community. The leaders have also painted anti-Pelambres mining slogans around the public areas of the village and several houses have black flags to show their mourning for the situation upheaval they are undergoing with regards to El Mauro tailings dam. (See image 10).

Image 11 – Caimanes Defence Committee member blocking access route to mine



Source: <http://airepurovalpo.blogspot.co.uk/2012/09/pueblo-de-caimanes-corta-ruta-de.html>

The group of Caimanes defence committee leaders around 12 locals in 2010 went on hunger strike in defence of their plight in the hope Pelambres would offer the community new housing in another location on the community's terms and conditions. Pelambres sent a Bishop to negotiate an end to the hunger strike and offer the community a resettlement deal, only on their terms as a mining company. The hunger strikers did not accept and after becoming very weak ended the strike after 88 days. Claudio Fuentes and three other leaders were invited twice to the French parliament to receive bravery medals for their resistance to Pelambres. Indeed it should be stated that Pelambres attempted continuously to hold dialogue and negotiate with the Caimanes Defence committee throughout 2010 and 2011, however no agreements were reached.

Cladio Fuentes and his lawyers were also taken to court by Pelambres mine for preventing the donations of money to other community members, which in March 2013 Claudio successfully defended in court. This was seen as an important victory by the community over Pelambres, and has made relations with the mining company even worse. Claudio claimed also that Pelambres offered him a blank cheque (in the Chile se Moviliza documentary aired on national Chilean television in 2013) in the

hope he would stop resisting and mobilizing the community against the mine with roadblocks and protests and by featuring in press reports.

In May 2014 the Caimanes defence committee achieved another victory against Pelambres' El Mauro dam. According to Vasquez (2014) in an on-line news report the Chilean justice courts categorized el Mauro dam as “ruinous” and ordered it to reduce its capacity by 40% in order to mitigate risks to the nearby community in Caimanes.

Image 12 – Anti Pelambres message in Caimanes Street



Source – Own photo

The above message translates as “The Defence committee will fight until death against Pelambres Mining company. We will fight for our rights as citizens. We will not allow Pelambres Mining company to abuse us as they think they can change our way of thinking by buying people. The caricature figure of the man is Andronico Luksic the wealthiest man in Chile and one of the wealthiest in Latin America, owner of Pelambres Mining company.

4.4 Colla community context

The Colla of Río Jorquera are a small group of 88 people or 35 - 40 families living scattered across the mountainous valley road that connects Chile with Argentina from the town of Tierra Amarilla around 1000m altitude up to around 3500m altitude higher up the road. At the highest point of the road just before the border crossing to Argentina at around 4500m is where Kinross Gold's Maricunga Gold mine is located. There are several other gold and copper mines located in this region, many of which use the same access road where the Colla live to travel to and from their mines. The nearest large city to the Colla community is that of Copiapó, which is located over 800km north of the capital Santiago in the driest desert of the world, the Atacama. Just 200km south is the Huasco Valley where the Diaguita people live with Barrick Gold's Pascua Lama goldmine. Image 12 shows a map of where the Kinross Gold Maricunga.

The Colla community no longer speak the language of their ancestors; they only speak Spanish and have lost many of their traditions. However, as their president explained to me they still continue to follow their transhumance custom where they herd their livestock (mainly sheep) from one grazing ground to another, as from lowlands to highlands, with the changing of seasons. The Colla as a people have also received recognition by The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a "Living Human Treasure" in September 2012, being the only indigenous group in Chile to receive such acknowledgement.


The Colla people also cultivate crops such as alfafa in the small flat areas between mountains, which they use for own consumption and also for selling. Overall the Colla community repeatedly expressed to me their great satisfaction and desire to live in peace and harmony with pachamama or nature, just as they had done for so many years and generations. The Colla community consider the land where they live as *their* territory even though legally the land belongs to the Chilean State. In a similar way to the Diaguitas to the south the Colla do not recognize the Spanish colonization in the 16th Century which later lead to the birth of Chile.

Image 13 – Location of Kinross Gold Maricunga Mine in Region III of Chile



Source: Kinross Gold website

4.41 Timeline of Colla Community – Kinross Gold



4.42 Key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society sectors

Market

- Kinross Gold

State

- Chilean justice courts
- National government Ministry of Environment
- CONADI – National body for Indigenous Peoples' Development

Civil Society

- Local community residents' association
- Lawyer representing community
- UNESCO

4.43 Economic Activity for Los Colla

As with the case of Los Caimanes the Colla of Río Jorquera community which is even smaller consists of around 40 families living high up in the mountains on the road to the Maricunga mine. Nonetheless, the municipality that addresses the Colla of Río Jorquera community is that of Tierra Amarilla located three hours by car from the Colla residents and between 80km – 130km from the homes of the Colla residents. Therefore as with the case of Caimanes the economic data for Tierra Amarilla should be considered as inappropriate for the approximately 40 families of the Colla of Río Jorquera.

Nonetheless as ascertained from the interviews with Colla community members most of the families make their living from subsistence farming of alfafa and sheep rearing which forms a central part of their indigenous identity (Interviewee Code B1, Community leaders p.). It should also be mentioned that a few of the male residents have worked in artisanal mining and even one of the younger male members had been hired as a trainee at the Maricunga mine. Overall, from the interviewees it was

apparent that the Colla of Río Jorquera community are not dependent on the Maricunga mine and instead are dependent on the land and water for their livelihoods.

4.44 Corporate engagement strategies with the local community

Since 2005 Kinross Gold has worked with the Colla community as part of the CSR programme and donated items such as fences, health insurance subsidies and modest college scholarships to some Colla residents. Kinross have also offered capacity building courses such as cake baking, all of which the Colla community perceive as too little for dealing with their main grievances. Since 2007 Kinross and the Colla community have also been discussing the development of an ethno/eco tourism project for the community.

Officially for Kinross the main influence strategy with their local communities is to be a “good neighbour” and to always leave communities several Kinross executives I spoke with in Chile in 2009 (Interviewee code B3). Kinross also aim to be a good neighbour as stated in the CSR policy known as the Ten Kinross Guiding Principles (website consulted 30th July, 2013).

Examples of influence strategies used by Kinross Maricunga include offering partial school scholarships to some of the Colla’s children as well as contributing towards health visit costs for the Colla. Kinross Gold has also organized entrepreneurship courses for the local community Colla such as for making cup cakes and commencing an eco/ethno-tourism project. Kinross also donated fences to a Colla farmer so he can keep his animals safe from the road, this is the social responsibility case study Kinross highlights on its Community section of their corporate website. Kinross Gold Maricunga set their whole terms of engagement for their relationship and influence strategy with the Colla around what they refer to as the *Protocolo* in Spanish which can be translated as a Cooperation Agreement.

The Cooperation Agreement (a confidential document which the Colla allowed me to access) states that both the Colla community of the Jorquera River and its affluent will use a Dialogue Table as an instance for their mutual cooperation, and in order for Kinross to socially assist the Colla people on the aforementioned areas of education, health and entrepreneurship. However, as stated at the start of this section on the Colla community, this community's main grievance was not as they repeatedly expressed over the course of four years to me as wanting more social benefits. The community wanted the dust and environmental spills to cease from mining related traffic heading to and from the Maricunga mine. This subject about grievances and nuisance from mining traffic was what can be interpreted as being where the SLO for Kinross Gold can be maintained or lost.

Since 2009 Kinross Gold has been in conversations with the regional Ministry of Public Works and the Colla community about getting the road asphalted to reduce dust being dispersed. In 2011-12 the road was partially asphalted and hence the dust problem was improved. However it seems Kinross did not resolve all of the Colla's grievances as the community continued to complain about dust, chemical spills by vehicles and hitting and killing their livestock animals on the road outside the Colla houses. As such the relationship has been tested in the Chilean courts, therefore Kinross have decided to engage with the Colla in the legal courts as deemed appropriate between 2011 and 2013 on these aforementioned complaints.

Overall as summarized by a Kinross employee the engagement with the Colla is cordial yet formal at the same time:

"Our relationship is like Peru with Chile who have diplomatic relations...where they have international trade as normal but at the same time they also have legal disputes regarding on border at the international criminal court in The Hague. It's the same for us, on the one hand we have good day to day relations with the Colla we partner with them in environmental monitoring of the mine road, we give them social benefits and assistance yet they are also suing us for complaint and issues related to the road" (Interviewee code B4, Community relations executive Kinross Maricunga).

The strategy of denial and acquittal of all accusations of negative impacts made by communities is also heavily employed by Kinross.

4.45 Community strategies towards Kinross Maricunga

Thus with the beginning of mining operations by Kinross Gold at Maricunga, the sudden surge in new heavy duty mining vehicles passing right by the Colla people's houses along the dirt road was the source of the main complaints despite the mine being located 20km from the nearest community members. This is because the road although an official international road connecting Chile with Argentina was hardly used by vehicles on a frequent basis. This international road was also just a narrow dirt track full of large holes (between 2008 and 2010 when I last visited the mine).

According to Colla leaders (interviewee code B1) the Colla community had to be proactive in 2005 and literally knock of the doors of the Maricunga mine to start some sort of dialogue. Thereafter came the protocol for framing and governing the relationship. As the Colla people became increasingly frustrated with the dust pollution and chemical spills and injuring of their livestock animals by vehicles traveling to and from the mine some residents created road blocks on at least two occasions.

However, the main strategy used by the Colla people is that of legal litigation against Kinross Gold. The Colla of Río Jorquera have the aid of a non-Colla woman lawyer, Solange who now lives in the community married to one of the leaders. Solange has defended the community against the environmental impacts of a few mining companies. It is alleged by mining company officials that the Colla community has managed to obtain several hundred thousand dollars in out of court settlements.

Images 13 and 14 show large and high plumes of dust caused by vehicles going to and from the mine being carried by the wind to the Colla's houses, livestock and alfafa plantations (See image 13 and 14).

Image 14 and 15 – Mining vehicles leaving dust plume by Colla houses



Source: Own photography



Source: Own photography

Image 16 –Myself with Colla member at his house next to access road to mine



Source: Own photography


4.6 Paracatu community context

The largest gold mine in Brazil located in the historic city of Paracatu in north western Minas Gerais state, 230km west from the national capital Brasilia (See image 16). The city of 85,000 was founded under colonial rule due to its gold deposits, however has also since become an agricultural power. Indeed before the arrival of the mine 1987 most of the local population made their living from artisanal mining whereby they would pan for their own gold using their own makeshift equipment and then sell the gold they extracted the same day in the city centre

The open cast gold mine, in operation since 1987 is only 2km from the city centre and also borders with Maroon communities such as Sao Domingos and several others. Maroon communities known as Quilombolas in Portuguese are the descendants of African slaves who were able to escape slavery and establish their own hidden communities hundreds of years ago. The mine also has one of Latin America's largest tailings dams which is located very close to the community of Lagoa. The satellite image 17 allows for an appreciation of the dimensions of the mine and tailings dam in comparison so Paracatu a medium sized city.

The Morro de Ouro mine changed hands from UK Rio Tinto to Kinross Gold in 2005. The mine directly employs 10% (interviewee code C8) of the formal workforce and also provides work to subcontractors and creates business for other products and services such as hotels, restaurants, housing and others. Kinross officials claim that one in four families has a member who works directly or indirectly at the mine.

4.61 Timeline of Morro de Ouro mine in Paracatu



4.62 Key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society

Market

- Kinross Gold
- Paracatu business associations
- Mining supplies and services, hotels, diners and small businesses serving Kinross
- Large agri-business

State

- Ministry of Environment
- State public prosecution office
- Minas Gerais State level politicians (temporarily)
- Municipal government of Paracatu

Civil Society

- Dr. Samuel medical doctor and community leader resisting mine now located in Germany
- Alerta Paracatu – blog critiquing the environmental and health impacts from the mine
- Various neighbourhood associations bordering the minesite
- Maroon associations and leaders (for and against the mine)
- Caritas – Catholic social justice organization
- Trade union
- Various social and education based organizations partnering with Kinross.

4.63 Economic activity in Municipality of Paracatu

According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics the municipality of Paracatu was mainly dependent on the services and industrial sector, which includes mining. Paracatu has a burgeoning education sector with the growth of new universities and this is reflected in the services statistics. Agriculture only accounted for 22% of Paracatu's GDP income. This corroborates the view from Kinross (interviewee code C8) that the mine directly employs 10% of the city's workforce. However, it should also be taken into account that those working in agriculture may not formally reveal their incomes, and many interviewees in Paracatu did state that agriculture employs more people than mining. However the statistics from IBGE contradict this argument.

Table 10 below shows these figures.

Table 10 – GDP per economic sector in Paracatu, 2011

Industry	GDP amount and percentage of local economy
Agriculture	426, 087, 000 reais (22%)
Services	778,345,000 reais (40%)
Industry (including Mining)	746,032,000 (38%)

Source: Municipal statistical report, 2011⁸

4.64 Corporate engagement strategies with the local community

The guiding principles of Kinross' influence strategies for maintaining its SLO are also the same as those of Maricunga, Chile as both mines are under the same Kinross Gold Corporation headquartered in Toronto, Canada. Therefore the influence strategies with the local community in Paracatu have been focused around being good neighbours, capacity building in partnerships with the local community to ensure they become more self-sufficient and less dependent on the mine.

8

http://www.cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/grafico_cidades.php?lang=&codmun=314700&idtema=125&search=minas-gerais%7Cparacatu%7Cproduto-interno-bruto-dos-municipios-2011

Examples include their “Partners” programme where local NGOs can apply for partial funding for educational and cultural projects, funding for Paracatu’s main hospital, a community centre and a small park amongst others. However for the vast majority of the local community I spoke with over two years between 2011 and 2013 it was perceived that Kinross does the absolute minimum in terms of social responsibility and giving back to the community in order to comply with the law and other requirements. The existing social responsibility programmes are judged by most of the local community as too little considering how much the mining company profits with precious natural resources from the community’s land. In summary this community perspective can be summarized as a timid, closed, absent and silent community engagement strategy.

Many of the local community residents claim that since Kinross Gold bought the mine from Rio Tinto relations have become colder and that Kinross is spending less on community investment. However, Kinross Gold officials explained to me they were targeting their CSR programmes more strategically for the sustainable futures of the local community, so that they can learn how to become self-sufficient as opposed to receiving hand outs and money. For example Kinross Gold believes in investing in capacity building programmes with the local community where there local NGOs also contribute money towards the initiative.

According to the Kinross Gold website the mine in Paracatu engages heavily with the local community these include:

- The local supplier pre-qualification program
- The annual Partnership Seminar process for selection of community projects for support by the mine,
- Several education and vocational training programs in partnership with the local schools and universities of Paracatu.
- Active participant in the development of Paracatu’s Sustainability Development Plan 2030, a community-driven initiative by ADESP, the sustainable development agency of Paracatu. The process began in 2009 and involved several rounds of workshops, community discussions, and studies, all

designed to form consensus around the key areas of focus for the community in planning for its long-term sustainability.

Kinross also claims on its website and in interviews with myself to conduct periodic dialogue with nearby affected neighbourhoods to discuss grievances around the noise and vibrations from the blasting of rocks and other inconveniences. The company also has a grievance mechanism for community residents to be able to complain by telephone or in person at the mine. However the quality of these consultations can leave much to desire as explained by a community resident:

“they (Kinross) are very open and willing to speak, if I call them now they will immediately in their Kinross trucks and sit down very cordially to have coffee and listen to us then they will tell us they will resolve our problem and say goodbye and that’s it! After that nothing happens ever! They are great at listening but never resolve anything for us they just ‘rolar rolar’ (Brazilian slang for talking extensively and knowing you will not help or solve the problem). So what good is being a good listener for us? The detonations and pollution continues!!”
Interviewee code C7, community resident, Paracatu).

Other interviewees had described the community dialogue forums held by Kinross as an example of the power imbalances between company and community (interviewee code C7).

Kinross has also had numerous demands from previously evicted dweller from land it acquired asking for compensation due to their status as Quilombola people (Maroon) descendents of African slaves. The mine has had to resettle and/evict many families over the years as it has expanded, which has also caused great conflict. Many of the dwellers in neighbourhoods such as Santa Rita and Machadinho who are of Maroon descent did not have the legal deeds or entitlement papers to prove they owned the land. Such residents were therefore evicted off the land with no compensation. Residents of Morreiras and Alto de Colina neighbourhoods are also expecting to be resettled now. This land issue has caused much strife and conflict in the past. On the

Kinross website the company affirms it acted within the confines of national and international law on these issues.


The Maroon settlement on the edge of the Kinross mine called Sao Domingos has been perhaps the most contentious for the company in terms of community engagement. The Maroon neighbourhood of Sao Domingos is arguably the best place to learn of the different dynamics and issues playing out with regards to relations between community and mining company. Sao Domingos borders with the mine's lands. Kinross Gold has placed a fence along the community so that none of the residents can enter into what used to be there land and now is property of the mining company. The mining company also exploded a waterfall in the community as well as changing the course of a river that ran through the community. Sao Domingos is also where Kinross Gold focuses much of its CSR and community relations.

The community in Sao Domingos has therefore become divided between those led by a university educated lady who argues they should not accept the alleged "breadcrumbs" of CSR in the form of a minimum salary and payment of electricity bills from Kinross to monitor environmental impacts from the mine in exchange for what consists of destroying their ancestral lands and community in the views of certain residents from Sao Domingos and Paracatu.

However, another group who are now recognized as the official community leaders defend Kinross Gold and openly testify to their good relations. This has resulted in the lady opposing Kinross having to flee Sao Domingos due to death threats. This story represents the divisions in Paracatu regarding the mine and moreover the importance of power and influence with regards to the mining company in determining relations. Images 18 and 19 show scenes from Paracatu's historic city centre and of a typical house in Sao Domingos maroon with my interviewees.

There are other much darker alleged aspects to Kinross' community engagement strategy which is not publicized and operates under the radar making use of its tremendous local power. According to an anonymous former employee from the mine and other interviewees Kinross acts in mysterious ways conducting surveillance of any detractors and even employees to ensure they behave in a manner appropriate to Kinross. With regards to detractors community interviewees maintain that the mining company co-opts them by either hiring them as consultants or simply pays them off. During one of my visits to Paracatu whilst there were municipal elections a Kinross management representative explained to me that they had told the chamber of councilors to suspend a public hearing and discussion about the detonations at the mine because they did not want this to turn into a political issue. As such the public hearing was cancelled. This also demonstrates and supports the view from several community interviewees that the mine is "the Almighty" (todopoderoso in Portuguese).

Image 17 – Map of Paracatu in Brazil



Source: Google Maps

Image 18 – Satellite view of Paracatu and Morro de Ouro mine



Source: Google Maps

4.65 Community strategies towards Kinross

When asking the local community residents overall about their perceptions of the mine their first reactionary response to tell of the daily explosions of rock using dynamite at the mine cause cracks in many of these residents' houses. Even more of a grievance was the view from the community of a toxic dust that covers their houses and affects their health on a daily basis.

Unlike at the previous four communities Paracatu has no strong vocal opposition against the nearby mine. During the mid 2000s there was a local community leader, Dr. Samuel who mobilized much of the population against the mine. However, after a few years of several protests and media reports he left Paracatu for Germany, many

locals claim he was offered a sum of money to leave the mining company alone. Indeed they claim this story has been repeated with many others who openly criticise the mine. Since then Samuel has been communicating his opposition against Kinross Gold's mine via an internet blog which he runs from Germany. A 60 minute documentary film called "Morro de Sangue" from 2008 that translates as "The mountain of Blood" instead of "Mountain of Gold" a play on the mine's name, was also produced and available on youtube. The Morro de Sangue documentary focuses on all the supposed human rights violations caused by the mine including the lethal shooting of a young man by the mining company security staff for supposedly mining illegally on the company's lands.

Most others in the community have tried to engage and collaborate with Kinross in its various CSR initiatives such as "Partners" via their own NGOs. The example of Sao Domingos Maroon also serves as a good example here. One side of the community which is lead by a law graduate is hoping to litigate against Kinross for its environmental impacts to their ancestral lands. However, the other side of the Maroon who are now the official elected leaders insist on engaging in good harmonious relations with the Kinross and partake in CSR initiatives and allegedly receive small payments of money to monitor the environmental impacts to their neighbourhood. There have also been other examples from those in the community who were evicted from their land due to expansion plans by Kinross to litigate against Kinross. Therefore in general the community strategy in Paracatu has been one of either collaboration or one of conflict in which those opposed have resisted the mine individually and not collectively as in other mining communities.

Image 19 – View of Paracatu’s Muncipal Chamber



Source: Paracatu.net

Image 20 – Typical house and residents in Sao Domingos Maroon community



Source: Paracatu.net

4.7 Mariana community context

Mariana is the first capital of Minas Gerais State. It is a historical and picturesque town of 55,000 inhabitants also founded on gold mining and slavery. Mariana is located within the *Quadrilátero Ferrífero* (the Iron Quadrangle), the size of a very large metropolitan city. This iron triangle is abundant with high quality iron ore mines and related businesses where Brazilian mining company Vale is highly active and has been for decades.

Vale therefore has a strong legacy in Mariana, as before, when it was a State-owned company, it offered good quality housing to its workers based in Mariana. Such benefits, in addition to a reliance on mining, have helped create more of a dependency culture in Mariana on the mining industry. Though there are not any mines located within 5kms of Mariana just yet, there are several large iron ore mines within 20km of the town which is where most of the local residents go to work. The city is visibly very reliant on the mining industry. During my time there the city centre streets were inundated with men and some women in mining company overalls at certain times of the day. All my community respondents explained to me that there is no other industry in Mariana except for mining, even though in my view it has enormous potential due to its beauty and rich heritage.


4.71 Proposed reactivation of Mina del Rey in Mariana

The main issue with regards to my research subject is that of the threat of a lush and green mountain 4km away and visible from the city centre being mined for Iron-ore by Brazilian mining multinational Vale. Images 21 show the possible impacts of the proposed mina del rey. The town already has several mines located 30km away which, has caused Mariana to increase rapidly in terms of population. It now faces a housing shortage, high rents and property prices, constant heavy traffic, crime and drug levels. Most people in the town welcome the new proposed mine due to the creation of jobs and income generation. Most locals work in other nearby mines or in services that live off or supply mining. The local economy is very mining dependent. Local residents told me how much of the local community was already planning to

extend their houses to build new rooms to rent out or buying houses in areas near the mine in the hope they would be given compensation by Vale. The essence of these anecdotes was to highlight the “wild west” culture one of my interviewees described the local community of possessing, one of profiteering at all costs.

Several of the local community residents who have businesses confided that they are against the opening of Mina del Rey as the town can no longer accept more migrants, traffic, and inflation due to mining and hold concerns due to the potential impacts to their water. However, these individuals have their hands tied as their clients all come from the mining sector and from Vale in particular.

4.72 Timeline of Reactivation of Mina del Rey in Mariana



Images 19 and 20 show some of the typical sights of Mariana.

Image 21 – View of Mariana



Source: Flickrriver.com

Image 22 – Two colonial churches in Mariana



Source: Flickrriver.com

4.73 Key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society

Market

- Vale
- Eco and Heretige tourism providers
- Mining supplies and services, hotels, diners and small businesses serving Kinross

State

- Ministry of Mines and Energy
- Ministry of Environment
- State public prosecution office
- Municipal government of Mariana
- IPHAN - National Institute of Historic and Artistic Heritage

Civil Society

- Academics in social movement against the reactivation of mine.

4.74 Economic activity in Municipality of Mariana

According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics the municipality of Mariana was highly dependent on the industrial sector, which includes mining as it represents 80% of Mariana's GDP contributions. The heretige tourism sector which interviewees referred to as important accounts for 19%, a much lower figure than mining. Agriculture only accounted for 1% of Mariana's GDP income.

The official figures demonstrate that Mariana is dependent on the mining sector as argued by interviewees (Interviewee code F1-F5). Table 11 below shows these figures.

Table 11 – GDP per economic sector in Mariana, 2011

Industry	GDP amount and percentage of local economy
Agriculture	17,799,000 reais (1%)
Services	1,034,075,000 reais (19%)
Industry (including Mining)	4,312,828,000 (80%)

Source: Municipal statistical report, 2011⁹

4.75 Corporate engagement strategies

Vale also has a long history and strong tradition of social responsibility in Mariana and nearby as many of its workers reside in and around Mariana and work in other nearby towns. Mariana falls within the *Quadrilátero Ferrífero* (the Iron Quadrangle) and area roughly the size of greater London in the state of Minas Gerais full of high quality iron-ore mines and related businesses where Vale is highly active and has

9

http://cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/grafico_cidades.php?lang=&codmun=314000&idtema=125&search=minas-gerais%7Cmariana%7Cproduto-interno-bruto-dos-municipios-2011

been for decades. Vale therefore has a strong legacy in Mariana, before when it was a State owned company it offered good quality housing to its workers based in Mariana. Vale organizes frequent cultural and musical concerns and shows in Mariana. The mining company also runs its emblematic stream train from Mariana for paying tourists to travel through the nearby countryside and mountains. Vale has built a modern train station with playground area and small park for children in Mariana. These actions and the legacy from before contribute towards a highly positive image of Vale from the majority of the population who work in mining or mining related areas.

As argued by some of the minority academics opposed to the reactivation of the Mina del Rey Vale are maintaining silent over their plans for this mine though are being astute in engaging in more aggressive public relations in Mariana about their image and identity as a social responsibility corporation committed to sustainable development, in the hope they can secure their SLO from a local community which holds Vale in an even higher esteem. As put forward by one university lecturer Claudio:

“The (mining) company is distributing various information (newsletter) in the homes of residents on their good deeds and actions that has been performing. But actually I realize this is just a social obligation, as it is exempt from various taxes. The company does not say anything about the issue of reactivation of Mina Del Rey The company says nothing about Mina Del Rey The company is only making propaganda about its “good things”, related to job creation, conservation areas, development...”
(Interviewee code F1 local resident opposing reactivation of mine, Mariana).

Community strategy towards ValeA small group of academics together with a local councillor reacted strongly in 2011 to the news of vale’s plans to reactivate the mine by mobilizing collectively and holding public hearings, creating online blogs, petitions and holding protest marches and even holding anti-mine banners at the top of the colonial church during the visit of the Brazilian President. .Academics have worked with students on communicating more to the local community about the negative impacts that reactivating the mine would bring about, however over the

months apathy has set in especially since Vale have remained so quiet about their plans.

Nonetheless these academics also point to the fact that Mariana is so heavily dependent on mining in general (as shown by the Economy activity figure for Mariana above) that their mobilization will never gain the force and traction needed. For example the owner of a blog opposing the reactivation of the mine remains anonymous and would not even tell me his name in correspondence because he teaches engineering at a university and most of his students are from mining companies. one dentist who spoke out against the mine lost clients as a consequence. For the majority of Mariana's residents it is a source of pride to wear a Vale uniform. The head of a local trade union also explained how the power of Vale is unchallenged by any actors and institutions in the local community. If challenged, Vale are able to quite easily co-opt and obstruct any threats. (Interviewee code F4).

Image 23 – View of *Future Mine* from Mariana




Source: <http://preservemariana.blogspot.com.br/2013/07/assine-contra-reativacao-da-mina-del.html>

4.8 Pedra Branca de Amaparí community context

The iron-ore mine in Pedra Branca de Amaparí belonged to Anglo American at the time of my visit in 2012. The mine is not located near the community of Pedra Branca de Amaparí, it is around 15km distance and therefore there is little dust or noise impact. The Pedra Branca iron-ore mine came as part of the Minas-Rio package deal with Eike Batista's MMX. Therefore Anglo American were obliged to purchase the Amapa mine which MMX had been operating since 2007.

4.81 Timeline of Mining near Pedra Branca de Amaparí



4.82 Key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society

Market

- Anglo American
- MMX
- Zamin Resources

State

- Municipal government of Pedra Branca

Civil Society

- Artisan miners
- Social NGOs partner with mining company

4.83 Economic activity in Municipality of Pedra Branca de Amapari

According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics the municipality of Pedra Branca is mainly reliant on services for its economy (55%) followed by industry which would be the large and only mine in the region (39%). Agriculture only represents 6% of the GDP contribution which reflects the lack of reference by interviewees in the town to the agriculture sector.

Table 12 below shows these figures.

Table 12 – GDP per economic sector in Pedra Branca de Amapari, 2011

Industry	GDP amount and percentage of local economy
Agriculture	16,488,000 reais (6%)
Services	147,092,000 reais (55%)
Industry (including Mining)	102,703,000 (39%)

Source: Municipal statistical report, 2011¹⁰

4.84 Corporate engagement strategies

Interviews with company representatives in Pedra Branca often started off with a reference to the previous large American mining operations Icomi in the town until the 1990s, which according to them had created a dependency culture with the community. Such a culture according to Anglo American employees is directly contrary to their corporate values with regards to local communities.

Anglo American did not aim to solve all the community's problems and instead wanted to transfer its belief in self sufficiency to the local community. The employees I spoke with from Anglo American stated that they would not do the same as Icomi and make the community dependent and then leave them high and dry suddenly when they need to leave. Instead as per the interviewees employed at Anglo American the mining company focuses on its own sustainability principles which are directed from headquarters in London. These focus areas include community income generation projects for self-sufficiency and local sourcing and employment.

One example of Anglo American's influence strategy was to donate 8,000 açai (Brazilian fruit) seedlings to local peasant farmers. Anglo American had also executed their award winning SEAT community development and relations management toolkit at Pedra Branca. Overall it seemed that Anglo American had a SLO and community perceptions were closely linked to private benefits accrued from the mining company mainly in the form of jobs there. If a local resident had a job there she/he was much more likely to hold a positive view of the company, if not then the contrary was true. Anglo American offers jobs, training, and has a social investment fund of several million reais which it pays to the municipal government to administer for local investment.

10

http://www.cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/grafico_cidades.php?lang=&codmun=160015&idtema=125&search=amapa%7Cpedra-branca-do-amapari%7Cproduto-interno-bruto-dos-municipios-2011


4.85 Community influence strategies towards Anglo American.

The local community in Pedra Branca has a very short history from the 1990s at most. There had been isolated incidents of community protest against the mine due to electricity outages caused by rainstorms. The majority of the local residents hope to work at the mine and complain if not given work there, however as in all the mining communities. In general there were not highly negative perceptions of the mine and certainly no organized community mobilization against the mine. Some residents complained about the vibration from the heavy industrial train that passes through the town causing damage to the structures and walls of basic houses.

One local resident referring to a land rights dispute where MinCorp have evicted him off their land, similar to GoldMin in Chile and Brazil. The resident had been mining for gold on the land MMX/Anglo American bought. Together with 17 other artisanal miners evicted from the land they would be taking legal action against Anglo America and also shaming them with video footage on the internet. It was evident that the local economy is dependent on the mine. However, locals were unsatisfied with the amount of CSR investment made by Anglo American in 2012 especially when comparing to Icomi from decades past and even MMX who apparently were more generous to the community.

In 2013 Anglo American decided to sell its major share in the mine to Indian based mining company Zamit Resources. Pedra Branca is a small municipality of around 11,000 inhabitants in the far northern state of Amapa (see image 22). From Sao Paulo it takes four hours by plane to arrive to the state capital Macapa. To put into context the dimension of Brazil the equator line passes through Macapa, whereas the tropic of Capricorn passes through Sao Paulo. From Macapa to Pedra Branca it is a further 180km.

Image 24 – Map of Pedra Branca de Amaparí in relation to Brazil



Source: Google Maps

In most interviews and conversations with local residents I was told about the importance of understanding the historical and political context surrounding the State and town. This is because the state only came into existence in 1943 separating from the larger Pará state to the south. Amapá borders with French Guyana and is strategically located in equatorial waters in the Atlantic Ocean.

Amapa is around the size of England, yet with a total population of just 700,000 (about 80 times less than England's population), therefore much of the state is uninhabited. Amapa's economy took off in 1953 when American mining company Icomi found large deposits of Manganese and began massive operations to mine this near Pedra Branca de Amaparai in the town of Serra de Navio. Icomi brought much development to Amapa and practically managed the State in terms of providing education, hospitals and commerce and overall this was highly appreciated by the local community who viewed it as superior to the rest of Brazilian standards. However by the 1990s Icomi had started to abandon Amapa and then the Federal and State government became the main drivers of the economy.

The importance of this on the local culture and identity is in having created a paternalistic mentality. According to my interviewees the local community expect many free hand outs from the State. The State senator for Amapa is a well known long time Brazilian politician José Sarney often linked with acts of paternalism for winning votes. The education standards in Amapa are much lower than that of the southern half of Brazil. Northern and North Eastern Brazil in many aspects and regions are more akin to sub-Saharan Africa. José Sarney has helped increased the population of Amapa by inviting many impoverished families from the even poorer State of Maranhao with the promise of land and some money. Underage prostitution is rife in Amapa and even encouraged by some of the parents of the girls despite being illegal. Apart from mining there is also much agriculture in niche fruits such as açai berries and forestry plantations

The history of Pedra Branca de Amaparí where the mine is located is short, as it was founded in 1992 due to mineral exploration. An important freight train railway crosses through Pedra Branca from the large mine down to the port where the minerals are shipped to other parts of the world. The town has very poor infrastructure, few sections of the roads are paved for pedestrians. There are several supermarkets and pharmacies and even banks with ATMs. (See image 23 for a view of a typical street in Pedra Branca)

The railway line is a source of contention with the local community who complain about its vibrations that crack their houses or how intoxicated people have been hit and injured by the train. Before the arrival of Anglo American the few local residents of Pedra Branca made a living from artisanal mining, however Anglo American evicted them having acquired the land for mining iron-ore. Another source of conflict is with the alleged pollution of the main river which locals living near the river claim has killed most of the fish. However, the numbers of such locals are very low of around 20-25 people. Anglo American claimed that the pollution was due to Icomi from years ago.

Image 25 - view of a typical street in Pedra Branca




Source: http://emanoelreis.wordpress.com/2013/03/25/pedra_branca_buracos_lam/

4.9 Barro Alto community context

This small town of Barro Alto has just 9,000 people is located in the central Brazilian state of Goiás. It is 220km by road from the Brazilian capital Brasilia and 45km from the nearest medium sized town that has urban infrastructure, called Goianense. (See image 24 for a map). Therefore it is isolated and in the middle of a green, rural and fertile region. The town of Barro Alto was only established and officially recognized around 60 years ago as a municipality.

4.91 Timeline for Anglo American in Barro Alto



4.92 Key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society

Market

- Anglo American
- Local commerce, accommodation provisers, and small businesses.

State

- Municipal government of Barro Alto

Civil Society

- CARE – International NGO partners with Anglo American
- Agenda Pública – Sao Paulo based Revenue Transparency focused NGO

4.93 Economic activity in Municipality of Barro Alto

According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics the municipality of Barro Alto is mainly reliant on services for its economy (56%) followed by industry which would be the large and only mine in the region (29%). Agriculture represents the least income to the local GDP with 25% of the GDP.

Table 13 below shows these figures.

Table 13 – GDP per economic sector in Barro Alto, 2011

Industry	GDP amount and percentage of local economy
Agriculture	16,488,000 reais (25%)
Services	147,092,000 reais (56%)
Industry (including Mining)	102,703,000 (29%)

Source: Municipal statistical report, 2011¹¹

4.94 Corporate engagement strategies

When Anglo American finally arrived to operate in 2006 they spent a year building community relations before constructing their mining operations as it was essential for the company to understand the local context in order to gain good community relations.

As with other Anglo American operations the company guides its community engagement by the corporate set values around helping communities become self-sufficient via entrepreneurship projects, skills training programmes and capacity building of local government in revenue transparency and investment of Anglo American's social fund.

In order to meet these community engagement strategies Anglo American has partnered with external NGOs who are now based in Barro Alto working on social and entrepreneurship projects in the hope to supply milk and trees to Anglo American that include CARE, Reprolatina and Agenda Publica.

The hope is also for local small scale farmers to grow vegetables to supply Anglo American's cafeteria as part of a local development initiative. Like in the urban centre of Conceição de Mato Dentro and Pedra Branca Anglo American also provides a social investment fund to the municipal government to spend on public services. Anglo American partners with an NGO from Sao Paulo based in Barro Alto called Agenda Publica that builds capacity in local government on how to be more transparent, accountable and invest strategically the tax revenues paid by Anglo American. The company has also paid for the construction of a new hospital for the community. Overall most the local community I spoke were in favour of Anglo American and grateful for their presence.

11

http://cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/grafico_cidades.php?lang=&codmun=520320&idtema=125&search=goias%7Cbarro-alto%7Cproduto-interno-bruto-dos-municipios-2011

In late 2012 Anglo American was awarded the prize for most sustainable company in Brazil by the prestigious Brazilian *Revista Exame* (a business review) for its open and transparent dialogue at the annual community Forum started since 2007 and in addition for its partnerships and results with Care and Agenda Publica. Anglo American states its aim is to build local capacity so that it is not dependent upon them as their mine expects to close in around 40 years, and the company feels the responsibility to leave behind a legacy making the community self-sufficient.

However, in the coming years Anglo American expects to start mining for nickel closer to the residents of Barro Alto and in their sight. Based on the community perceptions in Barro Alto this probably will not be as much of an issue as that of employment and generating local economic opportunities, however environmental impact will most certainly give any detractors another reason to oppose the company.

4.95 Community influence strategies towards Anglo American

The population was 40% lower before Anglo American started construction of their Nickel mine in 2006 (Grisotto, 2012), the rapid increase in population has been due to speculation and anticipation of financial gains and opportunities from the mine. Anglo American's mining operations and processing plant is located some 10km away approximately from Barro Alto, therefore environmental and visual impacts are almost minimal to the local community. Barro Alto has a very strong air of a small town setting in the old far west of the USA, as shown in films. The town lacks many modern features of other Brazilian urban centres, as well any more historical ones such as churches and colonial buildings.

Image 26 – Map of Barro Alto in relation to Brazil



The population grew by 50% from 6000 to 9000 in just a few years due to the expectation around employment and income related opportunities from the commencement of operations at Anglo American's mine in Barro Alto. Due to the recent history and the fact people moved there on speculation of gold mining there is not a collective identity or even a civic or civil society culture. Most people are materially and financially driven. The community had been lead to believe the mineral there was gold and that they would become wealthy as a result of new mining operations. They also see the minerals there as very much belonging to them and not to the Brazilian State as is the case legally. Thus it is clear to see that Barro Alto very much welcomed the mining project.

Image 27 – Aerial view of Barro Alto



After a year the construction phase of the mine started in 2007 this meant an influx of several thousand male manual workers from all over Brazil. Once the mining operations were built the community was expecting to maximize financial gains renting out rooms, properties, supplying the mine, selling products and services to mining personnel assuming that the majority of the new mining workers and executives would reside in Barro Alto, however, this was not the case and still up until today is not the case. The fact that mining executives in particular do not live in Barro Alto and that the mining bonanza never materialized as locals expect is the major source of contention amongst a vocal minority.

This collective anger manifested itself in particular every November from 2008 at Anglo American's annual local forum. Anglo American use this forum to make announcements to the local community about its coming year operations; hiring and social investment plans and needs in the hope that potential local suppliers and employees would apply for work and contracts.

However, according to my interviewees from Anglo American and from their funded NGO partner CARE there is little skilled capacity in the local community to supply and work for Anglo American. Furthermore, as per my mining company interviewees, the local residents were trying to charge extortionate rental fees for a low standard room or house in a very basic village/town, with few modern facilities, no good private schools or hospitals and therefore did not meet minimum living standards required by mining company executives or supervisors. Certain local community residents I interviewed counter argued that Barro Alto should be much better since Anglo American's arrival and additional tax revenues and instead it has not improved as much as it should have.

The issue of environmental impact did not seem to concern locals. The staunchest critics of Anglo American explained all they wanted was for a certain family member to get a job there or to be able to supply the mine with a certain product or service. In the first three of four annual local forums certain local community residents shouted, protested and insulted Anglo American. Until 2010-11 there seemed to be a higher level of conflict.

The following table offers a summary of the context cases presented above.

Table 14 - Summary of Context Cases

	Description of Stakeholders	Extent of conflict	Environmental Issues	Social Issues	Key NGO and Activist organizations	Current Economic Activity	US Dollar Costs of mining project
Huasco Valley	<p>Barrick Gold – Second largest Gold mining company in the world.</p> <p>Rural community of around 5,000 inhabitants. Divided into 35 formal neighbourhood associations</p> <p>Local elected government.</p> <p>National politicians supporting the suspension of Pascua Lama.</p> <p>Ministry of environment</p> <p>Corporate/Community Lawyers/Mediators</p> <p>Parish Church</p> <p>Water Vigilance Board/Wealthy farmers</p> <p>Comunidad Agrícola Huasco Altinos – Indigenous farmers opposed to large scale mining in the</p>	<p>High level of conflict. Majority of community is against large scale mining in the Valley. Frequent anti mining protests over last decade.</p> <p>Legal challenges to Barrick. Chilean courts forced Pascua to suspend operations in April 2013.</p>	<p>Threat to glaciers and water sources from mining at top of mountains. Water supply has diminished.</p> <p>Cyanide spills at minesite (lead to suspension of mine).</p>	Influence and co-optation strategies by Barrick have angered and divided much of local community.	<p>OLCA</p> <p>Protest Barrick</p> <p>Local Church</p> <p>Agriculture cooperative Huasco Alto</p>	Agriculture	\$8.5bn

	<p>Valley.</p> <p>OLCA – Environmental Justice activist organization based in Santiago – very active in the Huasco Valley</p> <p>Protest Barrick – Canadian based activist organization holds Barrick Gold accountable for actions.</p> <p>Mining Watch Canada - activist organization on Canadian mining company around the world.</p>						
Conceição de Mato Dentro	<p>Anglo American – one of the largest mining companies in the world.</p> <p>Multiple rural communities affected by mineduct construction.</p> <p>CIMOS – organized affected rural community residents.</p> <p>Atingidos pelo mineiroduto (The affected by the mineduct)</p> <p>Two State level politicians opening backing more regulation and even suspension of the mineduct construction work.</p> <p>Governmental Environmental licencing authorities</p> <p>Urban community – Conceição de Mato Dentro</p>	<p>High conflict level.</p> <p>Numerous public hearings</p> <p>Calls from State environmental authorities to suspend works due to irregularities in licencing process in June 2014.</p> <p>Alleged forced evictions of Maroon residents from their lands.</p> <p>Construction work temporarily suspended for three months in 2012</p>	<p>Impacts to water sources.</p> <p>Detonations and dust.</p> <p>Destruction of the highest waterfall in the State symbol of the eco-tourism industry.</p>	<p>Hyper inflation in mining towns affecting rent and accommodation shortage.</p> <p>Influx of thousands of male migrants to work in construction.</p> <p>Increased traffic.</p> <p>Workers in Anglo American's supply chain in Conceição de Mato Dentro working in slave-like condition including men from Haiti in 2014.</p> <p>Threat to Eco-</p>	<p>GESTA</p> <p>CIMOS</p> <p>State Prosector</p>	<p>Services sector</p>	<p>\$8.8bn</p>

	State Public Prosecutor GESTA – University activist and research group	Alleged security surveillance of activist/community gatherings		Tourism image of town and transformation to a mining identity. Resettlements and evictions from land.			
Caimanes	<p>Pelambres (Antofagasta Minerals listed on FTSE100 stock exchange).</p> <p>Caimanes defence committee – strong community leaders</p> <p>Ministry of Environment</p> <p>Head of College of Physicians – tested water to prove it is toxic</p> <p>Federal Police – worked with Head of College of Physicians</p> <p>Local community residents’ Defence Committee</p> <p>France Libertes – French social justice NGO</p> <p>Red Ambiental del Norte – Chilean environmental justice NGO</p> <p>London Mining Network – UK based mining affected communities NGO</p> <p>Two different lawyers defending Caimanes c community against Pelambres</p>	<p>High level of conflict</p> <p>Road blocks by community members on road to tailings dam.</p> <p>Community leaders locked themselves in school for over 100 days in 2010 to go on hunger strike.</p> <p>Community Vs Company court battles.</p> <p>Pelambres mine fined over US\$3 in 2013 for non compliance with environmental rules.</p> <p>Capacity of dam reduced by 40% due to court order in 2014.</p>	<p>Threat of dam breaking and flooding in earthquake.</p> <p>Toxins from tailings dam contaminating local water supplies according to community and their tests.</p> <p>No potable or drinking water available according to community.</p>	<p>Divided community due to compensation payment by Pelambres.</p>	<p>France Libertes – French social justice NGO</p> <p>Red Ambiental del Norte – Chilean environmental justice NGO</p> <p>London Mining Network – UK based mining affected communities NGO</p>	Agriculture and Services	\$600mn

Colla	<p>Kinross Gold – World's 4th largest Gold mining company from Canada.</p> <p>Chilean justice courts</p> <p>National government Ministry of Environment</p> <p>CONADI – National body for Indigenous Peoples' Development</p> <p>Local community residents' association</p> <p>Lawyer representing community</p> <p>UNESCO</p>	<p>Medium-High.</p> <p>Several court litigations by Colla to Kinross for environmental impact to them and their livelihoods.</p> <p>However on a daily basis they also collaborate on CSR projects.</p>	<p>Dust pollution from traffic.</p> <p>Chemical spills on road and territory.</p> <p>Hitting of livestock by mining vehicles.</p>	<p>Mining traffic prevents the transhumance tradition of the Colla who migrate with sheep over summer and winter.</p> <p>Feel stigmatized and discriminated by mining companies for being indigenous.</p>	None	Agriculture	\$290m for expansion costs only in 2010.
Paracatu	<p>Kinross Gold– World's 4th largest Gold mining company from Canada.</p> <p>Paracatu business associations – supportive of Kinross</p> <p>Mining supplies and services, hotels, diners and small businesses serving Kinross</p> <p>Large agri-business cooperative – powerful local actor supportive of Kinross.</p> <p>Ministry of Environment – Regulate the mine's environmental impacts</p> <p>State public prosecution office –</p>	<p>Medium</p> <p>Lots of comments of alleged abuse by the mine of power influencing local institutions and actors for own benefit.</p> <p>Divided community. Sao Domingos Maroon former President left under death threats.</p> <p>Several street marches and</p>	<p>Daily detonations of rock and land at the mine causes dust pollution and structural damage to basic housing near the mine.</p> <p>The use of cyanide and arsenic for gold mining according to a doctor is putting the health of locals seriously at risk.</p> <p>Destruction and diversion of rivers and waterfalls</p>	<p>Divided community due to who works at mine and who accepts and receives CSR benefits.</p> <p>High levels of crime attributed on new migrants coming in search of work at the mine.</p> <p>Increased traffic.</p>	Currently there is scant activist resistance to the mine due to what community informants refer to as the excessive power and fear the mine wields.	Services and Mining	\$1.45bn

	<p>there for the local community to defends rights against large actors such as the mine.</p> <p>Minas Gerais State level politicians (temporarily) – from Paracatu and critical of the mine</p> <p>Municipal government of Paracatu – local councillors some in favour and some against.</p> <p>Dr. Samuel medical doctor and community leader resisting mine now located in Germany</p> <p>Alerta Paracatu – blog critiquing the environmental and health impacts from the mine</p> <p>Various neighbourhood associations bordering the minesite</p> <p>Maroon associations and leaders (for and against the mine)</p> <p>Caritas – Catholic social justice organization critical of the mine.</p> <p>Trade union – critical of mine's conduct with employees.</p> <p>Various social and education based organizations partnering with Kinross.</p>	<p>protests against the mine several years ago.</p>	<p>affects livelihoods of some rural based community members.</p> <p>Deforestation.</p>				
Mariana	Vale – World's largest Iron-Ore mining company.	Low-Medium	Some clearing of trees. The main fear is of the potential environmental	This mine, and mining overall governs and rules	None.	Mining	No data available

	<p>Eco and Heritage tourism providers</p> <p>Mining supplies and services, hotels, diners and small businesses serving Kinross</p> <p>Ministry of Mines and Energy</p> <p>Ministry of Environment</p> <p>State public prosecution office</p> <p>Municipal government of Mariana</p> <p>IPHAN - National Institute of Historic and Artistic Heritage</p> <p>Academics in social movement against the reactivation of mine.</p>		<p>impact should the mine reopen.</p>	<p>the city.</p> <p>Due to the dependence on mining there is excessive traffic, high rents, shortage of accommodation, overall high prices.</p>			
Pedra Branca	<p>Anglo American – large multinational mining company</p> <p>MMX – Brazilian mining company</p> <p>Zamin Resources – Indian mining company operating in Latin America</p> <p>Municipal government of Pedra Branca</p> <p>Artisanal miners</p> <p>Social NGOs that partner with mining company</p>	Low	<p>Claims about polluting a river near the mine.</p> <p>Dust dispersed around town from the wheels of the SUVs driving through.</p>	<p>Vibrations from train passing through town damaging local housing.</p>	None.	Services and Mining	\$1.5bn

Barro Alto	<p>Anglo American— large multinational mining company</p> <p>Local commerce, accommodation providers, and small businesses.</p> <p>Municipal government of Barro Alto</p> <p>CARE – International NGO partners with Anglo American</p> <p>Agenda Pública – Sao Paulo based Revenue Transparency focused NGO</p>	Low	None	Not making the local economic investment the local community had hoped for and expected.	None.	Services	\$1.2bn
------------	---	-----	------	--	-------	----------	---------

5.0 Findings Analysis

5.1 Introduction

This analysis of findings chapter is presented in a series of eight tables for each mining community showing the Environmental impact, Social impact, Economic impact, Extent of conflict, Strength of collective action, Corporate strategies; and Community strategies illustrated by quotes and the different relevant coding/constructs.

The field research concluded that from the eight mining communities, the four higher conflict cases are more self sufficient and economically independent from their nearby mining projects than the four lower conflict communities who rely more on their nearby mining projects for their livelihoods. In summary when a community is independent and therefore non-dependent on a nearby mining project for its livelihood and well-being, this community can (temporarily) withhold the SLO creating a difficult environment in which to operate, which is an essential resource, from the mining company, therefore the local community in this situation holds some power and can dictate the terms of reference for the relationship. As a result the mining companies backed by the State will attempt to claw back this power from the independent communities using diverse strategies to essentially create some level of community dependence and hence an easier and more tranquil working environment to conduct mining.

However if the local community is dependent on the nearby mining projects for its own well-being and livelihoods and it desires to influence the mining company's behaviour, it will have to attempt to negotiate better terms of company behaviour in return for the continued supply of an SLO or a conflict free business environment. By considering the local community's demands and grievances via CSR strategies for

example, despite being dependent on the nearby mining project for its own well-being, a company can strengthen its SLO and external image.

Appendix D summarizes the main differences and similarities between the more independent and more dependent communities on the nearby mining projects. focusing on how a historical and socio-economic dependence or non-dependence on mining has led to the above types of influence strategies from mining companies and manifestations of conflict in the two types of mining communities.

Table 15 – Findings Analysis of Huasco Valley

Environmental impact	Social impact	Economic impact	Extent of conflict	Strength of collective action	Corporate influence strategies (by construct)	Community influence strategies (by construct)
<p>The main community grievances surrounding the impacts from mining activities in the Huasco Valley are centred around the usage, depletion and pollution of the scarce water supply which is located in the driest region of the planet – northern Chile.</p> <p>Water for the residents of the Huasco Valley is essential for their way of life as small and</p>	<p>Access to clean water supplies, also has a direct adverse social impact as it threatens the traditional way of life of the Diaguita people. Respondents had complained that their crops had suffered from less irrigation. Farming is a way of life and provides the identity of these communities;</p>	<p>The economic impact of the mine construction has not widely benefited Alto del Carmen municipality. Due to the community's overall rejection of the mine Barrick decided to focus its CSR attention elsewhere to Vallenar. Nonetheless Barrick has invested in social projects such as ceramics and</p>	<p>High – the mine is currently suspended by the Chilean courts and has been since April 2013. Widespread community rejection of the mine however, the community is divided as to whether it should accept compensation or benefits payments from Barrick for the negative</p>	<p>Highest of the eight communities. However, any collective action is impeded by the fact that the community is divided into two groups between those who want to negotiate and those who do not want to negotiate with Barrick.</p> <p>Community was well mobilized by local</p>	<p>Corporate Irresponsibility</p> <p><i>Co-optation/ Divide and Rule/Obstruction strategy</i></p> <p><i>“they were crazy about finding local community residents willing to participate in their CSR and social investment projects. They sent social and psychological assistants to go knocking on everybody's doors to see what information they could find out so they could manipulate them and also try to get them involved in their social projects.”</i> (Interviewee code E2, Community leader and elected local politician).</p> <p>Interviewees explained what they believe were the motives of Barrick's public support for promoting Indigenous recognition by the Chilean State of some</p>	<p>Collective resistance – to the proposed Pascua Lama project via marches, protests, anti-Pascua Lama social media campaigns.</p> <p><u>Maintain Independence</u> - Collective rejection to Collaboration (in Alto del Carmen) with Barrick Gold by majority to participate and in CSR projects.</p> <p><i>“I have to be very careful before going to any social events..you know I love Chilean folklore culture well whenever I am invited to any local social events such as rodeo shows or concerts the first</i></p>

<p>medium scale farmers. This is a way of life the Diaguita people cherish greatly and do not want to trade for any other way of life as per my interviewees, such as from an elderly resident Cristina who owns a large grape farm in the valley:</p> <p><i>“Here we have peace and tranquility but Barrick will force us out of here when they finish our water supplies. We won’t be able to stay here in our valley then, how can we? We don’t want to leave this for a city and all the stress that comes with that life..NO of course not!”</i></p>	<p>therefore without access to water they would not be able to continue with their culture, as stated in the earlier quote (in Environmental impact column) by Cristina. There were also at least three deaths of workers at the mine site of Pascua Lama between 2011 and 2012.</p> <p>In addition to the necessity of water for personal health, hygiene and for sustaining a traditional livelihood, water also has a cultural and</p>	<p>internet courses with the most vulnerable and poorest members of Alto del Carmen community. The most significant economic impact was the US\$65m investment paid to the valley’s wealthiest landowners via their Water Vigilance Board to manage the water supply to the rest of the Huasco Valley.</p> <p>Very few jobs were reportedly given to the local community residing nearest to</p>	<p>impacts.</p>	<p>community, leader, OLCA environmental justice activist organization and church since 2001. (Interview codes E1-2).</p>	<p>residents in the Huasco Valley. In line with Urkidi and Walter (2011) the interviewees explained it was to gain official legitimacy and endorsement by a Diaguita community largely created by the mining company itself. Barrick also published a book on Diaguita Identity that claims the true historical identity of the people is in mining and that agriculture is more recent.</p> <p><i>“...so that they (Barrick) can say to the Diaguitas, the government and the world “look at us and how much we care about the Diaguita people’s identities. We have good intentions we want to help the community in a good and genuine way” but the true intentions for Barrick was to co-opt and pacify the local community so they could start mining and destroy the Valley...they are very smart!”</i> (Interviewee code E3, Representative, Parish Church Alto del Carmen).</p> <p><i>“...it became much more difficult to fight and defeat the mine once those shameless businessmen who own most of the farms here sold out to Barrick. Those shameless</i></p>	<p><i>question I would ask is “who is financing it? Is it Barrick? Is it the local municipality that has been completely coopted by Barrick? If so, I can’t go otherwise they will take photos of me there with headlines in the press saying, “Don Orlando attends the event sponsored by Barrick” even when I didn’t know they sponsored it. We are an independent people, we don’t need Barrick”</i> (Interviewee Code, E3, Local community leader)</p> <p><i>“.....none of us were interested in their “little demeaning courses and workshops.” What can they teach us about being Diaguitas?! We are Diaguitas and land and water are essential to us, not these courses about artisanal goods and pottery! Just the most vulnerable, humble dear old ladies accepted and agreed to take part</i></p>
---	---	--	-----------------	---	---	---

<p>(Interviewee code E3, Dona Cristina, Grape Farmer, P.)</p> <p>The local priest Father Manuel also made an interesting argument about how the Diaguita's identity would be destroyed if they left the valley due to the destruction from mining:</p> <p><i>"As long as they (the Diaguitas) stay divided they won't find their Identity. Their Identity is in their Collectiveness. You can't be Diaguita in an urban area."</i></p> <p>Interviewee code E4, Local Priest, P.,</p>	<p>recreational purpose. Barbara reminisced about earlier years when they were able to play, swim and even wash dishes in their nearby rivers and streams. Nowadays this is not possible.</p>	<p>Pascua Lama by Barrick Gold.</p>			<p><i>people receive US\$60m from Barrick. I can't believe that! They have a lot of power in the valley. Now they are on the mine's side and just us the small people are left to fight that mine. We don't sell out for money to that mine like that group."</i> (Interviewee codes E2).</p> <p><i>"they (Barrick Gold) try to buy us with their social responsibility so we will look away and ignore their destruction of our glaciers and water."</i> (Interviewee code E1, Local Indigenous community leader, Huasco Valley p.)</p> <p><i>"El Morro mine offered me the keys to a brand new 4x4 pick-up truck..of course I said no, I knew they were trying to buy me. As for Barrick it also buys silence and people here."</i> (Interviewee code E3, Representative, Parish Church Alto del Carmen).</p> <p><i>"Barrick in their Diaguita publications speak about ceramics and knitting. They are Manipulating their (Diaguita)</i></p>	<p><i>but none of us (laughing). We showed them we don't want or need them in our valley!"</i> (Interviewee code E1, Local community leader)</p> <p><i>"Once a girl from el Morro came here offering us social projects and economic help but I refused as I've always worked hard for things in my life, I don't need this help that's why I would sell myself"</i></p> <p><i>"thanks to the lord my hands are good and my brain is in working order so why do I need that mine? I can sell a CD of my music and live off that so I'm not going to sell myself for something that would be bread for today and hunger for tomorrow"</i> (Interviewee Code, E3, Local community leader)</p>
--	---	-------------------------------------	--	--	---	---

					<p><i>Identity for their own good. Barrick does it to divert the attention to the secondary elements of the Identity and not to teach the parts of territory and water and language which are the Primary ones. Barrick finance the Indigenous New Year of the sun...They've created 22 communities here from three to get more internal conflict going on. divided the three diaguita groups into 22, so this creates conflict and disunites the people. (Interviewee code E3, Representative, Parish Church Alto del Carmen).</i></p> <p>In observational data I also witnessed how the Mining Industry including representatives from Barrick invited critical activists OLCA (who defend the Huasco Valley against Barrick Gold) to sit down and dialogue with them after OLCA had intruded to protest against CSR and mining into the Sheraton Hotel in October 2011 at the Social Responsibility for Mining conference.</p> <p><i>Abuse of power</i></p> <p><i>“Barrick have people in the local government to change rural zones into urban ones, so they can build and construct here. If we become</i></p>	<p><i>“I don't need handouts from Barrick or from the government I brought up my kids by my own hard work. That's what being a Diaguita is about it is about hard work and not accepting handouts from others. We are independent people and proud we don't need mining companies and the government!” (Interviewee code E2, Orlando, Local Politician and Community Leader)</i></p> <p>Legal resistance</p> <p>Legal courts and litigation to stop mine. With lawyer Luis Sanchez managed to suspend the mining operations with a court order in April 2013.</p> <p>Collaboration – The very same group litigating against Barrick lead by by Sandra and lawyer Luis Sanchez has</p>
--	--	--	--	--	--	---

					<p><i>Urban according to the government we won't be able to continue with many of our customs such as cooking with wood, having chickens, rabbits.</i></p> <p><i>The mine and government never the tell the whole story about urbanizing the community they always leave out the negative aspects". (Interviewee Code, E3, Local community leader)</i></p> <p>Create community dependency</p> <p><i>"Barrick together with the Municipal government changed the community from being self-sufficient to becoming dependent on them." (Interviewee codes E1-E3).</i></p> <p>Seek legitimacy from non-affected communities</p> <p>Disingenuous behaviour (to obstruct)</p>	<p>decided to enter into a joint participation agreement with Barrick Gold in May 2014, which could lead to generous benefits sharing. This clearly contradicts the Refusal to Collaborate strategy taken by the other half of the community and therefore demonstrates the great existing divide within the Huasco Valley community.</p>
--	--	--	--	--	---	---

Table 16 – Findings Analysis of Conceição de Mato Dentro

Environmental impact	Social impact	Economic impact	Extent of conflict	Strength of collective action	Corporate influence strategies (by construct)	Community influence strategies (by construct)
Many locals are complaining that the Passa Sete creek water that passes through the villages of Agua Quente and Jassém is now unfit for consumption and has an almost minimum flow. The Pereira and Vargem grande streams are also unfit both for human consumption and use, such as bathing or washing dishes according to two of my	One of the biggest complaints from the local community there is that of being unlawfully evicted from their land and property by State security forces to allow Anglo American to mine for iron ore. This, along with other forms of alleged intimidation to leave the land, to NGO	Positive for the urban centre. The local community were able to charge multiples more rent for rooms and housing, all restaurants were full and it was impossible to ever find a hotel room. However, this led to hyperinflation in the town, with the price of most things such as land and food	High – community are fighting for the mining project to be suspended at the very least so authorities can take stock of the environmental damage so far and then make Anglo American comply with the environmental regulations that were agreed.	High – aided by multiple external organizations and a well educated group of community leaders.	Corporate Irresponsibility <i>Co-optation/Divide and Rule/Obstruction strategy</i> Another company, the Brazilian iron ore giant MMX, had initially purchased this Minas-Rio project in 2007 and later sold it to Anglo American in 2008. MMX's initial strategy to gain entry to the area, as explained by several rural community informants (interview codes H1 – H5), was how in 2007 one of Batista's representatives arrived in Conceição de Mato Dentro making enquiries into the possibility of buying up land for horse breeding and farming. Unsuspecting local community residents helped him and sold land to the representative,	Collective resistance –. REASA social movement organization for community to defend its rights against the mineduct has helped with collective resistance in protest marches, public hearings, community meetings, social media, reports. Maintain independence “Yesterday we heard the testimonies of people who said they did not need and never needed the jobs that Anglo has to offer, that tranquility is priceless” (Interviewee code H1,

<p>interviewees from the region. Fernanda claimed, <i>“even the cows turn away from the stream and refuse to drink from it...”</i> (Interviewee code H1, Fernanda, Community leader) according to one interviewee the community has gone for many days without any access to water. (Interviewee code H2, Pamela community leader).</p> <p>In Conceição de Mato Dentro interviewees and civil society reports, such as by Gesta (2013), point to the mining construction’s</p>	<p>members and researchers in the area by mining company security personnel and state police is according to the residents an abuse of their human rights. Examples include threats and intimidation to rural community residents who did not want to leave to sell their land and be possibly resettled by Anglo American.</p> <p><i>“We used to use the streams for drinking, bathing, washing</i></p>	<p>increasing.</p>			<p>though became suspicious once they noticed how much the representative had bought. Soon after, it was revealed that the land had been bought for mining and not agriculture-related activities. The local community in the rural parts of Conceição de Mato Dentro felt cheated from that moment and lost trust in mining companies, therefore either did not provide or withheld their SLO.</p> <p><i>“it’s difficult for us to be united because of how the company has segregated us via their resettlements for example Communities Munbucá and Ferragem, no longer exist. There are families of these two communities here and there, scattered</i> (Interviewee code H1, Local community Leader Fernanda, P.)</p> <p><i>“I’ll give you an example, in my community, the company (Anglo American) after months of problems with installation of the septic tanks, the company met with the community and asked for a chance. The community has given</i></p>	<p>Local community Leader Fernanda, P.)</p> <p><i>“I brought up my kids perfectly well without the help of Anglo (American) so why would I need them to help raise my grandchildren? We don’t need them here for their help. We are well and better off without them here causing great impact to our lives.”</i> (Interviewee code H2, Maroon Community Resistance Leader, Transcripts p.)</p>
--	--	--------------------	--	--	--	---

<p>work which destroyed the state's highest waterfall (Cachoeira do Tabuleiro), as well as the polluted rivers and streams mentioned in the previous grievance section on water. Conceição de Mato Dentro is in addition considered to be the ecotourism capital of Minas Gerais state due to the number of areas of natural preservation nearby. The local community has also complained of many detonations from nearby mining operations resulting in dust and noise pollution for</p>	<p><i>clothes, cooking our meals, washing the dishes and pots...for everything...and now we cannot! It's hard...and inhumane."</i> (Interviewee code H1, Local community Leader Fernanda)</p> <p>With Conceição de Mato Dentro being an ecological centre in the region, the local community hold the environment in high regard. Community members also complained that Anglo American buried natural</p>				<p><i>and has over 1 years of chances and they still can not solve the issue of the installation of septic tanks. Nothing they do works. The community is in disbelief and demoralized"</i> (Interviewee code H1, Local community Leader Fernanda)</p> <p><i>"Anglo has tried to "influence" in my community offering benefits in other communities as well and they only offer these benefits for the few, to deploy discord among neighbors and even relatives...there have even been threats.</i></p> <p><i>Seek legitimacy from non-affected communities</i></p> <p>Interviewees had stressed that Anglo American had focused on building relations with the urban centre of this region and that in the beginning the mining company was very well received (interview codes H1-3)</p> <p>Anglo American has barely engaged with the rural community and largely ignored them:</p> <p><i>"....community relations? Social responsibility? Sincerely sir I cannot make any comments about</i></p>	
---	--	--	--	--	--	--

residents.	<p>water springs considered for their traditional medicinal properties in the Mumbuca community due to the new tailings dam being constructed. Newly resettled elderly community members also complained that their new homes provided for by Anglo American did not take into account the importance of a certain type of window they are accustomed to and furthermore that having an orchard and garden for growing fruit</p>				<p><i>that because the mining company has NO relation with us. We don't exist in their eyes. All they want is to buy our land and massacre this place but we have no relations."</i> (Interviewee code H2, Rural community Maroon resident, Agua Quente, Conceição de Mato Dentro)</p> <p><i>Disingenuous behaviour (to obstruct)</i></p> <p>Constant denial of any accusations of negative environmental impacts to nearby communities. Refusing to acknowledge the Diversus report that identified multiple communities as affected and impacted by the mineduct construction. Anglo American denied the legitimacy of this report and instead have commissioned their own report.</p> <p><i>"Anglo attends some of our REASA meetings and hears our grievances about small broken items to issues about water but they have never provided an acceptable solution"</i> (interview</p>	
------------	--	--	--	--	---	--

	<p>is highly important for their local culture.</p> <p>In December 2013 Anglo American published a Statement denying these accusations and insisting it was in compliance with Brazilian law and best practice international standards in its social and environmental performance in Conceição de Mato Dentro.</p> <p>Other social impacts included the arrival of hundreds of lowly educated male migrants from North</p>				codes H1-3)	
--	--	--	--	--	-------------	--

	<p>Eastern Brazil and even Haiti. This caused a strain on local police resources. Also lead to a shortage in available accommodation and threatened the historical and ecological identity of the town and area.</p> <p>Together with excessive traffic and other social problems some local residents are regretting the approval of the minedict as demonstrated by Fernanda and Paula from the rural community. Fernanda even commented that in July the urban centre of Conceição de</p>					
--	--	--	--	--	--	--

	<p>Mato Dentro saw a ugly side of the mining project after around 400 subcontracted miners went on the rampage many shirtless after having lost their jobs. These workers also set fire to the nearby located Anglo American employee accommodatio n site (this can be viewed on Internet video website youtube – accessed 26th July, 2013).</p> <p>In April 2014 Brazilian authorities also discovered illegal Haitian workers in slave like conditions</p>					
--	---	--	--	--	--	--

	working at a supplier of Anglo American's mining project.					
--	---	--	--	--	--	--

Table 17 - Findings Analysis of Caimanes

Environmental impact	Social impact	Economic impact	Extent of conflict	Strength of collective action	Corporate influence strategies (by construct)	Community influence strategies (by construct)
Community and NGO interviewees and reports allege El Mauro tailings dam represents a threat to the lives of Caimanes community if it fails to withstand a strong earthquake. These actors also claim the tailings dam has been polluting local water sources making it undrinkable for even animals according to	The behaviour by Pelambres mining company according to interviewees has divided the community. Multiple families were also resettled from their lands before the construction of El Mauro tailings dam.	Has impacted the sales of local produce. <i>“That mining tailings dam is polluting the valley and many of us grow crops, avocados, courgettes, watermelons... so that dirty and polluted water from the dam will contaminate our crops and then who is going to buy them when they hear they come from Caimanes?”</i>	High – Played out in the courtroom over the past few years. Community leaders blockaded themselves into local school on hunger strike for around 100 days in 2010. Frequent road blocks to tailings dam by community leaders. Strong social media	High – Strong community leaders.	Corporate Irresponsibility <i>Co-optation/Divide and Rule/Obstruction strategy</i> <i>“they’ve (Pelambres) offered me a blank cheque before so I stop giving them problems but I will never accept until I get justice for ALL of us in the community”</i> (Interviewee code D3, Clint Community Leader). Community, NGO and legal representative interviewees repeatedly stated how the compensation offer by Pelambres to the community via a wealthy landowner has completely divided a once united community. <i>“..that bishop was clearly paid by</i>	Collective resistance <i>“Our people have lived here for over 500 years they (Pelambres) have to move away and close down here! They want to send us away and pay for new homes but if they do then they owe us compensation for that and to all of us, not just to some.”</i> (Interview code D1, Local community defender, Claudio, Los Caimanes). 11 of the community leaders blockaded themselves into a school in late 2010 for around 100 days to go on a hunger strike demanding solution to their problem.

scientific tests carried out by the Chilean college of Physicians.		<p><i>Pelambres are offering lots of money to the municipality for us to have better public services if we accept then we become dependent on them! Then Pelambres will be able to do as they please with us and we will be dependent on them without our crops and livestock.”</i> (Interviewee code D1, Los Caimanes Community Defence leader Carlos)</p>	<p>campaign with video documentaries attracting foreign activists and researchers.</p> <p>Protest marches in Santiago and even one at the Annual General Meeting of the holding company Antofagasta PLC in London, UK in 2013.</p>	<p><i>Pelambres he was a Pelambrino! He said that Pelambres was willing to pay us eleven hunger strikers and our families generous compensation but we said NO! Again they are always trying to divide us and make us fight amongst ourselves. We insisted we will only accept a deal if it is for everyone in Caimanes! And we will not let them tell us who can and cannot be our leader!”</i> (Interviewee code D1, Carlos, local community activist in Defence Committee, Los Caimanes)</p> <p>The hunger strike lasted nearly 90 days but with no agreement. During 2011 and 2012 the Pelambres influence strategy was even more low key as they were suing the Caimanes Defence Committee’s leader and lawyers, so for legal reasons could not engage and had to maintain their distance. Up until the current day the same Caimanes Defence Committee leaders are in place and Pelambres’ influence strategy remains confined to legal questions. The question of how Pelambres’ El Mauro dam divided Los Caimanes community was the main concern in an article the Guardian newspaper in April 2014 titled “Chilean dam can’t hold back</p>	<p>This was a highly visible campaign and reported on national news and earned the leaders medals for their bravery and trips to France by the French government.</p> <p>Maintain independence</p> <p>Legal resistance</p> <p>The Caimanes defence committee’s lawyers have been instrumental in their resistance to the tailings dam taking the conflict to the courtrooms.</p>
--	--	---	--	---	--

					<p>the hatred: Residents say the dam linked to the Los Pelambres copper mine 'created so much inequality that it broke the town" (Guardian website, accessed 30th April, 2014)</p> <p><i>Disingenuous Behaviour</i></p> <p><i>"They even manipulate information and systems to prove they are responsible. They (Pelambres) are tipped off when an environmental inspector is coming to assess the water in their dam to ensure it is not coming from our community's water table. They tamper with mechanical things there and manage to show that they are not using our water...they're very clever we know as we have insider information from the mine people there working who feel for us what we are going through inform us".</i></p> <p><i>(Interviewee code D1, Community Leader resisting tailings dam)</i></p>	
--	--	--	--	--	---	--

Table 18 – Findings Analysis Colla de Río Jorquera

Environmental impact	Social impact	Economic impact	Extent of conflict	Strength of collective action	Corporate influence strategies (by construct)	Community influence strategies (by construct)
<p>The topic of dust pollution was the main grievance expressed by the Colla community in Chile. The dust, according to informants and observation from the Colla community, is caused by heavy-duty mining traffic passing by on a small road adjacent to the homes of the Colla people. This dust settles on their small plots of land where they</p>	<p>Harming of livestock and transhumance cultural life Mining vehicles have killed a few of the Colla people's livestock (a donkey and a horse) and this they regard as a threat to their culture as exclaimed by Jennifer, a Colla lady:</p> <p><i>"If only our animals could talk they would have so much to say about how the</i></p>	<p>None</p>	<p>High – Played out</p>	<p>High – Strong community leaders.</p>	<p>Corporate Irresponsibility</p> <p><i>Ungenerous</i></p> <p>Kinross Gold, according to my Colla interviewees (Interviewee code B1), had not been approaching them despite them and their farms being affected by large amounts of dust pollution from the passing mining traffic going to the Maricunga mine. However, the Colla community took the initiative according to their leaders about initiating engagement with the mining company.</p> <p>Kinross Gold are also avoiding road access via the Colla community as much as possible for their new mining projects in order to avoid potential future conflict</p>	<p>Collective resistance</p> <p>Legal resistance</p> <p>Aided by a lawyer the Colla community of Río Jorquera have taken numerous lawsuits against Kinross Marcunga on the issue of environmental impacts. The Colla community summarized his newfound self-esteem, confidence and feeling of empowerment in dealing with the mining companies proposing projects in what he regards as his people's territory:</p> <p><i>"I take great satisfaction from seeing those</i></p>

<p>grow alfalfa and sheep graze. The dust is a problem for the crops and for the different animals such as sheep and donkeys. There have also been hazardous chemical and fuel spills by mining-related traffic passing by on the road adjacent to the Colla people's homes and land.</p>	<p><i>mining companies treat them....those animals are sacred to us."</i> (Interviewee code B1, Colla Community Leaders)</p>				<p>with the Colla. Nonetheless, as according to interviewees from the Colla community (Interviewee code B1), Kinross has been very ungenerous with their social responsibility investment programme, offering only around US\$20,000 in total for an agriculture production programme.</p> <p>Examples of influence strategies used by Kinross Maricunga as a response to the demands for more social responsibility by the local community include offering partial school scholarships to some of Colla's children as well as contributing towards health visit costs for the Colla people. Kinross Gold has also organized entrepreneurship courses for the local Colla community, such as making cupcakes and commencing an eco/ethno-tourism project. Kinross Gold also donated fences to a Colla farmer so he could keep his animals safe from the road; this is the social responsibility case study Kinross Gold highlights on its Community section of their corporate website. Kinross Gold Maricunga set their whole terms of engagement for their relationship and influence strategy with the</p>	<p><i>managers having to fly from Canada and come to my humble and basic house to sit down here where you are and negotiate with me, with us the brutes and poor Indians as they refer to us."</i> (Interviewee code B1, Colla community President)</p>
---	--	--	--	--	--	---

					<p>Colla around what they refer to as the Protocolo in Spanish which can be translated as a Cooperation Agreement. For the Colla community Kinross Maricunga has been far too ungenerous with its investment to them.</p> <p><i>Disingenuous Behaviour</i></p> <p>The Colla community described nearby Kinross Maricunga as disingenuous on multiple occasions after making repeated promises to respect their land and animals yet continuously their subcontracted vehicles had chemical spills on the road outside their houses, drove too fast raising a dust plume over their land and livestock and also ran over killing their animals. Colla leader Ricardo described Kinross Maricunga as:</p> <p><i>“they give with one hand and take with another.”</i> (Interviewee code B1, Colla Community Leaders.)</p>	
--	--	--	--	--	---	--

Table 19 - Findings Analysis – Paracatu

Environmental impact	Social impact	Economic impact	Extent of conflict	Strength of collective action	Corporate influence strategies (by construct)	Community influence strategies (by construct)
<p>The main grievance from the residents living in the central and northern part of Paracatu (closest to Brazil's largest opencast gold mine) is related to toxic dust and noise pollution as well as heavy daily tremors from detonations which damage houses and building structures. Many local residents believe that the mine represents</p>	<p>Internal conflicts and divisions over the years.</p> <p>Many families had been evicted from their lands some years ago when the mine was expanding and building a new tailings dam. Only 60 families, those with the correct and authentic property titles and deeds were given resettlement by Kinross</p>	<p>Very high. Interviewees confirmed the mine the city would most likely collapse as it employs one in four working adults.</p>	<p>Medium – High grievance levels.</p>	<p>Weak collective resistance.</p>	<p>Corporate Irresponsibility</p> <p>Obstruction strategies</p> <p>A former employee from the mine Gilson explained that that once a person starts to work for the mine they attempt take over that person's life. Gilson (interviewee code C11) continued to relay that many of his friends who got jobs there later stopped speaking and socializing with him as, their bosses ordered them to stop mixing with those external to the company.</p> <p>Gilson added that the mine brainwashes employees in the first Introduction week and then throughout their time at working there. According to Gilson the mine also has many spies around the town who watch where and</p>	<p>Collective resistance</p> <p>Low collective resistance due to the dependence on the mine.</p> <p>Divided community</p> <p><i>"Love and hate....All love from our side and hate from the other side (referring to the defected previous leader)."</i> (Interviewee code C3, Sao Domingos Maroon, Woman community resident).</p> <p><i>"Sao Domingos is divided because of problems with water and pollution. The company want to invest there to win the community over so they can continue destroying their land"</i></p>

<p>a danger to the health of the local community as it uses excessive amounts of arsenic, which causes cancer. The link between the dust blown in from the mine and cancer rates in the city has not been proven, however, many locals including medical doctors believe this link exists.</p> <p>In addition local residents often referred to the mine as “destroying the city” due to its size and constant growth. One local resident like many others</p>	<p>between 2008 and 2009. Many of those living in these areas of Santa Rita and Machadinho were forced out of their homes and lands a few years ago and now reside in an area close to the mine called Bela Vista. The community of Machadinho was mainly a Maroon community and therefore protected by the Brazilian State; however in this case Kinross was still able to gain access to the land from the Brazilian State for their tailings dam.</p>				<p>what employees are doing. At work supervisors and managers would tell workers they shouldn't be going to certain bars and speaking to certain people after the weekend.</p> <p>In March and April of 2014 a former Kinross manager contacted me via email wishing to inform me in confidentiality about certain unethical practices which the mining company conducts. The manager's emails (excerpts in C39) speak about the persecution of (current and former) employees, trade unions, social movements and critical voices in the community. This informant further accused Kinross Paracatu of lying, manipulating and omitting information in order to sell a false image of it being socially responsible.</p> <p>With relation to opposing and critical voices the mining company according to the former manager claims has an intelligence service that denigrates, intimidates and attacks those who are willing to speak out and defend the</p>	<p><i>near to the Quilombo. The company have their discourse that doesn't convince they say they are environmentally friendly and have good relations with the community, value people but it's not convincing. They don't give responses to the population.”</i> (Interviewee code C37, NGO Worker, Paracatu).</p> <p>Changing/Dynamic community positions</p> <p>I was informed by representatives from Barrick Gold that vocal opponents of the company had previously been in favour of the company and even collaborated with them in the past. I also observed how after my first field visit that a NGO Director had clearly changed positions from being critical of Kinross to being in favour now that he was</p>
--	--	--	--	--	---	--

<p>complained:</p> <p><i>“...I’m fed up of constantly cleaning this black dust that comes from the mine, if I clean my house in the morning it’s covered in dust by night again! My husband can’t sleep well either because of the vibration sounds coming from the mine all night long and he has to wake up early to go to work.”</i></p> <p>(Interviewee code C10, local resident, Paracatu)</p> <p>Another lady who lives near the mine complained that:</p> <p><i>“I sometimes can’t breathe properly, the</i></p>					<p>community. In short Kinross anticipate problems by giving out “breadcrumbs” in the form of CSR to pacify any potential conflict and maintain its power unchallenged.</p> <p><i>Ungenerous/Disingenuous Behaviour/Co-optation</i></p> <p>Many of the interviewees in Paracatu claimed that the mine does the absolute minimum in order to continue mining in peace, as mentioned earlier. At Paracatu, interviewees claimed the mining company had executives who were false and insincere and multiple interviewees used a colloquial term to describe Kinross’ actions and social responsibility as (“Só para inglês ver”) which translated means “Just for the English to see” and relates to a period after slavery was abolished in Brazil and the British would check Portuguese boats arriving at Brazil for slaves. Usually the top deck was clean; however, underneath where the British could not see there were many slaves. Therefore in Brazil this phrase is used in a similar way that Greenwashing is used to refer to disingenuous CSR.</p>	<p>collaborating with them on a CSR project.</p> <p>One interviewee even confessed how he had changed positions since Kinross bought the mine from Rio Tinto in 2005:</p> <p><i>“Sometimes I publicly defended the company for free when it was RPM and “The Doctor” was attacking the company. I didn’t agree with that it was terrorism. I protested in the streets. Today it would be difficult for me to do that again with these relations they have. Because I believed in those people in management back when it was RPM they seemed more committed, been here for a long time, their kids were born here. Today I can’t defend them as I don’t believe in them. I have reservations about their external policy.”</i></p> <p>(Interviewee code C15, Journalist, Paracatu)</p>
---	--	--	--	--	---	--

<p><i>dust gets in my throat and eyes, always irritating, it's terrible!"</i> (Interviewee code C10, local resident, Paracatu).</p> <p>There was also a visit to an elderly couple who live in a rural house just metres from the mine. The couple have been without drinking water for years due to nearby mining activities. The couple used to get their drinking water from a stream that passes through their property. They can no longer either use the water from their stream to irrigate their plants or give it</p>					<p>Other interviewees in Paracatu also used the term "enrola" on many occasions for speaking about their community relations. This Brazilian expression means to agree with somebody in a patronizing manner promising you will help or solve their problem, however never actually doing so. One local politician described Kinross' identity as the following:</p> <p><i>"Their identity is that of an alligator's always smiling but when you turn your back they attack."</i> (Interviewee code C6, Local Cultural and Entrepreneur leader, Paracatu)</p> <p>One local NGO executive illustrated this disingenuous corporate behaviour by telling me how the mining company had acted some years ago to gain a social responsibility certification:</p> <p><i>"The mine always wins international awards. Someone who was working there told me an international organization came here and even the bosses start to clean up and those who are considered as the lowest skilled workers are put in a truck and</i></p>	<p>This phenomena of frequently changing towards the mine positions is explained as a result of Kinross' co-optation strategies by several interviewees who used the terms of "bought off" and "silenced" (Interview codes C2 – C4, C6, C10 – C12, C18, C21, C23, C25, C28-29, C33, C37).</p> <p>Apathetic/Individualistic</p> <p><i>"These days people participate less they all just care about their own lives. People with money close themselves off to the world if they have a bed, house and car they don't care about other people's problems. People are becoming increasingly individualistic here in Paracatu"</i> (Interviewee code C37, NGO Worker, Paracatu).</p>
--	--	--	--	--	---	---

to their cows, which has had a direct impact on their well-being and livelihoods. However, as they live isolated and alone without neighbours, there is only an elected councillor and the couple's daughter who are trying to help this couples' cause.					<p><i>taken to the forest and left there for the day so that the foreign visitors can assess the mine for the award. Once the foreigners leave the truck goes back for the low skilled workers. I was told this by someone who was taken to the forest."</i> (Interviewee code C37, NGO Worker, Paracatu).</p> <p><i>"They (the mining company) make certain investments mainly linked to the local council so they can continue with their practice of infecting public authorities, I consider they do this to avoid being legally required to do what they should do for the local community</i> (Interviewee code C7, local community leader, Paracatu).</p> <p>Many interviewees used the words "bought off" and "silenced" when explaining what happened to the critical voices of the mine in the community. (Interview codes C2 – C4, C6, C10 – C12, C18, C21, C23, C25, C28-29, C33, C37).</p> <p>Divide and Rule/Create</p>	<p>Dependent</p> <p>It was also clear from interviewees that despite the grievances with the mine they could not do much as the community at large was dependent on it for jobs. Incomes and livelihoods.</p> <p><i>"Yes we are depedent on the mine, the mine created that dependency which wasn't neessary."</i> (Interviewee code C2, Local Councillor, Paracatu).</p>
--	--	--	--	--	--	--

					<p>dependence</p> <p>One striking and potent quote from Claudia who works in social-related projects for the local community describes in her view using the “teach a man to fish” proverb as being the disingenuous nature of Kinross’ social responsibility as well as its ulterior motives of creating dependency on behalf of the community.</p> <p><i>“I’ve already taken part (in their social responsibility programmes) and I was able to see and I was able to be up close...(Kinross) is very deceitful... they pretend to do lots of capacity building social responsibility to make people more independent but in truth they just make people become more in need of their help; instead of teaching them to fish they give them a chewed up fish.”</i> (Interviewee code C6, Local Cultural and Entrepreneur leader, Paracatu).</p> <p><i>“The company just leaves crumbs in the community, they paint a church they put their name here and there. But they’re taking our wealth. The best jobs are not for people from here they come from outside.”</i></p>	
--	--	--	--	--	---	--

					<p>Importantly, the word “breadcrumbs” (migalhas in Portuguese) was used to describe Kinross’ CSR and overall positive contribution to the local community in 10 of the interviews (C1-4, 6, 7, 12, 25, 28, 32, 37 and 39).</p> <p>Divide and Rule</p> <p>In Sao Domingos Maroon adjacent to the mine the community mainly made up of relatives has been divided. One side, the lead by the previous President a law graduate is very sceptical of Kinross’ CSR and refuses to accept it seeing it as co-optation and a license to destroy their sacred and environment. The other side of Sao Domingos now lead by a lady with basic education is very much in favour of collaborating with Kinross in CSR projects. According to multiple interviewees (C2 – C4, C6, C10 – C12, C18, C21, C23, C25, C28-29, C33, C37) Kinross Gold pays “breadcrumbs” to the Sao Domingos leaders in capacity building courses, electricity bills and half minimum salary (US\$160)</p>	
--	--	--	--	--	--	--

					per month to monitor environmental impacts.	
--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Table 20 – Findings Analysis Mariana

Environmental impact	Social impact	Economic impact	Extent of conflict	Strength of collective action	Corporate influence strategies (by construct)	Community influence strategies (by construct)
At Mariana there are great concerns about possible contamination to the local water supplies which come from natural springs in the mountains where the mine is planned, should it be approved. This water is not treated as it is in other larger cities. Therefore if mining just 4km from the city centre, where the city's water supplies originate from,	The main objections from a minority of the Mariana residents, who are mainly non-native academics (interview codes F1-2 and F4), was that the city was already over full capacity with regard to population, traffic, housing availability and inflation. Mariana could not cope with a new mine being operated just 4km from	None so far	Low –	Low – sporadic public protests by local activists in 2011	<p>Corporate Irresponsibility</p> <p>Too powerful</p> <p>The minority of mainly academics and students who are against the reactivation of the Mina del Rey argue that Vale, the world's largest iron ore mining company, will be too powerful for the local Mayor to reject. Vale has also started a more aggressive public relations campaign in the city, which my interviewees believe is a form of co-optation of the local community to obtain their SLO for opening the new mine. As put forward by one university lecturer Claudio:</p> <p><i>“The (mining) company is distributing various information (newsletter) in the homes of residents on their good deeds and actions that they have been performing. But actually I realize this is just a social obligation, as it</i></p>	<p>Collective resistance</p> <p>Weak – due to dependence on mining industry within the radius of 40km. The town is economically dependent on mining.</p> <p><i>“We do not have the populations support ... Only a few demonstrate against the proposed project, of those few, even less do something concrete here In Mariana, the people are very individualistic (each only thinks about himself, and his own short-term benefit.) its very sadThere are also many city residents working in this company,</i></p>

<p>the risk of water contamination would be high, as per my interviewees and the blog posts on the internet ¹² . However, these same interviewees (interview codes F1-5) believed strongly that the rest of the local population would not be so concerned about contamination to their local water supplies as long as there were jobs.</p>	<p>the centre due to excess traffic, noise, migration, limited accommodation and high inflation (interview codes F1-2 and F4). The mine in essence would worsen the community's quality of life. Other grievances were related to the visual impact of the proposed mine which would be visible from the historic city centre. As explained by Claudio whilst we were driving in his car inside the city:</p>				<p><i>is exempt from various taxes. The company does not say anything about the issue of the reactivation of Mina Del Rey. The company says nothing about Mina Del Rey. The company is only making propaganda about its "good things", related to job creation, conservation areas, development ..."</i> (Interviewee code F1, local community resident opposing mine, Mariana).</p> <p><i>"I think the economic power of mining exerts is very strong influence in the community, especially regarding the economic and political control of the city. This creates a dependency and an almost survival of the local economy on mining due to a lack of long term government policies. Mining companies rule the cities."</i> (Interviewee Code F4, Trade Union Representative, Mariana)</p> <p><i>"Yes I agree with your paragraph below about mining company power, not forgetting the huge number of co-opted or corrupted leaders linked the community or</i></p>	<p><i>this creates a certain dependency."</i> (Interviewee code F1, local community resident opposing mine, Mariana).</p>
---	---	--	--	--	--	---

¹² <http://cuidardemariana.blogspot.com.br/> <http://marianaviva.blogspot.com.br/>

	<p><i>“Look at that! (pointing to a terrible traffic jam due to passing mining trucks driving at 5m.p.h) This is what we have to bear every day now, there’s nowhere to rent, space for cars, the city is full so if that mine reopens here the city will collapse...I and my wife will leave for sure.”.</i></p> <p>(Interviewee code F1, Local community resident opposing opening of mine, Mariana)</p>				<p><i>the trade union movement of mining itself.”</i> (Interviewee Code F4, Trade Union Representative, Mariana)</p>	
--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Table 21 - Findings Analysis Pedra Branca

Environmental impact	Social impact	Economic impact	Extent of conflict	Strength of collective action	Corporate influence strategies (by construct)	Community influence strategies (by construct)
<p>Overall – Low Interviewees (interview codes A1- A4) complained about the dust that is dispersed from the wheels of the mining vehicles circulating in the town; one local resident who was suing Anglo American for having prevented him from mining on their land summarized the dust problem as:</p> <p><i>“I told the company lawyer</i> </p>	<p>Locals would like more of a positive social impact from the mine.</p>	<p>It has been positive and attracted much of the new population who have arrived from nearby States as economic migrants.</p>	<p>Low</p>	<p>Low – sporadic public protests due to electricity cuts</p>	<p>Responsible</p> <p>According to most local community interviewees Anglo American is a responsible actor but could do more in terms of investment in local infrastructure, services and jobs.</p> <p>Corporate Irresponsibility</p> <p>Ungenerous</p> <p>Anglo were not as generous as Icomi the previous mine in the area who provided a hospital, high quality schools, stores and benefits for employees and their families.</p> <p>Anglo American’s strategy with the community is linked to the sustainability of the local community:</p> <p><i>“Anglo American wants the following...referring back to Icomi</i> </p>	<p>Collective resistance</p> <p>There are very few and weak resistance strategies as the community is not united and has a short history.</p> <p>The only one small group trying to resist the mine in 2012 was a group of artisanal miners who had been forced off the land by Anglo American.</p> <p><i>“For others the company is good, for those recent migrants, they have jobs for them. But for us the roots from here, the owners of the mines from 52 years, for us the company is being really bad, bad. I tell you, honestly if they don’t</i> </p>

<p><i>whilst you're driving around in your air conditioned (Toyota) hi-lux the minerals are all falling out of your vehicles in the town and affecting us as it spreads around especially from the wheels."</i></p> <p>(Interviewee code A1, long term resident and critical voice, Pedra Branca de Amapari)</p>					<p><i>the inevitable, they closed their doors and everyone was left high and dry and now everyone fears that Anglo American will do the same. So everything we do today is related to income generation or education. There's no point in coming here proposing a project not linked to this. It's all about the future".</i></p>	<p><i>resolve this I will and I promise I will cut off the road with my group having a protest and they won't have access to the mine! We will also put a video of their environmental crimes on the internet for the world to see"</i> (Interviewee Code A1, Artisan miner and long term resident, Pedra Branca</p>
--	--	--	--	--	---	--

Table 22 – Findings Analysis Barro Alto

Environmental impact	Social impact	Economic impact	Extent of conflict	Strength of collective action	Corporate influence strategies (by construct)	Community influence strategies (by construct)
None	Locals would like more of a positive social impact from the mine. Anglo American also claim they kept negative social impact to a minimum during construction phase. In 2007 the sustainability management decided to keep the hundreds of construction workers housed away from the centre	It has been positive and attracted much of the new population who have arrived from nearby States as economic migrants.	Low	Low – sporadic public protests at Anglo American's annual forum	<p>Responsible</p> <p>According to most local community interviewees Anglo American is a responsible actor but could do more in terms of investment in local infrastructure, services and jobs.</p> <p>In line with Anglo American's way of working with local communities they decided to partner with external NGOs who have set up operations in Barro Alto. One example is that of international NGO Care which is focused on social and entrepreneurship projects with milk, agriculture and trees. The hope is also for local small-scale farmers to grow vegetables to supply Anglo American's cafeteria as part of a local development initiative. Like in the urban centre of Conceição de</p>	<p>Collective resistance</p> <p>Very weak currently. However some years ago the aggrieved business owners resisted at corporate opportunities afforded by Anglo American.</p> <p>Anglo American in Barro Alto started to hold annual open and public forums from 2008 during the construction phase of the mine. The purpose of these forums was to communicate to the local community the mine's intentions with regard to local purchasing, recruitment, social responsibility strategies, social fund payments to local</p>

	<p>of Barro Alto despite knowing many locals were hoping to rent their rooms and houses to these migrant workers. The reason for this decision was in order to avoid potential social conflict between locals and the new workers. The workers were housed several kilometres from Barro Alto. This according to Miguel, the head of sustainability was an intelligent decision in hindsight:</p> <p><i>“..in order to reduce possible conflicts and disturbances</i></p>				<p>Mato Dentro and Pedra Branca, Anglo American also provides a social investment fund to the municipal government to spend on public services. Anglo American have partnered with an NGO from Sao Paulo based in Barro Alto called Agenda Publica that builds capacity in local government on how to be more transparent, accountable and invest strategically the tax revenues paid by Anglo American. The company has also paid for the construction of a new hospital for the community. Overall most members of the local community I spoke to were in favour of Anglo American and grateful for their presence. (Interviewee code G2, Community residents Barro Alto).</p> <p>Corporate Irresponsibility</p> <p>Ungenerous</p> <p>Those with minimarket stores and other businesses were the most aggrieved because they felt Anglo American should be doing more to develop the town's infrastructure and also lead by example by having its executives live in Barro Alto and not in another larger city 40km away.</p>	<p>government, amongst other items. However, at the first annual forums the aggrieved local businesspeople used them as opportunities to voice their concerns and protest against what they saw as a lack of social responsibility and local investment by Anglo American. However, Miguel explained that his team managed to show to the rest of the community that they were a good company and therefore the protesters eventually stopped attending the forums</p>
--	---	--	--	--	---	--

	<p><i>with the local community we housed the construction workers for one year some kilometres from here. This prevented many social tensions and conflicts from occurring.”</i></p> <p>(Interviewee code G1, Anglo American Social Performance Manager, Barro Alto),</p>				<p><i>“Anglo American are not ethical in their treatment of the community. They only hire people recommended by workers and friends there, there is nepotism. The company should do much more for the town to develop it so it can grow. The managers don’t live here otherwise they would spend more money and help the economy. Why do they live in Goianianese?”</i> (Interviewee code, G4, Shopkeeper, Barro Alto)</p>	
--	---	--	--	--	--	--

5.2 Historical context – High Conflict cases

The historical context is an important aspect for explaining how the two groups of higher and lower conflict communities became less dependent and more dependent respectively on the nearby mining projects. The higher conflict and more independent communities include the Huasco Valley, Caimanes and Colla communities in Chile and Conceição de Mato Dentro rural communities in Brazil. In the cases of the Huasco Valley and Colla communities in northern Chile, interviewees from there explicitly made mention of their respective rich pre-Hispanic histories of fighting previous invaders such as the Incas and Spanish in order to save and defend their identities. These communities therefore also needed to do the same to maintain these identities in the present era of neo-colonization by foreign mining companies. Barbara, the indigenous leader from the Diaguita community in the Huasco Valley explained this point clearly

“we were the first People the Spanish encountered upon entering Chile from Peru, and the Spaniards killed our Cacique in front of his family, yet we continued fighting even as the slaves of the Spanish....we burned down La Serena (town located 400km south) twice, when it belonged to the Spanish...they called us the ‘Valiant Campillay’, apparently it’s documented in a library somewhere in Spain, so we kept the Valley for our people and they the Spanish stayed near the coast.....so if we allow all these proposed mega mines into our valley it will turn into a mining valley and our culture will die. We want the mining companies to leave so we can keep our identity, culture and water which is life!” (Interviewee code E1, Indigenous Community leader)

This indicates that from a historical perspective of before the Spanish conquest of what is today northern Chile in the 16th Century, that the Diaguita community fought for their independence and autonomy and gained this right allowing them to live peacefully in the Huasco Valley and higher elevations free from the interference of the Spanish conquistadores. This view of the Diaguita and Huasco Valley history is

also shared by my other interviewees from the region and knowledgeable experts as well as by Standen (2011). Therefore this sensation of being independent from “outsiders” has been engrained in the Diaguita community for centuries and generations. Given this heritage, the arrival of one of the largest gold mining companies in the world to the Huasco Valley to mine their mountains for gold was highly objected to by the local community. The Diaguita people living in the Huasco Valley claim they were content living their own unique way of life growing grapes, avocados, vegetables amongst other crops in harmony with the environment and nature. The Diaguita people’s dependence and future well-being is directly tied to the land and water, with Mother Nature or as they refer to it as *Pachamama*.

With regard to the Colla of the River Jorquera community, their ancient history and self-reliance is very similar to that of the Diaguita people. The Colla people are considered as “cousins” of the Diaguitas and are located just 200km north of the Huasco Valley. The Colla, similarly to the Diaguita, have survived for centuries without large-scale mining, making their livelihoods mainly as shepherds herding sheep and growing alfalfa high up the Andes Mountains. The Colla do have a history of recent artisanal small scale mining similar to that in the Huasco Valley; however, this type of mining was carried out by the Colla and Diaguita people themselves who take full leadership and ownership of the mining – hence without the involvement of outsider companies or miners.

In addition, as put forward by several of my interviewees from within the Huasco Valley and external knowledgeable experts, the Colla people having lived so long independently of any involvement or assistance from outsiders, also have a natural mistrust of anyone who comes from outside their community, especially foreigners in search of mining their natural resources. During an improvised car ride to the nearest small town, Alto del Carmen a woman resident kind enough to offer me a lift who was campaigning for her husband to be elected as councillor from the “Spanish” side of the Valley in the Huasco Valley explained how on her Spanish side of the valley the people are more open, welcoming, and trusting compared to the Diaguita side where people are less trusting and closed especially to outside. The reason being as

explained by the lady was that the Diaguita had always lived isolated here in a closed way so they are not accustomed to meeting and co-existing with outsiders; they are suspicious of people who come from outside unlike her side of the valley which is mainly descended from the Spanish.

The Colla community has also grown stronger as an independent community in recent years as affirmed by their own leader, the community relations officer at Kinross and by two external knowledgeable experts; this community throughout the past three decades has become politicized after winning legal disputes over land rights via their logging trade union, which therefore has made them more confident and skilled in challenging large multinational mining companies. The Colla community over the years has grown in self-confidence that it can beat big businesses such as a large grape farmer they defeated in their claim for compensation for farming in what they consider as their indigenous territory. Indeed the Colla community has managed to take mining companies to court and gain compensation from them demonstrating their non-reliance and lack of fear of these nearby mining projects. Moreover, the Colla community has shown its strength of power in relation to the mining companies, thereby tipping the balance of power towards them as a community in line with Frooman's (1999) model of power and dependence.

The rural communities of Conceição de Mato Dentro and Caimanes in Chile are also at least 200 years old. They have never previously had large-scale related mining located very close to their settlements. Like the previous two Chilean communities, they were founded on agriculture and up until today are still agriculture-based communities, making them independent from mining and self-sufficient. In the case of Conceição de Mato Dentro, a few of the rural communities were established over 200 years ago by descendants of African slaves escaping slavery to set up their own communities by themselves known as Quilombo or Maroon in English. Therefore the struggle for independence has been at the roots and origins of the Conceição De Mato Dentro rural communities.

Community members in some of the Conceição de Mato Dentro rural communities and at Caimanes also made reference to history though much more recent history than at the Huasco Valley and the Colla community. At Conceição de Mato Dentro the historical context was mentioned on occasions by one of the community leaders Fernanda who explained that her community is not dependent upon mining and is self-reliant:

“we used to make well known cheeses, biscuits and sweet pastries here....mining is not part of what we do, we have cows and our land and are happy with that but mining impacts all of this. We also used to really enjoy going to the waterfall and playing in the water but we can't do that anymore as they have destroyed the waterfall which is the highest in this State for mining.” (Interviewee code H1, Community Leader, Transcripts)

All four higher conflict communities had a strong feature of independence and resilience installed in them from the moment they were formed hundreds of years ago. The communities have much shared and collective history, which is linked to their dependence on Mother Nature or *pachamama* for their future well-being. It is clear to understand from this historical perspective why these communities would be against giving the proposed nearby mining projects their critical resource of an SLO. Doing so could jeopardize their traditional ways of living.

5.3 Historical context – Low Conflict cases

In stark contrast to the histories of the high conflict cases, mining was a core part of the past of the four lower conflict cases. In the case of Paracatu, the city was founded over 200 years ago by Portuguese explorers searching for gold, therefore gold mining forms part of the city's historical identity. The Portuguese, according to my interviewees, found an abundance of gold and consequently soon built the city of Paracatu in order to send the precious mineral back to the Portuguese royal family in Portugal. Therefore several interviewees compared the current day process of sending the gold back to Canada via airplane and ship as a continuation of the early days of Paracatu in the 18th Century.

However, large scale mining, as is the case at the Morro de Ouro (Gold Hill) mine run by Kinross today, only began in the late 1980s when it was substantially smaller than today. Agriculture also forms a very important part of Paracatu's economy; however, it is located far from the mine and therefore does not directly compete or threaten the mining activity. The Morro de Ouro locals in Paracatu used to make their living by artisanal mining, or gold panning and at the end of the day would walk to the city centre and sell their gold discoveries. Therefore the idea of gold mining is not foreign at all in Paracatu and moreover, having the largest opencast gold mine in Brazil just a few kilometres from the city is a situation that all local residents under the age of 35 are familiar with since they can remember. One of my interviewees, a lady aged 31 born and raised in Paracatu explained:

“as a young child I grew up seeing the mine, it is all I have ever known. Everyone my age or younger here does not know a Paracatu without the mine, so it is not a foreign body to us like it might be in other communities where a new mine is being built.” (Interviewee code C1 Anastasia – Daughter of local politician and local resident)

The large Morro de Ouro mine, now owned by Kinross Gold, has been in operation for over 26 years since 1987. As Paracatu has grown to become more dependent on municipal tax revenues, employment and in terms of local economy on the mine over time, the mine has also successfully obtained the necessary legal licences as well as the SLO for several expansions including new very large tailings dams (supposedly some of the largest in South America).

In the case of Mariana, as with Paracatu, both are located in the State of Minas Gerais (General Mines in English). Mariana was the first capital of Minas Gerais State, founded 300 years ago after discovering gold there, similar to Paracatu. The main employer in the town has always been the mining sector through many different companies either mining companies or related suppliers to the sector.

Mariana falls within the *Quadrilátero Ferrífero* (the Iron Quadrangle), an area roughly the size of greater London in the State of Minas Gerais abundant with high

quality iron ore mines and related businesses where the mining company Vale is highly active and has been for decades. Vale therefore has a strong legacy in Mariana, as before, when it was a State-owned company, it offered good quality housing to its workers based in Mariana. Such benefits, in addition to a reliance on mining, have helped create more of a dependency culture in Mariana on the mining industry. Though there are not any mines located within 5kms of Mariana just yet, there are several large iron ore mines within 20km of the town which is where most of the local residents go to work. Unlike Paracatu, Mariana does not have a significant agricultural sector, therefore mining is even more important to the town which means a higher dependency level on mining companies.

The small town of Pedra Branca de Amaparí in northern Brazil was a small village of fewer than 4,000 inhabitants in 2000 and by 2012 the population had grown to over 12,000. The reason for this accelerated growth can be explained by the arrival of large-scale mining in 2008. Before the arrival of large mining companies, local indigenous and other small communities had been engaging in artisanal gold mining. Located just 12km from Pedra Branca is the town of Serra de Navío, which was founded in the 1950s by the US mining company “Icomi” which mined manganese. As all local community and mining company interviewees explained to me, Icomi took a paternalistic approach to doing business in the region. In the 1950s the population in the State (the size of England) was under 100,000 therefore Icomi was the major and only actor there.

Icomi built American style villages, infrastructure, housing, streets, high quality schools and a hospital. Therefore all native local community residents with whom I spoke look back with much fondness of the period when Icomi were mining and practically governing the area. This paternalistic approach, i.e. of taking the State’s role, created a dependency culture, which can be observed today, and was claimed to be true by the majority of my informants in Amapa State. It is the main underlying explanation offered by my interviewees (from both the mining company and local community) for the current state of relations and community expectations with the mining company. It can be posited that the small villages of Pedra Branca and Serra

de Navio only exist because of the arrival of large-scale mining operations in the past 60 years. In short, Pedra Branca de Amaparí and its localities have known nothing else other than mining and are thus dependent on the industry.

The town of Barro Alto was only established and officially recognized around 60 years ago as a municipality. The population was 40% lower before Anglo American started the construction of their nickel mine in 2006 (Grisotto, 2012). As explained by my interviewees, most of the local community are economic migrants or their parents came from other regions of Brazil once there was news about an apparently large gold mine in the town. The lure of this mine brought many new migrants to the area, in the late 1970s up until today, hoping to make money directly or indirectly from the mine. Therefore the main reason most of the 8,000 people are in Barro Alto is because of the mine; the historical context of mining speculation brought many of these residents from other areas to the locality to make a better life for themselves financially.

The contrast between the historical contexts of the four higher and lower conflict community groups is evident. The higher conflict cases started life as communities at least over 200 years ago based around agriculture as a way of life and identity. These four communities also confronted bigger colonial powers in order to fight for their independence and autonomy over 200 years ago. These events have lived in the collective memories of the local residents, most of whom can trace their families back over many generations. Therefore if a large multinational mining company enters their territory to carry out massive mining-related operations with certain environmental and social impacts on the traditional and historical ways of lives lived by the locals, it will not be accepted. The local communities in these four locations were never dependent upon mining or on any other institution. They have thrived for decades as independent people living in relative peace off the land and Mother Nature. Therefore trying to suddenly make them dependent to an extent on large-scale nearby mining after so many years of independence is a difficult challenge for a mining company or any other organization.

On the other hand, the four lower conflict communities were born and founded as a result of mining. Without mining, these towns would not even be here today. In the cases of Barro Alto and Pedra Branca these small towns owe their existence to the presence of the large mines currently in operation in these municipalities. Therefore the dependency link between local community and mine is very clear to comprehend from a historical viewpoint. In line with Frooman's (1999) argument, the future welfare of both organization (mining company) and stakeholder (local community) are tied to one another and, as quoted earlier, Anglo American do state on their website that there is a mutual dependence between them and their local community. In communities where dependence is so high towards the nearby mining projects it is also understandable why levels of conflict are much lower, as shown in Table 4 (with the exception of Paracatu which has a recent history of conflict against the Morro de Ouro mine). In more independent and autonomous communities, who fear the impacts from large-scale mining, conflict and hence a non-granting of an SLO is a distinct possibility for those with a strong collective memory, as also seen in Table 4. The fact that there is much less resistance in communities which have a strong history and identity of mining, also supports the claims made by authors such as Gramling and Freudenburg (2006), McAdam and Boudet (2012) and Walsh *et al.*, (1997).

5.31 Summary

At the lower conflict communities it can be perceived on the surface that some of the complaints around the mining company impacts are similar in nature to Paracatu and the higher conflict communities, such as with the environment and health as well as grievances around the ungenerous nature of mining companies. However, upon closer inspection one can distinguish some fundamental differences in the type of grievances between Paracatu, higher and lower conflict communities. Firstly, the issue of water was one of the main problems at the higher conflict communities and at Paracatu, though not given so much concern at the lower conflict communities. In the three cases of Mariana, Pedra Branca and Barro Alto, it is the minority who hold grievances against their nearby mining projects in contrast to the higher conflict communities. There is also much more of a perceived negative impact on people's land and livelihoods at the higher conflict communities and at Paracatu as opposed to the lower

conflict communities. At these lower conflict communities there were more complaints related to the impacts on the social and economic fabric from mining and also more about how ungenerous the mining companies were being with giving back to the community.

At Paracatu and the lower conflict communities, residents were reaching out to offer their SLO to the nearby mining companies though they wanted much more in return for this by way of economic benefits. As stressed earlier, the higher conflict communities claim they are not willing to negotiate their water, health or land with the mining companies for social responsibility and jobs. At the very least they are willing to sell out for generous compensation packages on their own terms. When comparing Paracatu with the higher conflict communities the similarities between grievances and impacts are clear. One could go further by saying that the grievances around the alleged impacts on the environment and health at Paracatu, as asserted by the community, are among the harshest of the different cases in my research. Therefore one is left with the question of why is Paracatu not classed as a higher conflict community?

The answer can be accounted for by the influence strategies used by the mining company and by the community for being more accepting of these grievances. This is where the discussion returns to the topic of dependence and power as posited by Frooman (1999), though in the context of mining company local community relations from the case studies researched.

In the following section I proceed to discuss the various stages I observed mining companies undergo to gain their SLO from the local communities at higher and lower conflict communities throughout the mining cycle. In addition I highlight the different community collective behaviour and action, or lack of it in response to these different mining company influence strategies, which ultimately determine the classification of the cases as higher or lower conflict communities.

5.4 Mining company influence strategies for attaining SLO

Based on my research data and a publication by ICMM (2012), I propose a model of community relations' stages between mining companies and their local communities in a Brazilian and Chilean context as shown in Table 22. More specifically, this model focuses on the different mining company influence strategies to gain an SLO from the local community at the various different stages of the mining cycle. In order to understand the table and analysis below, it is important to briefly explain the mining cycle. According to the International Council on Mining and Metal's Community Development Toolkit and Hugo Herrera Carvajal, Project Process Manager of Barrick Gold Pascua Lama, Chile in 2008 the mining cycle consists mainly of the following stages:

- Exploration – According to ICMM (2012) small teams, working on short time horizons across dispersed areas in a short timeframe. Carvajal (2008) explains that there is drilling and tunnelling that happens at this phase, which would need the detonation of explosives. The mining company wants to establish at this point whether there are enough minerals to make it financially viable to build and develop a large scale mining operation in the location.
- Feasibility – Land acquisition and legal permits/licences – the literature on this stage mentions that technical studies are made to determine the financial and legal viability, which includes an environmental impact assessment. The literature however, does not make any reference to land acquisition at any of the mining stages. However, based on my field research and conversations with mining experts, I argue that it is also at this stage that mining companies need to buy as much of the land needed where they believe the mineral is located and this can mean very large areas. This land can also have private owners therefore negotiations about land acquisition or resettling of people also commences here if appropriate. In my case studies, only Kinross Maricunga and Anglo American at Barro Alto did not have important land acquisition or resettlement issues.

- Construction and Development – this is asserted by ICMM (2012) as well as my mining company interviewees as the most intense in terms of impacts on the local community. Therefore there is the potential for harming community relations mainly due to the high influx of migrant construction workers to the location and the additional money being spent by these workers.

In more technical terms Carvajal (2008) argues that this stage consists of *pre-stripping*, which involves removing the worthless rock that is together with the mineral reserves. At the same time there is construction of facilities for extraction, processing, transportation, energy supply infrastructure and transport access (roads, railways, ports, airports) to and from the mine site. Therefore there would also be considerable impact on the local community in terms of the environment, dust and noise pollution.

- Operations – According to ICMM (2012) this is the most stable stage where community relations can be enhanced as construction of the mine is complete. However, the technical explanation by Carvajal (2012) would infer that the potential for impacts on the local communities is quite high and adverse. Carvajal (2008) separates the operations or production phase into three different stages of *Extraction, Processing, and Smelting and Refining*.

Extraction removes the mineral from the mine. The main processes involved are drilling and blasting of rocks, and loading and transportation of the materials to their destinations. *Processing* which includes leaching for gold mining aims to increase the concentration of metals by the use of chemicals such as sulfides which include cyanide and arsenic for gold mining. Thirdly there is *Smelting and Refining* which consists of the separation of the metals contained in concentrates. This is done by melting metals, through industrial processing known as fire refining and refining by Electrowinning. The

potential to cause harm to local communities' health, livelihoods and environments is apparent from the above description.

- Closure – this important final stage refers to the end of the mine which is usually decades after the initial exploration. However, it is not relevant at the moment for any of my case studies.

The International Council for Mining and Metals (ICMM) whose mission is to help improve sustainable development performance of its 21 large mining company members, which include three of the four companies examined in my research Anglo American, Barrick Gold and Vale (ICMM website consulted 25th August, 2013), published a similar table to Table 6 given below. The table titled “Description of phases of the mining project cycle and company/community interactions” was included in ICMM’s 2012 publication titled “Community Development Toolkit”. Under each stage of the mining cycle, ICMM include a short and generic text of between 70-100 words describing the mining company activities, community grievances and recommendations for improving relations. The table also has a column for “suggested community development activities” linked to tools. The ICMM’s table considers the following six mining cycle stages: Exploration, Feasibility, Constructions, Operations, Decommissioning and Closure, and Post Closure. However due to the nature of my case studies I align my data into the following four mining cycle stages for my analysis in Table 6 and subsequently:

1. Exploration and initial mining licences/permits
2. Feasibility – Land acquisition and legal permits/licences
3. Construction and Development
4. Operations

It should be stated that the four stages are not clearly defined and separate, as also claimed by the ICMM (2012) many of the mining activities and community

engagement overlap across the various stages of the mining cycle. Table 6 below goes beyond the ICMC one in terms of more detail about what takes place at each stage of the mining cycle and in terms of including mining company influence strategies followed by community response strategies using specific case studies; it is also more dynamic and process natured, explaining the events from one stage to the next in the mining cycle. This contrasts with the ICMC table which focuses mainly on the mining company and a little on possible general community grievances and perceptions though nothing on community action and responses. Therefore I argue that such a consideration and attempt to theorize mining company community relations from a more detailed, dynamic and dual perspective has not been considered by the literature and I hope to address this gap (see Table 22).

These following influence strategy stages are the result of analyzing my four higher conflict cases. It should be noted that as Conceição de Mato Dentro is a newer mining project it is only relevant up until stage three of Table 22. Below I offer an overview of the six main stages of mining company influence strategies in Table 22.

Table 23 – mining company influence strategies and community response strategies according to mining cycle stage at higher conflict communities

Mining company influence strategy at the different stages of mining cycle	Local community response strategy to mining company
Exploration and initial mining licences	
1. Geologists conduct tests on the soil for minerals. There is also initial land acquisition for mining – Maintain low profile while obtaining mining licences and permits.	Limited response, as community are unaware of these tests. In the case of Pádua Lama there was an over 20-year lag between exploration and application for legal permits.

Feasibility – Land acquisition and legal permits/licences	
<p>2. Determine the mine to be economically viable. Communicate success of initial engagement with certain urban community groups highlighting future economic investment benefits and new jobs the mining project will bring to the region. Announce social responsibility intentions to give back to community with the aim of securing the SLO. Begin land acquisition process for mining and necessary resettlement of communities who currently live on the land destined for mining. In addition begin compiling Environmental Impact Assessment studies in order to obtain the necessary environmental and mining permits and licences to start constructing the mine.</p>	<p>Complaints about the lack of transparency and ethics around the way land is being bought for mining. Concern escalates with each environmental licence approval process in specific on the potential environmental impacts on the community.</p> <p>Community leaders call to external actors such as NGOs, lawyers or state prosecution for assistance. Members of the affected (rural) community are annoyed that their concerns around the negative impacts on their lives from the proposed mine are being ignored by the mining company and that instead it chooses to focus on social responsibility. The rural community begins to view this as a co-optation strategy.</p> <p>The community strengthens its collectiveness in this adversity and anger with external actor assistance. Become more entrenched in their positions and view the situation as “them versus us”. More and larger mass protests, more collective action and more press coverage of their resistance.</p>
Construction and Development stage	
<p>3. The company receives its necessary mining licences and permits. As a result of heightened</p>	<p>A minority within the rural and affected communities accepts participating in the CSR programme as beneficiaries, usually</p>

<p>community mobilization and resistance, the company increases its effort to talk with the rural communities and becomes very proactive in offering generous CSR-related benefits (in health, education, income generation) to the more aggrieved and impacted community groups. Offer compensation to few powerful local community actors. However, still offer few jobs to the local community residents; most go to skilled workers from other regions. Still offer no credible solutions to the adverse environmental and social impacts including those of resettlement.</p>	<p>lowest income and schooling levels. Also a minority but powerful group in the local community who accept generous compensation are silenced and co-opted. They become dependent on the mining company and offer their SLO.</p> <p>Many also now after seeing the mining company win its licences and permits become resigned to its presence in the community and to its negative impacts.</p> <p>The majority of the community perceive the CSR as a form of co-optation to induce dependency on the mining company and hence gain an SLO to do as they please with the region. This majority refuse to collaborate with the mining company in any way including not participating in any corporate sponsored event.</p> <p>There are more grievances around impacts from mining on water, land, quality of life and culture. Some in the community are now speaking of demanding financial compensation from the mining company for the damages incurred to their lives by the mining activities. This creates some internal divisions amongst those opposed to the mine who want it to stop and leave the region.</p> <p>As few work at the mine, being largely</p>
--	---

	<p>self-sufficient from agriculture, they do not have divided loyalties and are able to resist the mining company's CSR and behaviour.</p> <p>Results in more continued protests (now from different fragmented groups) against the mining project and also collective legal action to cease operations, with success in some cases.</p>
Construction and Development/Operations stage	
<p>4. Marked by years of negative community perceptions, protests and now temporary suspensions in mining activities ordered by the courts of justice due to community complaints, the company retreats from dialogue attempts and from the public eye. The company realizes they have not obtained their SLO from the community and this has brought bad publicity and harmed its reputation.</p> <p>The company continues with social responsibility programmes with a minority of the rural community and with the urban community as before but with a lower public profile.</p> <p>The mining company also faces financial challenges for funding its</p>	<p>The community continue to mistrust the mining company and the government. They continue to complain and protest about the negative impacts from mining operations on their water, land and human rights.</p> <p>Their aim continues to be for the mining company to respect environmental impact agreements and/or for the company to stop mining operations for good. Many are also now demanding financial compensation for the damages incurred from mining activities. The internal divisions within the rural community grow between those in favour of negotiating with the mining company and those totally opposed to any dialogue.</p> <p>The majority prefer to remain independent from the mine and count on the assistance of external actors such as</p>

operations due to the protests, lost time from being suspended and workers' strikes and action.	lawyers, state prosecution and NGOs in their resistance for justice and their livelihoods.
5. Engagement with the affected rural communities is mainly through lawyers and litigation at the courts or state prosecution meetings.	Protests continue against the mine by certain community sections whilst others negotiate through lawyers for huge amounts of financial compensation. There are now two divided internal groups within the affected rural community.

Barrick Gold also addressed the contentious subject of the reconstruction of the Diaguita indigenous identity around 2006 by promoting and lobbying on behalf of the community to the government for them to be recognized as indigenous. Barrick Gold invested heavily with the most impoverished and vulnerable Diaguita groups in the Huasco Valley before they were officially recognized as Diaguitas. Once relations with this Diaguita group were good Barrick Gold, according to my sources, then explained to the group that they qualified for indigenous people's status as Diaguitas and that they would help them with their application to the Chilean government. Recognition as Diaguitas also meant access to additional State social benefits, so it had economic advantages. Thus once this friendly group was officially recognized as Diaguitas by the Chilean State, Barrick Gold were able to communicate that the Diaguita indigenous community were in favour of them and enjoyed good relations. Barrick Gold even apparently invited some of these friendly Diaguitas to their annual general meetings of shareholders in Toronto, Canada to demonstrate these good relations and supposed SLO. Nonetheless the majority of the Diaguitas in the Huasco Valley were not interested in or influenced by Barrick Gold and remained against the mining project from the perspective of my interviewees.

However, interviewees such as church clergyman Manuel, community leaders Barbara and Sandra (Interviewee code E1) in a geography thesis by Standen (2011) jointly stressed the need for a critical examination of what and why Barrick Gold did what it did regarding the Diaguita identity. These critical voices claim that Barrick Gold firstly was championing the case for the government to recognize the Diaguita people as indigenous because the multinational knew there was a good probability of this happening. Therefore the company took the visible ownership and leadership of the issue in the hope of gaining legitimacy or an SLO in eyes of the local community as a responsible actor with the Diaguita people, with whom they had already established good relations via social responsibility initiatives. It would also permit Barrick Gold to publicly show it has Diaguita community leaders defending and supporting the Pascua Lama mining project, and thus an SLO.

These findings and interpretations corroborate with a quote in Urkidi and Walter (2011) around the influence strategies of Barrick Gold around gaining community acceptance from manipulating the Diaguita identity and community:

‘‘The company has brought in professionals from other parts of the country to conduct workshops on the ‘traditional’ Diaguita crafts, essentially inventing a nonexistent Diaguita culture and denying the ethnicity of our community. They have raised false leaders, who are now attending meetings with the company and the media, discrediting the real leaders of the community and creating irreconcilable divisions between community members and their neighbours. All these actions have led to confusion and they have weakened the identity of the Diaguita Huascoalinos.’’(Letter to Canadian parliament by the Diaguita Huasco–Altino Agricultural Community, May 2009. P689, 2011)

In an attempt to show their acceptance in the region, Barrick Gold showcase on their website a letter from August 2007 signed by six different neighbourhood associations underscoring their support for Barrick Gold and Pascua Lama operating in the region. However, it is important to note that only one of the neighbourhood representatives who signed the letter of approval was from the Alto del Carmen municipality in the

Huasco Valley. This representative is also on the Water Vigilance Board, the group that received US\$6m from Barrick Gold. The other five representatives who signed the letter of approval are from the town of Vallenar and from Huasco which is even further away near the coast therefore adding strength to the argument that Barrick Gold chose to focus its efforts on gaining legitimacy from a more distant urban community.

In short, Barrick Gold has attempted to implement several different strategies to influence the local community's perceptions and relations with the mining company to gain their acceptance, cooperation, trust and most importantly their SLO.

Table 24 – Mining company influence strategies and community response strategies according to mining cycle stage at lower conflict communities.

Mining company influence strategy at different stage of Mining Cycle	Local community response strategy to mining company
Exploration and initial mining licences	
1. Geologists conduct tests on the soil for minerals. There is also initial land acquisition for mining – Maintain low profile while obtaining mining licences and permits	Community expectations of local economic opportunities heightened at the prospect of a large multinational mining company developing a large mine near community.
Feasibility – Land acquisition and legal permits/licences	
2. Determine the mine to be economically viable. Communicate success of initial engagement with nearby urban community highlighting future	Community becomes excited at the prospect of new jobs and business opportunities. New migrants begin arriving at the town also in the hope of

<p>economic investment benefits and new jobs the mining project will bring to the region. Announce social responsibility intentions to buy locally and give back to community with the aim of securing the SLO. However, doing so in a careful and measured way to manage expectations around levels of local investment. Begin land acquisition process for mining.</p> <p>Resettlement of communities who currently live on the land destined for mining is limited and lower than in the higher conflict communities.</p> <p>Environmental Impact Assessment studies pass through with limited opposition and company maintains consistent dialogue with the community.</p>	<p>benefiting economically.</p> <p>People begin to buy new properties and make extensions to their homes in the hope of profiting by renting out their properties in the near future. This creates the start of housing speculation and local inflation.</p>
<p>Construction and Development stage</p>	
<p>3. The company receives its necessary mining licences and permits and therefore begins construction of the mines.</p> <p>Brings in hundreds of construction</p>	<p>The fact that few local residents have been selected to work at the mine irritates many in the community, though they decide to wait until it is operational to see if they can gain employment then. Also they are not able to rent out their rooms</p>

<p>workers who are housed separately to the local community in order to minimize social unrest.</p> <p>However, still offer few jobs to the local community residents; most go to skilled workers from other regions.</p> <p>Company is concerned at lack of local government capacity in dealing with and reinvesting a sudden new influx of revenue from the mining company.</p>	<p>and properties to new workers.</p> <p>Local businesses are starting to become disappointed that their projected new sales are not materializing from this new mine. The business community is beginning to feel unsettled.</p> <p>However the mining company has started its social responsibility programme with the local community in areas such as capacity building, education and entrepreneurship, which pleases those who participate.</p> <p>A divide starts to form between those who benefit from the mine and those who do not.</p>
<p>Construction and Development/Operations stage</p>	
<p>The company rolls out more of its social responsibility programmes. It also participates in more local purchasing for its mining operations. Announces plans to invest in public services such as a hospital, technical college and park or plaza.</p> <p>However, most of the skilled jobs are offered to those from outside the community.</p>	<p>This situation exacerbates the internal divisions between those who are benefiting and those who are not from the mine in terms of employment, income generation opportunities and social responsibility benefits.</p> <p>Prices in the community start to rise and those not earning from mining-related activities complain even more.</p> <p>At the mines where there is a significant impact, such as in Paracatu, certain local residents become aggrieved from noise, tremors, threats to health and safety.</p>

	Those against the mine due to the adverse impacts and/or non-recipients of economic benefits try to mobilize and protest.
<p>4. The mine quashes mobilization attempts with counter-mobilization tactics, community influence strategies, co-optation and divide and rule.</p> <p>It engages with local community about its social responsibility strategy, local hiring and purchasing strategy and of its importance to the local economy.</p> <p>The main implied message is there is a mutual interdependence where one cannot thrive without the other.</p>	<p>Those with grievances hold negative perceptions of the mine but do not attempt to mobilize again as they understand the immense power of the mine in the local community.</p> <p>Understanding the local community is dependent on the mine. Some of the opponents of the mine switch sides towards partnering with the mine in its social responsibility projects, taking the approach that it is better to try and change from inside than from the outside.</p>

Below I detail the local community influence strategies used by the four different mining companies at the four different local communities in Chile and Brazil, which are aimed at creating some level of dependence and ultimately winning over an SLO.

5.5 Discussion of mining company influence strategies and historical and community contexts

One of the factors for the lower conflict communities is the mutual dependence between the mining company and the community (as confirmed on the Anglo American website (so this would include Barro Alto and Pedra Branca though the

latter was sold in early 2013). At the higher conflict cases the mining companies are not solving communities' most cited grievances. Moreover, the most referred to desire from higher conflict community members was for the mining projects to cease and stop mining permanently. Therefore these higher conflict communities are reluctant to even offer their SLO to the nearby mining projects. Also, the extent to which companies even could respond to community grievances such as water and land is questionable, given that these elements are core resources required in large quantities by large-scale mining.

Nonetheless, the mining companies at both higher conflict and lower conflict communities used influence strategies as per Frooman (1999) in order to gain their SLO via creating some level of mutual dependence, with the exception of the rural communities of Conceição de Mato Dentro in Brazil. These rural communities in Conceição de Mato Dentro claim to experience severe environmental and human rights abuses which they have publically expressed on multiple occasions, yet Anglo American refuses to recognize these rural communities as a legitimate stakeholder, and more so their complaints as legitimate therefore implying that an SLO is not needed from these actors. Anglo American has instead chosen to focus on the urban centre of Conceição de Mato Dentro with its influence strategies, where it has largely made progress with creating a mutual dependence, better relations and gaining an SLO. Therefore this is another strategy mining companies can use for grappling with their SLO, i.e., to deny a certain community which is opposed to the mine from being a legitimate stakeholder with power and urgency, as per Mitchell *et al.* (1997). In essence this converts such a group into what Mitchell *et al.* (1997) denominate as a “dangerous stakeholder”.

At the other higher conflict communities, the mining companies (Barrick Gold, Pelambres and Kinross) were also reported by my interviewees as having ignored them as legitimate stakeholders from the outset. In these three communities it also took substantial protesting and mobilization in various forms for the nearby impacted communities to be recognized as legitimate and powerful stakeholders by the three respective mining companies. From there on the mining companies began to engage

in influence strategies in the form of CSR to create some level of dependence or loyalty from the local community, enough to be able to gain their SLO. It seems that for certain mining companies ignoring their staunch opponents and critical voices is understood to be the best strategy for addressing them.

The mining projects that have an SLO are also the ones with lower conflict communities. The communities who supply the SLO generously at Paracatu, Mariana, Pedra Branca and Barro Alto are also highly dependent on their nearby mining projects. Therefore this mutual dependence between mining company and community exists, as also affirmed on Anglo American's website. Therefore the challenge for the mining companies operating there (Anglo American, Kinross and Vale) is to balance this dependency because an over dependent local community would become a strain on resources. However, at the same time the mining companies are aware they cannot abuse their power and not give anything back to the communities, thus they need influence or social responsibility strategies in order to maintain their respective SLO. Mining companies understand even though they hold power and the communities are largely dependent on them they are also dependent on the communities for a place to operate, human and physical resources, suppliers, security, infrastructure amongst other features for an SLO. Without access to these assets the mining projects would not be able to operate.

With reference to the higher conflict communities, I would argue they, in contrast, are not dependent upon their nearby mining projects. This is the first challenge facing the mining companies so they therefore attempt to create a certain level of dependency on them for the local communities, in contrast to the lower conflict communities. The companies need the local communities to have some sort of need for them in order to create a mutual dependence and therefore be in a position to negotiate their SLO (Frooman, 1999). One other strategy is to simply ignore the stakeholder group when a mining project has multiple community stakeholders, such as at Conceição de Mato Dentro. In this case the mining company chose to ignore the self-sufficient rural community and address the more dependent one in the urban area.

It is interesting to note that in conversations with officials from these mining companies as well as from studying their corporate websites and communications materials, there was total consensus that the CSR philosophies are geared towards helping capacitate local communities to become independent and self-sufficient and therefore not have to rely on the mining company. The old proverb of Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime, was quoted by officials from Kinross and Anglo American to summarize their approaches to communities. The most interesting aspect of this is how at the higher conflict communities the residents are already emancipated and independent. These communities do not feel the need for mining, nor do they want mining. Indeed these communities make their livelihoods via agriculture and therefore are in direct competition with mining for access to water and land. Therefore it is possible to infer that the communities in these four cases possess the power and choose not to supply the SLO to their nearby mining projects.

Through manipulative influence strategies such as paying large sums of money to certain groups to buy their loyalties, or trying to manipulate the local community's identity, as with the Huasco Valley, or by ignoring communities and the impacts to them, as at Conceição de Mato Dentro and the Colla, mining companies have tried to sidestep the question of an SLO. Furthermore attempts which could be construed as dependence creating, such as sponsoring cultural events at Huasco Valley and Caimanes, offering courses and gifts at Colla, Huasco Valley and Conceição de Mato Dentro, or even making alleged threats, still have not succeeded in creating a desired mutual dependence at these four higher conflict communities. Table 24 compares and contrasts both categories of communities.

Table 25 - Comparison between higher conflicts and lower conflict communities in terms of dependence, mining company influence strategies and Ability to mine without Community Resistance.

	Community Dependency on mining	Level of negative impacts from mining	Mining company influence strategy on local community	Ability to mine without conflict
Huasco Valley	Low	High	Tried and unsuccessful in creating mutual dependence via co-optation and CSR.	No – Multiple large street protests and lawsuits. Courts ceased operations now. Big media campaign against mine.
Conceição de Mato Dentro	Low	High	Co-opt and gain support of urban community. No recognition of rural communities who claim to be affected.	No – Multiple protests. Courts ceased operations in past.
Caimanes	Low	High	Tried and unsuccessful in creating mutual dependence via co-optation and CSR	No – Multiple large street protests and lawsuits. Big media campaign against mine.
Colla	Very Low	High	Do minimum CSR and distance relations as much as possible.	No – Lawsuits and had several roadblocks to mine.
Paracatu	High	High	Do minimum CSR, co-opt critical opponents, maintain a level of community dependence to maintain power	Mainly Yes
Mariana	Very High	N/A (would be high)	Public relations	Yes
Pedra Branca	Very High	Low	Do minimum CSR and try to make community more independent	Yes
Barro Alto	Very High	Low	Do minimum CSR and try to make community more independent	Yes

5.2 Historical context – Higher Conflict cases

The historical context is an important aspect for explaining how the two groups of higher and lower conflict communities became less dependent and more dependent respectively on the nearby mining projects. The higher conflict and more independent communities include the Huasco Valley, Caimanes and Colla communities in Chile and Conceição de Mato Dentro rural communities in Brazil. In the cases of the Huasco Valley and Colla communities in northern Chile, interviewees from there explicitly made mention of their respective rich pre-Hispanic histories of fighting previous invaders such as the Incas and Spanish in order to save and defend their identities. These communities therefore also needed to do the same to maintain these identities in the present era of neo-colonization by foreign mining companies. Barbara, the indigenous leader from the Diaguita community in the Huasco Valley explained this point clearly

“we were the first People the Spanish encountered upon entering Chile from Peru, and the Spaniards killed our Cacique in front of his family, yet we continued fighting even as the slaves of the Spanish....we burned down La Serena (town located 400km south) twice, when it belonged to the Spanish...they called us the ‘Valiant Campillay’, apparently it’s documented in a library somewhere in Spain, so we kept the Valley for our people and they the Spanish stayed near the coast.....so if we allow all these proposed mega mines into our valley it will turn into a mining valley and our culture will die. We want the mining companies to leave so we can keep our identity, culture and water which is life!” (Interviewee code E1, Indigenous Community leader)

This indicates that from a historical perspective of before the Spanish conquest in the 16th Century of what is today northern Chile, that the Diaguita community fought for their independence and autonomy and gained this right allowing them to live peacefully in the Huasco Valley and higher elevations free from the interference of the Spanish conquistadores. This view of the Diaguita and Huasco Valley history is also shared by my other interviewees from the region and knowledgeable experts as well as by Standen (2011). Therefore this sensation of being independent from

“outsiders” has been engrained in the Diaguita community for centuries and generations. Given this heritage, the arrival of one of the largest gold mining companies in the world to the Huasco Valley to mine their mountains for gold was highly objected to by the local community. The Diaguita people living in the Huasco Valley claim they were content living their own unique way of life growing grapes, avocados, vegetables amongst other crops in harmony with the environment and nature. The Diaguita people’s dependence and future well-being is directly tied to the land and water, and with Mother Nature or *Pachamama* as they refer to her.

With regard to the Colla of the River Jorquera community, their ancient history and self-reliance is very similar to that of the Diaguita people. The Colla people are considered to be “cousins” of the Diaguitas and are located just 200km north of the Huasco Valley. The Colla, similarly to the Diaguita, have survived for centuries without large-scale mining, making their livelihoods mainly as shepherds herding sheep and growing alfalfa high up the Andes Mountains. The Colla do have a history of recent artisanal small scale mining similar to that in the Huasco Valley; however, this type of mining was carried out by the Colla and Diaguita people themselves who take full leadership and ownership of the mining – hence without the involvement of outsider companies or miners.

In addition, as put forward by several of my interviewees from within the Huasco Valley and external knowledgeable experts, the Colla people having lived so long independently of any involvement or assistance from outsiders, also have a natural mistrust of anyone who comes from outside their community, especially foreigners in search of mining their natural resources. During an improvised car ride to the nearest small town, Alto del Carmen, a resident kind enough to offer me a lift was campaigning for her husband to be elected as councillor from the “Spanish” side of the Valley in the Huasco Valley. She explained how on her Spanish side of the valley the people are more open, welcoming and trusting compared to the Diaguita side where people are less trusting and closed, especially to outsiders. The reason being, as explained by the lady, was that the Diaguita had always been isolated here and lived in a closed way so they were not accustomed to meeting or co-existing with outsiders;

they are suspicious of people who come from outside, unlike those on her side of the valley who are mainly descended from the Spanish.

The Colla community has also grown stronger as an independent community in recent years as affirmed by their own leader, the community relations officer at Kinross and by two external knowledgeable experts; this community throughout the past three decades has become politicized after winning legal disputes over land rights via their logging trade union, which therefore has made them more confident and skilled in challenging large multinational mining companies. The Colla community over the years has grown in self-confidence, believing that it can beat big businesses such as the large grape farmer they defeated in their claim for compensation for farming in what they consider as their indigenous territory. Indeed the Colla community has managed to take mining companies to court and gain compensation from them, demonstrating their non-reliance and lack of fear of these nearby mining projects. Moreover, the Colla community has shown its strength of power in relation to the mining companies, thereby tipping the balance of power towards them as a community in line with Frooman's (1999) model of power and dependence.

The rural communities of Conceição de Mato Dentro and Caimanes in Chile are also at least 200 years old. They have never previously had large-scale related mining located very close to their settlements. Like the previous two Chilean communities, they were founded on agriculture and up until today are still agriculture-based communities, making them independent from mining and self-sufficient. In the case of Conceição de Mato Dentro, a few of the rural communities were established over 200 years ago by descendants of African slaves escaping slavery to set up their own communities by themselves known as Quilombo or Maroon in English. Therefore the struggle for independence has been at the roots and origins of the Conceição De Mato Dentro rural communities.

Community members in some of the Conceição de Mato Dentro rural communities and at Caimanes also made reference to history though much more recent history than

the Huasco Valley and Colla communities. At Conceição de Mato Dentro the historical context was mentioned by one of the community leaders Fernanda who explained that her community is not dependent upon mining and is self-reliant:

“we used to make well known cheeses, biscuits and sweet pastries here....mining is not part of what we do, we have cows and our land and are happy with that but mining impacts on all of this. We also used to really enjoy going to the waterfall and playing in the water but we can’t do that anymore as they have destroyed the waterfall, which is the highest in this State, for mining.” (Interviewee code H1, Community Leader, Transcripts)

All four higher conflict communities had a strong feature of independence and resilience installed in them from the moment they were formed hundreds of years ago. The communities have much shared and collective history, which is linked to their dependence on Mother Nature or *pachamama* for their future well-being. It is clear to understand from this historical perspective why these communities would be against giving the proposed nearby mining projects their critical resource of an SLO. Doing so would jeopardize their traditional ways of living.

5.3 Historical context – Low Conflict cases

In stark contrast to the histories of the higher conflict cases, mining was a core part of the past of the four lower conflict cases. In the case of Paracatu, the city was founded over 200 years ago by Portuguese explorers searching for gold, therefore gold mining forms part of the city’s historical identity. The Portuguese, according to my interviewees, found an abundance of gold and consequently soon built the city of Paracatu in order to send the precious mineral back to the Portuguese royal family in Portugal. Therefore several interviewees compared the current day process of sending the gold back to Canada via airplane and ship as a continuation of the early days of Paracatu in the 18th Century.

However, large scale mining, as is the case at the Morro de Ouro (Gold Hill) mine run by Kinross today, only began in the late 1980s when it was substantially smaller than today. Agriculture also forms a very important part of the Paracatu’s economy;

however, it is located far from the mine and therefore does not directly compete or threaten the mining activity. The Morro de Ouro locals in Paracatu used to make their living by artisanal mining, or gold panning and at the end of the day would walk to the city centre and sell their gold discoveries. Therefore the idea of gold mining is not foreign at all in Paracatu and moreover, having the largest opencast gold mine in Brazil just a few kilometres from the city is a situation that all local residents under the age of 35 are familiar with for as long as they can remember. One of my interviewees, a lady aged 31 born and raised in Paracatu explained:

“As a young child I grew up seeing the mine, it is all I have ever known. Everyone my age or younger here does not know a Paracatu without the mine, so it is not a foreign body to us like it might be in other communities where a new mine is being built.” (Interviewee code C1 Anastasia – Daughter of local politician and local resident)

The large Morro de Ouro mine, now owned by Kinross Gold, has been in operation for over 26 years since 1987. As Paracatu has grown to become more dependent on municipal tax revenues, employment and, in terms of local economy, on the mine over time, the mine has also successfully obtained the necessary legal licences as well as the SLO for several expansions including new very large tailings dams (allegedly some of the largest in South America).

In the case of Mariana, as with Paracatu, both are located in the State of Minas Gerais (General Mines in English). Mariana was the first capital of Minas Gerais State, founded 300 years ago after discovering gold there, similarly to Paracatu. The main employer in the town has always been the mining sector through many different companies either mining companies or related suppliers to the sector.

Mariana falls within the *Quadrilátero Ferrífero* (the Iron Quadrangle), an area roughly the size of greater London in the State of Minas Gerais, abundant with high quality iron ore mines and related businesses where the mining company Vale is highly active and has been for decades. Vale therefore has a strong legacy in Mariana, as before, when it was a State-owned company, it offered good quality housing to its

workers based in Mariana. Such benefits, in addition to a reliance on mining, have helped create more of a dependency culture in Mariana on the mining industry. Though there are no mines located within 5kms of Mariana yet, there are several large iron ore mines within 20km of the town which is where most of the local residents go to work. Unlike Paracatu, Mariana does not have a significant agricultural sector, therefore mining is even more important to the town which means a higher dependency level on mining companies.

The small town of Pedra Branca de Amaparí in northern Brazil was a small village of fewer than 4,000 inhabitants in 2000 and by 2012 the population had grown to over 12,000. The reason for this accelerated growth can be explained by the arrival of large-scale mining in 2008. Before the arrival of the large mining companies, local indigenous and other small communities had been engaging in artisanal gold mining. Located just 12km from Pedra Branca is the town of Serra de Navío, which was founded in the 1950s by the US mining company “Icomi” which mined manganese. As all local community and mining company interviewees explained to me, Icomi took a paternalistic approach to doing business in the region. In the 1950s the population in the State (the size of England) was under 100,000 therefore Icomi was the major and only actor there.

Icomi built American style villages, infrastructure, housing, streets, high quality schools and a hospital. Therefore all native local community residents with whom I spoke look back with much fondness on the period when Icomi were mining and practically governing the area. This paternalistic approach, i.e. of taking the State’s role, created a dependency culture, which can be observed today, and was claimed to be true by the majority of my informants in Amapa State. It is the main underlying explanation offered by my interviewees (from both the mining company and local community) for the current state of relations and community expectations of the mining company. It can be posited that the small villages of Pedra Branca and Serra de Navio only exist because of the arrival of large-scale mining operations in the past 60 years. In short, Pedra Branca de Amaparí and its localities have known nothing else other than mining and are thus dependent on the industry.

The town of Barro Alto was only established and officially recognized around 60 years ago as a municipality. The population was 40% lower before Anglo American started the construction of their nickel mine in 2006 (Grisotto, 2012). As explained by my interviewees, most of the local community are economic migrants or their parents came from other regions of Brazil once there was news about an apparently large gold mine in the town. The lure of this mine brought many new migrants to the area, in the late 1970s up until today, hoping to make money directly or indirectly from the mine. Therefore the main reason most of the 8,000 people are in Barro Alto is because of the mine; the historical context of mining speculation brought many of these residents from other areas to the locality to make a better life for themselves financially.

The contrast between the historical contexts of the four higher and lower conflict community groups is evident. The higher conflict cases started life as communities at least over 200 years ago based around agriculture as a way of life and identity. These four communities also confronted bigger colonial powers in order to fight for their independence and autonomy over 200 years ago. These events have lived in the collective memories of local residents, most of whom can trace their families back over many generations. Therefore if a large multinational mining company enters their territory to carry out massive mining-related operations with certain environmental and social impacts on the traditional and historical ways of lives lived by the locals, it will not be accepted. The local communities in these four locations were never dependent upon mining or on any other institution. They have thrived for decades as independent people living in relative peace, off the land and in harmony with Mother Nature. Therefore trying to suddenly make them dependent to an extent on large-scale nearby mining after so many years of independence is a difficult challenge for a mining company or any other organization.

On the other hand, the four lower conflict communities were born and founded as a result of mining. Without mining, these towns would not even be here today. In the cases of Barro Alto and Pedra Branca these small towns owe their existence to the

presence of the large mines currently in operation in these municipalities. Therefore the dependency link between local community and mine is very clear to comprehend from a historical viewpoint. In line with Frooman's (1999) argument, the future welfare of both organization (mining company) and stakeholder (local community) is tied up with each another and, as quoted earlier, Anglo American do state on their website that there is a mutual dependence between them and their local community. In communities where dependence is so high on the nearby mining projects, it is also understandable why levels of conflict are much lower, as shown in Table 4 (with the exception of Paracatu which has a recent history of conflict against the Morro de Ouro mine). In more independent and autonomous communities, who fear the impacts of large-scale mining, conflict and hence a non-granting of an SLO is a distinct possibility for those with a strong collective memory, as also seen in Table 4. The fact that there is much less resistance in communities which have a strong history and identity of mining, also supports the claims made by authors such as Gramling and Freudenburg (2006), McAdam and Boudet (2012) and Walsh *et al.*, (1997).

5.3.1 Summary

In the lower conflict communities it can be perceived on the surface that some of the complaints around the mining company impacts are similar in nature to Paracatu and the higher conflict communities, such as with the environment and health as well as grievances around the ungenerous nature of mining companies. However, upon closer inspection one can distinguish some fundamental differences in the type of grievances between Paracatu, higher and lower conflict communities. Firstly, the issue of water was one of the main problems at the higher conflict communities and at Paracatu, though not given so much concern at the lower conflict communities. In the three cases of Mariana, Pedra Branca and Barro Alto, it is the minority who hold grievances against their nearby mining projects in contrast to the higher conflict communities. There is also much more of a perceived negative impact on people's land and livelihoods at the higher conflict communities and at Paracatu as opposed to the lower conflict communities. At these lower conflict communities there were more complaints related to the impacts on the social and economic fabric from mining and

also more about how ungenerous the mining companies were being with giving back to the community.

At Paracatu and the lower conflict communities, residents were reaching out to offer their SLO to the nearby mining companies though they wanted much more in return for this by way of economic benefits. As stressed earlier, the higher conflict communities claim they are not willing to negotiate their water, health or land with the mining companies for social responsibility and jobs. At the very least they are willing to sell out for generous compensation packages on their own terms. When comparing Paracatu with the higher conflict communities, the similarities between grievances and impacts are clear. One could go further by saying that the grievances around the alleged impacts on the environment and health at Paracatu, as asserted by the community, are among the harshest of the different cases in my research. Therefore one is left with the question of why is Paracatu not classed as a higher conflict community?

The answer can be accounted for by the influence strategies used by the mining company and by the community for being more accepting of these grievances. This is where the discussion returns to the topic of dependence and power as posited by Frooman (1999), though in the context of mining company/local community relations from the case studies researched.

In the following section I discuss the various stages I observed mining companies undergo to gain their SLO from the local communities at higher and lower conflict communities throughout the mining cycle. In addition I highlight the different community collective behaviour and action, or lack of it, in response to these different mining company influence strategies, which ultimately determine the classification of the cases as higher or lower conflict communities.

5.4 Mining company influence strategies for attaining an SLO

Based on my research data and a publication by ICMM (2012), I propose a model of community relations' stages between mining companies and their local communities in a Brazilian and Chilean context, as shown in Table 22. More specifically, this model focuses on the different mining company influence strategies to gain an SLO from the local community at the various different stages of the mining cycle. In order to understand the table and analysis below, it is important to briefly explain the mining cycle. According to the International Council on Mining and Metal's Community Development Toolkit and Hugo Herrera Carvajal, Project Process Manager of Barrick Gold Pascua Lama, Chile in 2008 the mining cycle consists mainly of the following stages:

- Exploration – According to ICMM (2012) small teams, working on short time horizons across dispersed areas in a short timeframe. Carvajal (2008) explains that drilling and tunnelling happen at this phase, which would need the detonation of explosives. The mining company wants to establish at this point whether there are enough minerals to make it financially viable to build and develop a large scale mining operation in the location.
- Feasibility – Land acquisition and legal permits/licences – the literature on this stage mentions that technical studies are undertaken to determine the financial and legal viability, which includes an environmental impact assessment. The literature however, does not make any reference to land acquisition at any of the mining stages. However, based on my field research and conversations with mining experts, I argue that it is also at this stage that mining companies need to buy as much of the land needed where they believe the mineral is located and this can mean very large areas. This land can also have private owners therefore negotiations about land acquisition or resettling of people also commences here if appropriate. In my case studies, only Kinross Maricunga and Anglo American at Barro Alto did not have important land acquisition or resettlement issues.

- Construction and Development – this is asserted by ICMM (2012) as well as my mining company interviewees as the most intense in terms of impacts on the local community. Therefore there is the potential for harming community relations mainly due to the high influx of migrant construction workers to the location and the additional money being spent by these workers.

In more technical terms Carvajal (2008) argues that this stage consists of *pre-stripping*, which involves removing the worthless rock that is joined to the mineral reserves. At the same time there is the construction of facilities for extraction, processing, transportation, energy supply infrastructure and transport access (roads, railways, ports, airports) to and from the mine site. Therefore there would also be considerable impact on the local community in terms of the environment, through dust and noise pollution.

- Operations – According to ICMM (2012) this is the most stable stage where community relations can be enhanced as construction of the mine is complete. However, the technical explanation by Carvajal (2012) would infer that the potential for impacts on the local communities is quite high and adverse. Carvajal (2008) separates the operations or production phase into three different stages: *Extraction, Processing, and Smelting and Refining*.

Extraction removes the mineral from the mine. The main processes involved are drilling and blasting of rocks, and loading and transportation of the materials to their destinations. *Processing*, which includes leaching for gold mining, aims to increase the concentration of metals by the use of chemicals such as sulfides which include cyanide and arsenic for gold mining. Thirdly there is *Smelting and Refining* which consists of the separation of the metals contained in concentrates. This is done by melting metals, through industrial processing known as fire refining, and refining by Electrowinning. The potential to cause harm to local communities' health, livelihoods and environments is apparent from the above description.

- Closure – this important final stage refers to the closing of the mine which is usually decades after the initial exploration. However, it is not relevant at the moment for any of my case studies.

The International Council for Mining and Metals (ICMM) whose mission is to help improve sustainable development performance of its 21 large mining company members, which include three of the four companies examined in my research Anglo American, Barrick Gold and Vale (ICMM website consulted 25th August, 2013), published a similar table to Table 6 given below. Their table titled “Description of phases of the mining project cycle and company/community interactions” was included in ICMM’s 2012 publication “Community Development Toolkit”. Under each stage of the mining cycle, ICMM included a short and generic text of between 70-100 words describing the mining company activities, community grievances and recommendations for improving relations. Their table also has a column for “suggested community development activities” linked to tools. ICMM’s table considers the following six mining cycle stages: Exploration, Feasibility, Constructions, Operations, Decommissioning and Closure, and Post Closure. However due to the nature of my case studies I align my data with the following four mining cycle stages for my analysis in Table 6 and subsequently:

5. Exploration and initial mining licences/permits
6. Feasibility – Land acquisition and legal permits/licences
7. Construction and Development
8. Operations

It should be stated that the four stages are not clearly defined and separate, as also claimed by the ICMM (2012) many of the mining activities and community engagement overlap across the various stages of the mining cycle. Table 6 goes beyond the ICMM table in terms of more detail about what takes place at each stage

of the mining cycle and in terms of including mining company influence strategies followed by community response strategies using specific case studies; it is also more dynamic and process natured, explaining the events from one stage to the next in the mining cycle. This contrasts with the ICM table which focuses mainly on the mining company and a little on possible general community grievances and perceptions, though nothing on community action and responses. Therefore I argue that such a consideration and attempt to theorize mining company community relations from a more detailed, dynamic and dual perspective has not been considered by the literature and I intend to address this gap (see Table 22).

These following influence strategy stages are the result of analyzing my four higher conflict cases. It should be noted that as Conceição de Mato Dentro is a newer mining project it is only relevant up until stage three of Table 22. Below I offer an overview of the six main stages of mining company influence strategies in Table 22.

Table 26 – Mining company influence strategies and community response strategies according to mining cycle stage at higher conflict communities

Mining company influence strategy at the different stages of mining cycle	Local community response strategy to mining company
Exploration and initial mining licences	
6. Geologists conduct tests on the soil for minerals. There is also initial land acquisition for mining – maintain low profile while obtaining mining licences and permits.	Limited response, as community is unaware of these tests. In the case of Pascua Lama there was a 20-year plus lag between exploration and application for legal permits.
Feasibility – Land acquisition and legal permits/licences	
7. Determine the mine to be	Complaints about the lack of

<p>economically viable.</p> <p>Communicate success of initial engagement with certain urban community groups highlighting future economic investment benefits and new jobs the mining project will bring to the region. Announce social responsibility intentions to give back to community with the aim of securing the SLO. Begin land acquisition process for mining and necessary resettlement of communities who currently live on the land destined for mining. In addition begin compiling Environmental Impact Assessment studies in order to obtain the necessary environmental and mining permits and licences to start constructing the mine.</p>	<p>transparency and ethics around the way land is being bought for mining. Concern escalates with each environmental licence approval process, specifically on the potential environmental impacts on the community.</p> <p>Community leaders' call to external actors such as NGOs, lawyers or state prosecution for assistance. Members of the affected (rural) community are annoyed that their concerns around the negative impacts on their lives from the proposed mine are being ignored by the mining company and that instead it chooses to focus on social responsibility. The rural community begins to view this as a co-optation strategy.</p> <p>The community strengthens its collectiveness in this adversity and anger with external actor assistance. Becomes more entrenched in its positions and views the situation as "them versus us". More and larger mass protests, more collective action and more press coverage of their resistance.</p>
<p align="center">Construction and Development stage</p>	
<p>8. The company receives its necessary mining licences and permits. As a result of heightened community mobilization and resistance, the company increases</p>	<p>A minority within the rural and affected communities accepts participating in the CSR programme as beneficiaries – usually lowest income and educational levels. Also a minority but powerful</p>

<p>its effort to talk with the rural communities and becomes very proactive in offering generous CSR-related benefits (in health, education, income generation) to the more aggrieved and impacted upon community groups. Offers compensation to a few powerful local community actors. However, still offers few jobs to the local community residents; most go to skilled workers from other regions. Still offers no credible solutions to the adverse environmental and social impacts, including those of resettlement.</p>	<p>group in the local community who accept generous compensation are silenced and co-opted. They become dependent on the mining company and offer their SLO.</p> <p>Many also now, after seeing the mining company win its licences and permits, become resigned to its presence in the community and to its negative impacts.</p> <p>The majority of the community perceives the CSR as a form of co-optation to induce dependency on the mining company and hence gain an SLO to do as they please within the region. This majority refuses to collaborate with the mining company in any way including not participating in any corporate sponsored event.</p> <p>There are more grievances around impacts from mining on water, land, quality of life and culture. Some in the community are now speaking of demanding financial compensation from the mining company for the damages incurred to their lives by the mining activities. This creates some internal divisions amongst those opposed to the mine who want it to stop and leave the region.</p> <p>As few work at the mine, being largely self-sufficient from agriculture, they do not have divided loyalties and are able to</p>
--	---

	<p>resist the mining company's CSR and behaviour.</p> <p>Results in more continued protests (now from different fragmented groups) against the mining project and also collective legal action to cease operations, with success in some cases.</p>
Construction and Development/Operations stage	
<p>9. Marked by years of negative community perceptions, protests and now temporary suspensions in mining activities ordered by the courts of justice due to community complaints, the company retreats from dialogue attempts and from the public eye. The company realizes it has not obtained its SLO from the community and this has brought bad publicity and harmed its reputation.</p> <p>The company continues with social responsibility programmes with a minority of the rural community and with the urban community as before but with a lower public profile.</p> <p>The mining company also faces financial challenges for funding its operations due to the protests, lost time from being suspended and</p>	<p>The community continues to mistrust the mining company and the government. It continues to complain and protest about the negative impacts from mining operations on its water, land and human rights.</p> <p>Its aim continues to be for the mining company to respect environmental impact agreements and/or for the company to stop mining operations for good. Many are also now demanding financial compensation for the damages incurred from mining activities. The internal divisions within the rural community grow between those in favour of negotiating with the mining company and those totally opposed to any dialogue.</p> <p>The majority prefers to remain independent from the mine and counts on the assistance of external actors such as lawyers, state prosecution and NGOs in their resistance, both for justice and their</p>

workers' strikes and action.	livelihoods.
10. Engagement with the affected rural communities is mainly through lawyers and litigation in courts or at state prosecution meetings.	Protests continue against the mine by certain community sections whilst others negotiate through lawyers for huge amounts of financial compensation. There are now two divided internal groups within the affected rural community.

Barrick Gold also addressed the contentious subject of the reconstruction of the Diaguita indigenous identity around 2006 by promoting and lobbying on behalf of the community to the government for them to be recognized as indigenous. Barrick Gold invested heavily with the most impoverished and vulnerable Diaguita groups in the Huasco Valley before they were officially recognized as Diaguitas. Once relations with this Diaguita group were good Barrick Gold, according to my sources, then explained to the group that they qualified for indigenous people's status as Diaguitas and that they would help them with their application to the Chilean government. Recognition as Diaguitas also meant access to additional State social benefits, so it had economic advantages. Thus once this friendly group was officially recognized as Diaguitas by the Chilean State, Barrick Gold was able to communicate that the Diaguita indigenous community were in favour of and enjoyed good relations with them. Barrick Gold even apparently invited some of these friendly Diaguitas to their annual general meetings of shareholders in Toronto, Canada to demonstrate these good relations and supposed SLO. Nonetheless the majority of the Diaguitas in the Huasco Valley were not interested in or influenced by Barrick Gold and remained against the mining project from the perspective of my interviewees.

However, interviewees such as church clergyman Manuel, community leaders Barbara and Sandra (Interviewee code E1) in a geography thesis by Standen (2011) jointly stressed the need for a critical examination of what and why Barrick Gold did what it did regarding the Diaguita identity. These critical voices claim that Barrick

Gold firstly was championing the case for the government to recognize the Diaguita people as indigenous because the multinational knew there was a good probability of this happening. Therefore the company took visible ownership and leadership of the issue in the hope of gaining legitimacy or an SLO in eyes of the local community as a responsible actor with the Diaguita people, with whom they had already established good relations via social responsibility initiatives. It would also permit Barrick Gold to publicly show it has Diaguita community leaders defending and supporting the Pascua Lama mining project, and thus an SLO.

These findings and interpretations corroborate with a quote in Urkidi and Walter (2011) on the influence strategies of Barrick Gold around gaining community acceptance from manipulating the Diaguita identity and community:

“The company has brought in professionals from other parts of the country to conduct workshops on the ‘traditional’ Diaguita crafts, essentially inventing a nonexistent Diaguita culture and denying the ethnicity of our community. They have raised false leaders, who are now attending meetings with the company and the media, discrediting the real leaders of the community and creating irreconcilable divisions between community members and their neighbours. All these actions have led to confusion and they have weakened the identity of the Diaguita Huascoalinos.” (Letter to Canadian parliament by the Diaguita Huasco–Altino Agricultural Community, May 2009. P689, 2011)

In an attempt to show their acceptance in the region, Barrick Gold showcase on their website a letter from August 2007 signed by six different neighbourhood associations underscoring their support for Barrick Gold and Pascua Lama operating in the region. However, it is important to note that only one of the neighbourhood representatives who signed the letter of approval was from the Alto del Carmen municipality in the Huasco Valley. This representative is also on the Water Vigilance Board, the group that received US\$6m from Barrick Gold. The other five are from the towns of Vallenar and Huasco, the latter being even further away near the coast, therefore

adding strength to the argument that Barrick Gold chose to focus its efforts on gaining legitimacy from a more distant urban community.

In short, Barrick Gold has attempted to implement several different strategies to influence the local community's perceptions and relations with the mining company to gain their acceptance, cooperation, trust and most importantly their SLO.

Table 27 – Mining company influence strategies and community response strategies according to mining cycle stage at lower conflict communities.

Mining company influence strategy at different stage of Mining Cycle	Local community response strategy to mining company
Exploration and initial mining licences	
5. Geologists conduct tests on the soil for minerals. There is also initial land acquisition for mining – maintain low profile while obtaining mining licences and permits	Community expectations of local economic opportunities heightened at the prospect of a large multinational mining company developing a large mine near community.
Feasibility – Land acquisition and legal permits/licences	
6. Determine the mine to be economically viable. Communicate success of initial engagement with nearby urban community highlighting future economic investment benefits and new jobs the mining project will bring to the region. Announce social responsibility intentions to	Community becomes excited at the prospect of new jobs and business opportunities. New migrants begin arriving at the town also in the hope of benefiting economically. People begin to buy new properties and make extensions to their homes in the hope of profiting by renting out their

<p>buy locally and give back to community with the aim of securing the SLO. However, doing so in a careful and measured way to manage expectations around levels of local investment. Begin land acquisition process for mining.</p> <p>Resettlement of communities who currently live on the land destined for mining is limited and lower than in the higher conflict communities.</p> <p>Environmental Impact Assessment studies pass through with limited opposition and company maintains consistent dialogue with the community.</p>	<p>properties in the near future. This creates the start of housing speculation and local inflation.</p>
<p>Construction and Development stage</p>	
<p>7. The company receives its necessary mining licences and permits and therefore begins construction of the mines.</p> <p>Brings in hundreds of construction workers who are housed separately to the local community in order to minimize social unrest.</p>	<p>The fact that few local residents have been selected to work at the mine irritates many in the community, though they decide to wait until it is operational to see if they can gain employment then. Also they are not able to rent out their rooms and properties to new workers.</p> <p>Local businesses are starting to become disappointed that their projected new sales are not materializing from this new</p>

<p>However, still offer a few jobs to the local community residents; most go to skilled workers from other regions.</p> <p>Company is concerned at lack of local government capacity in dealing with and reinvesting a sudden new influx of revenue from the mining company.</p>	<p>mine. The business community is beginning to feel unsettled.</p> <p>However the mining company has started its social responsibility programme with the local community in areas such as capacity building, education and entrepreneurship, which pleases those who participate.</p> <p>A divide starts to form between those who benefit from the mine and those who do not.</p>
<p align="center">Construction and Development/Operations stage</p>	
<p>8. The company rolls out more of its social responsibility programmes. It also participates in more local purchasing for its mining operations. Announces plans to invest in public services such as a hospital, technical college and park or plaza.</p> <p>However, most of the skilled jobs are offered to those from outside the community.</p>	<p>This situation exacerbates the internal divisions between those who are benefiting and those who are not from the mine in terms of employment, income generation opportunities and social responsibility benefits.</p> <p>Prices in the community start to rise and those not earning from mining-related activities complain even more.</p> <p>At the mines where there is a significant impact, such as in Paracatu, certain local residents become aggrieved from noise, tremors, threats to health and safety.</p> <p>Those against the mine due to the adverse impacts and/or non-recipients of economic benefits try to mobilize and protest.</p>

<p>9. The mine quashes mobilization attempts with counter-mobilization tactics, community influence strategies, co-optation and divide and rule.</p> <p>It engages with local community about its social responsibility strategy, local hiring and purchasing strategy and of its importance to the local economy. The main implied message is that there is a mutual interdependence where one cannot thrive without the other.</p>	<p>Those with grievances hold negative perceptions of the mine but do not attempt to mobilize again as they understand the immense power of the mine in the local community. Understanding the local community is dependent on the mine. Some of the opponents of the mine switch sides towards partnering with the mine in its social responsibility projects, taking the approach that it is better to try and change from inside than from the outside.</p>
--	--

Below I detail the local community influence strategies used by the four different mining companies at the four different local communities in Chile and Brazil, which are aimed at creating some level of dependence and ultimately winning over an SLO.

5.5 Discussion of mining company influence strategies and historical and community contexts

One of the factors for the lower conflict communities is the mutual dependence between the mining company and the community (as confirmed on the Anglo American website (so this would include Barro Alto and Pedra Branca though the latter was sold in early 2013). In the higher conflict cases the mining companies are not solving communities' most cited grievances. Moreover, the most referred to desire from higher conflict community members was for the mining projects to cease and stop mining permanently. Therefore these higher conflict communities are reluctant to even offer their SLO to the nearby mining projects. Also, the extent to which companies even could respond to community grievances such as water and land is questionable, given that these elements are core resources required in large quantities by large-scale mining.

Nonetheless, the mining companies at both higher conflict and lower conflict communities used influence strategies as per Frooman (1999) in order to gain their SLO via creating some level of mutual dependence, with the exception of the rural communities of Conceição de Mato Dentro in Brazil. These rural communities in Conceição de Mato Dentro claim to experience severe environmental and human rights abuses which they have publically expressed on multiple occasions, yet Anglo American refuses to recognize these rural communities as a legitimate stakeholder, and more so their complaints as legitimate therefore implying that an SLO is not needed from these actors. Anglo American has instead chosen to focus on the urban centre of Conceição de Mato Dentro with its influence strategies, where it has largely made progress with creating a mutual dependence, better relations and gaining an SLO. Therefore this is another strategy mining companies can use for grappling with their SLO, i.e. to deny a certain community which is opposed to the mine from being a legitimate stakeholder with power and urgency, as per Mitchell *et al.* (1997). In essence this converts such a group into what Mitchell *et al.* (1997) denominate as a “dangerous stakeholder”.

At the other higher conflict communities, the mining companies (Barrick Gold, Pelambres and Kinross) were also reported by my interviewees as having ignored them as legitimate stakeholders from the outset. In these three communities it also took substantial protesting and mobilization in various forms for the nearby impacted communities to be recognized as legitimate and powerful stakeholders by the three respective mining companies. From there on the mining companies began to engage in influence strategies in the form of CSR to create some level of dependence or loyalty from the local community, enough to be able to gain their SLO. It seems that for certain mining companies, ignoring their staunch opponents and critical voices is understood to be the best strategy for addressing them.

The mining projects that have an SLO are also the ones with lower conflict communities. The communities who supply the SLO generously at Paracatu, Mariana,

Pedra Branca and Barro Alto are also highly dependent on their nearby mining projects. Therefore this mutual dependence between mining company and community exists, as also affirmed on Anglo American's website. So, the challenge for the mining companies operating there (Anglo American, Kinross and Vale) is to balance this dependency because an over dependent local community would become a strain on resources. However, at the same time the mining companies are aware they cannot abuse their power and not give anything back to the communities, thus they need influence or social responsibility strategies in order to maintain their respective SLO. Mining companies understand even though they hold power and the communities are largely dependent on them, they are also dependent on the communities for a place to operate, human and physical resources, suppliers, security, infrastructure, amongst other features, for an SLO. Without access to these assets the mining projects would not be able to operate.

With reference to the higher conflict communities, I would argue they, in contrast, are not dependent upon their nearby mining projects. This is the first challenge facing the mining companies so they therefore attempt to create a certain level of dependency on them for the local communities, in contrast to the lower conflict communities. The companies need the local communities to have some sort of need for them in order to create a mutual dependence and therefore be in a position to negotiate their SLO (Frooman, 1999). One other strategy is to simply ignore the stakeholder group when a mining project has multiple community stakeholders, such as at Conceição de Mato Dentro. In this case the mining company chose to ignore the self-sufficient rural community and address the more dependent one in the urban area.

It is interesting to note that in conversations with officials from these mining companies as well as from studying their corporate websites and communications materials, there was total consensus that the CSR philosophies are geared towards helping capacitate local communities to become independent and self-sufficient and therefore not have to rely on the mining company. The old proverb of Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime, was quoted by officials from Kinross and Anglo American to summarize their

approaches to communities. The most interesting aspect of this is how at the higher conflict communities the residents are already emancipated and independent. These communities do not feel the need for mining, nor do they want mining. Indeed these communities make their livelihoods via agriculture and therefore are in direct competition with mining for access to water and land. Therefore it is possible to infer that the communities in these four cases possess the power and choose not to supply the SLO to their nearby mining projects.

Through manipulative influence strategies such as paying large sums of money to certain groups to buy their loyalties, or trying to manipulate the local community's identity, as with the Huasco Valley, or by ignoring communities and the impacts on them, as at Conceição de Mato Dentro and the Colla, mining companies have tried to sidestep the question of an SLO. Furthermore, attempts which could be construed as dependence creating, such as sponsoring cultural events at Huasco Valley and Caimanes, offering courses and gifts at Colla, Huasco Valley and Conceição de Mato Dentro, or even making alleged threats, still have not succeeded in creating a desired mutual dependence at these four higher conflict communities. Table 24 compares and contrasts both categories of community.

Table 28 – Comparison between higher conflict and lower conflict communities in terms of dependence, mining company influence strategies and ability to mine without community resistance.

	Community Dependency on mining	Level of negative impacts from mining	Mining company influence strategy on local community	Ability to mine without conflict
Huasco Valley	Low	High	Tried and unsuccessful in creating mutual dependence via co-optation and CSR.	No – Multiple large street protests and lawsuits. Courts ceased operations now. Big media campaign against mine.
Conceição de Mato Dentro	Low	High	Co-opt and gain support of urban community. No recognition of rural	No – Multiple protests. Courts ceased operations in past.

			communities who claim to be affected.	
Caimanes	Low	High	Tried and unsuccessful in creating mutual dependence via co-optation and CSR	No – Multiple large street protests and lawsuits. Big media campaign against mine.
Colla	Very Low	High	Do minimum CSR and distance relations as much as possible.	No – Lawsuits and had several roadblocks to mine.
Paracatu	High	High	Do minimum CSR, co-opt critical opponents, maintain a level of community dependence to maintain power	Mainly Yes
Mariana	Very High	N/A (would be high)	Public relations	Yes
Pedra Branca	Very High	Low	Do minimum CSR and try to make community more independent	Yes
Barro Alto	Very High	Low	Do minimum CSR and try to make community more independent	Yes

6.0 Discussion

In this discussion chapter I intend to focus mostly on my contribution to theory and secondly to practice. Nonetheless, I begin with a brief summary of the main findings section for the benefit of the reader. In addition I will also attempt to acknowledge the limitations of my research and finally discuss further research. Within my contribution I aim to make an analysis of and I contribute to:

- Confirming extant theory
- Extending extant theory
- New theoretical development
- Refuting extant theory

6.1 Summary of Findings

In order to place my discussion into context I provide a synthesis of the findings from the previous chapter in which I categorized the eight case studies into two different groups of four; one pertaining to higher and the other to lower conflict communities. I compared and contrasted the two sets of cases according to their historical and economic contexts, main mining related grievances and mining company influence strategies and community responses throughout the mining cycle.

I argued that the four higher conflict communities did not have a history of large-scale mining operations, unlike the four lower conflict communities. Instead the higher conflict communities had a history of being small-scale farmers in isolated and rural areas. They also had longer histories and lower levels of migration from other regions as opposed to the lower conflict communities, which received many migrants due to the economic growth, spurred on by the mines. This implied that the residents of the higher conflict communities are more attached to their land and communities than the lower conflict communities. Very few local community members of the higher conflict communities worked at the mines in contrast to the lower conflict

communities where many locals did work at the mines directly or indirectly as the main source of employment. The economy at the lower conflict communities was centred on the mines, therefore most local businesses and services catered to employees, suppliers and others associated with the mine whereas the communities at the higher conflict communities did not have this close link to the mines for their livelihoods. The agricultural-based livelihoods indeed at the higher conflict communities depended on the same resources as mining, such as water and land. Moreover the residents of the higher conflict communities do not want change to occur and experience their villages being transformed from rural to mining-centred. The reason for this is that they feel the mine threatens their tranquil way of life as farmers and/or identities of indigenous peoples, as in the case of Huasco Valley and the Colla or as descendants of Maroon people in Conceição de Mato Dentro and Paracatu. Furthermore they did not want to transform from being independent to dependent on the mining projects.

In terms of the main mining related grievances, I separated these into three groups, higher conflict communities, Paracatu and lower conflict communities because the case of Paracatu is unique in that it experiences high levels of grievance yet lower levels of community conflict.

I noted some fundamental differences in the type of grievances between Paracatu, higher and lower conflict communities. Firstly, the issue of water was one of the main problems at the higher conflict communities and at Paracatu, though not highlighted as much at the lower conflict communities. In the three cases of Mariana, Pedra Branca and Barro Alto the minority in the community hold grievances against their nearby mining projects in contrast to the higher conflict communities. There is also much more of a perceived negative impact on people's land and livelihoods at the higher conflict communities and at Paracatu as opposed to the lower conflict communities. At these lower conflict communities there were nevertheless more complaints related to how ungenerous the mining companies were being about giving back and sharing their wealth with the community.

As stressed earlier, the higher conflict communities claim they are not willing to negotiate their water, health or land in return for social responsibility and jobs from the mining companies. At the very least they are willing to sell their land and lives for a very generous compensation package but on their own terms. When comparing Paracatu with the higher conflict communities, the similarities between grievances and impacts are clear. I would go further and say that the grievances around the alleged impacts on the environment and health at Paracatu, as asserted by the community, are among the harshest of the different cases in my research.

Therefore one is left with the question of why is Paracatu not classed as a higher conflict community? The answer can be accounted for by the successful influence strategies used by the mining company that exploit the dependence of the community on their mine for their economy and livelihoods. This is where I return to the topic of dependence and power as posited by Frooman (1999) though in the context of my mining company local community relations.

6.2 Stages of mining company – community relations throughout the mining cycle

I next compared and contrasted the two sets of higher conflict and lower conflict communities' relations with the mines in line with the different stages of mining cycles to offer a more process oriented perspective of how mining company community relations and conflict evolve over time. At the higher conflict communities the mining companies were much less communicative at the exploration stage than they were with the lower conflict mining companies. For example Anglo American in Barro Alto conducted dialogues with the community from when their geologists first conducted exploratory studies on the land near the communities, unlike in the higher conflict communities.

At the feasibility stage much more activity took place between the mining company and local community. In the higher conflict communities the mining companies began buying the land once they had realized that underground was full of highly valuable minerals such as gold or iron ore and in the case of Caimanes that the community's lands would be ideal for one of Latin America's largest tailing dams. The process of land acquisition at these communities was plagued with controversy as land was bought in unethical, non-transparent and even illegal ways via land grabs in Conceição de Mato Dentro. In contrast at the lower conflict communities there were fewer conflicts around purchasing the land for mining in Pedra Branca and Barro Alto. In Paracatu also when the main mine site was bought in 1987 there was little controversy. However, since Paracatu has been expanded it has had to resettle and evict communities from their land and this process appears to be likely in the near future for Mariana.

All mining companies tried aggressively to get the local communities on their side whilst applying for the necessary mining permits and licences. At the higher conflict communities, promises of social responsibility and jobs were not enough to convince locals of the benefits of the mining projects however. Nonetheless, the mining companies did manage to win some friends from within the higher conflict communities such as wealthy and powerful businessmen in Huasco Valley and Caimanes. In Conceição de Mato Dentro most of the urban community was happy to collaborate with the mining company in expectation of rapid local economic growth and benefits from mining. In return, Anglo American also officially recognized these two communities as affected community stakeholders whilst the highly discontent communities near the project who claim to be impacted on by the mining project were not officially recognized by the mining company. Meanwhile the lower conflict communities were on the whole happy to accept large, new, nearby mining projects, in anticipation of new business opportunities and/or jobs.

Once the higher conflict mines had their necessary permits and licences to mine at the construction stage of the mine, the communities began to feel the strong adverse impacts on their water, land, livelihoods (as mentioned earlier on grievances). This

led to collective action spearheaded by external actors such as lawyers, State prosecution units, NGOs and academics, including frequent street protests, council assemblies, hearings and meetings, social media campaigns, roadblocks and even a hunger strike in Caimanes for the negative impacts and threats to end. At the lower conflict communities, the residents began to feel some of the same impacts but did not complain as much as they overlooked these side effects in anticipation of prospering economically.

At the higher conflict communities, the mining companies and their supporters were now starting to counter-mobilize against the community mobilizations and win over some of the detractors by varying influence strategies such as:

- Offering large payments and social responsibility programmes
- Allegedly manipulating in the form of taking the initiative on strengthening and empowering local indigenous groups' identities who are not recognized by the local indigenous community leaders in the Huasco Valley
- Allegedly manipulating local political elections and leaders
- Allegedly even harming detractors by damaging their vehicles, intimidating them by following and spying on them.

These tactics related to divide and conquer strategies in terms of gaining an SLO worked to an extent in Huasco Valley, Conceição de Mato Dentro and Caimanes; however, the majority of the rural communities remained opposed to the projects though now more divided and fragmented.

As the construction phases drew to an end in the lower conflict communities, the complaints against increased traffic, noise and high inflation on all items and services began to surface. Moreover, the communities who had been waiting for many years to make huge sums of money from the mining projects realized it was not happening as

the mining company executives were not living in the town nor was the company investing as much as they had previously hoped for in the community.

The conflict at the higher conflict communities increased after the communities realised that the mining companies were dividing them. After many mobilization attempts they were able at all four communities to obtain court orders for the mines to be temporarily suspended on the grounds of environmental or cultural adverse impacts, which caused high amounts of costs to the mining companies. As already mentioned, Pascua Lama in Huasco Valley remains suspended today and the Federal State Prosecution in Brazil has recommended the same happen again to Anglo American's project in Conceição de Mato Dentro, the largest in the world.

At the lower conflict communities, the grievances from a minority manifested themselves into attempts to mobilize in a similar way to the higher conflict communities such as protests, assembly hearings, social media campaigns at Paracatu and Mariana, and legal court action at Pedra Branca, Paracatu and Mariana. However the might and power of the mining companies was too much for these collective action attempts and quashed them by counter-mobilizing or by influencing local politicians, also known as lobbying. It seemed that because most local employment and economic activities depended on the nearby mining projects, that any collective resistance to this would be met by mining companies and the government, thus neutralizing them. This was also an example of the limitations of social movement theory within the context of company conflict in the developing world.

Despite local residents feeling highly aggrieved from the mining company's impacts on their lives, they were not able to present a strong enough challenge as the mine was, as claimed by several of my interviewees, a "necessary evil". Nonetheless at the higher conflict communities the dwellers were not on the whole dependent upon the nearby mining projects for work, income or social responsibility benefits, instead it was a minority who were overall quiet and fearful of reprisals from those neighbours opposing the mine. Those in favour of the mines kept a low profile and were reluctant

to speak to me. In these communities the local residents had the power and placed fear into those with divergent views about the mining companies.

Diagram 1 (on page xx) is a model based on the findings. It summarizes the main overall contributions emanating from my findings. In the remaining section I proceed to discuss my research findings in terms of how they confirm, extend and refute current theory as well as offering a new theoretical and practical contribution.

6.3 Independence and Dependence as determinants of conflict

As far as confirming theory, the research findings provide data to corroborate the main theoretical propositions emanating from Frooman's seminal 1999 publication on the link between resource dependence and stakeholder influence strategies – in particular with Frooman's third proposition at the end of his paper.

Proposition 1: When the relationship is one of low interdependence, the stakeholder will choose an indirect withholding strategy to influence the firm. (p.202).

Proposition 1 relates to the four higher conflict communities. As argued, the findings suggest that the four higher conflict community cases have a degree of power over the mining companies. However, the four different communities are less willing to accept the mining companies. As Frooman (1999) professes, at the core of resource dependence theory is the concept that a firm's need for resources, in this case community acceptance or a conflict free environment to extract minerals without social disturbance, provides opportunities for others to gain control over it.

Furthermore, each of the cases has had instances of community roadblocks to the mines as a way of expressing their discontent with these mines, and thus shutting off their ability to operate temporarily. Other examples include street painting with anti-mining messages painted where the communities reside, extensive social media campaigns attacking two of these mining companies, a hunger strike by community residents which made international news, and many different film documentaries at three of the communities showing the grievances and adverse impacts inflicted by the

nearby mines. These instances demonstrate that there are low levels of community acceptance of the mining companies. In these cases the community members engaging in these acts are not interested in receiving CSR, employment and the further so-called developmental benefits promised by the mining companies.

It is therefore important to explain why the mining companies are partially dependent on the local communities at the higher conflict communities, whereas this does not hold true at the lower conflict cases. The reason for this, as alluded to earlier, relates to the fact that the overall community position is against the mine's presence due to its negative impacts on the communities' lives. In these four higher conflict communities the majority of the population is independent of the mine (see lower section of the Diagram 1 model) though dependent on things that will be damaged by mining and, most importantly for them, their water supply. Furthermore the majority of people in these communities do not want to move from being independent to being dependent on mining.

In the case of the four lower conflict communities there was also sufficient data to support Frooman's (1999) assertions around resource dependence and stakeholder influence strategies, as expressed in his second proposition.

Proposition 2: When the relationship is marked by firm power, the stakeholder will choose an indirect usage strategy to influence the firm. (p.202)

This relates to the findings around the four lower conflict cases. These four communities interestingly also hold grievances towards mining; however, they are dependent on the nearby mining projects more than the higher conflict cases, for their livelihoods and have been for decades. Mining is a way of life in these communities; it is not new or a foreign body. This implies that the communities have a certain level of dependence on the mining companies for their livelihoods which is much higher than that in the higher conflict communities.

Therefore in the field research I was able to affirm Frooman's second proposition that the community would use indirect usage strategies to influence the mining companies. Moreover, the majority of the residents of these four lower conflict communities were in favour of the mines staying in their communities; they are dependent upon them. Furthermore, the communities would like to see a more generous spending and investment in their town as opposed to the higher conflict communities who argue as being uninterested in any such social investment from the mines. A common phrase heard in these communities which summarizes well the lower conflict community perception of the mining companies is that *they do not give back as much as they should considering how much they take out from our community*. In short, community members felt they were getting an unfair deal from the mining companies. Despite this acceptance of mining at three of the four communities, there were widespread complaints against adverse environmental, health and/or social impacts, quite similar to those of the higher conflict communities. It would appear the communities were willing to trade off negative impacts from the mines for more economic and CSR benefits.

Therefore in the lower conflict communities the residents take a usage strategy of engaging and entering into a more peaceful dialogue with the mining companies, essentially asking them to change their CSR behaviour by spending more in the local community and also hiring more local residents for work at the mine in return for social harmony, acceptance or an SLO. Secondly, these communities also plead with the companies to respect environmental and health regulations; however, their responses are in contrast to the higher conflict communities which take a more aggressive and direct approach to influencing the mining company.

In conclusion, the data from the field can confirm Frooman's first proposition around the importance of non-mining dependent communities holding power when allying with external actors and importantly being able to reject or withhold nearby mining companies' approaches for an SLO. Moreover, it is important to stress that withholding an SLO by a community should be considered as temporary. The space of mining company community relations is dynamic due to the different influence

strategies being employed by mining companies, the State and civil society actors. Therefore the concept of SLO should be considered as a temporary resource susceptible to the influence strategies of larger and more powerful actors, namely large corporations.

Similarly, when communities are also more dependent on nearby mining companies their future well-being is tied to that of the firms' well-being and therefore they will utilize usage strategies to negotiate better social investment, local tax payments and the hiring of local labour. This can be seen in Diagram 1 in the upper section of the model where the more dependent communities are willing to receive social responsibility benefits and have dialogue with the mining companies. The recommendation to mining companies here is to empower communities to jointly monitor negative impacts from the mine so that all harm can be minimized and benefits maximized.

However, one of the criticisms levelled against Frooman's (1999) theory and at other stakeholder theorists, relates to their assumptions that stakeholders such as consumers or community groups can just simply "withhold" critical resources as they please; therefore Frooman (1999) fails to consider the necessary ingredients needed for such collective action to take place by these stakeholder groups. However, authors such as King (2008) and den Hond and de Bakker (2007) argue that this process of stakeholder collective action needs further analysis and cannot be assumed as a given, as posited by resource dependence theorists such as Frooman (1999).


The findings from this present research demonstrate how the higher conflict communities were able to come together via mobilizing structures and external resources such as lawyers, state prosecution departments and NGOs (lower section of Diagram 1), whereas the lower conflict communities were not able to collectively mobilize due to their high levels of dependence on the nearby mining projects (higher section of Diagram 1). Despite frequent attempts to mobilize all four of the lower conflict communities, leaders and momentum were quelled ultimately by the power of

the mining companies and the higher levels of dependence the communities had on them.

Despite the apparent confirmation of Frooman's first two propositions using the data analyzed for this current research, it is highly important to underscore the dynamic, complex and fuzzy nature of categorizing stakeholders as independent and/dependent. The data collated and analyzed from this present research helps to highlight the simplicity in Frooman's stakeholder influence strategy model. Freeman (1994) classifies focal organization and stakeholder in a binary sense as either independent, or dependent on the other. However the data from this thesis shows that community positions are ever changing, dynamic and moving from independent to dependent and vice versa due to mainly corporate and State influence strategies. This is why Diagram 1 has Dependent – Independent communities on a dynamic continuum where communities and moreover groups within communities can be placed temporarily. Over time, depending on mining company and State influence strategies along with community strategies, these groups will move along the independence/dependence continuum. Therefore the assumption around stakeholders being either independent or dependent on an organization should be reconsidered as a continuum with degrees of independence and dependence that are expected to change over time.

Diagram 1 is a model based on the findings. This model summarizes the main overall contributions emanating from the findings. The remaining section proceeds to discuss the research findings in terms of how they confirm, extend and refute current theory as well as offering a new theoretical and practical contribution.

Diagram 1 – Model of how community dependence levels on mining affects company/community relations¹³



6.4 The importance of social movements theory for understanding community conflict

Continuing with social movement related theories, one of the major arguments propelled by social movement theorists is that strong feelings of grievances by groups in society rarely lead to collective action (Zald and McCarthy, 1977; McAdam *et al.*,

¹³ Though the focus of this research falls on companies and communities, the role of the State cannot be ignored therefore it is addressed in the Practical Contribution section below. To have included the State would have fallen outside the research scope.

2001; King, 2008). This argument certainly holds true at the four lower conflict communities where many interviewees reported grievances regarding the nearby mining company; nevertheless, there was little or no collective action to address this (as shown in the upper section of Diagram 1).

King (2008) uses social movement theory to examine stakeholder collective influence, therefore it is a key and relevant paper for this study. The reason for its importance is because he attempts to focus specifically on how collective action is necessary for stakeholders to influence corporations, a consideration ignored by Frooman (1999). As a reminder, King (2008) categorizes the extensive social movement theory into the three following sections for explaining why some groups are able to overcome the obstacles:

4. Mobilizing structures
 - a. Organization strength
 - b. Resource endowment
5. Corporate (political) opportunities, and
6. Framing processes.

The findings affirm the importance of the first point of mobilizing structures, and in particular organization strength. Mobilizing structures according to King (2008) provide individuals with outlets and spaces to communicate their grievances and come to common understandings or shared meanings around certain issues or grievances. Furthermore, King (2008) refers to organization strength within mobilizing structures as determining whether groups can execute Frooman's (1999) withholding and usage theories. In other words, stakeholders need some sort of organization in order to engage in collective behaviour and action, such as a trade union or a neighbourhood community group which meets on a regular basis.

Without such mobilizing structures, King (2008) argues that grievances would fail to mobilize – from his review of the social movements literature. The current findings strongly support the significance of organizational strength within mobilizing

structures and this is depicted by how, in the higher conflict communities, organization strength was strong and close-knit in nature. In all four communities there is an organized committee leading the resistance against the mine with capable leaders, whereas the lower conflict communities do not possess such organizations within which they can openly discuss their shared grievances about the mining projects, or talk about how to deal with their shared problems or perceptions regarding the mining-related impacts.

6.5 How CSR and Stakeholder theories fit with the findings

With regard to the third research question of how CSR and stakeholder theory addresses and explains levels of mining company community conflict and relations, the findings also confirmed some of the theory and propositions in the academic literature. The data that confirmed these findings were categorized under the higher order code construct of Corporate Irresponsibility. The two main lower order constructs in turn were “Corporate influence to create community dependence” and “Corporate influence to obstruct critical voices” both with the aim of maintaining and/or strengthening corporate hegemony in the community. The term ‘corporate hegemony’ refers to how the mining companies can continue to operate in extracting minerals from the ground without being challenged or threatened by community and/or civil society actors. This concept differs from SLO or community acceptance because it is more consistent and coherent with the idea of corporate influence of local communities and civil society, as relevant from a CSR or stakeholder theory perspective. It also further extends the criticisms made by authors such as Owen and Kemp (2012); and Parsons et al (2013) against the SLO concept as the findings focus on the how and mechanics of mining companies quests for securing community acceptance. The literature that critiques the SLO concept on the basis of ignoring power imbalances does not highlight unethical and irresponsible corporate practices in the pursuit of the SLO or community acceptance or the local environment free of conflict. This thesis goes further and highlights the corporate influence strategies, which are deemed as immoral, unethical and irresponsible by many affected community members that mining companies utilize.

6.6 Corporate influence to create community dependence

A commonly voiced concern of more educated community members interviewed in the Huasco Valley, Conceiçao de Mato Dentro, Paracatu, Mariana and Barro Alto was that the mining companies were “buying” the acceptance of the most vulnerable, humble and lowly educated people in the community via piecemeal CSR investments such as biscuit making courses or paying very low amounts of money to monitor environmental impacts. This point was classed under the Co-optation first order code, referring to an argument posited by Kraemer et al. (2013) from their research on how a Vedanta Resources mining company co-opted a community leader who had been opposing the mine. Admittedly this argument in turn takes a more normative or ethical lens by questioning the morality of such a corporate influence strategy. This co-optation strategy can be considered as a strategy to increase the dependence of communities on the mining projects and therefore leverage more mining company power.

In another example of co-optation, which led to further divisions within the community or a divide and rule scenario for Barrick, was how the company was accused by community leaders of creating their own indigenous leaders and community so these actors could publically represent the mining company in a favourable light. Some of the community interviewees (E1-3 and E5) referred to this as a form of divide and rule corporate strategy. This finding confirms the claims made in the publication by Urkidi and Walter (2011) that Barrick Gold were creating their own “false indigenous leaders” in the Huasco Valley who were friendly towards the mining company. It can be inferred that by helping to create their own friendly Diaguita communities, Barrick was also leveraging its power to make the community more dependent on it and in turn increasing its own power. The previously cited example of Kinross Paracatu with the Maroon community in Sao Domingos, can also be interpreted as a divide and rule strategy whereby the previous community president was opposed to negotiating or collaborating with Kinross on CSR. This former, university educated president sees CSR investment as a form of *carte blanche* for Kinross to do as it pleases to their land and water under the monitoring of dust pollution by locally co-opted community leaders. However, Kinross have managed to

convince the current community president to accept collaboration in CSR programmes, donation of a community centre and a half-monthly minimum salary payment for monitoring environmental impacts (interviewee code C1-C5, C13 and C35-37). This has resulted in a division and conflict within the community leading to the former president leaving due to receiving death threats for trying to legally prevent Kinross from operating near the community.

A further, related example of a corporate influence strategy aimed at creating community dependency and hence increasing corporate power was that of Barrick Gold in Pascua Lama investing heavily in the most impoverished and vulnerable Diaguita groups in the Huasco Valley before they were officially recognized as Diaguitas (interviewee codes E1-3). Once relations with this Diaguita group were good, Barrick Gold, according to my sources, then explained to the group that they qualified for indigenous people's status as Diaguitas and that they would help them with their application to the Chilean government. Recognition as Diaguitas also meant access to additional State social benefits so it had economic advantages. Thus once this friendly group was officially recognized as Diaguitas by the Chilean State, Barrick Gold were able to communicate that the Diaguita indigenous community were in favour of them and enjoyed good relations. In short CSR can actually be interpreted as a form of corporate irresponsibility due to the divisions, mistrust and conflict it generates within communities. However, if this makes for less community resistance in order to conduct mining activities then many mining companies would see a clear benefit.

6.7 Corporate influence strategy to obstruct critical voices

The findings additionally corroborate the criticisms levelled by authors such as Banerjee and Bonnefous (2010) and Banerjee (2011), around corporate stakeholder strategies for managing civil society actors, including detractors of the company. Barrick Gold has always claimed via its official website that the only critical voices against its Pascua Lama project are not from the Huasco Valley. In a similar example to that of the Greenpeace one used by Banerjee and Bonnefous (2010), I was able to

see an improvised obstruction strategy unfold at the Social Responsibility Mining Conference in Santiago, Chile 2011 when the mining industry and consultant organizers invited OLCA, the activist organization opposing Pascua Lama, to sit down and partake in dialogue after a group of around ten of them had entered the Sheraton hotel with anti-mining and CSR banners and musical instruments. A few minutes after being convinced to sit down in the conference room an OLCA member stood up and threw a jar of water at the panel of mining industry speakers and then security guards ejected the OLCA members by force.

The OLCA participants had felt, as in the case of Greenpeace in France (Banerjee and Bonnefous, 2010), as if they were being co-opted and legitimizing the Social Responsibility for Mining Conference, to which they, as an organization, are fundamentally opposed. From the perspective of power, such an obstruction strategy can be deemed as suppressing the threat from OLCA or Greenpeace to the large organization's hold of power.

Another example of a corporate obstruction strategy to community detractors can be appreciated in the case of Caimanes, Pelambres which has taken the community leader to court along with his lawyers for attempting to block a compensation payment to one minor proportion of the community. This community leader Claudio and an activist from Santiago repeated on several occasions to me and journalists that they felt they were being persecuted by the mine.

One example of an obstruction strategy (Banerjee and Bonnefous, 2011) frequently referred to amongst interviewees, was that of discrediting oppositional voices from the community and civil society. An executive at Anglo American (Interviewee code H6) also claimed that the main State prosecutor who was opposing the mine duct in Conceição de Mato Dentro had ulterior political motives for his actions.

At Paracatu, Kinross employees also discredited three of the local community critical voices as either motivated by financial reasons, mental disturbance or losing rational thought. Indeed all those with critical voices in the community were dismissed and discredited by Kinross employees as illegitimate. A common dismissal and discrediting strategy employed by the mining companies (in particular by Barrick Gold, Pelambres, and Kinross Paracatu) in this investigation, is the claim they have conducted their own independent scientific investigation or research on the supposed negative impact, be it environmental, water, or risk to community health and safety, and found that everything is in legal compliance. In these cases it can be seen how the mining company utilizes the State as a legitimizer of its actions and position. This in turn also maintains the hegemony of corporate power by marginalizing or co-opting critical voices.

Some community interviewees in Paracatu also alleged that the mining company used co-optation as a strategy to buy critical opposition actors by offering them work as consultants, and as a consequence the detractors were silenced.

In addition under the construct of Corporate Irresponsibility was the code of disingenuous corporate behaviour for data such as how community residents complained that the quality of dialogue and consultation left much to be desired. This was reported most at Huasco Valley, Conceição de Mato Dentro and Paracatu where, as reported earlier, interviewees argued the mining companies were willing to listen but did not take appropriate or indeed any actions based on this dialogue.

A final first order construct under the Corporate Irresponsibility higher order code is that of Community Fatigue, which also confirms the argument made by Collins et al. (2005) that community actors can become exhausted and lose their fight, passion and interest in the debate with the corporation over time. Community residents and external actors from the Huasco Valley, Conceição de Mato Dentro, Caimanes and Paracatu underlined the importance of fatigue being a factor in communities becoming more passive and less resistant due to the extensive amounts of time and

resources required to contest actions, reports and policies proposed by the mining companies. This point was especially stressed by a community leader (Sandra, interviewee code E3, Huasco Valley) that they had become tired of marching and protesting for ten years against Barrick to no avail, so instead they preferred now to negotiate terms of compensation and collaboration with the mining company. This is the outcome the mining companies had desired, according to some interviewees.

In the following section I continue to analyze how my findings extend relevant extant theory.

6.8 Extending extant theory

In his review of the social movements literature, King (2008) posits that one of the main factors that inhibit collective action is the free rider problem whereby many participants do not fulfil their necessary roles and responsibilities within the collective group in the hope of still gaining an equal share of the rewards. Secondly there is a perceived risk of failure in overturning the target organization or government; members do not feel confident of victory. Thirdly, as mentioned in the previous section, there is a lack of organizational structure to encourage mobilization via dissemination of shared grief and meanings. However, the data from this thesis indicate this theory of inhibiting factors should be extended further to include the concept of dependence from Frooman (1999) which King (2008) and other social movement scholars overlook.

The findings based on the lower conflict communities indicate that if a community is economically dependent on the mine for its livelihood, residents would not be able to create the necessary mobilizing structures, despite holding grievances towards the mine's adverse impacts. Such mobilizing structures would include ones where they can openly discuss their shared grievances about the mining projects, or talk about how to deal with their shared problem amongst themselves or perceptions regarding the mining-related impacts. A community that is highly dependent on a company for

its livelihood will not mobilize against it as the community's future well-being is tied to the company's (Frooman, 1999). In short, attempts to mobilize collectively are neutralized by the economic dependence of the community on the mining company, whereby the majority are directly or indirectly economically dependent on the mine for their livelihoods (as depicted in the upper section of Diagram 1). The balance of power is thus concentrated with the mining company in such a situation.

Furthermore when lower conflict communities did attempt to mobilize and manifest their collective grievances against the nearby mining projects, these companies counter-mobilized, obstructed and stopped these events from taking place or replied with their own collective manifestation to show strong community support. By doing this, the mining company wanted to demonstrate it had a solid SLO or community support, as also posited by Kraemer *et al.* (2013) from their study on community resistance towards a mining company in India.

Therefore, one of the main intended contributions of this thesis, is to argue that social movement theory-related concepts are not applicable in contexts when there are higher levels of dependence of communities on nearby, high impact operations who also wield higher levels of power in community relations, as demonstrated in the upper section of Diagram 1. Thus in the context of collective action towards companies by local communities within the social movement literature, I put forward that the question of dependence should be considered in order to understand the likelihood of collective action.

6.9 New theoretical contribution

From an affected communities perspective, I propose a theory of how levels of dependence on nearby mining projects determine whether communities are able to engage in collective action to resist these mining projects, as shown in the central section of Diagram 1.

A first contribution to theory is aimed at problematizing Frooman's (1994) model of stakeholder influence strategies. The analysis of findings from this present community perspective research underlines the dynamism, complexity and constant change when attempting to categorize stakeholders under the concepts of being either Independent or Dependent on the focal organization. The situation in practice, as shown from empirical evidence from mining affected communities, is neither binary nor straightforward.

This thesis research shows how stakeholder and Resource Dependence theories work in practice within the eight mining communities from an affected communities perspective. At the crux of the notions of independent and dependent stakeholders is the issue of power, knowing who has the power over a critical resource such as an environment free of community resistance determines who is dependent (Frooman, 1994). This is a question that the current research addresses. There is no clear-cut answer, especially since community members were and still are constantly changing their positions towards the nearby mining projects as a result of corporate and State influence strategies.

Nevertheless the one unique contribution this research offers is that it shows empirically how a focal organization, such as a mining company, leverages its power to influence often under the guise of CSR initiative in order to induce an independent community to become more dependent on it for its livelihood and survival. Secondly this study additionally demonstrates an array of corporate obstruction strategies (Banerjee and Bonnefous, 2010) to certain civil society groups and community leaders who fight for collective identity or who have juxtaposed ideological values around large companies. Such actors are understood by mining companies as *non-co-optable*, or not interested in collaboration and thus can never be made dependent like other civil society actors.

As such, one should question the validity of the assumption that communities have the power to hold and grant an SLO. The findings of this thesis (taken from an

affected communities perspective) would argue that communities alone do not possess the power to turn on and off an SLO like a tap in accordance with Owen and Kemp (2012); and Parsons et al (2013). As the mining companies are able to determine via their own discourse what counts as an SLO they can suppress community resistance, as also asserted by Parsons et al (2013). Instead communities need many resources including other allies for this to happen even momentarily. Mining companies and the State will answer back via influence strategies and try to turn on the SLO tap to enable a working environment sufficient for conducting the extraction of minerals without conflict and resistance.

It would appear that mining companies are bewildered when stakeholders refuse to enter into negotiations with them over ways they can collaborate and benefit instead of persisting with their collective resistance. The corporate response to this is to employ obstruction strategies such as discrediting and marginalizing detractors via their own research, tests and public relations/communications. In such cases though companies cannot convert the independent to becoming dependent they can reduce the independent group's ability to control the critical resource of a conflict free operations environment.

As such, this criticism of Frooman's (1994) model lends further support to authors such as Collins et al. (2005), Jensen and Sandstrom (2011) and Banerjee (2011), who all observe that stakeholder theory fails to take account of the complexities in the political economy brought about by globalization that has seen unclear boundaries between different actors and institutions. Moreover, stakeholder theory does not account for corporate use and leverage of power to quell stakeholder resistance.

I propose that if a community is dependent upon a nearby mine, yet has highly negative perceptions and many grievances emanating from the mine's impacts, the community mobilizing structures will most probably fail if they attempt to resist the mine. Therefore an important contribution of this research is to explain this lack of collective resistance in dependent communities via mining company influence

strategies, such as counter-mobilization, CSR for co-optation and obstruction strategies, to maintain its control and power. In addition, the mining company in such contexts would also be able to call on its influence with State institutions and local government to legitimize its actions and also influence in the dilution of community resistance in the name of progress and development.

In summary, the data analyzed (from an affected communities perspective) indicates that it is not possible to have a successful social movement with collective action if there is simultaneous dependence for livelihoods on the target organization. If communities are independent from mining, or self-sufficient in terms of livelihoods, and have this independence threatened by the impacts of the nearby mining projects, then segments of these communities, together with external actors such as NGOs, lawyers and State representatives, are likely to challenge the nearby high impact operations, as is the case of the four higher conflict communities.

Therefore an important contribution to theory from this study is for social movements and resource dependence-related theories to acknowledge the importance of one another. The social movements literature does not address the subject of power and dependence of the target organization or institution on the movement. Though King (2008) criticises the resource dependence literature for not considering social movements, thinking about how collective action can take place and thus makes a contribution that social movement scholars and literature should consider the implications of dependency and power-related theories when researching conflicts between high impact operations with local communities.

This chapter on contributions finishes with the following propositions based on Diagram 1:

- The higher the level of dependence on mining the lower the probability of conflict.
 - The higher the level of dependence on mining the more likely any community resistance will be short-lived and ineffective, if possible at all.

- The higher the level of independence from mining the higher the probability of conflict.
 - The higher the level of independence from mining the higher the probability of mobilizing collective resistance together with other external actors against mining.
- If corporations feel their opportunity to operate in peaceful and resistance free circumstances is at threat from mobilized communities, they will seek to influence and manage these groups into becoming more dependent on the company via collaborating, partnering and/or accepting benefits.
 - If these groups refuse to accept the co-optation and influence strategies, corporations will use obstruction strategies such as discrediting and ignoring the groups and instead focus on trying to co-opt other groups within the community to demonstrate they have local support so that they can operate in peaceful and conflict free circumstances.

7.0 Practical Contribution – Implications for how Mining Activity should be governed

7.1 Recommendations for States

It is evident that mining leads to community conflict in many cases (Ocmal, 2013; Ejolt, 2014). The current research indicates that levels of community independence and dependence can be linked to levels of conflict between mining projects and affected communities. The research also reveals that the situation of dependence and independence of communities is not static but constantly changing in accordance with external conditions and influences from the political economy (including the State, civil society groups and mining companies).

Though the focus of this research has been on mining companies and affected communities, the significance of the State's role must be acknowledged in these contexts. If the State is ultimately responsible for and has a duty towards the welfare and well-being of its citizens as enshrined in international law it should protect its people including from other non-state actors such as mining companies.

1. Recommendation: As such the first recommendation is simply for States to uphold and abide by the international human rights related laws that correspond to them as stated in Pillar One in the UNGPs (Ruggie, 2011).

However, as I was often reminded by interviewees from the different communities, the foreign mining companies were in the communities having been invited by their respective national governments, and it was the responsibility of the government to ensure their human rights were protected. Indeed community interviewees in Conceição de Mato Dentro, Huasco Valley, Paracatu and Caimanes recalled how they do not even blame companies for what they deem as their irresponsible behaviour as this forms part of their DNA of profit maximization. However, as posited by those interviewees, it is their government that should prevent corporations from and hold them accountable for abuse that impacts on citizens. Developing country States view large-scale mining as a source of growth, development, progress, jobs and revenue. Therefore States and governments are often in a difficult position about whether to give more importance to local community grievances and concerns or the wider national economy. In reality, as interviewees at Paracatu stated, the mine is a necessary evil as it provides significant tax revenues, employment and growth to the local economy.

The most relevant legal instrument governments used for granting licences to mining companies upon consideration of their impacts to communities are Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs). Governments around the world including in Latin America are also beginning to implement relevant soft law guidelines, such as the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) discussed earlier.

However EIAs and the UNGPs do not directly address the subject of power imbalances and consent between businesses and affected community groups, which this thesis has highlighted. These aforementioned instruments focus on consultation and not on consent or approval by those who will be affected. Power remains with the State in the case of the EIA and with the company and State in the UNGPs.

It is important to mention that EIAs and the UNGPs do not speak about empowering communities to lead in the identification of (potential) impacts or even to participate with business and the State as an equal partner in having a decision as to whether the business project can (continue to) operate if communities in their majority reject certain projects, on the grounds of human rights.

The UNGPs, like much of the other voluntary guidance and tools, are set from a business perspective, especially the Operational Principles which companies pay most attention to. The Operational Principles like EIAs focus on reducing/mitigating the negative impacts and harm to affected actors such as communities and workers. The EIAs, UNGPs and other guidance do not attempt to curtail the power of business to continue doing business or even be held accountable for corporate irresponsibility such as negative impacts on the environment. EIAs and the UNGPs and other similar voluntary guides do not advocate to companies that in certain circumstances they should refrain from commencing or engaging in a certain commercial endeavor in order to respect human rights. The ethos of the UNGPs is that business can always operate in a manner that conforms to respecting human rights by mitigating (not eliminating) impacts. The emphasis on these aforementioned instruments is about impact mitigation and not on impact elimination.

2. Recommendation: As such governments should firmly bear in mind the shortcomings in EIAs, the UNGPs and other similar voluntary guidelines with regards to power imbalances between large corporations and affected communities.

Other State agencies (not the same ones overseeing the EIA) should empower communities who wish to remain independent from mining to address the power imbalances to make an informed choice and decision as to whether to reject mining outright if they feel it threatens their livelihoods, human rights and in turn their independence from mining.

International law has certain policies which, in theory, if implemented by national States, can help at least indigenous communities veto mining projects should they be in the majority against the installation of a new mine nearby. This includes ILO Convention 169 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Article 10 states. “Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where possible, with the option of return”. The Chilean and Brazilian have ratified this convention and they are currently publically debating the implementation of this.

These recommendations around legally empowering communities with the power to decide over projects that affect them and their livelihoods is much more difficult to implement in practice in the contemporary globalized neo-liberal world. Furthermore, with the possibility of corporate and State backed influence strategies on communities, it is even more difficult for such empowerment to be effective in practice. For example consider the example of petroleum companies resolving the challenge of indigenous community consent by asking members “How much does your consent signature cost?” This is a real situation in parts of South America, as a director from an indigenous rights NGO pointed out recently at a university seminar in May 2014 in Copenhagen.

This suggests there are important questions pertaining to the How of gaining consent. Gaining consent from an indigenous community might conceal an unethical approach

with heavy co-optation behind it by the mining company and even the State to attain their objective of consent.

3. In short EIAs, the UNGPs and other practitioner tools, guidance and frameworks ask for compliance and indicators as evidence. States should require companies and its own agencies to document all influence strategies and processes used to comply with these environmental and social/human rights guidance frameworks in order to provide a deeper and more complete picture of how human rights are being respected. In other words the story behind these indicators and ticks of compliance. State and private sector actors should place the emphasis on gaining the affected community perspective as the preferred methodology for doing so.

The questions around influence strategies to eliminate community resistance, whether by the State or corporations, are essentially ethical rather than legal. Companies in this present research were not openly conducting illegal practices to influence local communities. CSR is not illegal, nor is co-optation, nor is dividing and ruling communities, nor are obstruction strategies. It is not possible to take legal action against a company for using such strategies for community manipulation purposes. Instead these are intelligent approaches employed by actors with power, such as corporations and the State to influence certain outcomes, and in the context of this research a community resistance free environment for mining. The question then becomes whether these influence strategies are ethical and if not, how can the State or civil society actors regulate or prevent this?

4. Recommendation: The Chilean and Brazilian States should work on developing legally enforceable policy and guidelines around How the process of Indigenous Consent for extractives projects should be conducted. Such a discussion and policy should explicitly address how to address the issue of influence and co-optation strategies by more powerful and interested actors such as the mining companies, its business partners and even the State itself.

5. State's should strongly promote one of the central propositions of the UNGPs around encouraging corporations to use their leverage or influence to pressure and lobby other companies along their value chain and State actors for the good of human rights. This can also be interpreted as Responsible Lobbying and goes completely against the type of lobbying or influence strategies which this thesis documents that go against the human rights of many in the communities.

States need to debate firstly the impacts large mining corporations have on their people, whether the benefits clearly outweigh the costs or not. Perceptions of affected groups are necessary for such exercises, more so than the judgment of company executives or judges in courtrooms. After all who can really decide and determine whether human rights are being impacted on or not? At the crux of this problem is the perspective of the affected party, who is most often the disenfranchised, who has their life, livelihood and future decided for them by the State and increasingly so by the private sector. In short, mining needs to be governed more for, and even by, those who are (potentially) impacted on by it for the sake of a fairer society. If affected communities held more power and truly had the ability to issue and withhold a legal licence to operate as opposed to the vague SLO concept, it would be a more effective response to corporate irresponsibility.

Essentially it is the State who holds, grants and has the ability to withhold any legal license to operate. This means the State approves whether they will be willing to allow a mining company to operate and impact on its communities for which it has a duty of care including a community where the residents in their majority are opposed to such a mine. In such situations (which are commonplace around the world) one should ask “Should the State go ahead and grant the licence to a mining project, despite the overall rejection from the community? Does the State know best for the community’s welfare and well-being? Should the State give priority to community desires or to the economic gains for the nation as a whole?” Such tough questions can provide initial high-level answers to how mining activity can be governed.

In the light of a more globalized world with a shrinking State and growing reliance on the private sector, the State needs to take a stronger role in fulfilling its duties to its citizens and not delegating these responsibilities to companies. Companies are profit maximization organizations whose main purpose for existence is not to ensure the respect of citizens. Corporations are not legally bound to protect the human rights of citizens. Such a duty falls within the jurisdiction of States therefore governments need to fulfill their responsibilities and duties to protecting and respecting communities from human rights impacts by firms and irresponsibility caused by companies.

Corporate responsibility on the other hand is a complex and subjective notion that can mean responsible business behaviour to one group and simultaneously represent irresponsible conduct to another affected party. Dealing with corporate accountability, irresponsibility or access to remedy for affected citizens is where States should focus their governance on mining activities. Currently there is much talk about how mining can be self-governed by mining companies and their own industry sector associations such as ICMM in order to be more responsible but far too little concrete action on this subject by State institutions. Whilst States have remained quiet around governing mining responsibly the private sector and NGOs have been very proactive around self-governance. As already mentioned the self-governance of mining deals with making the activity a more responsible necessary evil (a contradiction in terms) instead of ever eliminating all the negative impacts and irresponsibility by ceasing mining operations altogether. In order to do States would need to force companies to forgo potential business in favour of the human rights of communities.

7.2 Recommendations to mining companies

It is therefore in the interests of mining companies to act as ethically and transparently as they possibly can when dealing with local communities, government and civil society. Though this may sound naïve and too moralistic a recommendation from a PhD researcher such as myself, the evidence publically available of large multinational mining companies unable to gain community acceptance due to such unethical behaviour is clear.

Mining companies within my research such as Barrick Gold and Anglo American, which feature in the higher conflict communities, as well as others mentioned previously such as Newmont Mining responsible for the Conga mine in Peru and Vedanta Resources for the bauxite mine in Odisha in India, have all faced serious threats to losing their community acceptance in certain mining projects in 2013 and all four companies' share prices were down by an average of 50% in late 2013 from their highs. I do not wish to make a causal attribution to a drop in share price with community conflicts due to the macro economic factors negatively impacting on mining companies' share prices also; however, in the case of Barrick Gold and Newmont Mining, it is clear to see their respective share prices dropped at the same time as the negative court rulings in Chile and Peru against the mining projects.

1. If a community does not consent to a mining project, it is most likely to be a better business and ethical decision not to try and create some level of community dependency on the mine at a later stage and win over community support, as suggested by the practical guidance literature on community relations. The previous cases show this does not yield positive results. Mining companies should not underestimate the persistence, knowledge, support and tenacity of communities, who are against mining projects in their backyards in developing world regions, to force the project to be delayed, suspended and even unviable.

Local communities and civil society organizations are astute, well-informed, educated and well supported with infrastructure and they will publically denounce any CSR strategies as manipulation tactics. These conflicts, as Barrick Gold, Anglo American, Vedanta Resources and Newmont Mining have learned, are a risk for their corporate image and reputation also, further making the case against trying to win over acceptance from communities where there is little consent for mining.

There is a plethora of extractives sector guidance literature which appears sophisticated as well as an abundance of specialist consultants highly trained and skilled in the social sciences who will claim it is possible to obtain an SLO from a situation where there is no community consent for mining; via strategies such as dialogue and partnership however, one only needs to point to the examples of India, Chile, Peru, Argentina and Brazil as recently mentioned. Such guides and consultants have self-serving motives to encourage mining companies to take the risk in engaging with CSR strategies with the local communities in the hope of an SLO.

However, I do not wish to sound opposed or negative towards these well thought out and designed community relations/investment guidance materials as I believe, based on my findings and research from an affected communities perspective, that they do serve a valuable purpose when used in contexts of lower conflict communities or in communities where mining activity is welcomed.

In higher conflict communities where mining companies engage in influence strategies that go beyond the principles of these community relations guides, such as those related to divide and rule, obstruction of critical voices, lobbying government, intimidating detractors amongst others, the good work they are probably doing in accordance with these guides is cancelled out and not appreciated by the local community or other relevant actors.

2. Recommendation: The main recommendation I would like to make to mining companies also related to the concept of leverage in the UNGPs (as I recommend to States). Companies should actively have policies, acts on and communicate on how they are influencing their business partners, suppliers and State counterparts for the protection and respect of human rights (of affected communities).

However, I also would make the recommendation to mining companies to follow the detailed community relation's best practice guides in communities where there is clear overall acceptance of mining as was clearly the case in Barro Alto and Pedra

Branca (both managed by Anglo American at the time of my research). Anglo American in particular followed their award winning Socio-Economic Assessment Toolbox (SEAT) for maintaining good community relations and maximizing their contribution to local development. This was possible because the communities overall supported the nearby mining projects and were dependent on them for employment and their livelihoods. Importantly the communities were not directly impacted by the mines as they live over 15km from the minesite. I would argue that the main principles and approaches from this extensive practitioner guidance material have changed little since the initial World Bank publications around a decade ago in 2005 so therefore experienced practitioners have little to contribute to the guides in current times. I would also argue that these guides do not need additional content for the aim of achieving good community relations, respecting human rights and contributing to the local community. This practitioner guidance if followed works well where mining activity is accepted by the nearby communities.

3. Recommendation: In cases of community acceptance of mining activity companies should follow the best in practice guidance literature on community relations.

My data suggest that regardless of the amounts of local investment and attempts to engage with the local community in line with the extant practical guidance, mining companies may not obtain community acceptance if trust were to be lost early on in the mining cycle, such as in the case of Pascua Lama where vital information about the environmental impact on water was omitted from the community, a clear example of corporate irresponsibility. Trying to implement the practical guidance from the various toolkits once trust has been lost and promises repeatedly broken by the mining company is likely to be futile when trying to gain a community acceptance.

Secondly, the practical guidance literature on improving mining company community relations makes scant mention of how certain communities and civil society actors can interpret CSR as manipulative strategies aimed at dividing and ruling, lobbying,

creating false leaders or co-optation. The literature overlooks this highly important practice that takes place at mining operations and is intrinsically linked with social responsibility strategies. The failure to recognize the risk of certain community groups interpreting mining company CSR efforts as manipulation and co-optation underscores the dominance of the company perspective of imposing its idea of what is responsible and good for the nearby communities. This leads back to the topic of power imbalances, which need to be addressed by companies themselves, such as by providing resources so that communities can become empowered by independent actors such as lawyers, NGOs or academics.

Mining companies should be aware of how their influence and even social responsibility strategies may be perceived by the community at large and consider whether they would be interpreted as co-optation, manipulation and divide and rule tactics. This is important because it directly impacts on the community's acceptance of the mining project or in other words the granting of an environment free of conflict. Again one strategy for addressing this complex question is by consistently engaging in dialogue with a cross section of local community members and leaders, and moreover discussing these sensitive and complex issues around community perceptions of their actions. This implies the need for a mining company to accept a certain level of modesty and humility, and relinquish power over to impacted communities.

4. Recommendation: Understand and act on the perceptions of critical voices in the community regarding any CSR or influence strategies. This means going beyond complying with what the current practical guidance on community relations and human rights around just consulting communities. My suggestion here is that should large mining companies perceive the majority of the community reject mining outright on their doorstep then they should respect these wishes (together with the host State) and not impose mining operations even with CSR. Large scale mining cannot operate with minimal impacts to water, environmental and social fabric, regardless of how much it is mitigated.

Even by employing CSR as an influence strategy to gain local community support and comply with international standards such as the UNGPs should be ruled out by companies. This creates internal community divisions and accusations of unethical and irresponsible co-optation practices for the sake of complying with CSR and Human rights related compliance. Mining companies should always be prepared to know and show How they became compliant with human rights and /or CSR related indicators. The approach and process of compliance with such criteria is where companies can be judged for their degree of ethics and responsibility by society.

5. Mining companies must begin to try to understand the world from the perspective of those in the community who are opposed to their actions and impacts. This includes companies trying to also view CSR from a critical perspective in contrast to the present where they view it amongst other things as a solution to overcoming resistance. This emphasis on the business case for CSR or in other words how CSR can benefit the mining company needs to be lessened. Instead mining companies should listen to what the what the main community groups are requesting of them, including calls of ceasing operations.

It should be acknowledged that for any extractives sector company to implement the sophisticated guidance literature on gaining acceptance from nearby communities is a complex task when considering the main extraction activities of these companies, together with the dynamics and politics at local, national and international level. However, mining companies should at the very least be transparent about their relations with all stakeholders including government actors, NGOs and any local community members. A lack of transparency by extractives sector companies generates mistrust and suspicion from the majority of affected local actors

As a final point, it should be clarified that being transparent does not guarantee winning over the trust or SLO from the local community; this is an unqualified

assumption made by extractive sector practitioners. The data from my research do not refer to transparency as the key issue for gaining good community relations; instead it was the level of independence or dependence on/from the extractives industry that gave most insight into whether communities would or would not collectively resist the project.

8.0 Conclusion

In summary, the following determinants, from an affected communities perspective, are seen as significant in determining the positions community members take towards nearby mining projects in the eight case studies in Brazil and Chile:

- Levels of dependence and independence of mining affected communities on mining for their livelihoods.
- Levels of corporate and State backed influence strategies.
- Levels of resources for mobilization such as finance, civil society partners, lawyers, the State.

The more independent communities who do not rely on the nearby mines for their livelihoods and well-being were opposed to them, whereas those who were economically dependent, be that directly or indirectly, were largely unopposed to the mines. I have taken care in choosing to use the word “unopposed” because these more dependent communities were not necessarily content with the nearby mining projects. In fact many held negative sentiments towards the mines, concluding that the mines were a “necessary evil” for the community in that despite their negative impacts they as a community were dependent on them. I also concluded that the four more independent communities had more of a conflict natured relationship with their nearby mining projects whereas the more dependent communities had lower conflict relations.

Nonetheless, when speaking of community relations this implies more than just sentiment or perceptions, it involves behaviour and action. Therefore, despite the

existence of negative perceptions of the nearby mining projects at all eight communities I visited, only at four of them did the communities attempt to mobilize collectively and resist the mines on a regular basis. At these higher conflict communities, groups were able to convert their negative sentiment into group action against the mines. This situation was not possible at the lower conflict communities mainly as a result of the high levels of economic dependence on the nearby mining projects for jobs, the local economy and CSR related investment. At the four lower conflict communities when groups attempted in the past to mobilize they were swiftly quashed with counter-mobilization or co-optation tactics by the large mining companies and even local government working in collaboration with those companies.

This final point also makes a new contribution to the literature by suggesting to social movement scholars that they should consider the notion of dependency when researching on communities mobilizing against businesses. A large company, as opposed to a government or State, as is usually researched in the social movements literature, is a different context. Traditional social movements literature pits aggrieved groups against the State in a zero-sum game which is very different from the context of a local community dealing with a nearby mining project. Traditional social movements research that considers protesters mobilizing for their ideologies, beliefs and convictions differs from that of local communities who may feel aggrieved due to the environmental and socio-economic impacts from mining on their lives, which has less to do with ideologies and beliefs. The protester groups in much of the social movements literature groups cannot be easily persuaded or influenced by the corporate influence strategies, which include social responsibility programmes, also with manipulation tactics such as lobbying government, dividing and ruling the communities, and co-optation, as reported in this thesis.

For stakeholder theory scholars, a suggestion is that they also consider the concepts of dependency, power and collective action from social movements literature if researching company/community relations and conflict. The many academic publications that are in the majority a-theoretical yet write about extractives sector

company conflicts with mining companies, should also consider using resource dependence and social movements-related theories as frameworks to help explain their findings and major arguments to give them greater academic robustness. For example, the descriptive publications on mining company/community conflict and relations, such as those by Kapeleus, 2002, Gifford and Kestler, 2008, Garvin *et al.*, 2009, Duarte, 2010 and Newenham-Kahindi, 2011, that explain how mining company/community relations strategies are not effective with local communities and that there is conflict, should also consider the concept of dependence or independence levels from the nearby (proposed) mining projects. This would allow authors to contribute to the resource dependence, social movements and stakeholder theoretical literatures.

The extensive mining company relations practical guidance literature would argue that conflict and negative community sentiment need not occur if mining companies followed their principles and recommendations. However, in the real context, based on this field research more caution should be placed around the implementation of these CSR policies as often they stoke the fire of internal conflict and divisions within communities. CSR and community relations policies should also be thought of by academics and practitioners as sources of contention, conflict and ironically of corporate irresponsibility. CSR does not guarantee a win-win or shared value scenario. This division renders the communities who are resisting mining projects even weaker.

In addition the practical and academic literature surrounding concepts of CSR, Resource Dependence and SLO must be challenged based on the findings of this community perspective based research in terms of how much power they assume communities hold. The SLO concept implies communities have the power to turn on and off a tap of SLO for extractive projects. However, the reality is that it is much more complex. The communities can in unison with other actors such as civil society actors, lawyers, the State and others all turn the tap of SLO off, albeit it must be stressed this is temporary and done via the legal courts. Knowing when the SLO is lost, gained or in between is an almost impossible task. Mining companies do not stay

static whilst communities attempt to turn off the SLO to them; the companies will use their own influence strategies to turn the tap back on and to be able to conduct their business in a problem-free way.

This problem with existing theory and concepts aligns with the notion that stakeholder and CSR theories must be researched and theorized within the context of globalization and the political economy. There are many different actors with varying aims and strategies for achieving their aims in these areas of contention, such as in mining communities. These actors are positioned at different levels such as international, national, local and their positions also change over time influenced by the actions of other actors. The scenario of mining company community relations is messy and not a clear-cut binary one and should therefore not be simplified.

8.1 Further Research

Research should focus on the dynamics of company/community relations within a temporal context; focusing on how the different positions change over time and the different influences from different actors, which induced these shifts in positions. This would also help reveal the how and the process behind the communications of mining companies who proclaim some form of CSR and human rights credentials and compliance. It would also be interesting to research to what extent the concept of Leverage (Ruggie, 2011) for the respect of human rights is exercised by extractive sector companies. Such research would enter the realm of a political economy agenda and would help scholars and practitioners understand and visualize how company/community relations and conflict unfold in practice over time.

One other possible avenue for future research would be to speak to mining companies about the data I managed to capture and see if it were possible to conduct action or ethnographic research with their executives from the start of a mining cycle, post exploration stage, at a controversial mining project in terms of community conflict. The main research question worthy of asking here would be “How are community

relations strategies implemented by mining companies?” Such a research question would assist in learning why so many mining companies do not obtain the SLO they desire from following the practitioner guidance material.

Furthermore, such research could understand more closely how and if an SLO is possible from a community which is initially against the mining project. Such factors could include internal organizational ones, ensuring all community concerns are considered in the construction, development and operations stages of the mine and the social responsibility and community relations strategy throughout the cycle, which is something researchers Kemp and Owen (2013) have argued does not currently happen in mining company. They compare the way mining companies deploy their community relations executives with that of firefighters who only go out to work in order to put out fires. These authors mean by this analogy that community relations staff do not work consistently in consulting and engaging with the local community throughout the mining cycle, instead they work intensively during the construction phase and then take a peripheral role once the mine is operating.

In other words it would be interesting to test my findings of what does not work with community relations strategies at all eight mining communities and try to address these shortcomings from the outset of the mining project to see if there is an overall SLO after some years. Such research admittedly would require several years of frequent site visits and interviews therefore would be of a longitudinal nature. Furthermore, this research I believe would provide a useful insight into the often cited internal struggles and tensions between corporate headquarters and mining sites with regard to the use and implementation of the community relations guidance tools. Conducting such research from an organizational culture and identity theory perspective would afford it a more robust theoretical foundation and potential contribution to both academic literature and practice.

A shorter future research based on my findings could be to explore the perceptions of why community relations in a mining context face such challenges in spite of the vast

practical assistance available from consultants and organizations on a more mass scale. This could include interviewing multiple extractive sector community actors such as leaders, politicians, NGOs, religious figures and mining company executives by taking advantage of the communications technologies available today such as skype, low cost international phone calls and email. There are several social media groups in existence today made up of dozens of mining company community relations executives, which could provide interesting access to data. Furthermore such research could be conducted in line with the proposed framework by Banerjee (2011) where data to explain conflict and good relations would be categorized according to the role of the State, civil society and the market.

Finally it would also be interesting to research in more depth “How community relations evolve during the mining cycle” allowing the testing of my initial proposition on this question. Doing so would allow me to refine my theory. Researching archival data from the Internet would also be an important and valuable addition to the interviews as well as conducting longitudinal ethnographic field research. The findings from such research would also contribute towards creating a database of community characteristics and attributes regarding their level of place attachment, social network ties, history, type and socio-economic situation, amongst others, to see how they have responded to mining company influence and social responsibility strategies throughout the various stages of the mining cycle.

8.2 Limitations

One important limitation was related to access to data by mining companies. I was not afforded interviews by Barrick Gold, Pelambres, Anglo American’s Minas – Rio project in Conceição de Mato Dentro or Vale. The fact that Anglo American was willing to give me open doors access for its then Pedra Branca project and its award winning Barro Alto project but yet not for the much larger Minas – Rio project is a telling indictment of the levels of conflict and sensitivity surrounding the latter. Nonetheless an executive from Anglo American’s headquarters in London did agree to a meeting with me to discuss all three mining projects.

Another limitation related to access is the unequal amount of time I physically spent at each community and the types of interviewees I was able to interview. I was not able to visit each of the eight communities the same number of times, spend the same number of days at each one or speak to the same number of people from the different actor groups including the mining company. Though they should not have to be identical in numbers due to the difference in sizes of communities, it would have been better if I could have spent longer in Conceição de Mato Dentro speaking with more community residents. However, to counter this limitation I spent much more time conducting frequent post-field visit interviews over Internet communications such as skype with community leaders. I was also able to watch three public hearings after my field visit, over the Internet, of the community airing its grievances at the mining company's impacts to their lives at the State and Federal prosecution forum.

A final limitation relates to duration of stays at the communities and I feel my data could have been enriched by living longer amounts of time in each community to gain a better and deeper understanding of the social fabric of the communities, the dynamics of the different community positions, levels of dependence on the nearby mining companies and responses to CSR. Nonetheless I did feel by the end of my data collection that I had met the criteria of data saturation whereby I was obtaining highly similar data from different interviews and interviewees within each community.

8.3 Final Reflection

I initially started this research looking to find some answers as to why mining company/community relations were still poor despite the sophisticated practical advice and guidance that exists. I was convinced, like many of those in the private sector and in NGOs that support extractive sector firms, that the answer lied within the sphere of companies. This includes how companies just need to embed better and deeper processes into their organizations of how they deal with and impact on communities. After my field research (as an independent student) over recent years, I learned that the minority, such as some academics and NGOs, have a fundamental and

credible argument. That is to say, understanding the community perspective is essential to understanding why perceptions of mining companies are negative. It is necessary for extractives companies to understand the community perspective well in order to see why relations are poor and why they are often not welcomed by the community. The inputting of tools and policies from inside a company does not seem to improve community relations or perceptions.

The issues of power and dependency as underscored in my thesis are also pertinent to making sense of company/community relations. For example I would argue that the thought of constructing a large-scale mine near a large city such as New York, Toronto, London, Sydney, Rio de Janeiro and others would seem highly unlikely and unimaginable. The residents of these cities would not be in favour of such a project as they are quite content with their lives. Should not the dwellers of rural communities equally, if not as more content as the urban residents from wealthy cities, enjoy the same right to a life free from the impacts of nearby large scale mining?

If the majority of a community in the developing world is opposed to a mining project from the outset and content with its own way of life, then that should be respected just as companies and States would respect the wishes of well educated white communities in the developed world who might be residing near large unexplored mineral deposits.

Whilst the enforcement of law is much weaker in developing nations compared to those in developed countries that help defend and protect communities against any unwanted mining projects, I argue that multinational companies should use the same criteria and these stricter laws (often from their home State) when dealing with communities in the developing world. In the end I have come to see this research question and subject as a matter of ethics, values and doing what one believes is right. These topics are complex and their understanding varies from person to person.

References

Aaltonen, K., & Kujala, J. (2010) A project lifecycle perspective on stakeholder influence strategies in global projects. *Scandinavian Journal of Management*, 26(4), pp.381-397.

Abers, R. N. (2007) Organizing for governance: building collaboration in Brazilian river basins. *World Development*, 35(8), pp.1450-1463.

Anguelovski, I. (2011). Understanding the dynamics of community engagement of corporations in communities: the iterative relationship between dialogue processes and local protest at the Tintaya copper mine in Peru. *Society and Natural Resources*, 24(4), 384-399.

Anglo American website <http://angloamerican.com/development/social/community-engagement/engagement> consulted 20th July, 2013

Anglo American Position Statement in response to Human rights violation claims (2013) <http://www.business-humanrights.org/Links/Repository/1023845/jump> accessed 31st May, 2014

Banerjee, S. B. (2001) Corporate citizenship and indigenous stakeholders. *Journal of Corporate Citizenship*, 2001(1), pp.39-55.

Banerjee, S. B., & Bonnefous, A. M. (2011). Stakeholder management and sustainability strategies in the French nuclear industry. *Business Strategy and the Environment*, 20(2), 124-140.

Banerjee, S. B. (2011) Voices of the Governed: towards a theory of the translocal. *Organization*, 18(3), pp.323-344.

Banerjee, S. B. (2011). Embedding sustainability across the organization: A critical perspective. *Academy of Management Learning & Education*, 10(4), 719-731.

Barrick Gold website accessed 3rd July, 2013

Bastida, E, Irarrázabal, R; and Labó, R (2005). Mining Investment and Policy Developments: Argentina, Chile and Peru in Ei source book <http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/Mining%20Investment%20&%20Policy%20Developments,%20Argentina,%20Chile%20&%20Peru.pdf> accessed 29th May, 2014.

Bebbington, A., Humphreys Bebbington, D., Bury, J., Langan, J., Muñoz, J.P. and Scurrah, M. (2008). Mining and social movements: struggles over livelihood and rural territorial development in the Andes. *World Development*, 36(12), pp. 2888-2905

Benford, R and Snow, D (2000) Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment, *Annual Review Sociology*, (26) pp.611–633

Berry, G. R. (2003). Organizing Against Multinational Corporate Power In Cancer Alley The Activist Community as Primary Stakeholder. *Organization & Environment*, 16(1), 3-33.

Blaikie, N. (2007) *Approaches to social enquiry: Advancing knowledge*. Polity.

Business and human rights resource centre (2013)
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/236901/BHR_Action_Plan_-_final_online_version_1_.pdf accessed 12th February, 2014

Calvano, L (2008) Multinational Corporations and Local Communities: A Critical Analysis of Conflict. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 82(4) pp. 793–805.

Camera de Deputados (2013) Ambientalistas consideram retrocesso o projeto do novo Código de Mineração <http://www2.camara.leg.br/camaranoticias/noticias/MEIO-AMBIENTE/451188-AMBIENTALISTAS-CONSIDERAM-RETROCESSO-O-PROJETO-DO-NOVO-CODIGO-DE-MINERACAO.html> accessed 31st May, 2014

Casciaro, T., & Piskorski, M. J. (2005). Power imbalance, mutual dependence, and constraint absorption: A closer look at resource dependence theory. *Administrative science quarterly*, 50(2), 167-199.

Chile se Moviliza (2013) Los Caimanes, Video documentary accessed 3rd July, 2013

Cimos (2013) <http://cimos.blog.br/reasa/conceicao-do-mato-dentro-e-regiao/> accessed 20th September, 2013

Clarkson, M. E. (1995) A stakeholder framework for analyzing and evaluating corporate social performance. *Academy of management review*, 20(1) pp.92-117.

Código de Mineração Brasil http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Decreto-Lei/Del0227.htm accessed 30th May, 2014

Collins E, Kearins K, Roper J. (2005). The risks of relying on stakeholder engagement for the achievement of sustainability. *Electronic Journal of Radical Organization Theory* 9(1)..

Creswell, J. and Miller, D. (2000). Determining Validity in Qualitative Enquiry, *Theory into Practice*, 39(3) summer.

Dasgupta, K. (2013). Vedanta's India mining scheme thwarted by local objections <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/aug/21/india-dongria-kondh-vedanta-resources-mining#!> *The Guardian* online 21st August, 2013 accessed 9th September, 2013

Davis, R. and Franks, D.M. (2011, October). The costs of conflict with local communities in the extractive industry. In *First International Seminar on Social Responsibility in Mining* (pp. 19-21). SRMining.

Den Hond, F., and De Bakker, F. G. (2007) Ideologically motivated activism: How activist groups influence corporate social change activities. *Academy of Management Review*, 32(3), pp.901-924.

Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada DFAID (2009) Building the Canadian Advantage: A Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Strategy for the Canadian International Extractive Sector <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/other-autre/csr-strat-rse.aspx> accessed 9th September, 2013

Devlin, J. and Tubino, D. I. (2012) Contention, participation, and mobilization in environmental assessment follow-up: the Itabira experience. *Sustainability: Science, Practice, & Policy*, 8(1), pp.106-115.

Donaldson, T. and Preston, L.E. (1995). The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts, evidence, and implications. *Academy of Management Review*, 20(1), pp. 65-91.

Duarte, F. (2010) Corporate social responsibility in a Brazilian mining company: ‘official’ and divergent narratives, *Social Responsibility Journal*, 6(1), pp. 4-17.

Edmondson, A. C., and McManus, S. E. (2007) Methodological fit in management field research. *Academy of management review*, 32(4), pp1246-1264.

Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989) Building theories from case study research. *Academy of Management Review*, 14(4), pp. 532-550.

Eisenhardt, K and Graebner, M (2007) Theory building from cases: Opportunities and Challenges, *Academy of Management Journal*, 50(1), pp. 25–32.

Escobar, A. (2011). *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (New in Paper)*. Princeton University Press.

First Peoples Worldwide (2013) Mining Council's "New" Commitment to FPIC Falls Short from FPW website (<http://firstpeoples.org/wp/ mining-councils-new-commitment-to-fpic-falls-short/>)

Freeman, R. E. (1984) Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. *Boston: Pitman*

Franklin, J in The Guardian online (2014) Chilean dam can't hold back the hatred <http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/chile-los-pelambres-copper-mine-antofagasta-broken-town> (accessed 30th April, 2014)

Freeman, R.E., Wicks, A.C. and Parmar, B. (2004). Stakeholder theory and "the corporate objective revisited". *Organization Science*, 15(3), pp. 364-369.

Frooman, J. (1999). Stakeholder influence strategies. *Academy of Management Review*, 24(2), pp. 191-205.

Garvin, T., McGee, T.K., Smoyer-Tomic, K.E. and Aubynn, E.A (2009). "Community company relations in gold mining in Ghana", *Journal of Environmental Management*, 90, pp. 571-586.

Gesta (2013) Ficha Tecnica – Conceição de Mato Dentro accessed online 13th September, 2013 <http://conflitosambientaismg.lcc.ufmg.br/info.php?id=253>

Gifford, B. and Kestler, A. (2008). Toward a theory of local legitimacy by MNEs in developing nations: Newmont mining and health sustainable development in Peru. *Journal of International Management*, 14(4), pp. 340-352.

Gramling, R. and Freudenburg, W.R. (2006). Attitudes toward offshore oil development: A summary of current evidence, *Ocean & Coastal Management*, 49(7), pp. 442-461.

Grisotto, R (2012) Política de boa vizinhança, *Revista Exame* <http://planetasustentavel.abril.com.br/noticia/desenvolvimento/politica-bou-vizinhanca-733873.shtml> accessed 9th December, 2012.

Guba, E.G. and Lincoln, Y.S. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative research. In N.K. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (pp. 105-117). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Haalboom, B. (2012). The intersection of corporate social responsibility guidelines and indigenous rights: Examining neoliberal governance of a proposed mining project in Suriname. *Geoforum*, 43(5), 969-979.

Henriques, I., Sharma, S. (2005). Pathways of stakeholder influence in the Canadian Forestry Industry. *Business Strategy and the Environment* **14**: 384–398.

Hendry, J. R. (2005) Stakeholder influence strategies: An empirical exploration. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 61(1), pp.79-99.

ICMM (2012) Mining has a growing role in economic development and poverty reduction from ICMM website <http://www.icmm.com/role-in-economy-and-trends> (accessed 1st September, 2013).

ICMM (2013) ICMM responds to First Peoples Worldwide critique of Indigenous Peoples and Mining Position Statement from ICMM website <http://www.icmm.com/page/96314/publications/documents/icmm-responds-to-first-peoples-worldwide-critique-of-indigenous-peoples-and-mining-position-statement>

IFC (2007) Stakeholder engagement: A good practice handbook for companies doing business in emerging markets. International Finance Corporation. Accessed online http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/938f1a0048855805beacfe6a6515bb18/IFC_StakeholderEngagement.pdf?MOD=AJPERES accessed 2nd September, 2013

Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (2012) Gross Domestic Product of Municipalities – 2011 – Conceição de Mato Dentro http://www.cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/grafico_cidades.php?codmun=311750&idtema=125&search=minas-gerais|conceicao-do-mato-dentro|produto-interno-bruto-dos-municipios-2011&lang= EN accessed 2nd June, 2014.

Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (2012) Gross Domestic Product of Municipalities – 2011 – Paracatu http://www.cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/grafico_cidades.php?lang=&codmun=314700&idtema=125&search=minas-gerais%7Cparacatu%7Cproduto-interno-bruto-dos-municipios-2011 accessed 2nd June, 2014.

Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (2012) Gross Domestic Product of Municipalities – 2011 – Mariana http://www.cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/grafico_cidades.php?lang=&codmun=314000&idtema=125&search=minas-gerais%7Cmariana%7Cproduto-interno-bruto-dos-municipios-2011 accessed 2nd June, 2014.

Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (2012) Gross Domestic Product of Municipalities – 2011 – Pedra Branca de Amapari
http://www.cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/grafico_cidades.php?lang=&codmun=160015&idtema=125&search=amapa%7Cpedra-branca-do-amapari%7Cproduto-interno-bruto-dos-municipios-2011 accessed 2nd June, 2014.

Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (2012) Gross Domestic Product of Municipalities – 2011 – Barro Alto
http://cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/grafico_cidades.php?lang=&codmun=520320&idtema=125&search=goias%7Cbarro-alto%7Cproduto-interno-bruto-dos-municipios-2011 accessed 2nd June, 2014.

Instituto Humanitas Unisinos (2012) Convenção 169 da OIT: o descaso brasileiro. Entrevista especial com Carolina Bellinger
<http://www.ihu.unisinos.br/entrevistas/512272-convencao-169-da-oit-o-descaso-brasileiro-entrevista-especial-com-carolina-bellinger> accessed 30th May, 2014

Johnson, B. (1987) Examining the validity structure of qualitative research, *Education*; Winter 1997; 118, 2; Research Library p. 282

Jones, A. and Thomas, A. (2013) Anglo American \$4bn hit on Brazil project, Financial Times, 29th January, 2013, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4f2e3cee-69e6-11e2-a80c-00144feab49a.html#axzz2beS3Hd5w> accessed 2nd August, 2013.

Jones, T.M. (1995) Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of ethics and economics. *Academy of management review*, 20(2), pp. 404-437.

Kemp, D., Owen, J. R., Gotzmann, N., & Bond, C. J. (2011) Just relations and company–community conflict in mining. *Journal of business ethics*, 101(1), pp.93-109.

Kemp, D. and Owen, J.R. (2013) Community relations and mining: Core to business but not “core business”. *Resources Policy*, 38(4), pp. 523-531.

Kinross Gold website consulted 30th July, 2013 <http://www.kinross.com/corporate-responsibility.aspx/guiding-principles.aspx>

Klandermans, B. (2004) The demand and supply of participation: Social-psychological correlates of participation in social movements. *The Blackwell companion to social movements*, pp.360-379.

Kotze, C. (2012) South American mining sector to continue as resource-based economy in *Mining Weekly* (Online magazine) <http://www.miningweekly.com/article/south-american-mining-sector-to-continue-as-resource-based-economy-2012-06-15> (accessed 1st September, 2013).

Laplume, A. O., Sonpar, K., & Litz, R. A. (2008). Stakeholder theory: Reviewing a theory that moves us. *Journal of management*, 34(6), 1152-1189.

Lertzman, D and Vredenburg, H (2005) Indigenous Peoples, Resource Extraction and Sustainable Development: An Ethical Approach, *Journal of Business Ethics*, 56 pp.239–254.

McAdam, D., Boudet, H. S., Davis, J., Orr, R. J., Richard Scott, W., & Levitt, R. E. (2010). Site Fights: Explaining Opposition to Pipeline Projects in the Developing World. *Sociological Forum*, 25 (3) pp. 401-427.

Margolis, J.D., and Walsh, J.P. (2003). 'Misery loves companies: rethinking social initiatives by business'. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 48, 268-305.

Mannarini, T., Roccato, M., Fedi, A., & Rovere, A. (2009) Six factors fostering protest: predicting participation in locally unwanted land uses movements. *Political Psychology*, 30(6), pp.895-920

Manrique, R. (2013) Dos tercios de proyectos mineros con EIA aprobado tienen retraso por conflictos sociales, <http://gestion.pe/economia/dos-tercios-proyectos-mineros-eia-aprobado-tienen-retraso-conflictos-sociales-2076484> Gestión (newspaper accessed 18th September, 2013).

Mapuexpress (2014) Comunicado Comité de Defensa de Caimanes ante declaración por obra ruinosa del Tranque el Mauro <http://mapuexpress.org/comunicado-comite-de-defensa-de-caimanes-ante-declaracion-por-obra-ruinosa-del-tranque-el-mauro/> accessed 21st May, 2014

Miningfacts.org (2012) <http://www.miningfacts.org/Communities/Does-mining-cause-social-conflict/#sthash.06EQyGWm.dpuf> (Accessed 24th August, 2013).

Mining Watch Canada (2014) Barrick Gold Hit with Quebec Class Action - Follows Shareholder Suits in Ontario and US <http://www.miningwatch.ca/news/barrick-gold-hit-quebec-class-action-follows-shareholder-suits-ontario-and-us> (Accessed 15th May, 2014)

Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J. (1997). Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. *Academy of management review*, 22(4), 853-886.

Morse, J.M., Barrett, M., Mayan, M., Olson, K. and Spiers, J. (2002) Verification Strategies for Establishing Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 1(2).

Nestor and Springer (2013) BSR insight: Six Ways for the Extractives Sector to Improve Stakeholder Engagement <http://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/bsr-insight-article/six-ways-for-the-extractives-sector-to-improve-stakeholder-engagement>
website accessed 13th July, 2013

Newell, P. (2005). Citizenship, accountability and community: the limits of the CSR agenda. *International Affairs*, 81(3), 541-557.

Newenham-Kahindi, A.M. (2011) A global mining corporation and local communities in the Lake Victoria zone: The case of Barrick Gold multinational in Tanzania. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 99(2), pp. 253-282.

OCMAL, (2013) Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros de América Latina, www.conflictosmineros.net, accessed 10th June, 2013.

Owen, J. R., & Kemp, D. (2013). Social licence and mining: A critical perspective. *Resources Policy*, 38(1), 29-35.

Özkaynak, B., Rodriguez-Labajos, B., Arsel, M., Avcı, D., Carbonell, M.H., Chareyron, B., Chicaiza, G., Conde, M., Demaria, F., Finamore, R., Kohrs, B., Krishna, V.V., Mahongnao, M., Raeva, D., Singh, A.A., Slavov, T., Tkalec, T., Yáñez, I., Walter, M., Živčič, L., (2012) Mining Conflicts around the World: Common Grounds from Environmental Justice Perspective, *EJOLT Report 7*,

Parsons, R., Lacey, J., & Moffat, K. (2014). Maintaining legitimacy of a contested practice: How the minerals industry understands its 'social licence to operate'. *Resources Policy*, 41, 83-90.

Phillips, R.A. (1997). Stakeholder theory and a principle of fairness. *Business Ethics Quarterly* 7: 51-66

Pizarro, C. (2010) Caimanes: Un pueblo dividido por la plata de los Luksic, *The Clinic online*, 27th November, 2010 (online newspaper consulted 4th July, 2013 <http://www.theclinic.cl/2010/11/27/caimanes-un-pueblo-dividido-por-la-plata-de-los-luksic/>)

Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2012) Mining in the Americas http://www.pwc.com/en_CA/ca/mining/publications/pwc-mining-in-the-americas-2012-03-en.pdf (accessed 1st September, 2013).

Reporter Brasil (2014) Fiscalização volta a flagrar escravidão em megaobra da Anglo American <http://reporterbrasil.org.br/2014/05/fiscalizacao-volta-a-flagrar-escravidao-em-megaobra-da-anglo-american/> (accessed 16th May, 2014)

Revista Exame (2013) A Anglo American contra Eike Batista
<http://exame.abril.com.br/blogs/primeiro-lugar/2013/10/10/a-anglo-american-contra-eike-batista/> accessed 10th October, 2013

Rowley, T and Moldoveanu, M (2003) When will stakeholder groups act? An interest and identity based model of stakeholder group mobilization, *Academy of Management Review*, (28) 2, pp. 204-219.

Sandberg, J. (2005) How Do We Justify Knowledge Produced Within Interpretive Approaches?, *Organizational Research Methods*, 8(1).

Sandelowski, M. (1986) The Problem of Rigor in Qualitative Research, *Advances in Nursing Science*, vol. 8, pp. 27–37.

Sargent, A (2013) El Mauro" Tailings-Dam Pits Community Against the Oligarchy in Chile <http://upsidedownworld.org/main/chile-archives-34/4335-qel-mauroq-tailings-dam-pits-community-against-the-oligarchy-in-chile> accessed 11th August, 2013

Scherer, A. G., Palazzo, G., & Matten, D. (2009). Introduction to the Special Issue: Globalization as a Challenge for Business Responsibilities. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 19(3).

Seale, C., Gobo, G., Gubrium, J. F., and Silverman, D. (Eds.). (2004) *Qualitative research practice*. Sage.

Shriver, T. E., & Kennedy, D. K. (2005) Contested Environmental Hazards and Community Conflict Over Relocation. *Rural sociology*, 70(4) pp. 491-513.

Silverman, D. (2000) *Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook*, London: Sage.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986) The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & L. W. Austin (Eds.), *Psychology of intergroup relations*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

Taillant, J. D (2013) <http://wp.cedha.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Los-Glaciares-de-Barrick-Gold-version-20-mayo-2013-ENGLISH-small.pdf> accessed 30th August, 2013

Urkidi, L. (2008) Movimientos anti-mineros: el caso de Pascua-Lama en Chile. *Revista Iberoamericana de Economía Ecológica (REVIBEC)*, (8), pp. 63-77.

Urkidi, L. (2010) A glocal environmental movement against gold mining: Pascua-Lama in Chile. *Ecological Economics*, 70(2), pp. 219-227.

Urkidi, L. and Walter, M. (2011) Dimensions of environmental justice in anti-gold mining movements in Latin America. *Geoforum*, 42(6), pp. 683-695.

Van Maanen, J. (2011) *Tales of the field: On writing ethnography*. University of Chicago Press.

Vasquez, V (2014) Caimanes logra importante victoria judicial contra el Grupo Luksic online news report <http://eldesconcierto.cl/caimanes-anota-fallo-judicial->

[contra-grupo-luksic-pero-sigue-bajo-amenaza-de-tranque-el-mauro/](#) accessed 4th June, 2014.

Vega, F. (2012). La cruzada de Jean Paul Luksic, *Revista Capital online*, October 2012 (online magazine consulted 3rd July, 2013) <http://www.capital.cl/poder/la-cruzada-de-jean-paul-luksic/>

Walsh, E. J., Warland, R. H., & Smith, D. C. (1997) Don't burn it here: Grassroots challenges to trash incinerators. Penn State University Press.

Whetten, D (2006) Albert and Whetten Revisited: Strengthening the Concept of Organizational Identity *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 15 pp. 219-234.

Zandvliet, L. and Anderson, M. (2009) Getting it Right Making Corporate–Community Relations Work, Greenleaf Publishing Ltd.

Zorilla, C (2014) Illegal arrest and illegitimate mining in Intag Valley (Ecuador) in EJOLT on-line <http://www.ejolt.org/2014/04/illegal-arrest-and-illegitimate-mining-in-intag-valley-ecuador/> accessed 14th May, 2014

Appendix A

Table – Details of interviews and interviewees with Identification Code from field research. (Mining company officials are highlighted in blue). Names kept anonymous for confidentiality purposes

Interviewee	Case Study	Context of Interview	Dates of meetings or communication	Duration of interview(s) or conversations	Interviewee Code (if quoted in thesis)	Referenced Interviewee transcript/ page number
Summary - Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil: 7 days and one visit with two telephone interviews one year after. Interviewed 12 Anglo American executives, Conducted Focus Group and Drawing activity with 20 new local recruits, 10 local community residents and six local government officials.						
Community relations coordinator, Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	6-11/01/12	3 hours total	A2	395

Health & Safety manager and Dam Specialist, Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	7/1/12	1 hour		
Two basic operators, mining operators, Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	7/1/12	30 minutes		
Explorations manager, Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	7/1/12	30 minutes		
20 new entrant employees from local community at Anglo American Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Company and Community Identity	8/1/12	1.5 hours		
Head of HR and sustainability, Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local	8/1/12	1 hour		

		history				
Two experienced miners, mining operators, Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	8/1/12	45 minutes		
Head of Institutional Relations, Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	In person and Skype calls with Jarilon Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	8/1/12	3 hours and two Skype conversations		
Trade union leader	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	9/1/12	15 minutes	A4	
President of the municipal chamber, Pedra Branca	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	9/1/12	30 minutes	A3	
Long term resident in Pedra Branca also an	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations and Conflict with local community, company	9/1/12	45 minutes	A1	391

ex independent gold miner currently suing Anglo American		and community identity, local history				
Together with JVisits to four residents in Pedra Branca area from Anglo American we drove around 30km to deliver hundreds of Açaí seedlings	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	9/1/12	4 hours		
Head of Social Assistance at local government	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	10/1/12	15 minutes		
Representatives of Environmental agency	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	10/1/12	30 minutes	A4	
Former Federal politician now Head of	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local	10/1/12	30 minutes		

Municipal Education		history				
Four Local residents in town including a pharmacy owner	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	10/1/12	1 hour	A4	
Head of CSR	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	11/1/12	2 hours		
Summary: Los Colla and Kinross Maricunga, Chile – 22 days of five visit over 3.5 years. Interviewed Four company executives repeatedly over this period. Interviewed three Colla community leaders repeatedly over this time period.						
Vice President Corporate Affairs, Kinross Gold	Colla Community, Chile	Corporate identity, culture, CSR policy, Community Relations - Drivers and Perceptions	Throughout 2009 and 2010 and 21/10/11	2 hours and several email exchanges		
Community Relations officer, Kinross Gold	Colla Community,	Corporate Identity, community relations, CSR	Throughout 2009 and 2010	8 hours of shadowing and		

	Chile	- Drivers and Perceptions	24/10/11	conversations		
Focus group with 11 executives from Kinross Gold	Colla Community, Chile	Focus group on Corporate Identity with individual and collective drawings and discussion	24/10/11	3 hours		
Community relations officer, replacing Carolina	Colla Community, Chile	Community history, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	19/10/12	2 hours		
(Colla Community Leaders) and two women leaders	Colla Community, Chile	Relations with neighbouring mines, reasons behind these relations, their Identity and Culture	Throughout 2009 and 2010, 25/10/11 and 20/10/12	5 hours	B1	411
Summary – Paracatu - Kinross, Brazil – 25 days of three visits over 15 months with constant email and telephone interviews since first visit. Interviewed 68 local community residents, 12 Kinross executives and four local government representatives.						

Locally Elected Councillor	Paracatu, Brazil	Spoke on a daily basis over 15 days, made field visits together, exchanged email communication. Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine.	16/11/11, 15/03/12, 08-09/12, 01/13 - 04/13	18 hours approximately	C2	416
Long term resident	Paracatu, Brazil	In Paracatu, London and over email. Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine.	16/11/11, 11/08/12 and 01/13 – 04/13	4 hours	C1	
Barber	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine.	18/11/11	30 minutes	C12	
Four Field visits to Sao Domingos	Paracatu,	Community history, identity, culture, current	16/11/11, and three times	5 hours	C3	

Quilombo (Maroon) next to mine. Spoke to eight residents	Brazil	affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine.	between 08-09/12			
Head of Afro-Brazilian NGO and former candidate for local councillor	Paracatu, Brazil	Maroon Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	18/11/11 and four times between 08-09/12	5 hours	C4	435
Head of Sao Domingos	Paracatu, Brazil	Maroon Community history, identity, culture, internal conflicts, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	16/11/11, 29-31/08/12 and 10/01/13	3 hours	C36	
Medical Doctor and former elected local councillor	Paracatu, Brazil	Two visits to neighbouring communities to the mine and one interview in office. Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine,	19/11/11, 21/11/11 and 05/09/12	5 hours	C5	

		impacts from mine				
local cultural leader, social entrepreneurship initiative	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	16-20/11/11, 15/03/12 and between 08-09/12	5 hours	C6	457
Socialist party and neighbourhood leader and activist	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	17/11/11	1 hour	C7	474
Now Former Director of Community Relations and Communications, Kinross Gold	Paracatu, Brazil	Community relations, engagement, investment, identity and culture.	19/11/11, 06/09/12 and 16/01/13	6 hours	C8	
10 Kinross Gold Cross Section Management Executives	Paracatu, Brazil	Community relations, perceptions, and identity and culture	06/09/12	1.5 hours	C13	
Community Relations	Paracatu,	Visited social projects	06/09/12 and	2 hours	C14	

Officer	Brazil	financed by Kinross and spoke to the project managers and beneficiaries	16/01/13			
Community Relations Officer	Paracatu, Brazil	Visited two community leaders to speak about community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	06/09/12	4 hours	C15	
Local café owner	Paracatu, Brazil	History of mining company - community relations	19/11/11 and 04/09/12	45 minutes	C35	
Local entrepreneur leader	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	19/11/11	1,5 hours	C9	
Visits together with Councillor to four families living besides	Paracatu, Brazil	Impacts from mining on community and relations and perception of the mine	19/11/11	4 hours	C10	

the mine						
community leader lost land years ago due to tailings dam.	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	20/11/11 and 31/08/12	2 hours	C11	
President of Trade Union at Kinross Gold	Paracatu, Brazil	Worker relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	21/11/11 and 10/09/12	2 hours	C12	492
Caritas Social Justice NGO	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	21/11/11 and email 10/02/13	2 hours	C37	511
Focus group session with 12 students aged 11 – 17	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	22/11/11	1,5 hours	C38	
Radio journalist, and	Paracatu,	Community history,	22/11/11,	5 hours	C15	498

wife well known local radio and TV journalist	Brazil	identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	04/09/12 and 06/09/12 radio interview			
head of hospital management	Paracatu, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	23/11/11	30 minutes	C16	
Lawyer	Paracatu, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	23/11/11	15 minutes	C17	
Long term resident and Secretary of Caritas Social Justice NGO	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	29/08/12	1 hour	C18	
Lady who works in Culture and Education and civil society campaigner, also mother of Community relations official from	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	29/08/12	40 minutes	C19	

Kinross						
State Deputy politician and was socialist mayor candidate	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	30/08/12	1.5 hours	C20	
elderly hotel owner and landowner affected by mine	Paracatu, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	31/08/12	1 hour	C21	
Sociology Lecturer and his students at Finom University in Paracatu who did his Master's thesis on Sao Domingos Maroon and its Identity	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	07/09/12	3 hours	C22	
(Priest) of Paracatu	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine,	31/08/12 and 10/01/13	1.5 hours	C23	

		impacts from mine				
Ex-employee of Mine	Paracatu, Brazil	Culture and identity of mining company.	07/09/12	2 hours	C11	
owner of local newspaper, environmental NGO and former anti- mining activist	Paracatu, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	31/08/12	30 minutes	C24	
well known in community to opposing mine and own neighbours in Maroon.	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	02/09/12	2 hours	C25	
Owner of Environmental NGO and also former critic of Kinross	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	10/09/12	1 hour	C26	
local cultural and artistic leader and	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current	03/09/12	2 hours	C27	

hotel owner		affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine				
Community leader fighting construction of other mine near his home and also former dam engineer at Kinross	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	09-15/01/13	Met, spoke and drove around everyday to meet other residents. 6 hours approximate	C28	
Parents of lady Kinross official took me to interview, affected by dam	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	12/01/13	1 hour	C29	
Neighbourhood leader, located nearest to tailings dam	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	11/01/13	1 hour	C30	

Elderly couple living very near mine, isolated and without water supply	Paracatu, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	13/01/13	1 hour	C31	
President of Municipal Chamber and Elected Councillor	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	11/01/13	30 minutes	C32	
Communications officer from municipal government			16-20/11/11, 15/03/12 and between 08-09/12	2 hours	C33	
Two local journalists	Paracatu, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	10/01/13	30 minutes	C34	
Former Kinross Manager	Email	Mining company influence strategies with community and government	03-04/14		C39	519

Summary - Los Caimanes, Chile: One visit 4 days in total. In-depth interviews with two local community leaders and short interviews with 42 local community residents, 1 expert on the conflict, 1 lawyer defending community and 1 company consultant						
Archeoastronomer, and defender of Los Caimanes	Los Caimanes, Chile	History of Community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Dam, impacts from mine	03/10/12	3 hours		
Lawyer defending Los Caimanes	Los Caimanes, Chile	Community, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Dam, impacts from mine	03/10/12	30 minutes		
Community Relations consultant for Pelambres mine	Los Caimanes, Chile	History of Community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Dam, impacts from mine	06/10/12 and 26/10/12	2 hours		
Community activist defending against Pelambres mine	Los Caimanes, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and	Between 07/10/12 – 13/10/12	6 hours approximate	D1	521

		perceptions of Dam, impacts from mine				
Community leader defending against Pelambres mine	Los Caimanes, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Dam, impacts from mine	Between 08/10/12 – 13/10/12	4 hours approximate		
Parents of Community leaders who are former Community Leaders against Pelambres mine	Los Caimanes, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Dam, impacts from mine	08/10/12	1 hour		
40 different local community residents including priest	Los Caimanes, Chile	Going from house to house to collect signatures for Protection Remedy to hand to courts. Perceptions of Dam, history of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture,	Between 08/10/12 – 13/10/12	Conversations between 10 – 120 minutes with each participant		

Summary – Huasco Valley, Chile: One visit 10 days in total. Further interviews over email since. Interview 12 local community residents (some repeatedly), several knowledgeable experts and did not get access to company officials to discuss this community conflict.						
Local environmental activist representing OLCA and candidate for councillor	Huasco Valley, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	20/10/12 and consequent email contact until 09/13	2 hours		
Elderly grape farmer who gave me accommodation	Huasco Valley, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	20-27/10/12	5 hours approximately		
Niece of elderly grape farmer lady and local indigenous leader	Huasco Valley, Chile	Travelled with her to local community meetings and spoke of history of personal and community conflict with mine,	21-27/10/12 and consequent frequent email contact until	12 hours approximately	E1	525

		identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	09/13			
Local Priest	Huasco Valley, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	23 and 26/10/12	2 hours	E3	549
local indigenous leader and candidate for councillor and former mine worker	Huasco Valley, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	23/10/12	2 hours	E2	545
Non-participant observation at community meeting lead leaders to convince community to sign and join their collective class action	Huasco Valley, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	23/10/12	3 hours	E2	

against Barrick Gold						
local community resident and artist	Huasco Valley, Chile	Identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	23/10/12	30 minutes	E2	
Three sons-in-Laws of eldery grape farmer	Huasco Valley, Chile	Identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	26/10/12	1.5 hours		
Local Shopkeeper	Huasco Valley, Chile	identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	24/10/12	15 minutes		
local community leader and activist against mine	Huasco Valley, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	26/10/12	1.5 hours		
82 year old resident of the valley	Huasco Valley, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and	26/10/12	1 hour		

		perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine				
Bishop of Copiapo, 150km from Huasco Valley	Copiapo, Chile	Met at cathedral to speak about refusal to accept US\$1m donation from Barrick, mining company community relations and conflicts.	29/10/12	20 minutes		
Summary: Mariana, Brazil – proposed open cast mine 4km from historic centre. One visit of 7 days. Interviewed 15 local community residents in person and by email. Also gave two guest lectures at universities and discussed my research with students. Spoke with one local government councillor and one Public Prosecutor Did not get access to Vale mining company.						
Local resident sat next to me on bus, whose husband works as a miner	Mariana, Brazil	Community relations, perceptions and conflict with mines	6/12/12	1 hour		
Local burger and beer stand owner and community leader	Mariana, Brazil	Community relations, perceptions and conflict with mines	6/12/12	30 minutes		
Opposing figure to	Mariana,	History of personal and	6/12/12 and	3 hours	F1	558

mine and girlfriend, young technical engineering teacher	Brazil	community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	consequent frequent email contact until 09/13			
Local elected councillor	Mariana, Brazil	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	6/12/12	2 hours	F5	574
NGO Director owns social NGO and also works for Kinross in Paracatu	Mariana, Brazil	Community relations, perceptions and conflict with mines	7/12/12	2 hours	F3	568
Sociology lecturer	Mariana, Brazil	Interview and several email exchanges - History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of	7/12/12	2 hours and four email exchanges	F2	565

		Mine, impacts from mine				
History Professor and wife Sociology Professor	Mariana, Brazil	Interview and also gave class for History students at University. History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	9/12/12 and 14/12/12 and consequent frequent email contact until 09/13	3 hours		
Mining worker's trade union leader	Mariana, Brazil	Email exchange of questions relating to History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	13/12/12	Two lengthy emails	F4	570
Three young sales assistants at chocolate store	Mariana, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	11/12/12	30 minutes		

Barber	Mariana, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	11/12/12	30 minutes		
Café store owner	Mariana, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	12/12/12	20 minutes		
15 University students from guest lecture at Univerdade Federal de Ouro Preto	Mariana, Brazil	History of relations with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	11/12/12	1 hour		
Public Prosecutor	Mariana, Brazil	History of relations with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	12/12/12	1 hour		
Bishop of Mariana	Mariana, Brazil	History of relations with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine,	12/12/12	30 minutes		

		impacts from mine				
Summary: Barro Alto, Brazil – One visit of 7 days. Interviewed three Anglo American executives, four NGO workers funded by by Anglo American, 13 local community residents and one local councillor						
Director of Communities, Anglo Nickel Head Office Sao Paulo	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	28/12/13	1 hour		
Head of CARE NGO funded by Anglo American	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	19/01/13	1 hour	G2	579
officer at Head of CARE NGO funded by Anglo American	Barro Alto, Brazil	Several site visits to social projects. History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions,	19-22/01/13	4 hours	G2	

		identity and positions. CSR initiatives.				
Secretary, Head of CARE NGO funded by Anglo American	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	19-22/01/13	1hour		
Head of Community relations, Anglo American	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	19 and 22/01/13	2 hours	G1	575
Three teenagers who attend music school funded by Anglo American	Barro Alto, Brazil	Perceptions of Anglo	20/01/13	1 hour		
Cleaner at CARE, Local Resident, Barro Alto	Barro Alto, Brazil	Community identity and culture and perceptions of Anglo	20/01/13	30 minutes		
local supermarket	Barro Alto,	History of mining company	19/01/13	45 minutes	G3	

owner	Brazil	– community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.				
elderly lady, husband and daughter critical of Anglo American	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	21/01/13	1 hour	G4	580
Two boys on rural farm beneficiaries of Anglo's social investment	Barro Alto, Brazil	Perceptions of Anglo	20/01/13	30 minutes		
Local councillor	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	20/01/13	30 minutes		
Couple who are local activists and leaders for civil rights and	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community	21/01/13	1 hour		

anti-corruption		perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.				
Head of Agenda Publica NGO for strengthening local government capacity and transparency, financed by Anglo American	20/01/13	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. Local government corruption and capacity	21/01/13	1 hour		
Manager Community relations, Anglo American	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	20/01/13	1 hour	G5	581
Taxi Driver to airport	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	23/01/13	3 hours	G6	581

Summary: Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil – one visit of 3 days. Interviewed 7 local community members, two State prosecutors, two Anglo American executives and one former executive						
local resident and Maroon community leader affected by mine	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	26/01/13	1 hour	H2	594
Pamela, local community resident	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	26/01/13	1.5 hours	H3	599
Fernanda, local community resident	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	26/01/13 and consequent frequent email contact until 09/13	1.5 hours and weekly skype exchanges until 10/13	H1	582
Coordinator at Public Prosecutor's office on Social Movements	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	25/01/13	1 hour	H4	600

Local community leader	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	26/01/13	30 minutes		
Machado, Public Prosecutor	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	26/01/13	1 hour	H5	602
Community relations head at Barro Ato	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	15/01/13	15 minutes		
Head of Social Performance, Anglo American, London HQ	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. Social investment	12/02/13	1.5 hours	H6	603
Former, Head of Social Performance, Anglo American,	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and	20/02/13	30 minutes		

London		positions.				
Below are over 30 interviews I conducted with knowledgeable experts on my case studies who live outside the affected communities, also other community members, academics, company executives and practitioners not related to any of my case studies who work with company - community relations and conflicts in the extractives sector. These interviews helped shape my knowledge and understanding of my research phenomenon.						
London Business School, focuses on critical CSR	My presentation of Colla case study at Egos	The need to critically analyse and focus on community perspective and less on corporate as it is a given.	09/07/11	20 minutes		
Community Leader of community near several mines in far northern Chile	His own community in Sierra Gorda, several	Met at social responsibility for mining conference in Santiago and also spoke over phone one year later. Community organization, relations with mining companies and identity	20-22/10/11 and 10/11/12	2 hours		
Facebook "Mining	Participated in	Asked questions around the	July 2012	Six		

company – community relations in Conga, Peru” page	social forum over two week.	drivers for protest and conflict in Conga and about community identity and its importance		questions and answers		
Social movement activist for indigenous people’s and filmmaker	Huasco Valley	Phone and in person interviews. Filmed documentary and stayed at Clementina’s farm. Spoke about drivers of community perceptions and positions of Barrick Gold	20/07/12 (phone), emails and 17/10/12	2 hours and three emails		
Community Activist in Lancashire against Fracking	Her community’s action against extractive sector project in UK context	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	30/06/12 and 10/07/12	2 hours		
Activists of NGO “Frack Off” as well as several local community members	Fracking in Lancashire	At community meeting about local fracking proposals. Community motives for protest or for	30/06/12	30 minutes		

in Lancashire		indifference				
Couple defending community against nearby coal mine in Merthyr Tydfill – UK context of such conflicts	Open cast coal mine in Merthyr Tydfill	5 days spent talking with couple and their friends on Motives for activism, identity, community identity, organization, relations and perceptions of mine.	8/7/12-12/7/12	8 hours		
Four Local councillors in Merthyr Tydfill about nearby coal mine	Open cast coal mine in Merthyr Tydfill	Motives for activism, identity, community identity, organization, relations and perceptions of mine	10/07/12	1.5 hours		
Academic - Cardiff School of Planning and Geography, focuses on local community movements against mining and climate change in Wales	Community movements in general	Motives for activism, identity, community identity, organization.	Several email exchanges between July – October, 2012	3 lengthy emails received		

Master's class of Environmental law at Unisantos university, Brazil	Brazilian communities in general affected by mining	Identities, culture, relations with companies, history and environmental impacts	22/08/12	1.5 hours		
Head of community relations, Petrobras Sao José dos Campos refinery, Brazil	Local community relations	Engaging with local community over contentious issues and over social investment	15/09/12	1.5 hours		
Head of Social Development, Anglo American, Santiago, Chile	Local community relations at Chilean mines	Engaging with local community over contentious issues and over social investment	09/10/12	1 hour		
Professor - Social Movements academic	Social movements in CSR context	Email exchanges Motives for protest and for non-protest in mining communities	25/10/12	1 detailed email reply		
Professor - Sociologist in sustainability at Universidad Católica,	Social movements and community	Why communities react the way they do towards mining in Chile	31/10/12	1 hour		

Chile	participation					
Head of Sustainability, National Mining Company, Chile	Mining company – community relations in Chile, in particular about Colla	Motives and reasons for mining company community relations in Chile and how to improve these	08/11/12	1 hour		
Director of Community relations, Collahuasi Mine (part owned by Anglo American), Santiago, Chile	Company - community relations	Drivers behind company - community relations and conflicts	12/11/12	30 minutes		
mining company community relations consultant, Santiago, Chile	Mining company community relations in Chile	Drivers behind company - community relations and conflicts	13/11/12	40 minutes		
Professor - Renowned Chilean anthropologist	Mining company	History, Identity and Drivers behind company -	14/11/12	1 hour		

for Northern Indigenous communities.	community relations in Chile	community relations and conflicts				
Social and Community Auditor Barrick Gold Peru and Chile	Company - community relations and CSR	Drivers behind company - community relations and conflicts and Identity.	27/11/12	30 minutes		
Environmental activist on mining communities especially in Huasco Valley	Capitalism and mining industry	Capitalism, mining companies, Chilean government, reason why mining is permitted so easily in Chile - philosophical	28/11/12 and consequent email contact until 09/13	1.5 hours		
researcher and activist – anti mining in Northern Chile, defender of Indigenous peoples	Capitalism and mining industry	ILO169, Indigenous identity, mining community - conflicts in Chile, drivers of community positions	29/11/12	1 hour		
Head of Indigenous Affairs, Chilean	Government-mining company –	Drivers behind local indigenous community relations with mining	14/11/12 and 0212/12	1.5 hours		

government	indigenous community relations	company in northern Chile.				
Human geographer Academic, Director Sustainability Centre, Universidad Católica Chile	Mining company community relations/positions	How to present my data of different perceptions and positions	03/12/12	1 hour		
Sustainability Manager, Alcoa, Brazil	Company - community relations in company operations in Amazon and South East Brazil	Drivers behind company - community relations and community positions	18/12/12	1 hour		
Leading sociologist on Social movements, Collective action in extractives sector communities in USA	Social movements, Collective action in extractives	Different levels of factors which drive communities to mobilize or not mobilize against nearby extractives projects	01/12/12	1 email reply		

	sector					
co-author of book analysing factors of community mobilization of LNG plants in USA	Social movements, Collective action in extractives sector in her book	Different levels of factors which drive communities to mobilize or not mobilize against nearby extractives projects	18/12/12	1 email reply		
Business Development Director at Zamin Resources Mining company, bought over Pedra Branca mine from Anglo American December 2012.	Mining company – community/government relations in South America	Drivers behind company - community relations and community positions	07/01/13	1.5 hours		
Professor - Political Sciences, University of Brasilia, Social movement researcher	Social movement in Brazil, literature, Paracatu community	Factors leading to collective action in Brazil with case of Paracatu that she knows	17/01/13	1 hour		

Mining in Peru focused Academics, practitioners, NGO representatives, Anglo American governmental relations at conference on Extractives in Peru at UCL	Mining company community relations in Peru	Impacts of mining and Peru and drivers of company - community relations	04/03/13	6 hours		
Retired Head of Mining Operation, Rio Tinto	Mining company operations and community relations in South American	Mining company strategies for community relations	Monthly meetings since 05/05/13	10 hours		
Head of international NGO on communities affected by mining	Mining company – community conflict in South America	Mining company – community conflict in South America	30/08/13	1 hour		

Interviewee	Case Study	Context of Interview	Dates of meetings or communication	Duration of interview(s) or conversations	Interviewee Code (if quoted in thesis)	Referenced Interviewee transcript/ page number
Summary - Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil: 7 days and one visit with two telephone interviews one year after. Interviewed 12 Anglo American executives, Conducted Focus Group and Drawing activity with 20 new local recruits, 10 local community residents and six local government officials.						
Community relations coordinator, Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	6-11/01/12	3 hours total	A2	
Health & Safety manager and Dam Specialist, Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	7/1/12	1 hour		
Two basic operators, mining operators, Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	7/1/12	30 minutes		
Explorations manager,	Pedra Branca,	Relations with local	7/1/12	30 minutes		

Anglo American	Amapa, Brazil	community, company and community identity, local history				
20 new entrant employees from local community at Anglo American Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Company and Community Identity	8/1/12	1.5 hours		
Head of HR and sustainability, Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	8/1/12	1 hour		
Two experienced miners, mining operators, Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	8/1/12	45 minutes		
Head of Institutional Relations, Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	In person and Skype calls with Jarilon Relations with local community, company and community identity,	8/1/12	3 hours and two Skype conversations		

		local history				
Trade union leader	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	9/1/12	15 minutes	A4	
President of the municipal chamber, Pedra Branca	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	9/1/12	30 minutes	A3	
Long term resident in Pedra Branca also an ex independent gold miner currently suing Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations and Conflict with local community, company and community identity, local history	9/1/12	45 minutes	A1	
Together with JVisits to four residents in Pedra Branca area from Anglo American we drove around 30km to deliver hundreds of	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	9/1/12	4 hours		

Açaí seedlings						
Head of Social Assistance at local government	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	10/1/12	15 minutes		
Representatives of Environmental agency	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	10/1/12	30 minutes	A4	
Former Federal politician now Head of Municipal Education	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	10/1/12	30 minutes		
Four Local residents in town including a pharmacy owner	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	10/1/12	1 hour	A4	
Head of CSR	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local	11/1/12	2 hours		

		history				
Summary: Los Colla and Kinross Maricunga, Chile – 22 days of five visit over 3.5 years. Interviewed Four company executives repeatedly over this period. Interviewed three Colla community leaders repeatedly over this time period.						
Vice President Corporate Affairs, Kinross Gold	Colla Community, Chile	Corporate identity, culture, CSR policy, Community Relations - Drivers and Perceptions	Throughout 2009 and 2010 and 21/10/11	2 hours and several email exchanges		
Community Relations officer, Kinross Gold	Colla Community, Chile	Corporate Identity, community relations, CSR - Drivers and Perceptions	Throughout 2009 and 2010 24/10/11	8 hours of shadowing and conversations		
Focus group with 11 executives from Kinross Gold	Colla Community, Chile	Focus group on Corporate Identity with individual and collective drawings and discussion	24/10/11	3 hours		
Community relations officer, replacing	Colla Community,	Community history, identity, culture, relations	19/10/12	2 hours		

Carolina	Chile	with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine				
(Colla Community Leaders) and two women leaders	Colla Community, Chile	Relations with neighbouring mines, reasons behind these relations, their Identity and Culture	Throughout 2009 and 2010, 25/10/11 and 20/10/12	5 hours	B1	
Summary – Paracatu - Kinross, Brazil – 25 days of three visits over 15 months with constant email and telephone interviews since first visit. Interviewed 68 local community residents, 12 Kinross executives and four local government representatives.						
Locally Elected Councillor	Paracatu, Brazil	Spoke on a daily basis over 15 days, made field visits together, exchanged email communication. Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine.	16/11/11, 15/03/12, 08-09/12, 01/13 - 04/13	18 hours approximately	C2	

Long term resident	Paracatu, Brazil	In Paracatu, London and over email. Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine.	16/11/11, 11/08/12 and 01/13 – 04/13	4 hours	C1	
Barber	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine.	18/11/11	30 minutes	C12	
Four Field visits to Sao Domingos Quilombo (Maroon) next to mine. Spoke to eight residents	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine.	16/11/11, and three times between 08-09/12	5 hours	C3	
Head of Afro-Brazilian NGO and former candidate for local councillor	Paracatu, Brazil	Maroon Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	18/11/11 and four times between 08-09/12	5 hours	C4	

Head of Sao Domingos	Paracatu, Brazil	Maroon Community history, identity, culture, internal conflicts, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	16/11/11, 29-31/08/12 and 10/01/13	3 hours	C36	
Medical Doctor and former elected local councillor	Paracatu, Brazil	Two visits to neighbouring communities to the mine and one interview in office. Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	19/11/11, 21/11/11 and 05/09/12	5 hours	C5	
local cultural leader, social entrepreneurship initiative	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	16-20/11/11, 15/03/12 and between 08-09/12	5 hours	C6	
Socialist party and neighbourhood leader	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and	17/11/11	1 hour	C7	

and activist		perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine				
Now Former Director of Community Relations and Communications, Kinross Gold	Paracatu, Brazil	Community relations, engagement, investment, identity and culture.	19/11/11, 06/09/12 and 16/01/13	6 hours	C8	
10 Kinross Gold Cross Section Management Executives	Paracatu, Brazil	Community relations, perceptions, and identity and culture	06/09/12	1.5 hours	C13	
Community Relations Officer	Paracatu, Brazil	Visited social projects financed by Kinross and spoke to the project managers and beneficiaries	06/09/12 and 16/01/13	2 hours	C14	
Community Relations Officer	Paracatu, Brazil	Visited two community leaders to speak about community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine,	06/09/12	4 hours	C15	

		impacts from mine				
Local café owner	Paracatu, Brazil	History of mining company - community relations	19/11/11 and 04/09/12	45 minutes	C35	
Local entrepreneur leader	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	19/11/11	1,5 hours	C9	
Visits together with Councillor to four families living besides the mine	Paracatu, Brazil	Impacts from mining on community and relations and perception of the mine	19/11/11	4 hours	C10	
community leader lost land years ago due to tailings dam.	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	20/11/11 and 31/08/12	2 hours	C11	
President of Trade Union at Kinross Gold	Paracatu, Brazil	Worker relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	21/11/11 and 10/09/12	2 hours	C12	

Caritas Social Justice NGO	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	21/11/11 and email 10/02/13	2 hours	C37	
Focus group session with 12 students aged 11 – 17	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	22/11/11	1,5 hours	C38	
Radio journalist, and wife well known local radio and TV journalist	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	22/11/11, 04/09/12 and 06/09/12 radio interview	5 hours	C15	
head of hospital management	Paracatu, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	23/11/11	30 minutes	C16	
Lawyer	Paracatu, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine,	23/11/11	15 minutes	C17	

		impacts from mine				
Long term resident and Secretary of Caritas Social Justice NGO	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	29/08/12	1 hour	C18	
Lady who works in Culture and Education and civil society campaigner, also mother of Community relations official from Kinross	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	29/08/12	40 minutes	C19	
State Deputy politician and was socialist mayor candidate	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	30/08/12	1.5 hours	C20	
elderly hotel owner and landowner	Paracatu, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine,	31/08/12	1 hour	C21	

affected by mine		impacts from mine				
Sociology Lecturer and his students at Finom University in Paracatu who did his Master's thesis on Sao Domingos Maroon and its Identity	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	07/09/12	3 hours	C22	
(Priest) of Paracatu	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	31/08/12 and 10/01/13	1.5 hours	C23	
Ex-employee of Mine	Paracatu, Brazil	Culture and identity of mining company.	07/09/12	2 hours	C11	
owner of local newspaper, environmental NGO and former anti-mining activist	Paracatu, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	31/08/12	30 minutes	C24	

well known in community to opposing mine and own neighbours in Maroon.	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	02/09/12	2 hours	C25	
Owner of Environmental NGO and also former critic of Kinross	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	10/09/12	1 hour	C26	
local cultural and artistic leader and hotel owner	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	03/09/12	2 hours	C27	
Community leader fighting construction of other mine near his home and also former dam engineer at Kinross	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	09-15/01/13	Met, spoke and drove around everyday to meet other residents.	C28	

				6 hours approximate		
Parents of lady Kinross official took me to interview, affected by dam	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	12/01/13	1 hour	C29	
Neighbourhood leader, located nearest to tailings dam	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	11/01/13	1 hour	C30	
Elderly couple living very near mine, isolated and without water supply	Paracatu, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	13/01/13	1 hour	C31	
President of Municipal Chamber and Elected Councillor	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine,	11/01/13	30 minutes	C32	

		impacts from mine				
Communications officer from municipal government			16-20/11/11, 15/03/12 and between 08-09/12	2 hours	C33	
Two local journalists	Paracatu, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	10/01/13	30 minutes	C34	
Former Kinross Manager	Email	Mining company influence strategies with community and government	03-04/14		C39	
Summary - Los Caimanes, Chile: One visit 4 days in total. In-depth interviews with two local community leaders and short interviews with 42 local community residents, 1 expert on the conflict, 1 lawyer defending community and 1 company consultant						
Archeoastronomer, and defender of Los Caimanes	Los Caimanes, Chile	History of Community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Dam, impacts from mine	03/10/12	3 hours		

Lawyer defending Los Caimanes	Los Caimanes, Chile	Community, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Dam, impacts from mine	03/10/12	30 minutes		
Community Relations consultant for Pelambres mine	Los Caimanes, Chile	History of Community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Dam, impacts from mine	06/10/12 and 26/10/12	2 hours		
Community activist defending against Pelambres mine	Los Caimanes, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Dam, impacts from mine	Between 07/10/12 – 13/10/12	6 hours approximate	D1	
Community leader defending against Pelambres mine	Los Caimanes, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Dam, impacts from mine	Between 08/10/12 – 13/10/12	4 hours approximate		

Parents of Community leaders who are former Community Leaders against Pelambres mine	Los Caimanes, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Dam, impacts from mine	08/10/12	1 hour		
40 different local community residents including priest	Los Caimanes, Chile	Going from house to house to collect signatures for Protection Remedy to hand to courts. Perceptions of Dam, history of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture,	Between 08/10/12 – 13/10/12	Conversations between 10 – 120 minutes with each participant		
Summary – Huasco Valley, Chile: One visit 10 days in total. Further interviews over email since. Interview 12 local community residents (some repeatedly), several knowledgeable experts and did not get access to company officials to discuss this community conflict.						
Local environmental activist representing OLCA and candidate	Huasco Valley, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and	20/10/12 and consequent email contact until	2 hours		

for councillor		perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	09/13			
Elderly grape farmer who gave me accommodation	Huasco Valley, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	20-27/10/12	5 hours approximately		
Niece of elderly grape farmer lady and local indigenous leader	Huasco Valley, Chile	Travelled with her to local community meetings and spoke of history of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	21-27/10/12 and consequent frequent email contact until 09/13	12 hours approximately	E1	
Local Priest	Huasco Valley, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine,	23 and 26/10/12	2 hours	E3	

		impacts from mine				
local indigenous leader and candidate for councillor and former mine worker	Huasco Valley, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	23/10/12	2 hours	E2	
Non-participant observation at community meeting lead leaders to convince community to sign and join their collective class action against Barrick Gold	Huasco Valley, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	23/10/12	3 hours	E2	
local community resident and artist	Huasco Valley, Chile	Identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	23/10/12	30 minutes	E2	
Three sons-in-Laws of elderly grape farmer	Huasco Valley, Chile	Identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of	26/10/12	1.5 hours		

		Mine, impacts from mine				
Local Shopkeeper	Huasco Valley, Chile	identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	24/10/12	15 minutes		
local community leader and activist against mine	Huasco Valley, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	26/10/12	1.5 hours		
82 year old resident of the valley	Huasco Valley, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	26/10/12	1 hour		
Bishop of Copiapo, 150km from Huasco Valley	Copiapo, Chile	Met at cathedral to speak about refusal to accept US\$1m donation from Barrick, mining company community relations and	29/10/12	20 minutes		

		conflicts.				
Summary: Mariana, Brazil – proposed open cast mine 4km from historic centre. One visit of 7 days. Interviewed 15 local community residents in person and by email. Also gave two guest lectures at universities and discussed my research with students. Spoke with one local government councillor and one Public Prosecutor Did not get access to Vale mining company.						
Local resident sat next to me on bus, whose husband works as a miner	Mariana, Brazil	Community relations, perceptions and conflict with mines	6/12/12	1 hour		
Local burger and beer stand owner and community leader	Mariana, Brazil	Community relations, perceptions and conflict with mines	6/12/12	30 minutes		
Opposing figure to mine and girlfriend, young technical engineering teacher	Mariana, Brazil	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	6/12/12 and consequent frequent email contact until 09/13	3 hours	F1	
Local elected councillor	Mariana, Brazil	History of personal and community conflict with	6/12/12	2 hours	F5	

		mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine				
NGO Director owns social NGO and also works for Kinross in Paracatu	Mariana, Brazil	Community relations, perceptions and conflict with mines	7/12/12	2 hours	F3	
Sociology lecturer	Mariana, Brazil	Interview and several email exchanges - History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	7/12/12	2 hours and four email exchanges	F2	
History Professor and wife Sociology Professor	Mariana, Brazil	Interview and also gave class for History students at University. History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of	9/12/12 and 14/12/12 and consequent frequent email contact until 09/13	3 hours		

		Mine, impacts from mine				
Mining worker's trade union leader	Mariana, Brazil	Email exchange of questions relating to History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	13/12/12	Two lengthy emails	F4	
Three young sales assistants at chocolate store	Mariana, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	11/12/12	30 minutes		
Barber	Mariana, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	11/12/12	30 minutes		
Café store owner	Mariana, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	12/12/12	20 minutes		
15 University students from guest lecture at	Mariana, Brazil	History of relations with mine, identity, culture,	11/12/12	1 hour		

Univerdade Federal de Ouro Preto		relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine				
Public Prosecutor	Mariana, Brazil	History of relations with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	12/12/12	1 hour		
Bishop of Mariana	Mariana, Brazil	History of relations with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	12/12/12	30 minutes		
Summary: Barro Alto, Brazil – One visit of 7 days. Interviewed three Anglo American executives, four NGO workers funded by by Anglo American, 13 local community residents and one local councillor						
Director of Communities, Anglo Nickel Head Office	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community	28/12/13	1 hour		

Sao Paulo		perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.				
Head of CARE NGO funded by Anglo American	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	19/01/13	1 hour	G2	
officer at Head of CARE NGO funded by Anglo American	Barro Alto, Brazil	Several site visits to social projects. History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	19-22/01/13	4 hours	G2	
Secretary, Head of CARE NGO funded by Anglo American	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	19-22/01/13	1hour		
Head of Community relations, Anglo	Barro Alto,	History of mining company – community relations,	19 and 22/01/13	2 hours	G1	

American	Brazil	conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.				
Three teenagers who attend music school funded by Anglo American	Barro Alto, Brazil	Perceptions of Anglo	20/01/13	1 hour		
Cleaner at CARE, Local Resident, Barro Alto	Barro Alto, Brazil	Community identity and culture and perceptions of Anglo	20/01/13	30 minutes		
local supermarket owner	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	19/01/13	45 minutes	G3	
elderly lady, husband and daughter critical of Anglo American	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	21/01/13	1 hour	G4	

Two boys on rural farm beneficiaries of Anglo's social investment	Barro Alto, Brazil	Perceptions of Anglo	20/01/13	30 minutes		
Local councillor	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	20/01/13	30 minutes		
Couple who are local activists and leaders for civil rights and anti-corruption	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	21/01/13	1 hour		
Head of Agenda Publica NGO for strengthening local government capacity and transparency, financed by Anglo American	20/01/13	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. Local government corruption and capacity	21/01/13	1 hour		

Manager Community relations, Anglo American	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	20/01/13	1 hour	G5	
Taxi Driver to airport	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	23/01/13	3 hours	G6	
Summary: Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil – one visit of 3 days. Interviewed 7 local community members, two State prosecutors, two Anglo American executives and one former executive						
local resident and Maroon community leader affected by mine	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	26/01/13	1 hour	H2	
Pamela, local community resident	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and	26/01/13	1.5 hours	H3	

		positions.				
Fernanda, local community resident	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	26/01/13 and consequent frequent email contact until 09/13	1.5 hours and weekly skype exchanges until 10/13	H1	
Coordinator at Public Prosecutor's office on Social Movements	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	25/01/13	1 hour	H4	
Local community leader	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	26/01/13	30 minutes		
Machado, Public Prosecutor	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	26/01/13	1 hour	H5	

Community relations head at Barro Ato	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	15/01/13	15 minutes		
Head of Social Performance, Anglo American, London HQ	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. Social investment	12/02/13	1.5 hours	H6	
Former, Head of Social Performance, Anglo American, London	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	20/02/13	30 minutes		
Below are over 30 interviews I conducted with knowledgeable experts on my case studies who live outside the affected communities, also other community members, academics, company executives and practitioners not related to any of my case studies who work with company - community relations and conflicts in the extractives sector. These interviews helped shape my knowledge and understanding of my research phenomenon.						
London Business	My	The need to critically	09/07/11	20 minutes		

School, focuses on critical CSR	presentation of Colla case study at Egos	analyse and focus on community perspective and less on corporate as it is a given.				
Community Leader of community near several mines in far northern Chile	His own community in Sierra Gorda, several	Met at social responsibility for mining conference in Santiago and also spoke over phone one year later. Community organization, relations with mining companies and identity	20-22/10/11 and 10/11/12	2 hours		
Facebook “Mining company – community relations in Conga, Peru” page	Participated in social forum over two week.	Asked questions around the drivers for protest and conflict in Conga and about community identity and its importance	July 2012	Six questions and answers		
Social movement activist for indigenous people’s and filmmaker	Huasco Valley	Phone and in person interviews. Filmed documentary and stayed at Clementina’s farm. Spoke about drivers of community perceptions and	20/07/12 (phone), emails and 17/10/12	2 hours and three emails		

		positions of Barrick Gold				
Community Activist in Lancashire against Fracking	Her community's action against extractive sector project in UK context	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	30/06/12 and 10/07/12	2 hours		
Activists of NGO "Frack Off" as well as several local community members in Lancashire	Fracking in Lancashire	At community meeting about local fracking proposals. Community motives for protest or for indifference	30/06/12	30 minutes		
Couple defending community against nearby coal mine in Merthyr Tydfill – UK context of such conflicts	Open cast coal mine in Merthyr Tydfill	5 days spent talking with couple and their friends on Motives for activism, identity, community identity, organization, relations and perceptions of mine.	8/7/12-12/7/12	8 hours		
Four Local councillors in Merthyr Tydfill	Open cast coal mine in	Motives for activism, identity, community	10/07/12	1.5 hours		

about nearby coal mine	Merthyr Tydfill	identity, organization, relations and perceptions of mine				
Academic - Cardiff School of Planning and Geography, focuses on local community movements against mining and climate change in Wales	Community movements in general	Motives for activism, identity, community identity, organization.	Several email exchanges between July – October, 2012	3 lengthy emails received		
Master's class of Environmental law at Unisantos university, Brazil	Brazilian communities in general affected by mining	Identities, culture, relations with companies, history and environmental impacts	22/08/12	1.5 hours		
Head of community relations, Petrobras Sao José dos Campos refinery, Brazil	Local community relations	Engaging with local community over contentious issues and over social investment	15/09/12	1.5 hours		

Head of Social Development, Anglo American, Santiago, Chile	Local community relations at Chilean mines	Engaging with local community over contentious issues and over social investment	09/10/12	1 hour		
Professor - Social Movements academic	Social movements in CSR context	Email exchanges Motives for protest and for non-protest in mining communities	25/10/12	1 detailed email reply		
Professor - Sociologist in sustainability at Universidad Católica, Chile	Social movements and community participation	Why communities react the way they do towards mining in Chile	31/10/12	1 hour		
Head of Sustainability, National Mining Company, Chile	Mining company – community relations in Chile, in particular about Colla	Motives and reasons for mining company community relations in Chile and how to improve these	08/11/12	1 hour		

Director of Community relations, Collahuasi Mine (part owned by Anglo American), Santiago, Chile	Company - community relations	Drivers behind company - community relations and conflicts	12/11/12	30 minutes		
mining company community relations consultant, Santiago, Chile	Mining company community relations in Chile	Drivers behind company - community relations and conflicts	13/11/12	40 minutes		
Professor - Renowned Chilean anthropologist for Northern Indigenous communities.	Mining company community relations in Chile	History, Identity and Drivers behind company - community relations and conflicts	14/11/12	1 hour		
Social and Community Auditor Barrick Gold Peru and Chile	Company - community relations and CSR	Drivers behind company - community relations and conflicts and Identity.	27/11/12	30 minutes		

Environmental activist on mining communities especially in Huasco Valley	Capitalism and mining industry	Capitalism, mining companies, Chilean government, reason why mining is permitted so easily in Chile - philosophical	28/11/12 and consequent email contact until 09/13	1.5 hours		
researcher and activist – anti mining in Northern Chile, defender of Indigenous peoples	Capitalism and mining industry	ILO169, Indigenous identity, mining community - conflicts in Chile, drivers of community positions	29/11/12	1 hour		
Head of Indigenous Affairs, Chilean government	Government-mining company – indigenous community relations	Drivers behind local indigenous community relations with mining company in northern Chile.	14/11/12 and 02/12/12	1.5 hours		
Human geographer Academic, Director Sustainability Centre, Universidad Católica	Mining company community relations/posit	How to present my data of different perceptions and positions	03/12/12	1 hour		

Chile	ions					
Sustainability Manager, Alcoa, Brazil	Company - community relations in company operations in Amazon and South East Brazil	Drivers behind company - community relations and community positions	18/12/12	1 hour		
Leading sociologist on Social movements, Collective action in extractives sector communities in USA	Social movements, Collective action in extractives sector	Different levels of factors which drive communities to mobilize or not mobilize against nearby extractives projects	01/12/12	1 email reply		
co-author of book analysing factors of community mobilization of LNG plants in USA	Social movements, Collective action in extractives sector in her	Different levels of factors which drive communities to mobilize or not mobilize against nearby extractives projects	18/12/12	1 email reply		

	book					
Business Development Director at Zamin Resources Mining company, bought over Pedra Branca mine from Anglo American December 2012.	Mining company – community/government relations in South America	Drivers behind company - community relations and community positions	07/01/13	1.5 hours		
Professor - Political Sciences, University of Brasilia, Social movement researcher	Social movement in Brazil, literature, Paracatu community	Factors leading to collective action in Brazil with case of Paracatu that she knows	17/01/13	1 hour		
Mining in Peru focused Academics, practitioners, NGO representatives, Anglo American governmental relations at conference on Extractives in Peru at	Mining company community relations in Peru	Impacts of mining and Peru and drivers of company - community relations	04/03/13	6 hours		

UCL						
Retired Head of Mining Operation, Rio Tinto	Mining company operations and community relations in South American	Mining company strategies for community relations	Monthly meetings since 05/05/13	10 hours		
Head of international NGO on communities affected by mining	Mining company – community conflict in South America	Mining company – community conflict in South America	30/08/13	1 hour		
Interviewee	Case Study	Context of Interview	Dates of meetings or communication	Duration of interview(s) or conversations	Interviewee Code (if quoted in thesis)	Referenced Interviewee transcript/ page number
Summary - Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil: 7 days and one visit with two telephone interviews one year after. Interviewed 12 Anglo American executives, Conducted Focus Group and Drawing activity with 20 new local recruits, 10 local community residents and						

six local government officials.						
Community relations coordinator, Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	6-11/01/12	3 hours total	A2	
Health & Safety manager and Dam Specialist, Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	7/1/12	1 hour		
Two basic operators, mining operators, Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	7/1/12	30 minutes		
Explorations manager, Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	7/1/12	30 minutes		
20 new entrant employees from local community at Anglo	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Company and Community Identity	8/1/12	1.5 hours		

American Anglo American						
Head of HR and sustainability, Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	8/1/12	1 hour		
Two experienced miners, mining operators, Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	8/1/12	45 minutes		
Head of Institutional Relations, Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	In person and Skype calls with Jarilon Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	8/1/12	3 hours and two Skype conversations		
Trade union leader	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	9/1/12	15 minutes	A4	
President of the	Pedra Branca,	Relations with local	9/1/12	30 minutes	A3	

municipal chamber, Pedra Branca	Amapa, Brazil	community, company and community identity, local history				
Long term resident in Pedra Branca also an ex independent gold miner currently suing Anglo American	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations and Conflict with local community, company and community identity, local history	9/1/12	45 minutes	A1	
Together with JVisits to four residents in Pedra Branca area from Anglo American we drove around 30km to deliver hundreds of Açaí seedlings	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	9/1/12	4 hours		
Head of Social Assistance at local government	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	10/1/12	15 minutes		
Representatives of	Pedra Branca,	Relations with local community, company and	10/1/12	30 minutes	A4	

Environmental agency	Amapa, Brazil	community identity, local history				
Former Federal politician now Head of Municipal Education	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	10/1/12	30 minutes		
Four Local residents in town including a pharmacy owner	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	10/1/12	1 hour	A4	
Head of CSR	Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil	Relations with local community, company and community identity, local history	11/1/12	2 hours		
Summary: Los Colla and Kinross Maricunga, Chile – 22 days of five visit over 3.5 years. Interviewed Four company executives repeatedly over this period. Interviewed three Colla community leaders repeatedly over this time period.						
Vice President Corporate Affairs,	Colla Community,	Corporate identity, culture, CSR policy, Community	Throughout 2009 and 2010 and	2 hours and several		

Kinross Gold	Chile	Relations - Drivers and Perceptions	21/10/11	email exchanges		
Community Relations officer, Kinross Gold	Colla Community, Chile	Corporate Identity, community relations, CSR - Drivers and Perceptions	Throughout 2009 and 2010 24/10/11	8 hours of shadowing and conversations		
Focus group with 11 executives from Kinross Gold	Colla Community, Chile	Focus group on Corporate Identity with individual and collective drawings and discussion	24/10/11	3 hours		
Community relations officer, replacing Carolina	Colla Community, Chile	Community history, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	19/10/12	2 hours		
(Colla Community Leaders) and two women leaders	Colla Community, Chile	Relations with neighbouring mines, reasons behind these relations, their Identity and Culture	Throughout 2009 and 2010, 25/10/11 and 20/10/12	5 hours	B1	

Summary – Paracatu - Kinross, Brazil – 25 days of three visits over 15 months with constant email and telephone interviews since first visit. Interviewed 68 local community residents, 12 Kinross executives and four local government representatives.						
Locally Elected Councillor	Paracatu, Brazil	Spoke on a daily basis over 15 days, made field visits together, exchanged email communication. Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine.	16/11/11, 15/03/12, 08-09/12, 01/13 - 04/13	18 hours approximately	C2	
Long term resident	Paracatu, Brazil	In Paracatu, London and over email. Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine.	16/11/11, 11/08/12 and 01/13 – 04/13	4 hours	C1	
Barber	Paracatu,	Community history, identity, culture, current	18/11/11	30 minutes	C12	

	Brazil	affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine.				
Four Field visits to Sao Domingos Quilombo (Maroon) next to mine. Spoke to eight residents	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine.	16/11/11, and three times between 08-09/12	5 hours	C3	
Head of Afro-Brazilian NGO and former candidate for local councillor	Paracatu, Brazil	Maroon Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	18/11/11 and four times between 08-09/12	5 hours	C4	
Head of Sao Domingos	Paracatu, Brazil	Maroon Community history, identity, culture, internal conflicts, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	16/11/11, 29-31/08/12 and 10/01/13	3 hours	C36	
Medical Doctor and former elected local	Paracatu,	Two visits to neighbouring communities to the mine	19/11/11, 21/11/11 and	5 hours	C5	

councillor	Brazil	and one interview in office. Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	05/09/12			
local cultural leader, social entrepreneurship initiative	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	16-20/11/11, 15/03/12 and between 08-09/12	5 hours	C6	
Socialist party and neighbourhood leader and activist	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	17/11/11	1 hour	C7	
Now Former Director of Community Relations and Communications, Kinross Gold	Paracatu, Brazil	Community relations, engagement, investment, identity and culture.	19/11/11, 06/09/12 and 16/01/13	6 hours	C8	

10 Kinross Gold Cross Section Management Executives	Paracatu, Brazil	Community relations, perceptions, and identity and culture	06/09/12	1.5 hours	C13	
Community Relations Officer	Paracatu, Brazil	Visited social projects financed by Kinross and spoke to the project managers and beneficiaries	06/09/12 and 16/01/13	2 hours	C14	
Community Relations Officer	Paracatu, Brazil	Visited two community leaders to speak about community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	06/09/12	4 hours	C15	
Local café owner	Paracatu, Brazil	History of mining company - community relations	19/11/11 and 04/09/12	45 minutes	C35	
Local entrepreneur leader	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine,	19/11/11	1,5 hours	C9	

		impacts from mine				
Visits together with Councillor to four families living besides the mine	Paracatu, Brazil	Impacts from mining on community and relations and perception of the mine	19/11/11	4 hours	C10	
community leader lost land years ago due to tailings dam.	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	20/11/11 and 31/08/12	2 hours	C11	
President of Trade Union at Kinross Gold	Paracatu, Brazil	Worker relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	21/11/11 and 10/09/12	2 hours	C12	
Caritas Social Justice NGO	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	21/11/11 and email 10/02/13	2 hours	C37	
Focus group session with 12 students aged	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current	22/11/11	1,5 hours	C38	

11 – 17		affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine				
Radio journalist, and wife well known local radio and TV journalist	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	22/11/11, 04/09/12 and 06/09/12 radio interview	5 hours	C15	
head of hospital management	Paracatu, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	23/11/11	30 minutes	C16	
Lawyer	Paracatu, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	23/11/11	15 minutes	C17	
Long term resident and Secretary of Caritas Social Justice NGO	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	29/08/12	1 hour	C18	
Lady who works in	Paracatu,	Community history,	29/08/12	40 minutes	C19	

Culture and Education and civil society campaigner, also mother of Community relations official from Kinross	Brazil	identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine				
State Deputy politician and was socialist mayor candidate	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	30/08/12	1.5 hours	C20	
elderly hotel owner and landowner affected by mine	Paracatu, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	31/08/12	1 hour	C21	
Sociology Lecturer and his students at Finom University in Paracatu who did his Master's thesis on Sao Domingos Maroon and its Identity	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	07/09/12	3 hours	C22	

(Priest) of Paracatu	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	31/08/12 and 10/01/13	1.5 hours	C23	
Ex-employee of Mine	Paracatu, Brazil	Culture and identity of mining company.	07/09/12	2 hours	C11	
owner of local newspaper, environmental NGO and former anti-mining activist	Paracatu, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	31/08/12	30 minutes	C24	
well known in community to opposing mine and own neighbours in Maroon.	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	02/09/12	2 hours	C25	
Owner of Environmental NGO and also former critic	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine,	10/09/12	1 hour	C26	

of Kinross		impacts from mine				
local cultural and artistic leader and hotel owner	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	03/09/12	2 hours	C27	
Community leader fighting construction of other mine near his home and also former dam engineer at Kinross	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	09-15/01/13	Met, spoke and drove around everyday to meet other residents. 6 hours approximate	C28	
Parents of lady Kinross official took me to interview, affected by dam	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	12/01/13	1 hour	C29	
Neighbourhood leader,	Paracatu,	Community history,	11/01/13	1 hour	C30	

located nearest to tailings dam	Brazil	identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine				
Elderly couple living very near mine, isolated and without water supply	Paracatu, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	13/01/13	1 hour	C31	
President of Municipal Chamber and Elected Councillor	Paracatu, Brazil	Community history, identity, culture, current affairs, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	11/01/13	30 minutes	C32	
Communications officer from municipal government			16-20/11/11, 15/03/12 and between 08-09/12	2 hours	C33	
Two local journalists	Paracatu, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	10/01/13	30 minutes	C34	
Former Kinross	Email	Mining company influence	03-04/14		C39	

Manager		strategies with community and government				
Summary - Los Caimanes, Chile: One visit 4 days in total. In-depth interviews with two local community leaders and short interviews with 42 local community residents, 1 expert on the conflict, 1 lawyer defending community and 1 company consultant						
Archeoastronomer, and defender of Los Caimanes	Los Caimanes, Chile	History of Community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Dam, impacts from mine	03/10/12	3 hours		
Lawyer defending Los Caimanes	Los Caimanes, Chile	Community, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Dam, impacts from mine	03/10/12	30 minutes		
Community Relations consultant for Pelambres mine	Los Caimanes, Chile	History of Community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Dam, impacts from mine	06/10/12 and 26/10/12	2 hours		

Community activist defending against Pelambres mine	Los Caimanes, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Dam, impacts from mine	Between 07/10/12 – 13/10/12	6 hours approximate	D1	
Community leader defending against Pelambres mine	Los Caimanes, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Dam, impacts from mine	Between 08/10/12 – 13/10/12	4 hours approximate		
Parents of Community leaders who are former Community Leaders against Pelambres mine	Los Caimanes, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Dam, impacts from mine	08/10/12	1 hour		
40 different local community residents including priest	Los Caimanes, Chile	Going from house to house to collect signatures for Protection Remedy to hand to courts. Perceptions of	Between 08/10/12 – 13/10/12	Conversations between 10 – 120 minutes		

		Dam, history of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture,		with each participant		
Summary – Huasco Valley, Chile: One visit 10 days in total. Further interviews over email since. Interview 12 local community residents (some repeatedly), several knowledgeable experts and did not get access to company officials to discuss this community conflict.						
Local environmental activist representing OLCA and candidate for councillor	Huasco Valley, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	20/10/12 and consequent email contact until 09/13	2 hours		
Elderly grape farmer who gave me accommodation	Huasco Valley, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	20-27/10/12	5 hours approximately		
Niece of elderly grape	Huasco	Travelled with her to local	21-27/10/12 and	12 hours	E1	

farmer lady and local indigenous leader	Valley, Chile	community meetings and spoke of history of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	consequent frequent email contact until 09/13	approximately		
Local Priest	Huasco Valley, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	23 and 26/10/12	2 hours	E3	
local indigenous leader and candidate for councillor and former mine worker	Huasco Valley, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	23/10/12	2 hours	E2	
Non-participant observation at community meeting	Huasco Valley, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture,	23/10/12	3 hours	E2	

lead leaders to convince community to sign and join their collective class action against Barrick Gold		relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine				
local community resident and artist	Huasco Valley, Chile	Identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	23/10/12	30 minutes	E2	
Three sons-in-Laws of elderly grape farmer	Huasco Valley, Chile	Identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	26/10/12	1.5 hours		
Local Shopkeeper	Huasco Valley, Chile	identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	24/10/12	15 minutes		
local community leader and activist against mine	Huasco Valley, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	26/10/12	1.5 hours		

82 year old resident of the valley	Huasco Valley, Chile	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	26/10/12	1 hour		
Bishop of Copiapo, 150km from Huasco Valley	Copiapo, Chile	Met at cathedral to speak about refusal to accept US\$1m donation from Barrick, mining company community relations and conflicts.	29/10/12	20 minutes		
Summary: Mariana, Brazil – proposed open cast mine 4km from historic centre. One visit of 7 days. Interviewed 15 local community residents in person and by email. Also gave two guest lectures at universities and discussed my research with students. Spoke with one local government councillor and one Public Prosecutor Did not get access to Vale mining company.						
Local resident sat next to me on bus, whose husband works as a miner	Mariana, Brazil	Community relations, perceptions and conflict with mines	6/12/12	1 hour		

Local burger and beer stand owner and community leader	Mariana, Brazil	Community relations, perceptions and conflict with mines	6/12/12	30 minutes		
Opposing figure to mine and girlfriend, young technical engineering teacher	Mariana, Brazil	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	6/12/12 and consequent frequent email contact until 09/13	3 hours	F1	
Local elected councillor	Mariana, Brazil	History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	6/12/12	2 hours	F5	
NGO Director owns social NGO and also works for Kinross in Paracatu	Mariana, Brazil	Community relations, perceptions and conflict with mines	7/12/12	2 hours	F3	
Sociology lecturer	Mariana,	Interview and several email exchanges - History of	7/12/12	2 hours and four email	F2	

	Brazil	personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine		exchanges		
History Professor and wife Sociology Professor	Mariana, Brazil	Interview and also gave class for History students at University. History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	9/12/12 and 14/12/12 and consequent frequent email contact until 09/13	3 hours		
Mining worker's trade union leader	Mariana, Brazil	Email exchange of questions relating to History of personal and community conflict with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	13/12/12	Two lengthy emails	F4	

Three young sales assistants at chocolate store	Mariana, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	11/12/12	30 minutes		
Barber	Mariana, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	11/12/12	30 minutes		
Café store owner	Mariana, Brazil	Relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	12/12/12	20 minutes		
15 University students from guest lecture at Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto	Mariana, Brazil	History of relations with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	11/12/12	1 hour		
Public Prosecutor	Mariana, Brazil	History of relations with mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine	12/12/12	1 hour		
Bishop of Mariana	Mariana,	History of relations with	12/12/12	30 minutes		

	Brazil	mine, identity, culture, relations with and perceptions of Mine, impacts from mine				
Summary: Barro Alto, Brazil – One visit of 7 days. Interviewed three Anglo American executives, four NGO workers funded by by Anglo American, 13 local community residents and one local councillor						
Director of Communities, Anglo Nickel Head Office Sao Paulo	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	28/12/13	1 hour		
Head of CARE NGO funded by Anglo American	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	19/01/13	1 hour	G2	
officer at Head of CARE NGO funded	Barro Alto, Brazil	Several site visits to social projects. History of mining	19-22/01/13	4 hours	G2	

by Anglo American		company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.				
Secretary, Head of CARE NGO funded by Anglo American	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	19-22/01/13	1hour		
Head of Community relations, Anglo American	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	19 and 22/01/13	2 hours	G1	
Three teenagers who attend music school funded by Anglo American	Barro Alto, Brazil	Perceptions of Anglo	20/01/13	1 hour		
Cleaner at CARE, Local Resident, Barro	Barro Alto,	Community identity and culture and perceptions of	20/01/13	30 minutes		

Alto	Brazil	Anglo				
local supermarket owner	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	19/01/13	45 minutes	G3	
elderly lady, husband and daughter critical of Anglo American	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	21/01/13	1 hour	G4	
Two boys on rural farm beneficiaries of Anglo's social investment	Barro Alto, Brazil	Perceptions of Anglo	20/01/13	30 minutes		
Local councillor	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	20/01/13	30 minutes		

Couple who are local activists and leaders for civil rights and anti-corruption	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	21/01/13	1 hour		
Head of Agenda Publica NGO for strengthening local government capacity and transparency, financed by Anglo American	20/01/13	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. Local government corruption and capacity	21/01/13	1 hour		
Manager Community relations, Anglo American	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. CSR initiatives.	20/01/13	1 hour	G5	
Taxi Driver to airport	Barro Alto, Brazil	History of mining company – community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and	23/01/13	3 hours	G6	

		positions. CSR initiatives.				
Summary: Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil – one visit of 3 days. Interviewed 7 local community members, two State prosecutors, two Anglo American executives and one former executive						
local resident and Maroon community leader affected by mine	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	26/01/13	1 hour	H2	
Pamela, local community resident	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	26/01/13	1.5 hours	H3	
Fernanda, local community resident	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	26/01/13 and consequent frequent email contact until 09/13	1.5 hours and weekly skype exchanges until 10/13	H1	
Coordinator at Public Prosecutor;s office on	Conceição de Mato Dentro,	Community relations, conflict, community	25/01/13	1 hour	H4	

Social Movements	Brazil	perceptions, identity and positions.				
Local community leader	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	26/01/13	30 minutes		
Machado, Public Prosecutor	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	26/01/13	1 hour	H5	
Community relations head at Barro Ato	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	15/01/13	15 minutes		
Head of Social Performance, Anglo American, London HQ	Conceição de Mato Dentro, Brazil	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions. Social investment	12/02/13	1.5 hours	H6	
Former, Head of	Conceição de	Community relations,	20/02/13	30 minutes		

Social Performance, Anglo American, London	Mato Dentro, Brazil	conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.				
Below are over 30 interviews I conducted with knowledgeable experts on my case studies who live outside the affected communities, also other community members, academics, company executives and practitioners not related to any of my case studies who work with company - community relations and conflicts in the extractives sector. These interviews helped shape my knowledge and understanding of my research phenomenon.						
London Business School, focuses on critical CSR	My presentation of Colla case study at Egos	The need to critically analyse and focus on community perspective and less on corporate as it is a given.	09/07/11	20 minutes		
Community Leader of community near several mines in far northern Chile	His own community in Sierra Gorda, several	Met at social responsibility for mining conference in Santiago and also spoke over phone one year later. Community organization, relations with mining	20-22/10/11 and 10/11/12	2 hours		

		companies and identity				
Facebook “Mining company – community relations in Conga, Peru” page	Participated in social forum over two week.	Asked questions around the drivers for protest and conflict in Conga and about community identity and its importance	July 2012	Six questions and answers		
Social movement activist for indigenous people’s and filmmaker	Huasco Valley	Phone and in person interviews. Filmed documentary and stayed at Clementina’s farm. Spoke about drivers of community perceptions and positions of Barrick Gold	20/07/12 (phone), emails and 17/10/12	2 hours and three emails		
Community Activist in Lancashire against Fracking	Her community’s action against extractive sector project in UK context	Community relations, conflict, community perceptions, identity and positions.	30/06/12 and 10/07/12	2 hours		
Activists of NGO “Frack Off” as well as	Fracking in	At community meeting about local fracking	30/06/12	30 minutes		

several local community members in Lancashire	Lancashire	proposals. Community motives for protest or for indifference				
Couple defending community against nearby coal mine in Merthyr Tydfill – UK context of such conflicts	Open cast coal mine in Merthyr Tydfill	5 days spent talking with couple and their friends on Motives for activism, identity, community identity, organization, relations and perceptions of mine.	8/7/12-12/7/12	8 hours		
Four Local councillors in Merthyr Tydfill about nearby coal mine	Open cast coal mine in Merthyr Tydfill	Motives for activism, identity, community identity, organization, relations and perceptions of mine	10/07/12	1.5 hours		
Academic - Cardiff School of Planning and Geography, focuses on local community movements against mining and climate	Community movements in general	Motives for activism, identity, community identity, organization.	Several email exchanges between July – October, 2012	3 lengthy emails received		

change in Wales						
Master's class of Environmental law at Unisantos university, Brazil	Brazilian communities in general affected by mining	Identities, culture, relations with companies, history and environmental impacts	22/08/12	1.5 hours		
Head of community relations, Petrobras Sao José dos Campos refinery, Brazil	Local community relations	Engaging with local community over contentious issues and over social investment	15/09/12	1.5 hours		
Head of Social Development, Anglo American, Santiago, Chile	Local community relations at Chilean mines	Engaging with local community over contentious issues and over social investment	09/10/12	1 hour		
Professor - Social Movements academic	Social movements in CSR context	Email exchanges Motives for protest and for non-protest in mining communities	25/10/12	1 detailed email reply		
Professor - Sociologist in sustainability at	Social movements	Why communities react the way they do towards	31/10/12	1 hour		

Universidad Católica, Chile	and community participation	mining in Chile				
Head of Sustainability, National Mining Company, Chile	Mining company – community relations in Chile, in particular about Colla	Motives and reasons for mining company community relations in Chile and how to improve these	08/11/12	1 hour		
Director of Community relations, Collahuasi Mine (part owned by Anglo American), Santiago, Chile	Company - community relations	Drivers behind company - community relations and conflicts	12/11/12	30 minutes		
mining company community relations consultant, Santiago, Chile	Mining company community relations in Chile	Drivers behind company - community relations and conflicts	13/11/12	40 minutes		

Professor - Renowned Chilean anthropologist for Northern Indigenous communities.	Mining company community relations in Chile	History, Identity and Drivers behind company - community relations and conflicts	14/11/12	1 hour		
Social and Community Auditor Barrick Gold Peru and Chile	Company - community relations and CSR	Drivers behind company - community relations and conflicts and Identity.	27/11/12	30 minutes		
Environmental activist on mining communities especially in Huasco Valley	Capitalism and mining industry	Capitalism, mining companies, Chilean government, reason why mining is permitted so easily in Chile - philosophical	28/11/12 and and consequent f email contact until 09/13	1.5 hours		
researcher and activist – anti mining in Northern Chile, defender of Indigenous peoples	Capitalism and mining industry	ILO169, Indigenous identity, mining community - conflicts in Chile, drivers of community positions	29/11/12	1 hour		

Head of Indigenous Affairs, Chilean government	Government-mining company – indigenous community relations	Drivers behind local indigenous community relations with mining company in northern Chile.	14/11/12 and 0212/12	1.5 hours		
Human geographer Academic, Director Sustainability Centre, Universidad Católica Chile	Mining company community relations/positions	How to present my data of different perceptions and positions	03/12/12	1 hour		
Sustainability Manager, Alcoa, Brazil	Company - community relations in company operations in Amazon and South East Brazil	Drivers behind company - community relations and community positions	18/12/12	1 hour		
Leading sociologist on Social movements, Collective action in	Social movements, Collective	Different levels of factors which drive communities to mobilize or not mobilize	01/12/12	1 email reply		

extractives sector communities in USA	action in extractives sector	against nearby extractives projects				
co-author of book analysing factors of community mobilization of LNG plants in USA	Social movements, Collective action in extractives sector in her book	Different levels of factors which drive communities to mobilize or not mobilize against nearby extractives projects	18/12/12	1 email reply		
Business Development Director at Zamin Resources Mining company, bought over Pedra Branca mine from Anglo American December 2012.	Mining company – community/government relations in South America	Drivers behind company - community relations and community positions	07/01/13	1.5 hours		
Professor - Political Sciences, University of Brasilia, Social movement researcher	Social movement in Brazil, literature, Paracatu	Factors leading to collective action in Brazil with case of Paracatu that she knows	17/01/13	1 hour		

	community					
Mining in Peru focused Academics, practitioners, NGO representatives, Anglo American governmental relations at conference on Extractives in Peru at UCL	Mining company community relations in Peru	Impacts of mining and Peru and drivers of company - community relations	04/03/13	6 hours		
Retired Head of Mining Operation, Rio Tinto	Mining company operations and community relations in South American	Mining company strategies for community relations	Monthly meetings since 05/05/13	10 hours		
Head of international NGO on communities affected by mining	Mining company – community conflict in South	Mining company – community conflict in South America	30/08/13	1 hour		

	America					
--	---------	--	--	--	--	--

Appendix B

Examples of first rounds of coding from the initial interview transcripts based on first field research trip. Coding of an interview with NGO representative in Paracatu

Rajiv: what do you think about Kinross and it's relations with the community?

Joao Paulo: they came here imposing a lot of things on us in the 1980s. progress and development now depends on them they called us a small backwards town. The mine's vision here is all about profit maximization, just making profits. ^{x2} Profit, course a man power. Now it's even stronger with Kinross. They're relationship with the community is about dominance. They leave very little behind. More dangerous moderate people here don't want the mine to leave. They should have more power period. democratic relations here. They're not investing enough here. dangerous

Rajiv: I hear the company will invest 1 million reais here

Joao Paulo: if you count the 30 years they mine here and consider 1 million reais it's very little. The agriculture here uses a lot poison but that's no excuse for the mine to poison here. One mistake doesn't justify another. The health of Paracatus population has worsened. We need doctors still here, the hospital doesn't have enough, it's just full of student doctors. dangerous Health impact

Kinross distributes crumbs to social projects. Each project gets around 10, 15, 20, 30 thousand reais per project it's very little for the amount of profits it takes from here in Paracatu. The Mayor has no power to get the company to pay more. dangerous

The company don't listen to the population on issues of pollution. A university found proof of it in the air but the company say it's an isolated incident. The company don't give us answers. The water here is polluted, the company then shows their research to show it's not polluted. ^{unhelpful answer} poll environment.

Rajiv: it's like a fight of research

Joao Paulo: we need some neutral research. (The local community need to know the truth about pollution.) The other thing you must have perceived already is about compensation to those resettled. *Desire*

The mine is not responsible for her acts or damages, cracks in houses, dust and the detonations. (The mine doesn't relate well with the community, people with money can get compensation but poor people can't, they don't negotiate with the community they negotiate with people as individuals. They divide the community.) *damage, dust, noise*
Divide + rule - Disingenuous

Once I complained about the mine on a Saturday and a manager overheard me in Sao Domingos Quilimbo talking and on Monday company representatives came over here to explain their policy to us. She never explained it was due to my criticism.

Sao Domingos is divided because of problems with water and pollution. The company want to invest there to win the community over so they can continue destroying their land near to the Quilombo. The company have their discourse that doesn't convince they say they are environmentally friendly and have good relations with the community, value people but it's not convincing. They don't give responses to the population. *environment*
Disingenuous
Dising

Rajiv: what did you think of the people from the mine?

Joao Paulo: everything comes from the top - down at the mine. They mine, destroy and profit. We saw the relationship and there is no friendly relationship with the, but from behind they defend a capitalist model of profit. They impose their ideas with force. *profit*
aggressive - Dominate - Power
neg relations

Rajiv: but the company says otherwise that they are responsible with the community.

Example of second order coding (IN CAPS) as per perspective (Community on Company's identity)

The mine's vision here is all about profit maximization, just making profits. Now it's even stronger with GoldMin. Their relationship with the community is about dominance. They leave very little behind. More moderate people here don't want the mine to leave. They should have more democratic relations here. They're not investing enough here.....if you count the 30 years they mine here and consider 1 million reais it's very little.....Kinross distributes crumbs to social projects. Each project gets around 10, 15, 20, 30 thousand reais per project it's very little for the amount of profits it takes from here in Paracatu. The Mayor has no power to get the company to pay more.....The company don't listen to the population on issues of pollution. – UNGENEROUS, PROFIT FOCUSED, ABUSE POWER, ARROGANT

The mine is not responsible for her acts or damages, cracks in houses, dust and the detonations. The mine doesn't relate well with the community. people with money can get compensation but poor people can't. they don't negotiate with the community they negotiate with people as individuals. They divide the community.....They don't give responses to the population. – IRRESPONSIBLE, UNFRIENDLY, ABUSE POWER TO DIVIDE AND RULE, DISINGENIOUS

You see that sign about how many days they've had no accidents. That's a lie. The managers are trained about silencing anyone who got injured there, they drive them home and stop them from saying anything. I've heard from reliable sources this is true. UNETHICAL AND ABUSE OF POWER

The mine always wins international awards. Someone who was working there told me an international organization came here even the bosses start to clean up and those who are considered as the lowest skilled workers are put in a truck and taken to the forest and left

there for the day so that the foreign visitors can assess the mine for the award. Once the foreigners leave the truck goes back for the low skilled workers. I was told this by someone who was taken to the forest. – DISINGENIOUS

foreigner that's here to make profit and destroy the population. There's nothing more than that. They're controlled by shareholders around the world waiting for results and they have no idea of what's happening here. In the future we could have a destroyed city, without work, hunger and a sick population. – PROFIT FOCUSED, FOREIGNER.

The company fires people for any small thing. I know someone was fired after working there for twenty years his boss told him he was unmotivated. Most people leave there with an illness due to chemical products. – UNETHICAL AND IRRESPONSIBLE

When you see the communication from the mine it makes you cry it's so beautiful what they're doing. - DISINGENIOUS

The mine keeps imposing its ideas and does not dialogue or listen. – ABUSE POWER AND DISINGENIOUS

Appendix C

In this example of coding I was categorizing the data according to four different levels of analysis to understand which factors were the strongest in influencing community positions towards mining companies. The example provided below is of the four higher conflict communities. The darker shaded factors point towards a stronger explanation of why conflict is high from a community perspective. I eventually moved on from this thinking by combining aspects of these factors with Frooman's (1999) Resource Dependence model as elaborated in the thesis. As shown in the Findings section the data is arranged under some of the factors in the above figure, therefore this figure played an important role in my interpretation of the data.

Figure 2 - Consolidated high conflict community positions towards mines



Appendix D – Socio-Economic-Historic differences between Independent and Dependent communities with Company and Community influence strategies

Independent	Dependent
History – Communities founded hundreds of years ago (pre-Hispanic in the three Chile cases). Founded on agriculture.	History – Communities established and grown due to the discovery and exploration of minerals between 50 – 300 years ago in Brazil. First established by a mix of Portuguese conquerors and African descended slaves.
Community Type – Rural and isolated with low levels of new migrants. Smaller populations varying between 80 – 4,500 residents. Therefore the community is able to develop closer levels of attachment and ties with neighbours. Most locals were born in these communities and can trace their families back several generations within the same community. There are just several main surnames in these communities.	Community Type – Urban centres of between 5,000 – 85,000 inhabitants. High levels of new migrants, communities have highly transient populations. Communities are not as able to build social ties and attachment with others from the community due to the transient nature of the population. Have large mining activity located between 2km – 20km from the main settlements.
Main Economy – agriculture based communities. Main form of livelihoods from agriculture, though in Caimanes many of the local men work in the provision of the nearby mining industry.	Main Economy – revolves around the nearby mining projects. The mines are the main employers and also generate much of the local economies through employment and businesses in hotels, restaurants, housing, sales of consumer goods and

	funding of public sector and social projects.
<p>Main community grievances on impacts from mining and Mining company influence strategy for gaining SLO – in line with the stakeholder influence strategies proposed by Frooman (1999) I argue that the mining companies in my research also devised and executed their own influence strategies on their local communities in a bid to win their SLO from new communities where they were starting new operations, which also implies making these communities become mutually dependent on the mining companies, as in the case of the lower conflict cases. Mutual dependence as per Frooman (1999) gives the mining company more power over accessing and controlling the critical resource of the SLO.</p> <p>These influence strategies were based on instrumental stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman <i>et al.</i>, 2004; Jones, 1995; Mitchell <i>et al.</i>, 1997). The mining companies in general attempted to take this key local community stakeholder into consideration with the objective of gaining their SLO.</p>	<p>Mining company influence strategy for maintaining SLO – in line with the stakeholder influence strategies Frooman (1999) proposes, I argue that the mining companies in my research also devised and executed their own influence strategies on their local communities with the aim to maintain their SLO in communities where the majority in the community had already accepted them. These influence strategies were based on instrumental stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman <i>et al.</i>, 2004; Jones, 1995; Mitchell <i>et al.</i>, 1997). The mining companies in general attempted to take this key local community stakeholder into consideration with the objective of maintaining their SLO, considering the constant demands of more benefits sharing from the local communities.</p> <p>In these four communities the mining companies have already been operating for at least several years (in the case of Mariana there are many mining companies operating around 25km from the city, though the mine in question for my research is yet to be given full approval to</p>

<p>The mining companies sent many young sociologists, anthropologists and psychologists out to the communities to better understand their perspectives, ways of thinking and needs, as much of the community relations literature recommends for extractives sector companies. According to some interviewees this was so that the mining companies could utilize the information to make them dependent on the nearby mining projects.</p> <p>Tried to implement community investment and development policies and initiatives based on principles of joint partnerships, collaboration, capacity building and entrepreneurship, so that they could leave communities better off than they found them.</p> <p>After seeing such initiatives were not working in gaining their SLO, mining companies engaged in what can be considered to be co-optation tactics, which go against the recommendations in the community relations practitioner literature. Mining companies used their financial</p>	<p>open just 4km from the city centre). Therefore these mining companies via their small community relations teams (which usually have at least one staff member from the local community) have been engaging and dealing with the community for several years at least and therefore know its identity, culture and needs well.</p> <p>The mining companies have all followed standard CSR and community relations procedures for the extractives sector as per publications by the IFC and ICMM for designing and implementing community development initiatives. Such initiatives emphasize the importance of joint collaboration and even joint funding where the communities have to find part of the funding for social projects, which the mining companies will also finance. The main philosophy is not to give handouts to the local community but to make them learn to become self-sufficient where they learn how to fish instead of receiving readymade fish on a plate. Typical projects may include entrepreneurship courses for making biscuits, hairdressing or ecotourism. Mining companies also invest in health, education and cultural-related initiatives and projects. However, it should</p>
--	---

<p>power to try and win over the support of influential members of the local communities to at least partially gain their SLO, leaving the local community to battle internally over why a certain section within itself is granting the SLO to the mining company.</p> <p>However, these principles of stakeholder theory, community relations and even co-optation did not work to win over the local community's SLO and in turn make the community more dependent or create a mutually dependent relationship with the nearby mining project (as with the lower conflict cases). The mining companies in these four cases have failed to reduce stakeholder (local community) power as per Frooman (1999) after years of trying with large sums of money and resources.</p>	<p>be underlined that the amount of money and resources they spend in these lower conflict communities is significantly less than in the higher conflict communities. The reason being is that as per Frooman (1999) the mining companies are aware that there is a mutual dependence with the local community (as stated on Anglo American's website) and therefore unlike with the higher conflict communities where the power rests with the local community, in these lower conflict cases the power is shared and both groups need each other for their future welfare. Thus mining companies can afford to spend less on maintaining their SLO as they know the local community is just as dependent upon them for their welfare. The quote I was frequently given in Paracatu is appropriate for summarising this argument "they (the mining company) do the absolute minimum in terms of CSR to ensure the community does not revolt against them."</p>
<p>Present day perspective on Independence/Dependence on nearby mining projects – feel totally independent of the mine. In the two indigenous community Chilean cases (Colla and Diaguita), the community explicitly sense</p>	<p>Present day perspective on Independence/Dependence on nearby mining projects – the overall perception is that of the nearby mine as either a "necessary evil", as was often quoted in Paracatu, to a feeling that without the mine</p>

<p>the nearby mining projects depend on their approval, i.e., SLO.</p> <p>Clearly state they do not want CSR or “handouts” as they refer to them from the mining companies.</p>	<p>the town and community would cease to exist which was explained across all four lower conflict communities.</p> <p>More than willing to participate in mining company CSR programmes and would like even more CSR investment.</p>
---	--

Appendix E - Interview Transcripts and Reflections

Interviewee Code A1 – Raymundo – Long term resident in Pedra Branca and critical voice towards the nearby mine

Rajiv: I'm interested in hearing your views about the mine to get a more balanced perspective.

Raimundo: when I first moved here many years ago there was nobody living here most people I saw were English, speaking English, black creole people they spoke English and French and Patois. Very few Brazilian were here.

Rajiv: why has this town grown so much?

Raimundo: due to the mine, it's good for job generation. But for those who have roots here and were and gold-miners like myself it was bad. They threw us out from where we were. The well in their mine belongs to me and they still haven't paid me. They've stolen all of my stuff. We are a group of 11 there are a total of 18 of us they evicted from the land.

We want compensation so far the company is just running us over. The company is not complying with the contract we have with them. Within the Mining Conduct they have to respect me but they're not. They have a lot of financial strength. They manage to I wouldn't say but the justice system but influence it so when the judge comes from Macapa he's been sent by the company.

The company lawyer told me they actually prefer to settle this in court and I wonder then what kind of affinity they have with the ministry of Justice in order to have that level of confidence! The company lawyer explained to me very frankly that Eike Batista left lots of problems for Anglo when they bought in and they want proof for everything they are going through. I told him honestly that I have documents that if I put them on the internet we'll close you down, we know of environmental crimes you have committed there in your land where you killed the land and native protected wood. We have photos of this. Also of irregular practices. We were outside of their land and the company's security came and told us we couldn't film. We filmed them cutting down the protected wood. It's an environmental crime. The company was fined. Last year.

I told Sergio the lawyer, we're planning to go to Brasilia with this issue. We have a right to income compensation the company never paid us for damages and losses. We've never been paid. We're definitely going to Brasilia it's just a case of setting the dates. We have GPS coordinates to prove the environmental crime. We'll send it straight to Europe, that info will go straight to Europe.

For us who are originally from here 52 years here. I am forced to commit to environmental crimes to feed my family, in my freezer I have monkeys and birds I hunted as I don't have any money for food!!!! It's shameful for the company. I'm going to go and get it to show you the monkey (goes to freezer and brings back dead frozen monkey and bird). I hunted this 3-4kg bird that tastes like Turkey and environmental crime!

Rajiv: what's your perception of this company? if they were a person?

Raimundo: they are a person, I'd want them to put themselves in my place and comply with laws. I'm different, I'm religious, I love and fear God so I wouldn't do the same with them. Their wealth is a lot.

For others the company is good, for those recent migrants, they have jobs for them. But for us the roots from here, the owners of the mines from 52 years, for us the company is being really bad, bad. I tell you, honestly if they don't resolve this I will and I promise I will cut off the road with my group having a protest and they won't have access to the mine!

The company violated the property rights of a colleague and they owe him money so we had a protest recently. He's ill and receives nothing.

Rajiv: have you tried talking to company for example with the two people who brought me here?

Raimundo: they're sent, they're sent, they're sent they have no power their boss sends them over. The big boss always avoids us. That's how Eike Batista has become the richest man in the world. I don't want to owe anything to anyone apart from God and Jesus Christ. I just want to live within my means, within my means. I don't believe in debts. Some people don't pay their debts. I want my soul to be clean.

The whole town knows the company owes us. The town is small. Most people in the town support the company as they depend on it.

I left my area in 1998 working as a gold miner by myself.

Rajiv: Have you ever thought about working at the mine?

Raimundo: Anglo Gold helped the independent gold miners with machinery, built houses for them and actually bought their gold from them. But this company doesn't resolve anything.

I told the company lawyer whilst you're driving around in your air conditioned hi-lux the minerals are all falling out of your vehicles in the town and affecting us as it spreads around especially from the wheels.

**Interviewee code A2 Interview with Christine – Community Relations Coordinator
Anglo American – Pedra Branca de Amaparí**

My thoughts:

Again as in previous cases talking with the community relations person she was always on the defensive and insinuating that the company is always right and need to educated the local community on what is acceptable or not. In other words set the rules in the relationship.

In a response to what the main challenge of her job is “I used to work with soil and now I work with people, it’s more complicated” “Sometimes I wonder if it was worth making the move to Community relations, you never know in the future I could go back to Geology”.

Rajiv: How would you compare both local communities Pedra Branca and Serra do Navío?

Christine: Serra do Navío was the urban centre, closed and organized of Icom similar to Carajás in Pará state. There are rules for getting in and out of there. When Icom left there it became a local patrimony but there were a lot invasions and it became deteriorated with wooden houses in the middle. After the company left it went downhill.

Pedra Branca was a small village once the mine companies started arriving such as Beadle who mine gold and Anglo American the town grew a lot. Here in Pedra Branca

most people just know Anglo American but confuse it with MMX who Anglo American bought 3 years ago. Beadle was also MBPA before recently. We've been trying to change people's perceptions this year in terms of brand name to Anglo American as it used to be Anglo Ferrous before.

Anglo American today want to consolidate themselves into one single group and uniform across the corporation. In Pedra Branca most people to identity us as Anglo American.

Rajiv: How would you describe the local community's identity?

Christine: people used to survive from small scale agriculture for self subsistence and it's the same today. Anglo American have encouraged it's workers to move out of the accommodation to the town. I have actually made that move as I don't like the accommodation. It's an extension of the company, you're in the company for 24 hours that way, you have no personal life! I tell everyone I sleep in my own bed, I eat my own food I don't have to eat from the work refectory. I don't have to show my identity badge when I come in and out of home. The company pays an amount toward your rent in the town, but there's short supply of decent housing so rent is very expensive. Most housing is very basic. So we bought a piece of land and constructed our own small house. I don't regret it at all. It has it's pros and cons like everything. Living in the accommodation is worse overall I think.

Rajiv: how far is the mine from here?

Christine: 13km.

Rajiv: Is there any environmental impact on the community from it?

Christine: No none. It is open pit but nobody lives near it. But we get complaints about the railway line which cuts the town in two. There is a small community far from here what we call river people but they're very few. Our main problem is related to the railway line. Our other main source of complaints comes from the increase in traffic on the main road because of more dust or high speeds. As it used to be a really backwards city, people don't have the custom to see cars or even walk on the pavement (Interesting as I walked there and was annoyed to find no pavement on main streets) children playing in the street.

Rajiv: Whe did the traffic increase?

Christine: when MMX arrived. Not so long ago but we are getting lots of complaints lots. We're creating lots of partnerships to address this with the police to get them to stop more drivers and with education. Once the police have their radars and monitor on the road people slow down but when they leave they drive fast again. We've had meetings with suppliers too with those that use heavy vehicles as you've been driving fast and seen drinking and driving so we have to keep telling them how to behave. As you know human beings.....it's difficult to work with them

Rajiv: now you're working with humans and not soil as before

Christine: (laughs) yes I know so each person has their own opinion and react differently. We speak to the owners of the suppliers and tell them what they're drivers are doing, if

they continue we take their names and they can get fired. Otherwise it'll end up being very disorganized.

We also have problems with the train, when the dust blows off there from the wind. We hear complaints that the train made lots of noise travelling in the early hours. The train line was constructed when Icomi started working here in the 1960's.

Rajiv: how can the community communicate with you?

Christine: we have lots of channels via email, phone, and they can come and visit us by foot as the town is only 5 minutes walk from here. The reason why we are in this trailer is located here by the entrance is exactly for community members to have easy access to us and so they don't have to show their ID to get in. it's a lot easier for them, they don't have to deal with the bureaucracy of getting in.

Christine shows me a communications community relations bulletin paper sent to the community with the different communication channels.

Rajiv: are the people in the community generally literate?

Christine: no not really

Rajiv: what about other indirect social impacts such as the excess in men who may drink and generate prostitution?

Christine: let me show you this research from 2010 Anglo American hired ERM to conduct a perceptions study to find out what the main issues should be, all the positive and negative points. It forms part of Anglo American's SEAT. 212 interviews in the area with different stakeholders on the government and company. We worked on top of the results here so prostitution was mentioned as a negative issue. With relation to under age prostitution, high rates of pregnancy and AIDS so we hired "Reprolatino" who focus on sexual disease education to come here and raise awareness. They started with workshops last year their work is really good.

What else do we do? Education for adults and helping with small scale agriculture. (Christine shows me in the material how many people were benefited by which initiatives and programmes that were based on the Perception's study).

Rajiv: you live here in Pedra Branca, would do you think is the general perception of the mine?

Christine: look.....we have a small problem still called Icomi. That mine came here with a paternalistic mentality so it embraced everyone, hired everyone from here, gave them housing, they had their own amazing hospital people even came from Macapa (180km) to be treated here. The houses were really good also the sanitation. People from Pedra Branca knew about that and they wanted the same.

There's that side but on the other hand when Icomi closed up they simply closed and went away in a hurry. They didn't have a mine closure plan. They just closed and went. This still affect us a lot. People think we should have a hospital, improve this and that, asphalt the town. We receive lots and lots of complaints and request such as "I want to

build a school, can't you help me?". Even things such as "we're building a church so we'd like building materials for it". Everything you can imagine...they'll look to us for it.

I remember in one focus group I took part in back when I was in the Geology department one guy from the local community said he thought the company should build a hospital here in Pedra Branca and I looked at him and thought "my god our own employee saying that" I stopped him and said the company is a mining company and is here to mine it pays its taxes duly it's not here just taking minerals and leaving. Now if you want to build a hospital it's the municipality or government who have to build it with the resources we give to them.

Apart from the federal taxes we also pay a "social fund" of \$4m reais or a % to the local municipality and it's more than \$4m.

Rajiv: so that should be enough for paying a hospital?

Christine: that money is for specific aims. There's usually a woman who wants to improve her crops so she knocks on our door saying "Anglo" thinking we have resources, that's why we created the Social Fund so these people go and deal with the municipality.

When MMX arrived they invested very heavily socially. Most of the current projects are from that time. People here have noticed that and they expect us to invest the same way and amount. But back then they didn't have the social fund. Now we have this fund it doesn't mean we will no longer invest in any social programmes no not at all. If we see a project that we like or the Directors like we'll invest in it too.

Rajiv: what kind of project?

Christine: that's very relative. For example one project we've taken on is at the jail in Macapa. We're helping the prisoners get trained up. A garden. Rehabilitate the prisoners as it's so hard for them to find work later. So we created a partnership for this programme. We actually recruited 10 ex prisoners at the Santana office.

Rajiv: who took that decision for taking such a project?

Christine: That was Bruno Sé he's head of Institutional Relations. You can meet him later this week. The final word comes from our Director for such initiatives. They actually make furniture at the prison for their own enclosures it's really cool. Even though the company had the social fund they still invested in this project.

Rajiv: It was interesting what you said about the employee who said the company should build a hospital and how you countered by saying the company should only pay all its taxes and mine. What do you think is the identity of Anglo American? What makes it different and central features? You know Vale and MMX.

Christine: Anglo focuses much more on Safety, it's the first value and principle. In other miners it's not as important. The sustainability side is growing a lot. We need to change our workers a little in that sense because that lad who said what he did about the hospital he was a new employee from the town.

Rajiv: do you think what he said was incorrect?

Christine: At that moment I thought he was wrong , later I thought maybe he was right because he doesn't understand how a company works "corporatively" this education and culture change work we're doing and it takes time.

Rajiv: Why did Icomi do so much then? Why was it so paternalistic?

Christine: there's a similar reality in Carajas where I lived. I saw in Serra do Navio it was an American style of housing, something you don't see in Brazil everything nice, front lawns, water hoses like in carajas a closed community, we had strict rules about noise and times for arriving back. That's what companies did back in the old times. Vale haven't finished with Carajas but I've seen at their other places they're building their houses in the middle of the local communities. People there would say "I live in the Carajas housing so I'm superior" so Vale's vision is changing. Now they're housing is integrated in the community as the company wants their employees to have contact with the community.

Rajiv: Why do you think Anglo American has changed their policy and stance compared to Icomi from before and not being so generous socially or being paternalistic anymore?

Christine: I think that the mining sector as a whole as changed, I use the example of Vale because Vale used to be like Icomi before it used to be advantageous for companies to be in control of everyone, however they were creating a financial debt, it wasn't financially viable, people didn't mix either....what I hear about Icomi is that it imported everything from the USA. They never bought anything locally. That paternal mentality has changed, and companies now encourage workers to live in the local communities.

Our priority here and as a whole at Anglo American is to hire locally, our problem is finding qualified skilled labour. For example Christine (me) left geology for community relations, do you think we can get somebody from the local community to replace her in geology? Not even in Macapa you can find anyone.

Today we have our own technical institute for mining with the first group graduating. Workers come from other parts of Brazil such as Minas Gerais. We have that deficiency and we get complaints on that.

Rajiv: Who's complaining about that?

Christine: From the local community and outsourced workers. Anglo today has a mentality where it never does social investment by itself, it does everything together in partnership with local municipalities and states.

Rajiv: Why that?

Christine: so we don't assume all the responsibility by ourselves, we want to pursue something more sustainable.

Rajiv: so that's the main focus here? Sustainability. So what do you understand by sustainability? (Extremely heavy rains starts to downpour and is very loud as we're in a mobile a trailer)

Christine: Anglo American wants the following...referring back to Icomi the inevitable, they closed their doors and everyone was left high and dry and now everyone fears that Anglo American will do the same. So everything we do today is related to income generation or education. There's no point in coming here proposing a project not linked to this. It's all about the future. The company's already working on a closure plan as it will have to leave some day...the current contract is for 20 years of more mining we are legally obliged to develop a mine closure plan. When we leave at least the community would be self sufficient. So everything the company does today is linked to sustainability.

Rajiv: how about detonations of rocks when mining?

Chiara: The largest rock is detonated twice a week.

Rajiv: do you have local communities to the mine itself?

Chiara: no nobody just a few river community folk. When I worked in Vale in Pará we had serious problems with the local community as it was always vibrating for them so got lots of communities. We got a complaint the other day here too about cracked houses due to the train that goes past but we've been to see the houses and those that were built according to civil construction norms do not have cracks....now those houses built in whatever way possible they are cracked. They are houses which were built after the trainline which is there 50 years ago, they build houses very close to the trainline.

Rajiv: How many people work here at Anglo American?

Christine: Just Anglo American employees we have 400 people, 200 here in Pedra Branca so 600 in total. If you include outsourced another 700 so 1300 in total.

Rajiv: What percentage of those are from the local community.

Christine: very few, around 10% maximum because of the lack of skill they have. In terms of outsourced workers it's a lot higher. About 20 – 30% are born here in the state of Amapá.

Rajiv: so the majority are from other states....

Christine goes to look up the official figures and also show me the organization chart of the mine to arrange future interviews.

Christine: we have a problem here due to the heavy rains from last July. When the floods passed through the town it flooded a street over 2 metres. It also went over the railway line. Our railway operations had to cease. In that period they started blaming Anglo and wanted to close us down so this talk has been going on since July. Even though we've been helping the community and buying items to help victims of the flood. There was a misunderstanding between the mayor and the community and due to that.....this issue was left in the air. We've been trying to re-establish dialogue and we decided we will buy materials to help them.

Christine: I'm seeing the company through new eyes now because me as Christine came from the Geology department...I wasn't focused in this community part, I used to do my

work, come home take a shower and go to bed, I didn't know much about this community relations area. Now I'm seeing the community with new eyes now I look back to my time at Vale I think I could have done a lot more in terms of the community.

Rajiv: But what triggered that change in vision you Had?

Christine: Since I got involved in the volunteer work where I helped adult learners here in the community and created a programme for them. So I saw it from another perspective and as I always tell Osiani we have to show the company internally everything we do, I didn't know about any of this. People in the community know more about what we do that people inside the company.

I am an example of this. We spoke to people in the company who didn't know about our community programmes and we then realized we needed to do more. We've already seen that it's not enough just stating what we do in the internal newsletter of the company, it's the job of an ant (a constant task little by little) then we can have more face to face meetings. The families of workers who come here on family visit days learn more about our community programmes than their husbands who work here. We want to show more to our internal public what we're doing with sustainability. I noticed that difference when I entered here. There's so much going on that I think we should let others know.

Rajiv: Do you have a voluntary programme?

Christine: Yes, we do now on family finance education also how to look after your house, mechanics. We also hired one person from the course we taught. It's really cool. The company helps us for volunteering. The focus for sustainability today is education and

income generation. The company won't get involved in paternalism like buying gifts for the community. At Vale I don't even remember who worked in the community relations department, I had no relations with them in my work in geology.

Interviewee Code A3 - Interview with President of Municipal Chamber, Pedra Branca

President: from one perspective it's a necessary evil. Mining in Brazil is seen a giant destruction. For our community Pedra Branca it was a really good thing. But in any large project in the world you get negative impacts such as prostitution, more crime, environmental impacts. We receive around \$25 million reais per year in tax revenue so the benefits are huge.

If the mine were to close and leave it would be a catastrophe for us. The mine has paid around 100 million reais by now. When they leave we'll think about tourism, agriculture, education.

Rajiv: what will happen when the mine leaves?

President: the company is complying with it's responsibilities and we have to make sure we plan for that day. They pay their taxes and have some social projects.

Rajiv: do you think those social projects are enough?

President: yes it is enough. It's not just the company that has to want to develop social projects, society does too and our community isn't organized enough.

(infers the local municipal government is not organized enough to partner with company on social investment).

President: Anglo's mining project is the best thing to ever happen to the state of AMapá. Yes, there are complaints from the community such as dust, pollution, parking their truck in the wrong place. They're not going to drive 100kph through the town are they?

Rajiv: Not sure about that.

President: which human never makes mistakes? There are some things I think they could change. It's not these multinational companies that have to come here and do everything perfect by themselves but the world that asks them to. The world tells them they want ecological material. So the company needs to have that global vision. It's the world that's asking them. Do you live in Europe? Europe's first world. Today we pay the price for Europe polluting and destroying their natural resources. We learn from ignorance.

In my opinion there is no hell there is torture you pay before arriving there.

Rajiv: how would you describe the company's identity?

President: very friendly, not perfect as only Jesus Christ was perfect, careful with their commitments. What is missing today is our lack of participation and responsibility as a society, the mayor, councillors it's us we're the problem.

Rajiv: does the Mayor think like you then?

President: No, and we'll pay the price later. And our Brazilian society...you're light years ahead of us, we have land water. To get where we have we needed an illiterate President. Europe has much less corruption, we have lots of politicians in jail. Our culture is of immigrants and Indians. Indian culture is like this, it's just that, he wants to take everything, but we're in his country, and it's wrong to see them as our guests as we're their guests! Brazilians are Brazilians and Indian's are Indians.

The company has a train with such a huge social impact. I heard the company didn't want to let a local resident get on there in Macapa with a fridge but it's better they let her get on as it's no big problem for them and if they didn't she would speak badly about them. That affects their image in a negative way. Before Councillor I am a citizen. We all need to be citizens. The Anglo workers get on that bus with their Anglo badges on their uniforms, once they cross half way across the bridge he transforms into an employee of Anglo, he doesn't spit on the ground, he doesn't throw litter. When he comes back, half way over the bridge he leaves his Anglo mentality behind and he lights up his cigarette, he comes back totally different.

I'd like more international companies to come here to teach these values to our community. Anglo need to get more involved in national policy and I've told them.

Interviewee Code B1 – Three Colla Leaders Interview Transcript and Notes from Interview

Biodiversity is most important for their Identity and Values

Ricardo: “If we don’t keep fighting we” die as a people and we’re recognized by UNESCO as a “Living Human Treasure” in Sep 2012, only Indigenous group so this strengthens Identity and desire to exist”.

Frequently refer to 169 – they are protected as government signed.

Ricardo: “The dust from the mines are killing off our plants, crops and livestock the Mines speed up the natural ecological cycle, water is also drying up”

Ricardo: “We see life differently especially how we see nature we co-exist with nature unlike occidental culture. We see mountains as part of our cosmovision”.

Ricardo: We have 3 lawsuits against companies for their negative impacts they have compensate

Ricardo: Before 169 we were always fighting!! We are fighters/battlers its part of our culture.

Ricardo: The Spanish gave the land to the COusiños they gave it to Provence we had no rights.

Ricardo: we are aware of mining strategies of dividing and ruling us but we are strong as a collective community and they don’t understand that.

Monthly meetings ALL community in formal way. They built their own community centre.

Ricardo: Kinross are stringy they want to pay just 2000 pounds per agriculture project to us. Wanted to leave in 9 palos for whole community. Kinross helps other communities which don't even exist with 50,000 pounds buying houses for them etc!

Lorries have turned over and spilled acid – stops transhumance (showed me photos of spills).

Ricardo: Kinross want us to stop existing!

Ricardo: Mining companies are currently blackmailing and threatening Chilean government of pulling out investments if they don't do things their way, for Environmental Certificate.

Ricardo: We are suing the State with ILO169.

Love of land and of family who live up at the top drives them. Identity

Ricardo: We're happy with 10 lucas (pounds) a day.

Ricardo: We want to beat the mines and the State that's what gives us most satisfaction and motivation

Ricardo: They run over our animals all the injustices they do it gives us satisfaction to beat them.

I want to take some money of them so (Sacarle um chaicho de una minera and) that hurts them. It gives me great pleasure they fly over by plane and have to sit here in our HQ in this house...they classify us as Indios (derogatory term for Indigenous).

Our love for our neighbours and community to help them rear their livestock.

Ana: They see us as the poor and brute Indians (indios rotos) we hear it being said everywhere, but we don't care, so all the better they come here to sit down with us here...here we treat everyone the same...we don't care they call us with insulting nicknames

Ana: "we don't need to be professionals, our lives have taught us how to fight....they wonder how we know so many things but life is not for free"

Ana: they affect us with water from the sources they use, we use water from the river

Ana: "we're not going to accept money of Casales mining project" We don't trust companies at all in what they say, concerned about animals and future, they wouldn't give us work, they always make false promises and never keep them. My daughter did the nursing course to work in Barrick finished it and they won't give her a job because she is the daughter of a Colla!"

They have never hired any of us in 12 years. It makes you so angry...they're always causing harm to our animals, if our animals knew how to talk they would say so many things about the way the mining companies have treated them and covered them in dirt.

We'll never lose hope against the mining companies

Ana: (White woman who doesn't look Colla) "I got accused of not being a real Colla but I've been living in the hills since 1960 where there were flowers it was beautiful to horseride there do you think its nice to go by horse nowadays?"

The paths are full of mining traffic and vehicles...we have to take long routes to avoid the traffic...some people say we should get involved in eco-tourism but who's going to want to go over there with the place all destroyed?

Ricardo: Our identity is stronger the more we fight against the mining companies. now we oblige any new mining companies to come and speak to us when they try to enter our territory, they have to come over here. Here the one's who is at fault is the State. The State is their godfather allows them to be there

Ricardo: Relations are bad because they there's no respect to us, there's no respect and they don't apply their CSR policies, they just want to take photos of us together

Sometimes we sign a paper and they use it for something else they're dishonest. Sometimes they take a photo of someone saying they're from the Colla RJ community but we don't even know that person!

18 mining projects in their territory

80% of the COLLAS live off their animals and not off mining – WE DON'T NEED MINING, we can exploit tourism which is friendly unlike mining. The mining companies

come and take our children they train them up and offer them 500 when they were earning 150 on the land so of course they go and leave our culture behind.

There he'll be exploited ordered about but here in the and no, he is his own boss and has freedom. We have true freedom, we answer to nobody.

Interviewee Code – C2 – Elena, local elected Politician, Paracatú. (21 minutes)

Rajiv: Então Elena, pode me falar o que você acha sobre a mineradora Kinross aqui em Paracatu sobre as relações que ela mantém com a comunidade?

Elena: Bom Rajiv Paracatú nos últimos anos deu um boom em desenvolvimento porque não é a questão só da mineradora a tecnologia na agricultura, no água pecuário, no agro negocio, se desenvolveu muito. Se desenvolveu bastante nesses oito anos e o que não foi desenvolvido aqui foi a questão de industrias. Porque o que é o que nós precisamos ainda? E que a cidade tem que agregar valor ao que produz ao tomate, cebola, alho, arroz o que fora o soja principalmente e isso não conseguimos fazer ainda tem vários motivos o imposto que minas gerias tem, minas gerias tem um dos impostos maiores no Brasil.....
(conversation with daughter about other topic)

A mineradora...eu acredito se ela nunca tivesse vindo seria melhor para a gente viveríamos a nossa vida interior com a evolução no agropecuário acredita a mesma maneira

Rajiv: Então hoje em dia Paracatu depende da mineração?

Elena: Sim depende dela criou sim essa dependência nela que não era necessário. Mas como ela já veio ela tem seus não sei se você sabe seus bônus e seus ônus tem as coisas boas e as coisas ruins que não adiante a gente se enganar. A questão ambiental nunca mais será a mesma talvez daqui a uns quinhentos anos mil anos talvez né. Então o mal se já instalou. É uma mineradora de céu aberto todo o mundo sabe e tem conhecimento que é muito mais prejudicial no meio ambiente para a população

Rajiv: para a poeira....

Elena: É. Outra questão negativa é que ta dentro do município e dentro da cidade do perímetro urbano. Fica comendo a cidade.

Mas a relação dela com a comunidade já esteve melhor. Hoje não é boa mais.

Rajiv: Eu já ouvi falar que antes era melhor e a empresa estava mais próxima e hoje ficou mais distante. Isso tem a ver com que a Kinross entrou?

Elena: Tem, tem a ver com a mudança dos proprietários e com a novas normas ne as novas leis dessa empresa, a política da empresa é diferente do que era da RPM.

Rajiv: A RPM era empresa Brasileira?

Elena: A RPM era Rio Paracatu com parceiros Brasileiros Eike Batatista era também proprietário. Parece que ele tinha mais ações. Era melhor com a comunidade, MUITO MELHOR.

Rajiv: Não tão fria?

Elena: Não tão fria, não tão distante e não tão omissa. Omissa é que não enxerga ao frente os problemas e esconde. Não que eu pense que ela tem que dar dinheiro toda hora para a comunidade comprando opiniões favoráveis não...relação, enfrentar aos problemas. Tem as coisas boas que ela traz para a comunidade né? Do geração do emprego e renda a participação em alguns, alguns projetos grandes, médios e pequenos mas eu acredito que ela tem que contribuir mais e ela tem que olhar melhor a comunidade. Ela não esta olhando no FUTURO dessa comunidade.

Rajiv: Entendi. Antigamente ela sim olhava mais para a frente? Vc interatua hj com a empresa?

Elena: Não. É meio distante. Procuro mas não precisar. Não criar dependência ou vinculo pra não stressar receber e não não não sem criar dependência com ela.

Rajiv: Como você acha que ela poderia melhorar relações com a comunidade,

Elena: tendo uma pessoa que atende a comunidade DE FATO para dialogar. Não ficar só na mídia, radio, televisão e imprensa escrita não. Contato HUMANO. Relações HUMANAS.

Rajiv: é isso que não está fazendo?

Elena: Ela não existe. Ela é uma empresa. A gente sabe visa lucro.

Rajiv: Mas ela tem um departamento de relações com a comunidade e responsabilidade social?

Elena: a gente não vê isso de FATO. E muitas situações. Entendeu? A gente não vê. Tem movimentos, você vai ver se vai encontrar com Max Mordin que é o Presidente do Central da Associação dos bairros. Nós temos vinte associações eu acho de bairros mais que isso eu acho. Agora ele é o presidente o central. Ele tá coordenando um movimento contra a Kinross.

Rajiv: Posso falar com ele? Tem o contato dele?

Elena: Tenho sim. Posso te ajudar. Então não é isso que eu penso. Paracatu tem que pensar na criação de recursos, a questão do Mao de obra, a empreendedorismo.

Rajiv: A empresa faz isso?

Elena: Olha tem a programa de “Parceiros” se vai deparar com ele aí. O seminário de parceria. Eu acho muito pequeno. O valor.

Rajiv: Eles cobram para isso?

Elena: Você vai fazer projetos. Vc vai através da sua associação. Você manda projeto para isso. Eles tem lá.....quinhentos mil reais que acho vai ser. Quinhentos mil reais. Ela recebe vinte projetos, vão ser aprovado dez, cinquenta em cada um cabo e pronto.

Rajiv: A empresa acompanha o projeto ou...?

Elena: Antigamente não acompanhava. Eu fui uma das pessoas que falei que deveria ter acompanhamento para não jogar o dinheiro fora. Então hoje tem acompanhamento.

Rajiv: Pois é, é para ter relações com a comunidade, para ter um laço com a comunidade.

Elena: criar um laço e vínculo ne? Então de fato as pessoas da comunidade acham que ela age de maneira misteriosa de maneira não verdadeira.

Rajiv: muito interessante.

Elena: sabe que não tem certeza das coisas.

Rajiv: Como identidade da empresa como você a descreveria?

Elena: (respira profundo)...Identidade que ela criou?

Rajiv: é

Elena: Sabe? Lucro e dinheiro.

Rajiv: Lucro e dinheiro. Ta

Elena: não é que eles não fazem nada. Fazem sim. Por exemplo na área da saúde eu não sei se foi a construção da vem do dinheiro deles e da faculdade Atenas ai eu não sei mas sei que existe muito dinheiro deles. Mas acho que não é o suficiente o dinheiro não paga o mal..... grande que está fazendo na comunidade em relação ambiental. Então eu acredito que eles devem fazer MAIS na questão ambiental e na PREPARAÇÃO dos jovens para ser empresários....efetivar não construir uma casa e falar aqui vai ser uma escola de aperfeiçoamento e não ser mantenedora diária dessa escola porque ela vai fechar em 2030 se não me engano.

Rajiv: 2041 eu acho

Elena: 2041 mas ela vai ir embora. Que certeza nos temos que ela vai ficar ali? Que certeza nos temos? Os donos do Kinross são vários acionistas. Vários ne? São cinquenta acionistas. No mundo inteiro. Ela vai embora ela fecha. O Brasil e Paracatu vem ação contra quem? Contra as cinquenta pessoas?

Rajiv: É uma empresa aberta na bolsa de Toronto.

Elena: É

Rajiv: então é bem mais que cinquenta acionistas.

Elena: que vai acontecer em Paracatu? Que segurança Paracatu tem?

Rajiv: Ai tem a ver a questão de agregar valor que você me contou antes.

Elena: Isso agregar valor na soja.

Rajiv: Mas já criou essa dependência ne?

Elena: PLANEJAMENTO.

Rajiv: planejamento. A empresa precisa pensar um pouco isso também. Suas opiniões. A empresa sabe de suas opiniões? Porque imagino que outros compartilham essa opinião que você tem. Que resposta ela tem?

Elena: Eu não sou a única pessoa que fez esse tipo de comentário e tem várias pessoas fazendo.

Rajiv: Você não é a única pessoa que fez esse tipo de comentário?

Elena: Eu acredito qualquer que quiser passar um email para a RPM passa email falando o que quiser eu nunca passei.

Rajiv: a RPM tem algum canal de contato?

Elena: Eles tem o email da pessoa da comunicação. Falar? Eu acho que não falei isso com ninguém mas essa opinião foi dada para outras pessoas lá dentro em seminários. Outra coisa....voce rajiv....poderia....dar um jeito. Vou ver meu tempo para te levar a ver moradores na redondeza da expansão. (Draws a map) Aqui está RPM aqui estão pequenas propriedades existe um casal que o senhor tem mais de 80 anos e a senhora tem mais que 70. São doente os dois. Depois que fez a expansão eles não tem a água limpa mais no rio a água fica suja tem que levar água de caminhão para eles.

Rajiv: eles tem alguma relação com a empresa?

Elena: a empresa fica ROLANDO e ROLANDO e nunca cumpre vai lá não cumpre não resolve é problema deles. Eles não podem plantar mais porque tem medo e pensam que em qualquer hora vão ter que sair. Eles não tem....antes o ônibus passava lá e voltava para trazer-los e cobrava passagem hoje não passa mais. Eles tem que pagar um carro para levar-los trazer para Paracatu e levar-los. Para você conversar com um deles para ver a situação que eles vivem lá. É uma situação muito humilhante e muito triste. Então se eles tem o dinheiro eles podem comprar isso lá não só deles mas de todo mundo nessa região me entendeu porque eles estão pedidos a tomar água potável. Quando eles vem para a cidade eles pagam um carro para trazer-los e levar-los.

Rajiv: Eles ainda não tem água potável?

Elena: Eles usavam do rio para lavar, banhar e beber. Hoje não pode mais a RPM manda levar. Fica assim “a nós estamos cumprimos com nosso PAPEL” não somos nada para eles.

Rajiv: Mas não estão levando água para eles?

Elena: Estão levando água mas água de caminhão PIPA. Quem garante da onde vem essa água? Pode ser água contaminada.

Rajiv: É a água que vem na garrafa?

Elena: Não é água que vem na caminhão. É um caminhão que tem um depósito. Então eles me procuraram. Eu procurei essa pessoa que tinha a relação com a comunidade o Pedro que foi embora agora..

Rajiv: é agora tem a Fadwa ne?

Elena: chegou a Fadwa é.

Rajiv: conhece a Fadwa?

Elena: conheço a Fadwa.

Rajiv: e como ela é?

Elena: é uma pessoa.....ela vai falar para você o que a empresa manda ela falar. Entendeu? Então assim eu conheço a Fadwa, conheci o Pedro que foi embora.

Rajiv: e antes estava o Marcelo Coelho?

Elena: Marcelo Coelho uma pessoa muita boa também. Muita boa. Então levei o Pedro até a casa desse casal de idosos fora da cidade e o Pedro assumiu o compromisso de cuidar deles, Pedro foi embora e não resolveu e os velhos estão lá. Agora tem a chuva. Um dia eles pagaram uma pessoa de carro da cidade quando eles iam era de noite o motorista tem a perna mecânica o carro parou num lugar cheio de água e o água veio vindo veio vindo e os dois velhos dentro do carro não dava conta porque tem a perna mecânica e não dava conta de andar direito. Até pareceu outro carro que os tirou de lá. Então olha a situação Rajiv.

Rajiv: nossa.....e a Kinross sabia disso?

Elena: SABE disso sabe porque eu tava presente quando o casal contou para o Pedro e não entendeu? E até hoje não tomaram uma decisão nenhuma.

(Interruption – different work related conversation with daughter).

Elena: então Rajiv essa é minha opinião.

Rajiv: muito obrigado é muito valido pois eu quero entender quais são as percepções de atores importantes sobre a mineradora e especialmente sobre as relações. Porque eu acho que não sempre as comunidades querem receber dinheiro, dinheiro, dinheiro eles também querem ter uma relação e aqui com o que você me falou esta parecendo que a empresa não tem uma boa relação.

Elena: ela tem assim relação com a faculdade Atenas e com a prefeitura lá com presidente da câmara se precisar de alguma coisacom comunidade.

Rajiv: mas o que que é comunidade para você?

Elena: os moradores os vizinhos tem muitas reclamações dos vizinhos muitas mesmo.

Rajiv: e ninguém reclamou para a prefeitura?

Elena: GRITA mas não escuta ninguém escuta

Rajiv: Não escuta

Elena: Não escuta

Rajiv: mas a prefeitura não escuta?

Elena: A prefeitura pode fazer muito POUCO a autorização nao vem do município e do governo federal e eles estão cumprindo todas as normas

Rajiv: entendi. Agora eles tem um processo com os quilombolas ne?

Elena: Tem mas não faz comunidade crescer comunidade desenvolver eles falam que faz você vai lá você vai ver os projetos são muito PEQUENOS tem que dar uma escola lá dentro da comunidade para conhecer a sua historia eu vou lá hoje para DOAR um acordeão porque eles não tem

Rajiv: Nossa

Elena: Aí o que eles falam assim que a comunidade não tem conhecimento do que precisa de fato mas um antropólogo sabe o que a comunidade precisa SABE.

Rajiv: se entende e sabe disso conversando com a comunidade entendendo a cultura e historia dela e do que ela vai precisar

Elena: Então se esta perdendo as tradições deles se esta perdendo TODO, as roupas típicas, a dança é um sacrifício eu vou lá as 6:30pm hoje as 18 horas pretendo sair daqui aí vou pegar o rapaz do projeto e volto lá é pertinho daqui eu tenho que voltar as 7:30 porque tenho um compromisso não sei que hora e amanhã saio a madrugada para Belo Horizonte. Então se quiser a gente vai juntos para a Quilombola.

Rajiv: Eu quero sim ir para lá. Que tem a ver com a empresa se eles estão perdendo a cultura deles?

Elena: Tem a ver porque se a empresa fala que vai ajudar o que que é bairro? O que é mais importante para você? Não é sua historia? Suas raízes? E o que que fica da raiz? Não é a questão dos tradições? Então eles vão te mostrar o que eles fazem mas o resultado existe lá. Vamos dar para eles um acordeão um instrumento tradicional para eles porque eles não TEM as roupas deles são (não entendível) eles não tem um espaço para ELES mesmo assim instrutores, pesquisadores por conta deles não tem para tomar conta da historia deles e transformar-los em como que se fala...empreendedores dentro da associação...(answers the phone, attends to other issues at office, more phone calls and interview ends. Shortly after we go to the “Quilombo São Domingos”).

Ana: A mineradora deixava crianças das escolas entrar e conhecer a as operações. Eles tentavam a todo custo mostrar para a gente que eles não agrediam.

Rajiv: Porque eles faziam isso?

Ana: Eu acho talvez para a gente ter uma boa visão e para não estar em contra da situação.

Rajiv: Entendi

Ana: Então eu acho que o governo deve de alguma certa forma ser beneficiado pelo Kinross.

Rajiv: Então porque você acha que agora a Kinross já não convida mais os crianças para ver as operações?

Ana: eu acho porque não é interessante.....no inicio do Kinross eles tinham uma abertura maior com a população tinha algumas pessoas que lidavam com a população da cidade e dessa maneira acho que as pessoas se davam melhor agora eles se fecharam.

Rajiv: Porque se fecharam você acha?

Ana: Não sei talvez porque já não seja mais de interesse deles ter contato com a população ou porque já eles conseguiram o que queriam.

Rajiv: Entendi. A gente sabe que eles tem a pareceria com a hospital e faz algumas outras atividades sociais. Em quanto a relação mais humanas parece que não ta?

Ana: Eu não sei até que ponto esse parceria é só dar dinheiro, por exemplo eu te dou aqui 100,000 reais e pronto acabou não vou manter porque é fácil construir hospital o difícil é manter no dia a dia ne. E também imagino o que são 100,000 reais pro que eles tiram daqui porque eles deparam...nao sei....nao estou julgando mas não sei como se eles deparam todo (diferente conversa com outras pessoas).....eu imagino que 100,000 reais para eles não devem ser nada.

Rajiv: Que identidade você daria para a mineradora, como a descreveria?

Ana: se tivesse que descrever a identidade da Kinross.....seria como vampiro porque é muito fácil ludibriar e iludir as pessoas de ahhh da mesma forma de quando era criança e visitei e falaram “não a gente vai retirar o ouro mas a gente vai reflorestar replantar tudo”

Rajiv: Você acreditava?

Ana: Não não acreditava eles não deixava a gente visitar algumas partes não respondeu algumas perguntas.

Rajiv: mas é interessante como você falou, algumas pessoas na cidade talvez muitas pessoas não concordariam com você talvez são mais pobres e eles não questionam.

Ana: não tem acesso na informação

Rajiv: não tem acesso por exemplo quando cheguei aqui na cidade fui almoçar num restaurante e a moça daí me perguntou sobre o que estava fazendo aqui e eu expliquei que era um pesquisador sobre a mineradora e ela respondeu que a mineradora dá muito emprego e que na casa dela tem duas pessoas trabalhando nela e tem medo de perder o emprego se algo acontece na mineradora.

Ana: (chamada telefônica)..... mas as vezes também Rajiv as pessoas ficam sem opção por exemplo eles querem comprar uma parte de uma fazenda de alguém que é pobre mas tem aquela fazenda e tem ali sua identidade e a vida toda.

Rajiv: isso a identidade

Ana: uma pessoa que não imagina nunca ver por exemplo 60,000 reais as vezes 60,000 reais para essa pessoa é muita coisa. A terra dele vale trinta. A empresa oferece 60,000 ele SAIM.

Rajiv: o dinheiro que manda ne? Mas parece que os quilombas não são tão assim.

Ana: Não porque dentro daí eles tem muitas pessoas que tem acesso ao informação. E eles lutam para manter aquilo. Eu não sei eu acho assim como dizer eles podem entrar com processo. Acho que vai levar uns 60 ou 70 anos até que eles não estão vivos mais...e talvez já a mineradora fez o que queria ne. (Pausa para conversar com colegas durante alguns minutos).

Rajiv: mas eu não entendo porque a empresa era melhor antes e mais aberto.

Ana: não que era melhor eles conseguiram talvez iludir..assim a população e hoje eles ne mais se falam

Rajiv: entendi. Eles convidavam as pessoas para falar e eram mais participativos.

Ana: Isso. Agora tanto que não tem engenheiros e nenhum engenheiro é daqui e aqui existem muitos engenheiros assim esses cargos mais altos....hoje é a Fadwa ne antes era a

Nadia Caldas uma jornalista formada numa universidade federal da Brasília muito bem conceituada e era daqui hoje em dia nem ela esta. Varias pessoas saíram gente que não é de Paracatu que veio trabalhar mas eles se demitiram porque não aceitavam mais a política de Kinross.

Rajiv: a política de ter as portas abertas?

Ana: antes era mais aberto, eu não se de alguma brigas internas....essas duas pessoas que tinham contato com a população não aceitavam mais a política deles e se demitiram gente que tinha dez anos trabalhando na empresa.

Rajiv: Você conseguiu falar com a Nadia depois?

Ana: Não mas ela é minha prima.

Rajiv: essa é sua prima a Nadia?

Ana: sim.

Rajiv: ela te conversou sobre isso?

Ana: Não eu não perguntei. E isso foi recente. E ela vai casar com um dos chefes de lá. Mas ela brigou com lá e não aceitou. Eu não sei qual foi a briga dela mas.....de duas outras pessoas que não aceitavam a política. Eles foram em contra e eles saíram.

Rajiv: é uma pena que são mais próximas da cidade.

Ana: Eu assim, eu imagino que eles poderiam ajudar eles tiram tanto que já destroem tanto fazem todas as coisas ruins que eles poderiam tentar a começar de outra forma que ajudasse com o desenvolvimento da cidade.

Rajiv: isso

Ana: porque eles patrocinam algumas festas essas coisas. Você vai conversar com alguém lá?

Rajiv? Da empresa?

Ana: é

Rajiv: eu quero muito mas não sei se vou conseguir entrar mandei muitos emails mas não retornam liguei também desde são Paulo e nunca atendem. A Fadwa nunca responde os emails para mim.

Ana: eu já ouvi dizer que não é muito simpática

Rajiv: Você tentou falar com eles?

Ana: Quatro anos atrás. Você vai perceber quando falar com eles e como se tudo fosse um teatro é com roteiro decorado que eles vão falar que isso, isso, isso que vai trazer esses benefícios (cantando e rindo) meio propaganda sabe então não tem credibilidade

Interviewee Code C4 – David – Head of Afro-Brazilian culture NGO

Rajiv: o que você acha sobre as relações da mineradora Kinross com a comunidade e os quilombos em particular?

David: a relação a questão a questão em pauta é mineradora com os quilombos eu não sei você....já tem....conhecimento das formas do quilombo?

Rajiv: não ontem eu visitei um....

David: São Domingos?

Rajiv: sim São Domingos

David: a principio quilombos brasileiros era onde os negros fugiam. Tinha alguns quilombos grandes no Brasil. E depois quando houve a libertação dos escravos que os senhores e os donos da fazenda foram obrigados a mandar eles ir embora. Ai eles procuraram um refugio um lugar que ninguém queria. Ai foi o que aconteceu em Paracatu. Esse pessoal procurou esse lugar que ninguém queria que hoje a Kinross quer muito. Fizeram essa pesquisa da Kinross. A Kinross tem 20 anos aqui mas com pesquisa e tudo que eu sou daqui dez anos antes de começar o manejo e trabalhar dez anos antes eles já tinham pesquisa. Furavam o chão eles viam com homens em caminhão.

Rajiv: isso sem consultar aos quilombos?

David: Não. Ele furava tudo na cidade. Toda cidade. Aí passou por aquele campo lá. Aí pegava o 2:10 de terra e levava para analisar. Aí depois disso constatou que o morro de ouro como chama lá que é o setor de três comunidades quilombolas (são domingos, amaros e machadinho) aí constatou aquilo. Mas ao princípio era só morro que eles já desceram com isso já tá bem baixo... a terra o ouro aqui é céu aberto né? Mas todos os dias eles soltam uma bomba.

Rajiv: as quatro horas né?

David: as quatro horas. Quando vento tá para lá eles soltam aquela bomba e põem aquela que fica no aeroporto...se chama.....aqui se chama..... um “quadorzao” que dá a coisa do vento aí quando vira para lá eles soltam a bomba.

A relação...era... no mínimo uma relação respeitosa era respeitosa era respeitar e tudo porque os quilombos foram reconhecidos pelo governo federal. Nós temos um instituto que fizemos de “Fala Negra” que faz parte desse processo todo. O que é quilombo, porque que é chamado de quilombo, porque que aí é quilombo. Aí nós trazemos pesquisadores para fazer o questionário para ver e depois nós fizemos... a “Fala Negra” fez o questionário e todo fizemos em 85 comunidades em Minas Gerais e cinco aqui em Paracatu. Aí foi lá buscou o que que bebe, que come que planta o que que canta aí levantou a identidade. Depois que levantou a identidade.

Rajiv: foi há 5 anos atrás?

David: não, mais já estamos com 10 anos. Ai vieram os antropólogos de Brasília então sim esse questionário tiver preenchido corretamente é uma comunidade quilombola e dança, todas elas dançam, todas elas cantam.....

Porque que essas três comunidades quilombolas ficaram ali? Porque ali tinha um córrego em São Domingos onde se lavava ouro é a sobrevivência deles.....aqui também na praia do córrego rico aqui também é um espécie de quilombo os donos os proprietários aqui em Santana são tudo negro no meu tempo de criança era tudo negro tudo negro tudo negro tudo negro quase tudo parente tudo negro negro (explica mais sobre a historia do bairro).....eles vediam o ouro do córrego.

É dizer o patrão que dava comida e aqui meu pai ele fez um clube de negro, um clube de negro porque não podiam entrar na sociedade de maneira nenhuma aqui.

Rajiv: depois da abolição de escravos?

David: DEPOIS da ABOLIÇÃO aqui é ainda hoje extremamente preconceituoso

Rajiv: dá para notar estou aqui no Brasil há um ano e meio

David: pois é aqui no Paracatu é um dos mais preconceituoso

Rajiv: pensei que seria menos por causa dos quilombolos.

David: NAO. A afro descendência aqui tem 65%

Rajiv: dá para ver. Então vocês são a maioria aqui.

David: a grande MAIORIA se pode ver. Ainda tem um detalhe...Negro na prefeitura tem pouco.....a câmara dos vereadores daqui (explica sobre o dia de emancipação) só teve dois vereadores aqui em Paracatu

Rajiv: imagino que se um negro fosse candidato para ser vereador seria eleito como você ne?

David: mas acontece o seguinte..que os negros, tem muito negro sentado aqui na praça um para falar aqui....ele não fala não não vai falar tem medo se você pega o microfone ai os brancos tudo fala mas os negros não falam. Isso cai acima da historia e da política então negro é criado pelos pais “não vai não você é preto! não vai não porque eles te vão chamar a atenção.” Minha mãe dizia assim “se vai num aniversario mas se te oferece alguma coisa se come.....nao chega perto da mesa. Fica lá fora” você me esta entendendo? E A CRIAÇÃO

A escravidão do Brasil tem 123 anos só. A Inglaterra obrigou a princesa gritar e daí veio a historia de “só para inglês ver”.

Rajiv: existe legislação no Brasil que protege muito as pessoas negras ne?

David: Mas como tudo aqui no Brasil tem lei mas não cumpre tem lei mas não cumpre. A lei federal do 1978 fala que tem direito a terra aquele quilombola. Mas acontece que aqui não funciona a terra é dos quilombolas a Kinross entrou ela foi notificada pela INCRA até hoje não acertou nada ai leva no embrulho é só para inglês ver ai quando tem um fica mandando sabendo da situação eles trocam ele manda ele embora ai chega outro eu não sei nada chega o maior inocente do mundo me explica isso? Quando eles acaba de explicar eles trocam tudo ai mais um ano torna trocar torna trocar então não existe conflito armado porque os negros são tímidos.

Rajiv: lá nas quilombolas?

David: Sim nas quilombolas.

Rajiv: (Expliquei sobre minha visita de ontem na quilombola e como estão a favor de trabalhar com a empresa)

David: mas sabe porque eles te falaram isso? Porque tem gente trabalhando na mineradora. O que estão fazendo? Estão eliminando estão acabando com o movimento quilombola. A gente vai fazer a festa aqui no dia 20 a zumbi da palmares mais importante que o dia da libertação muito mais importante para nós.....quando vc pede uma ajuda a Kinross não tem vontade nenhum para ajudar. Porque? Para fortalecer, o negro não quer fortalecer o negro. Ai o prefeito também leva dinheiro também se foi lá fazer um ofício inclusive trabalho na prefeitura trabalho no museu.....o prefeito também mora dentro da terra dos quilombolas

Rajiv: o prefeito da cidade Paracatu mora na terra dos quilombos?

David: sim o prefeito daqui. Tem uma fazenda lá ele não tem interesse nenhum em ajudar os quilombas..... Como se diz formiga em inglês? (compara “ant” com anta).....O prefeito não gostou que fizesse uma reunião no museu para resgatar a cultura quilombola. Meu pai ele tem uma bandeira, uma caixa e um acordeão isso é da raça do costume. Que acontece? Vai ser terminado.

As pessoas estão sofrendo estão com dificuldades. Me manda um DVD se quilombos e explica sobre a história deles de como alguém morreu. A Kinross o achou caído e tentou o ajudar mas morreu no hospital e cabo. A questão é isso não tem NINGUEM que engole Kinross não tem ninguém.

Evani...a elegeram errada a Cristina é minha amiga sabe o que fala é consciente foi a primeira presidente que colocamos depois entrou a Evani.....quem toca o processo do Kinross não é o quilombola é o governo federal.

Nos que começamos todo o processo levamos as pessoas para a Brasília, Recife, Maceió aprender sobre a cultura quilombola e conhecer outros.....nao se pode trabalhar pensando.....que deu beneficio e não aderi. A kinross reuniu todo o mundo aqui em Paracatu, a empresa sabe que esta errada, mudou de idéia porque ia dar tumulto foi só a metade, a não foi muita gente então vai ser a metade da metade. Ultimamente eles estão reunindo com quatro ou cinco quilombola e o advogado eles nunca vão ganhar. Hoje mesmo a 1 hora da tarde tem uma reunião ai me chamaram para ir lá mas eu não vou não pertence ao grupo quilombola.

Rajiv: seu papel é de fortalecer a cultura?

David: FORTALECER meu papel seria de colocar muita gente, comida típica para pessoal ver que o grupo esta forte mas ele a Kinross foi minando tirando pessoal hoje está conversando com cinco pessoas. Com duas pessoas de cada quilombola.

Falei para eles que a empresa tem medo de nós juntos. De um a um eles pisa igual a uma formiga igual ao “ant” pisou igual “ant” cabo. Agora se vem subindo na roupa você tem que sair correndo.

Rajiv: Percebi que estão dividindo a comunidade

David: EXATAMENTE! E ali na Machadinho sabe o que fizeram? Tem lá uma terrinha pequeno 1 a 2 hectares que o dono pensava que era 10,000 reais eles mandava outra pessoa comprar por 30. Ele vende. A Kinross tira ouro toneladas de ouro.

Rajiv: as relações entre a empresa e os quilombolas são boas?

David: eu até disse que em nossa posição de necessitados devemos ter um cuidado maior. O subsolo é do governo federal quem da licença ambiental gera dinheiro para o governo nos temos que ir comendo junto no prato com eles tem uma lei que ampara.

Rajiv: qual seria a solução ou situação ideal?

David: o governo fazer a empresa cumprir e lei só isso o artigo 68 e todos. Primeiro era descobrir os quilombos. Segundo identificar os quilombos. Terceiro relacionou a todos os

quilombos e ter relação com todas as pessoas eu tenho ele mas não tenho. O antropólogo ficou um ano aqui ficou sabendo da onde eles vieram o que bebiam, o que comiam, que cantavam. Então eles o governo tem que bater o martelo porque estão na ultima instancia tem que bater o martelo ya tem que só bater o martelo bater o martelo quer dizer o INCRA desapropriar porque eles tem dinheiro para pagar.

Os amaro alem de ser quilombola eles tem escritura. A terra é deles e o histórico. É tudo irregular e vai acabando com a gente.

Rajiv: você prefere que os quilombas fiquem ai ou vão para outro lugar?

David: não podem porque tem as raízes ai os ancestrais enterrados ai. Nasceu lá a pessoal. A situação ideal.....é a empresa entrou e pagar eles por mês pagar eles por mês como royalty em quanto eles estiver lá e devolver para eles o resto o que foi demarcado. Os Amaro tem 966 hectares. Tem muitas fazendas. Isso aqui pertence aos quilombolas. (Ele entra em detalhes legais sobre o processo de venda de terreno e propriedade e como estão sendo prejudicados obrigados a vender para a empresa sendo desapropriados).

Eles ficam empurrando com a barriga não resolve nada....para inglês ver também para inglês ver.....eu fiz uma estratégia lá mudei essa parte mandeisua historia é ai na índia a MINHA É AQUI. A gente levava muitos palestrantes, levava eles para o sul para Rio Grande do Sul para Rio de Janeiro ai encontrar com outros lá ver que estava acontecendo.

Rajiv: a empresa não entende seu discurso?

David: NAO a empresa é CAPITALISTA e capitalista só quer capital

Rajiv: não esta interessada na historia dos quilombolos?

David: NAO não tem interesse nenhum no Maximo se tiver todo o mundo juntos mas começo a fracionar que só vai receber dois ou só uma

Rajiv: porque essa empresa tem uma política forte de ser um bom vizinho

David: (explica como a empresa cresceu). Você foi lá?

Rajiv: não não fui ainda mas quero sim

David: vai lá se vai ser a monstruosidade

Rajiv: eu vi desde o ônibus e da faculdade Atenas o tamanho e é grande

David: é muito grande. Se você foi perguntar a faculdade Atenas eles não interessem. Eu já falei lá com eles para criar alguma coisa lá sobre a “anemia falciforme”

Rajiv: anemia falciforme? O que é isso?

David: se não sabe? É a doença congênita do negro. Ela vem da África só tem negro. Hoje o Brasil tem o teste pezinho quando o menino nasce a enfermeira vai lá e “puff” com a agulha tira sangue e pinga na lamina para ver se ele tem anemia falciforme. Se ele tiver ele vai ser uma criança que não vai direito. Se eu tiver eu sou uma pessoa indesejável na cidade (explica sobre os globos vermelhos e brancos e como é erídano). Essa criança morre com 3 anos. Mas tem tratamento. O governo sabe disso mas fala que é o negro que trouxe a doença da África defendendo da malária. (Explica sobre a doença na sangue). Quem tem sofre muito. Eu pedi a Atenas participar mas não deu resposta.

Rajiv: como você vê o tema da identidade do quilombo e negro? Você acha que a empresa está ajudando ou prejudicando a essa identidade?

David: está PREJUDICANDO PREJUDICANDO

Rajiv: então daqui a 50 anos talvez a cultura e identidade dos quilombos desapareça?

David: eles estão fazendo tudo para isso.

Rajiv: a empresa quer fazer isso? Fica na interesse dele?

David: o que não está ajudando está atrapalhando.

Rajiv: ajudando o que?

David: a cultura do negro pode ajudar a RPM? Não nada. Então para eles se não esta ajudando está atrapalhando.

Rajiv: mas ontem percebi com um grupo de quilombos que estavam a favor da empresa e a gente deu um acordeão

David: deu acordeão? Eu di um acordeão para eles há pouco tempo. Lá é o grupo todos tem a casa rachado. Essa Evani é uma metida intelectual trata as pessoas muito mal eu deixei de ir lá eu gosto da dona Cristina as vezes vou nas festas. A Evani não consegue reunir uma só pessoa. Tem muito problema interno. Vão ter eleição agora e eu estou querendo que mude a diretoria. Para ser eleita ela mudou a estatuto inteira não pode fazer isso.

Rajiv: Ela se preocupe pela cultura e identidade quilombola?

David: não lá é outro grupo. A empresa cortou a água co cachoeira deles. Isso é bom parceiro? E também deu um “combi” velho. Eu consegui 20,000 reais para reformar essa casa lá na comunidade.

Rajiv: então você acha que eles estão sendo comprados pela empresa?

David: de certa fora sim. (chega um amigo de David na praça e conversa sobre a religião espiritualismo)

Rajiv: O que você acha sobre a mineradora

Amigo de David: Causa muito impacto social, ambiental cultural.....

David: (me convida para igreja espiritual dele e como preocupava sobre o meio ambiente e tem corrente indiano durante 5 minutos)

Rajiv: mas.....em quanto ao impacto da mineradora você me estava contando que é muito ne?

Joao Batista: é muito GRANDE! O que começa errado termina errado mudar de lugar não tem como.

David: aqui no bairro Santana tem muitas pessoas trabalhando na empresa. (me corrige na pronúncia da palavra “Quilomba”).....o nome dele é bem difícilRajiv

Joao Batista: Raaajeeviii? Você é que?

Rajiv: estou fazendo meu doutorado sobre as percepções entre as mineradoras e a comunidade.

David: ela é boa porque não tem jeito de reação

Rajiv: não entendi isso de “reação”?

David: que se a gente pudesse chegar lá e torcer a pescoço dela mas a gente não pode

Rajiv: a então a empresa está dominando ne?

David: sim DOMINA por isso que é boa

Rajiv: então ela consegue fazer o que quiser?

David: O QUE QUISE não só com os negros, não só com os quilombolas mas com a cidade inteira

Joao Batista: é autoritária

David: um comercio vende mais por causa da mineradora eles vende mais por causa da mineradora. Se tiver um filho e ele trabalha lá eu não preciso dar mais para ele. Então eu sou favor da mineradora.

Rajiv: isso esta acontecendo ne?

David: isso esta acontecendo

Rajiv: então estão dando a prioridade no dinheiro sobre a cultura ne?

David: isso estão matando a cultura. Ai eu vou falar que a mineradora é ruim? Mesmo sendo um quilombola?

Rajiv: isso aconteceu com o grupo de ontem eu acho.

David: EXATAMENTE. Agora se não tivesse nada para eles. Então a mineradora faz exatamente essa jogada. Eu emprego seu filho, eu trato bem a seu filho.

Rajiv: todos os quilombos tem filhos trabalhando na mineradora ou existem alguns que não tem?

David: é RARO.

Rajiv: porque queria falar com um grupo de quilombos que estão em contra da mineradora.

David: é raro, é raro porque aquele que faz doce e salgado vende mais para pessoa que vem da mineradora.

Rajiv: você concordaria que o seguinte: as pessoas da Paracatu dão mais prioridade pelo lado econômico que pelo lado social, cultural e ambiental?

David: com certeza com certeza porque se não tivessem ainda tem outra coisa as funções lá de alto nível não é de pessoal daqui.

Rajiv: são todos de fora ne?

David: sim todos de fora. O sub emprego é do povo de Paracatu.

Rajiv: e eles aceitam?

David: eles aceitam porque não tem outro. Mas em quanto isso estão fazendo uma casa fazendo não sei que ai vem a RPM ai dá brinquedos dá outra coisa e fica feliz.

Joao Batista: Paracatu é uma colônia moderna.

Rajiv: o que é uma colônia moderna?

Joao Batista: é uma colônia da empresa.

David: tem outra coisa. Eu trouxe aqui uma jornalista da da da fora chama “Raymond Coutts” ele é inglês porque a barragem..... a pessoal da cidade roubava sacos e terra e lavava no quintal e tirava bastante ouro e a Kinross andava matando uns deles.

Rajiv: matando?

David: MATANDO!

Rajiv: quando foi isso?

David: seis ou oito anos atrás. Ai eu trouxe essa agencia aqui e ele fez uma reportagem sobre uma mulher que mataram os dois filhos dela pegando o rejeito.

Rajiv: e quem matou?

David: a segurança da empresa

Rajiv: ela tentou processar a empresa?

David: o juiz e delegado recebem dinheiro. A empresa comprou uma fazenda para a mulher. Deu para ela tudo para calar boca ne? Para ela ficar calada. Então a Kinross é maior do que as pessoas pensam aqui em Paracatu. Maior que o governo.

Rajiv: ela que manda aqui.

David: ela que manda. Então esse “combi” que leva os meninos para o colégio hoje é por causa dos pais trabalhando na empresa. A poluição do cianeto é enorme. A poluição aqui deve matar muita gente aqui.

Rajiv: a empresa vai embora ne daqui a 30 anos?

David: NAO VAI NAO. Porque tudo aqui tem outro.

Rajiv: mas ela não pode entrar aqui no centro ne?

David: QUE NAO PODE ENTRAR? PODE! Ela vem comprando comprando

Rajiv: Vai comprar a cidade inteira?

David: VAI COMPRAR A CIDADE INTEIRA SE TIVER OURO. Ela vai sempre pagar mais para as casas e comprar. Eles tem dinheiro!

Rajiv: mas a empresa tem política de ser responsável com os vizinhos isso esta no site de internet da empresa

David: AAAAA ISSO E BALELA

Rajiv: O que é “balala”?

David: só para inglês ver. Antes tinha só duas jornais na cidade e hoje tem doze. O 80% fala do Kinross.

Rajiv: Você conhece o site no internet de “alertaparacatu” que fala em contra da empresa Kinross? E o Sergio Dani?

David: Essa é uma outra historia. Eu não sou bobo eu já viajei para a Japão e outros países quando jogava futebol. O Sergio Dani ele é medico e fez umas reuniões ai na camara. Ai eu chamei ele para ajudar, ajuda com a doença porque até não tem atendimento em Paracatu com 65% descendente de Africano. Ai ele fez um movimento conseguiu dinheiro, pegou o dinheiro e foi embora. Ele esta na Alemanha. Primeiro ele pegou 500,000, depois 1 milhão.

Rajiv: e esse dinheiro veio da onde?

David: daqui e da Kinross

Amigo de David: a TODAPODEROSA

David: e para ele ficar calado mandou ele para ALEMANHA. Fez o mesmo com a senhora que perdeu os dois filhos para calar. Então o Sergio Dani para mim não vale ele não ajudou ele foi embora com dinheiro para Alemanha. Quando o dinheiro acaba ele vem de novo procurando dinheiro. (repete historia sobre doença anemia falciforme) nos fizemos lá na “fala negra” uma pesquisa tinha 40 pessoas com anemia falciforme dessas pessoas só tem 26 vivos o resto já morreu por falta de tratamento.

Joao Batista: o manda é a maioria ne? Só que tem uma coisa se a maioria não esta certo não. Ele pode estar errado.

Rajiv: Lógico. Pelo que estou ouvindo essa maioria estar sendo comprado?

David: esta sendo COMPRADA, COMPRADA, COMPRADA

Amigo de David: a empresa é tão grande que toda família tem uma pessoa trabalhando nela e a empresa manda a família CALAR

David: melhorou a situação em casa, o cara tem credito

Rajiv: o crescimento da cidade viu mais pessoas da fora chegando de mau de obra baixa? Isso teve algum impacto social na cidade?

David: A droga ta terrível

Rajiv: isso se pode vincular com a empresa?

David: PODE a circulação do dinheiro faz isso (explica sobre os impactos da droga na cidade). No ano passado morreram 60 moleques que vendiam drogas 60. (uma senhora na rua pergunta onde vive a senhora Cristina que faz bolos).

Joao Batista: A RPM não estava preparada receber a Kinross EM TODA SENTIDO

Rajiv: em quais sentidos por exemplo?

Joao Batista: POLITICAMENTE, AMBIENTALMENTE se ela fosse preparada ela não fosse desse tipo.....na folga os funcionários colocam uniforme para fazer compra. ESTAVAM DE FOLGA USAVAM UNIFORME

Rajiv: porque?

João Batista: e porque a companhia pedia para divulgar

Rajiv: Nossa

João Batista: eu te pergunto você tem um comércio se você vende para mim e sou da RPM sou garante de pagamento. A empresa tem convenio. Para quem você vai vender? Para Ele ou para mim que sou da empresa?

David: se você chega numa loja hoje e quer comprar te pedem fazer ficha e perguntam onde você trabalhar, se você fala na Kinross te fala “AA não precisa fazer ficha”

Rajiv: Entendi. É um tipo de discriminação ne

João Batista: mas para o vendedor é melhor e garante a comissão

Rajiv: isso acontece por causa do dinheiro ne?

João Batista: é o DINHEIRO

David: você já sabe eu estou aqui e no museu e pode me procurar.

Interviewee Code – C6 – Claudia – Resident and Social Entrepreneur, Paracatu

Rajiv: What do you think about the relationships that have the city / community with mining?

Claudia: The relation of weak I think both sides, the side of the people is not 100% organized to fight for what she calls, then there is a certain unreadiness of the population in question to go in search of what is their desire and a also little knowledge of what is possible than is legal question of knowledge even know, is like the great philosophers tell us we must know the enemy to know with what weapons we fight them and this is rarely done when it is done and the few that do not end up bearing the pressure ends up being a fight in the popular saying cat fight.

Rajiv: Who is the big dog the company? A poodle ...

Claudia: almost exactly ... it's a kitten, and the company, then I do not see it the true and real effort to be against giving the game is that it will add value to the community then most of the company's stock is not if it did not have more all her actions to the community I've attended I've ever envisioned and that I had the opportunity to be close is very misleading, in 2009 here, I've been always very close and inserted within these very legal lawsuits.

Rajiv: Are these legal lawsuits from the Quilombolas?

Claudia: With mining in the community.

Rajiv: What the community or Quilombola Paracatu?

Claudia: The Community of Paracatu, city,

Rajiv: So, since 2009

Claudia: I'm saying the word community in question I used this time towards the city Paracatu

Rajiv: this is interesting, you worked with, followed and saw the company

Claudia: yes we have made several proposals for change as coping with the community and you realize some things that have been altered, have been improved.

Rajiv: Like what?

Claudia: a large grain of sand in the middle of the beach, you know.....well then, the relationship between the town and Kinross is more or less at the level of government public policy some time ago,

Rajiv: How's that?

Claudia: very misleading,

Rajiv: deceitful, how do they deceive?

Claudia: they pretend they do, what they do causes people to be in need of their help, instead of teaching people to fish they give them chewed fish.

Rajiv: I understand, but this is exactly what the company says it will not do

Claudia: Yes but it is just what they have done, because then you get to come in this context you will analyze the historical question, you have several points crucial to this, there is a culture of beneficialism

Rajiv: yeah, in Brazil?

Claudia: In Brazil, and much has been cut Paracatu also taught that if the beneficiary is to be the issue of adding value to human beings for it with their efforts to seek alternatives to build your own world to build their bridge itself

Rajiv: training people

Claudia: yes to train them, to be inserted in the process of training a new instruction to be a new quest for a new opportunity, take people's heads so that I was born, grew well and I will die like this, and this mentality that we must change

Claudia: The mining itself has already paracatuense own culture, because it was always thus has some philosophers who speak of the matter is, nobody is what he wanted to be like that because someone taught you or induced you to be what you are

Rajiv: so its the environment as constructionists would say?

Claudia: Do you seek be what will be taught, as much as you give away more of what they teach you what is the root and the environment that you live that makes you, you have much more than you lived through that than you own, 100% of what a human would be at most 10% owned by us

Rajiv: is the philosophy of social constructionism?

Claudia: it is exactly socialism, then so we have educational institutions, government, private companies, all of us in society have the responsibility of the environment that we live within this co-responsibility I do not see the mining effort to change that reality on the contrary, the more they stay that way for us I best repayment of what is my duty and do not need to heat the head with what it takes, 'cause our Brazilian law they are open and many double meaning and will give too much interests or according to what each play, this is the great truth, as our law is very open to what will happen, the company that actually has a responsibility towards the social and economic importance that it mainly engages in this issue companies that are involved with social and environmental issue,

she will play her socio-economic environment, I only to the extent the law "requires" pq our law and loose enforcement has little to our law, has a double understood, in fact it should be the watchdog some in society and then, since our legal process and slow and full opening, and then who want to enjoy this advantage and the less people knew and understood the subject better for the entrepreneur because fewer headaches he has, will have less population pressure, the population will not know what to collect charges and will charge the wrong way, it does not oblige the authorities to do this pq charging the wrong way, there is all these factors, has a range of historical factors that this relationship is weak, morbid, failed, and I would say that it is untrue

Rajiv: untrue?

Claudia: False

Rajiv: Because very interesting what you talk, you talk all that the company Kinross speaks of it in policies, they want to teach people to fish, they want to teach people to be sustainable.

Claudia: Let me tell you one thing, as St. Francis of Assisi would say, between talking and doing is a great difference, one thing is I'm saying that I want to be just another thing I bear witness to life, I I do so be the first one who says it has to be the first to run, 'cause the ear closer to that of the speaker that this is defending whom? It is not who's ahead or beside him who is his own, who is the feet of A or B is defending himself then it is that they have to put the first instance and sent to us human beings in general and Brazil is not just a matter of our world culture is someone I talk to do is wake up and go, the more I put myself to do this year was here on an open assembly hall where the Kinross participated judge federal prosecutors and state was very bad.

Rajiv For what was the company's position?

Claudia: the company, it omits a lot of things it invents a lot.

Rajiv: What do you mean by omit?

Claudia: Omit is when you do not speak neither yes nor no, if you omit, you out instead of you is lying on the fence, I do not suppose to tell you a lie I do not tell you the truth, wants to convince that the default is correct. So what has happened so questioned there, it's beautiful that you guys preach politics is very beautiful, just that this year many of our reality of what actually happens, the management policy for example, I commented to look there, and went and quoted including personal names were there, so and so are their employees, whenever we get something for him to solve the community he is willing to respond to people talk, more the result? I feel much more personal look at the company can only help you here so that way we will not be able to meet you

Rajiv, and does not explain why?

Claudia: No, it's because it's just business practice is a matter of the functional organization it does not work this is the great truth, if you bring her project up a mega project of \$ 50,000.00 it will not pay you, will not invest in your project only because it's only \$ 50,000.00 that the company invests, now let's combine what you make \$ 50,000.00 to restructure people, environment, culture, opening possibilities of creating opportunities for career growth prospects for people by humans.

Rajiv: you'd need about 10 of these projects, to actually make a difference

Claudia: \$ 50,000.00 from, you are knowledgeable, you are a scholar, can you? Is that enough?

Rajiv: It would work on a micro scale

Claudia: micro Very, very micro, you understand, then well, agent has already led several projects self-sustaining agent has the answer to is the same.

Rajiv: over \$ 50,000.00 that we do not work that way

Claudia: If you want it that way but

Claudia: Oh you have to get more partners, more waiting oh oh

Rajiv: Why seek a partner?

Claudia: I agree to seek partners because it is the duty, the wave of the moment today is a good wave and thank GOD, that fashion cool has to go right and have to take is the question of networking, you work in networks , you make the mass of brick and the brick I do so together we have built a wall.

Rajiv: yes

Claudia: uniting So it's going, building, sewing it all, and their question is not only the question of seeking partnership, which I very people question is do you have the obligation to invest more in the city which they invest is very much to just “ SHUT MOUTHS”

Rajiv: What is “shut mouths”? What is it enough for?

Claudia: to shut up the people

Rajiv: I understand, and it works right?

Claudia: the worst is it works it works so well, that's where I'm telling you the issue of context is the failure of the company but also has the cultural failure of social organization,

Rajiv: Civil society

Claudia: This understood, Why civil society is not united, it is not and where I speak of not being prepared to be searching for these network alternatives, including a process that we are now riding for now we will push them in and we have already started now until

the end, even they began to change some of them positions they had before, more then ever to get answers and talk more we invest hey, this is more bullshit

Rajiv: You are working with Sergio Dani?

Claudia: No, no, more if needed we can

Rajiv: I speak today in the morning with David, he has a similar vision

Claudia: This is how the society looks like this, A, B and C, everyone looking the same result, the more each one fighting alone, today we are making this concept together, dreamed a dream is only an illusion dreamed a dream together is achievement,

Rajiv: Over here in the city you here in town think their perception is the same as yours?

Claudia: Yes it is

Rajiv: Why people more humble and yesterday then this maroon community and I asked the same question to them

Claudia: which one? Santo Domingo

Rajiv: Yeah, Santo Domingo,

Claudia: You've had a chance to go there?

Rajiv: I went yesterday, and the first question I was expecting a response like yours, because they live very close and I asked how the relationships are what you think of the company? and relations are good and he is a very good partner agent wants to work with the company except that here the other maroon Evani not want to work, so we can not work the company is good is good-hearted

Claudia: You interviewed who?

Rajiv: A group of eight people, mainly women who spoke were

Claudia: Do you remember someone's name?

Rajiv: We gave an accordion

Claudia: Oh ok

Claudia, the more there if you talk to others, also is a little afraid, we were organizing a walk to paralyze the company for at least two hours, more staff will do next year, but I can not tell you, 'cause laughter agent will do even what that within these conversations

that agent is doing, which is what we see more people join barrier against is any activity, it is rare in Paracatu a family that has someone who works directly or indirectly to company, so afraid of shredding, so it'll be the rare times you find someone who works there or a close relative and that will have even more courage you taping, mining is reputed to be suspicious and we're even, if you had recorder and gone without this you would have gone with Elena harvested true things, now recorder, you is not here and with an accent, they will think you will know what to do with the information that will lead to them and the problems for me there is this fear

Rajiv: I noticed that they all have children working in the company, they want to work for the company, they do not want the children to be harmed.

Claudia: In 2009 there was a possibility of the company get out there and what the company has, brainwashing agent plays up, is because if you leave so many thousand people will lose their jobs, sooner or later it will happen, not ore is eternal, ore has to end date

Rajiv: 2041

Claudia: whatever it is that is has a date prior to end, 'cause the company so much that it draws from the city in such a negative image it leaves us, so many negative consequences, because if we consider a general balance of costs and benefits, Paracatu gets the negative impacts of mining

Rajiv: Oh, you think the overall balance is negative? Even considering the jobs they bring?

Claudia: well, well, considering the whole, the positive and negative part, if we put in the balance we are well above the negative to positive, the best part about it is those who are not in, to get the tax federal and gold we have is a single Congressman representing ourselves, get out there

Rajiv: But that will change, the city will receive 10%

Claudia: When God has mercy on us, and put a different mentality in the minds of rulers and even more in the minds of those who vote, because if we have, everyone has a leader who deserves it is not, the sentence is true, Who are we vote then we deserve everything bad and good because we who put them, sometimes people are the most was not me who voted or put the guy there, what it was you did not vote for the other, We are all very apathetic, I know, I

Rajiv: I've heard a lot about the Brazilian

Claudia: no, we are, we are a people great, wonderful, full of wisdom has no place in the world, I say this without fear of contradiction, creative people, dedicated, hardworking, diligent and wise as we do because we know all the best thing that's very true, any thing else in the world that you people are rather most of them can do something better and not worse of all worse than it appears to us, for our society we can do better, then agent a concept of life that you can not know, change the situation before you, which you outsource then switch on the situation in which this front, so that's where you can have a good relationship I have a good relationship with mining.

Rajiv: You have a good relationship?

Claudia: I have, it is necessary, we can not mix things up, is not 'cause she plays it I do not have to live well,

Rajiv: understood

Claudia: it is a necessary evil, suppose you is ill, a serious illness is something you can do but better than to live with it until a cure, you will live well

Rajiv: So you do not have any other option?

Claudia: no, it's the best option is to have another option, but it is the best option

Rajiv: So what's the other option?

Claudia: there you can have a bad relationship with the company, you have several options, choose the best more

Rajiv: what we were talking about yesterday in the maroon

Claudia: you can have a relationship neither here nor there, sitting on the fence, like if I come to me unless the beneficiary is not, and you can have a healthy relationship is that you know how to separate the wheat from the chaff, it is necessary, not to because they

are not 100% they should have done that I will not live as well give it destroys the left there's no way, so as you will struggle to improve, you have to know until you talk to, considering, you know how to deal have to know the situations that lead to the reality which we are placed and if I do not get along is complicated to do something about it, I have a good relationship with them, the agent works with a project with them,

Rajiv: Oh, there's a project?

Claudia: It has, more so, if you ask me what my satisfaction it is almost zero, despite my living

Rajiv: Why?

Claudia: because I do not think even one-third of the second half of their duty

Rajiv: I understand, and which is their obligation?

Claudia: to society, for starters I think they have to reverse this situation has changed a lot since improved a lot, really

Rajiv: Since when?

Claudia: seminar on the issue of their partnership, which is a form of investment projects in Paracatu, has changed a lot, this walking, is not what should be is not yet ideal, already walking over to it, congratulations here note 10. Let's look at everything in its place, the question of society as a whole is, there are some other things very important quality that could be done and more is set aside, or else do something here very badly done and puts everyone that she is doing and inhibits any other legal problem cool I think there are other ways to do it, do well and bring concrete results, please everybody 'cause she will not get neither Jesus did, more so , we will endeavor to do the best that's my thought is to make every one of them dialogue to become reality, 'cause all that talk is true 5% the rest put in the drawer and whip fire, you understand?

Rajiv: I understand?

Claudia: oh we did for the Quilombo community of St. Dominic and St. Antonio da Lagoa, there is a cool place for you to go, places the two projects with 300 thousand dollars

Rajiv: With money from mining?

Claudia: in close partnership with him for 100,000 For mining, I'm almost as disheveled calm nervous, I called the manager responsible partner has more ah? hey we made a presentation to them to explain the entire project with multiple people. (Interview stops as Max Munding, President of Neighbour Association arrives for our interview).

22nd November, Casa da Cultura kitchen. Conversation with Claudia Santos

Rajiv: the mine explain on their website all the different social activities in which they engage and participate in. Judging from the website they are doing a lot of things in the social sphere, and even claim to be responsible.....

Claudia: But they don't practice what they say! You don't ask a child if he's well behaved do you? You ask his parents!

Rajiv: Oh so you're saying Kinross just do Greenwashing?

Claudia: Yes, that's what they do with images of laughing children. They are a really cold company they never approach the community. They should engage with the local community. Nobody here will tell you that they are friendly. They just are about profits. My brother once went to work there and I told him it was a mistake, he shouldn't and he never listened..

Rajiv: So what happened?

Claudia: (laughing) he left after a few weeks he couldn't take it anymore, they were exploiting him and he told me I was right. I felt to happy that he left. I often thank god that I don't DEPEND on them and I can make a living from another industry by myself!

Rajiv: Estou fazendo o meu doutorado na Inglaterra sobre as percepções, sobre as relações entre as empresas mineradoras e as comunidades aqui no Brasil, América latina, então não estou procurando a verdade e sim as percepções sobre essa relação.

Interviewee Code – C7 – Max - Local Socialist community leader, Paracatu

Max: A realidade do momento e da vida

Raiv: a realidade de cada pessoa, cada pessoa tem uma verdade, mais eu queria entender bem o que vc

Max: nós e o seguinte, primeiro antes de vocês gravar você tem saber o seguinte, o movimento nosso nós estamos no terceiro setor, tem o primeiro setor que é pouco, tem o segundo setor e nos estamos no terceiro setor que e eu represento as associações de bairros, central das associações, hoje nos somos 35 associações de bairros legalizados mais os povoados que tem São Domingos, Lagoa e Cunha e são Sebastião que são 4 povoados que uma extensão de como se fosse um bairro mais são povoados mais próximos do meio rural, na verdade Paracatu é uma cidade que completo 213 anos, uma cidade histórica, se é histórica tem história e a história de Paracatu e a história de Paracatu justamente aqui nasceu por causa do Ouro.

Rajiv: Ah, nasceu por causa do ouro, sempre teve ouro?

Max: então e até hoje, por exemplo, na questão do minério, o ouro, então os primeiros habitantes aqui sabe que desde a época do início de Paracatu, hoje eu estou mais na história recente, no caso nosso, de população hoje não é diferente do mundo, estamos sofrendo os impactos ambientais, então os impactos ambientes hoje eles não refletem só nos grandes centros , ou nos países, então hoje nos estamos sofrendo a questão dos impactos ambientais e relativamente a questão da mineração e a história da mineração aqui ela por mais, hoje eu não sou contra a empresa, não trabalho contra para fechar a empresa ela não é boa para a história de Paracatu, porque, o que fica o que gera e o que faz na parte ambiental, social, cultural e da parte turística é quase nada pelo que representa da riqueza que esta saindo de um solo, de um município, maior que hoje o ouro é a moeda mais valorizada no mundo, com tanto contraste que hoje a gente vive hoje me Paracatu de não ter uma compensação social pela empresa

Rajiv: Mais eles falam que tem o objetivo de ser responsável pela comunidade e ambiente

Max: Hoje nós estamos no pior momento em relação da comunidade com a empresa, já se passou 20 anos e vai vir mais 30 anos e estamos assim no macro porque já sabemos como eles atuam, já sabemos o que eles fazem hoje nos estamos em plena discussão para saber o que vamos fazer daqui para frente, porque por exemplo, até hoje em relação a comunidade o que já tirou de ouro de Paracatu pelo que eles estão fazendo, para mim como representante das associações é quase nada certo, quase nada

Rajiv: Eles estão com hospital e fazendo investimentos, deram uma Kombi ?

Max: Eles fazem alguns investimentos pontuais, mais ligados ao poder publico principalmente com a prefeitura, porque eles continuam com a prática de engessamento do poder publico, eu considero que isso é para não serem cobrados pelas grandes realizações que eles tem que fazer

Rajiv: Eles fazem um pouquinho para não ser (?), mínimo

Max: e sempre, e assim, sempre para, não assim com aquele espírito que não esta engessando, eles trabalham, esses canadenses eles trabalham com esse espírito sabe, são inteligentes, eles pontuam aquilo que eles devem fazer e que principalmente representam a lei para eles não serem cobrados legalmente, e eles sempre tem o discurso nós estamos dentro da lei, vão lá prefeitura e falam que estão dentro da lei e os órgãos do governo nos estamos dentro da lei mais a lei que a gente vê mais que eles estão infringindo a questão ambiental e social eles

Rajiv: Mais eles falam que faz muito, que vão além da lei

Max: Eles fazem além da lei, mais pelo aqui que estamos cobrando hoje que é a retirado do solo o ouro, isso não da nem 1% nem 0,5%, nos estamos em uma realidade, por exemplo só para você ter uma idéia já que você esta aqui fazendo um estudo, por exemplo , nós aqui somos uma cidade que parte turística fica capengando(ruim), a cidade que tem uma mineradora, a parte cultural vc não tem um grande espaço, vc não tem uma vila olímpica para a juventude a criança para o adolescente, então isso eles agarram na

reforma do hospital por mais de 20 anos que eles estão aqui, isso aqui não representa nada, até hoje nos estamos em discussão com essa mineração não só com essa mais com todas as grandes empresas que representam o capital, é só vou citar um exemplo para você existem 5 bairros que no ano de 2010 e 2011 a desvalorização imobiliária significa 65%, se vc tem uma casa hoje nesses bairros que são vizinho da Kinross se vc tinha uma casas que ela valia 100 mil reais ela desvalorizou 65%

Rajiv: Por causa da mineradora?

Max: é hoje ela vale 35 mil, em exemplo pq, o danos ninguém quer comprar, então o que que gera, desvalorização imobiliária, temos danos, poeira, ruídos, bombas detonação,

Rajiv: e a empresa esta crescendo, expandindo

Max: Nós estamos num momento de confronto, ao mesmo tempos que este bairros estão sendo desvalorizados aqueles mais distantes da mina estão super valorizados, pq, ao mesmo tempo que o pessoal esta correndo dali esta migrando para lá.

Rajiv: Nossa é impacto forte

Max: impacto forte, então hoje nos esse ano foi o ano de mobilização a central esteve próxima de paralisar a BR 040 em manifestação a Kinross em defesa do direito da população e até hoje nos estamos assim esperando uma resposta pq, hoje nos já sabemos o que queremos, vejo que se a empresa não apresentar uma resposta de indenização e solução para essa população eu acredito seriamente que vai ter uma revolução, igual esta acontecendo em outros países,

Rajiv: aconteceu em outras mineradoras

Max: se o povo sabe o que esta sendo atingido e se a empresa fala que não é ela que esta atingindo, não existe dialogo, pq, já se passou 20 anos e a empresa vai querer continuar tirando ouro e a população vai querer ter uma vida, vc esta entendendo?

Rajiv: eu entendo

Max: não esta querendo acabar com a empresa.

Rajiv: Mais eu fico surpreso pq a empresa, qdo eu leio o material dela de comunicação dela no site da empresa ou internet eles falam que fazem muitas coisas para a comunidade

Max o que eles fazem muito bem é o marketing deles, o mkt deles é o seguinte, a imprensa de Paracatu hoje fala muito em da empresa , se vc for ver a grande mídia hoje ela tem acesso, tem tudo é uma empresa de mineração, então assim, essa empresa ela conseguiu mudar o percurso de uma BR 040, se vc chegar La tem um trevo ali em cima pq eles conseguiram mudar aquilo, então é o poder econômico eles tem influência no congresso nacional em toda esfera do governo, agora referente a nós que nós somos uma entidade que não temos rabo preso e o negocio nosso é o povo, nos somos totalmente independente e nos estamos assim, com a empresa a relação esta no pior momento

Rajiv: mais vcs tem que procurar a empresa ou a empresa vem para vc? Se quer dialogar a empresa esta chegando, ah Max agente que falar com vc ou é vc que tem que ?

Max: não não, hoje nos eles estão sinalizando alguma coisa só através de pressão,

Rajiv: só através de pressão

Max:a única coisa que eles ainda respeitam hoje é o seguinte por exemplo é a pressão popular, eles ficam incomodados em ver a possibilidade de a população partir em marcha até a empresa

Rajiv: pq fica mal na mídia neh

Max: ai a grande imprensa se ta entendendo

Rajiv: não quer que o mundo veja isso

Max e se vc me pergunta hoje eu não vejo outra possibilidade, vai acontecer, não aconteceu pq sinalizou ta assim mais

Rajiv: Mais a população de Paracatu eu estou vendo que esta bem dividida, por exemplo, eu tenho a opinião de vc, da Claudia e do vereador que eu acho parecida bem criticas mais tem a opinião de outras pessoas que eu estou vendo que são mais humildes, estive

ontem com a Elena na comunidade de quilombolas de São Domingos e tem essa quilombolas esta dividida em dois e eu estava com um grupo de pessoas e eu fiz as mesmas perguntas, como estão as relações o que vc acha da mineradora, e as relações são boas e agente acha que eles são muito bons parceiros e a gente quer muito trabalhar com eles e fazer projetos pq eles são bons, so que outro grupo que não quer colaborar

Max: é os que se sentem atingidos, entendeu, essa divisão ela hoje , se um a empresa ela tem hj mais ou menos uns 3000 empregos vc há de convir comigo que pela questão as famílias a partir do momento que tem uma pessoa lá ou as vezes tem um prestador de serviço ou um empresário que se relaciona comercial com a empresa kinross, eles defender pelo interesse financeiro por causa de que, ah mais a empresa é um mau necessário, eles costumam falar que é um mau necessário, hoje eu posso até falar que é um mau necessário seguinte virgula pq a partir do momento que seja resolvido o problema da população atingida, oh eu vou ser a favor de fechar uma kinross, não, mais tbm não vou ser a favor dela estar danificando uma casa de um cidadão trabalhador, então é esse meio termo que nos temos que chegar, eu estou em defesa do cidadão

Rajiv: Como vc convence as pessoas que não querem nenhuma briga com a empresa e tem medo de, do sistema financeiro de ter prejuízo o de perder emprego e possibilidade

Max: hoje eu posso te falar que é o seguinte que a rejeição a empresa é muito maior, muito maior que a aceitação, então isso significa que a população hoje ela já convenceu que ela esta sendo muito mais atingida do que assistida, então por exemplo não é só quem é visinho da kinross se eu tenho uma casa cá do outro lado na época de poeira a dona de casa que esta trabalhando fora quando ela chega ta aquele poeira e uma porcentagem grande tem arcenico, cada tonelada que soltam no ar da questão parece que 1 % é com arcenico, e aqui a grande discussão que nos temos é o arcenico, então a partir do momento que ela joga a poeira para cima o arcenico vai para todo que é canto da cidade, lençol freático, nascente para tudo, entendeu, isso que hoje no momento que as autoridades ai vc fala que prefeitura mais é o seguinte as instituições no entanto estão engessados prefere fazer uma parceria ali ,para construir uma obrzinha e não querem discutir o problema como um todo

Rajiv o principal

Max. O principal por exemplo, a saúde, pode ser a minha a sua ou de um cidadão, hoje o que nos estamos cobrando é o resultado do estudo epidemiológico,

Rajiv: Sei que a faculdade esta fazendo um estudo

Max : que ai sim, nos queremos saber qual é a real situação

Rajiv: então pelo que eu entendo a empresa fala e tem um canal aberto de comunicação, tem pessoas como a Fadwa e tem outras pessoas que estão dispostas a falar com vcs e se vc quiser falar tudo isso que falou para mim pode ir na empresa e conversar com eles

Max: eles falam isso com vc o seguinte, tem, mais assim deixa eu te falar como isso funciona, os diretores da Kinross funcionam nesse seguinte quesito que vc falou ai, tem uma turma que são gerentes para a operacionalizar a empresa para ela não parar e tira mais ouro e tem um equipe se fala que são as relações com a comunidade que são aqueles que são formados para posar de bons , vc quer conversar vamos conversar, mais assim eles nunca negam de conversar, mais fogem de reconhecer os danos que estão causando e eles fogem de apresentar uma solução para aquilo que a população esta reivindicando então assim vc inicia o ano e termina o ano com aquele mesmo dialogo sem avançar em nada com a comunidade.

Rajiv: E a empresa entende essa frustração porque não é só vc que me falou isso tudo mundo que eu falei fala o mesmo

Max: Tem avançado a partir do momento em que nossa entidade com e outros parceiros, inclusive ONGs e faculdades tem posicionado e mobilizado a sociedade, certo, eu tenho que reconhecer para vc que tem avançado o seguinte, primeiro eles estão reconhecendo que não da mais para ficar só enganando, chegou num ponto que ou eles reconhecem o que tem que fazer e apresenta uma solução ou vai encarar o confronto

Rajiv: tá

Max, isso eles tem consciência, tem tido várias mudanças nos quadros de pessoas eles tem mudado internamente o jeito da empresa se relacionar, então por exemplo, de

primeiro vc fazia aqui um negocio que tinha que ir para Belo Horizonte depois para o Canada certo aquele negócio, hoje eles vivem com essa maneira as pessoas vinham aqui colhiam a opinião publica e depois sumiam e a empresa ficava com o desgaste, então esse ano através de toda a mobilização que existe através do câmara dos vereadores, várias audiências, assembléia legislativa, o deputado da nossa cidade aqui que esta sempre levantando o debate sobre a mineração, eles tem mudado sabe

Rajiv: é eu percebi o vereador

Max: eles tem mudado e eu inclusive, nos, a central das associações nos estamos no aguardo, nos apresentamos uma pauta vou pegar no carro pra vc, uma pauta que nos apresentamos na audiência pública que agente acha necessário para eles apresentarem a resposta para nos e a população são dez itens, e essa pauta nos estamos aguardando a resposta que eles passaram para instancia superior Canada

Rajiv Já passaram para a empresa?

Max: que eles passaram para instancia superior Canada ou Chile ou não sei aonde eles tem

Rajiv: Chile ou Canada

Max: Então assim, não sei se vc tem visitado o seguinte, o grande debate que vai vir agora nesse final de ano e no ano seguinte é a desvalorização imobiliária, pq ai esta mexendo no bolso do cidadão, por exemplo, vc tem uma propriedade aqui, vizinho da Kinross, se não fosse a Kinross ela tava e com a Kinross ela foi para baixo e ai?

Rajiv e alguém tem que responder

Max: e isso não é eu é o caro que ta lá, que investiu sua casa ele quer uma resposta e quem tem que dar a resposta e a empresa e eu como representante da população na sociedade civil em to em cima, por exemplo ninguém me compra eu não tenho emprego na kinross, vc esta entendendo não sou contra não é a nossa intenção de fechar a kinross mais é o seguinte a relação com a kinross desse ano para frente ela é de firmeza de embate e de cobrança nos temos um plano de desenvolvimento sustentável nos estamos pensando em

Paracatu 2030, aonde que passa justamente com a discussão com a Kinross a criação de um fundo, vc esta entendendo, um fundo para e ai depois eles vão embora e quem vai discutir esse fundo a população civil , e ai não é depois é agora, vc chegou em um momento que se vc voltar aqui o ano quem vc vai ver os resultados, agora por exemplo se for acontecer essa marcha vc tem que estar para cobrir, que por exemplo essa marchar é uma Marcha que nos colocamos nome dela em defesa da vida, vc esta entendendo, isso é a ultima instancia, se chegar a ponto dessa marcha é uma coisa que vc pode saber que a imprensa internacional e nacional vai cobri pq já é o confronto da população com a empresa eu até quero acreditar que não vai chegar nesse ponto, mais nos já temos isso com uma decisão já soberana da população

Rajiv: Então isso já esta acordado com seus bairros?

Max: Tudo com Quilombola, pessoal de Sta Rita, meio rural , esse movimento aqui hoje não conta aqui mais fica em defesa dos direitos, ele é grande

Rajiv: Mais como vcs chegaram a esse acordo, vc teve um voto?

Max: Com assembléias nos bairros, com participação na câmara lotada

Rajiv: Então a empresa já sabe?

Max: Ela sabe e esta ciente, por exemplo, eu sempre estou nas ruas cobrando os direitos dos cidadãos

Rajiv: Vc esta vendo que as famílias que tem filhos ou pessoas trabalhando na empresa eles já estão chatos? chateados

Max: é esses bairros vizinhos que é , inclusive nos titulamos de abismo, inclusive se vc vier de avião vc vê um abismo, um abismo que é o seguinte daí as famílias estão morando ali próximas perto e cada vez eles vão aprofundar

Rajiv: Vc vai lá nos próximos dias? Vc me convida?

Max: convido se vc quiser ir lá tirar foto de longe, para vc vêr o que que é a realidade

Rajiv: estou precisando

Max: daí nos vamos subir lá na curva da morte, para vc ver lá de cima para vc ver o cenário e aí vc vai nos bairros e vc vê a realidade, vc vê casa com rachaduras, por causa das bombas das 4 horas, agora são 4 tem a bomba das 4 e se não teve vai ter e treme isso aqui tudo, todo dia um pouco antes ou um pouco depois, mais o bom de sentir como é que é o temor dela, se vc quiser que o horário para fazermos a visita é só ir lá, daí agente vai conversando mais, mais assim eu tenho uma consciência de que a empresa ela não vai embora ela vai querer deixar de tirar ouro, mais ela tem ciência que terá que abrir os cofres e não é para mim e sem para a cidade.

Rajiv: Mais pq ela vai ter que fazer isso, pq se a lei não obriga

Max: pq ela terá que fazer a compensação dos danos, e isso é nos a sociedade que tem que fazer a discussão com ela, ela tem que compensar os danos que ela está causando a população e o que que é a compensação e chegar na questão do turismo ajudar a desenvolver turismo a cultura, o esporte e construir uma vila olímpica para a juventude e fazer um hospital do câncer, vc está entendendo, a empresa é que tem que resolver aí onde tem mineração ela é que tem que compensar a cidade e não depois

Rajiv: e vc acha que vai acontecer?

Max: vai assim, com a cobrança da população pq com a cobrança com a parte dos políticos nós fazemos distinção, pq uma parte dos políticos eles tem um vínculo direto com a empresa, pq eles tem alguma benéfica, eles tem caminhões prestando serviço lá, eles tem uma empresa

Rajiv: Eu tô vendo pq, que isso é uma barreira grande

Max: uma barreira, um engessamento financeiro, isso vc sabe que no capitalismo eles atuam em cima disso, lá Kinross se vc chegar lá eles sabem quem é as autoridades municipais eles pontuam, quem que eles tem que.....certo....

Rajiv: o seu nome está ali tbm

Max: eles tem eu ali como uma pessoa que não, uma pessoa que tem que apresentar, do jeito que eles querem se relacionar comigo tipo de me engessar com alguma benéfica eu

to do lado do povo, se eu entrar eles sabe que vou ser mais um , então isso ai não funciona, então eles tem a preocupação comigo de dar a resposta para aquilo que eu estou levando para voz d o povo

Rajiv: e eles sempre dão a resposta?

Max: Sim, eu não sei se é bom para mim mais é o seguinte eles tem uma preocupação comigo assim mais emergente e para o Deputado Almir Para, pq hoje as duas instituições que estão colocando a, então eles estão com essa preocupação acredito que eles vão ter avanço que eles vão indenizar parte daqueles pessoas atingidas que vc vai ter a oportunidade de ver e vai tbm dar uma resposta para a cidade como um todo com a questão do fundo, pq nos não podemos cobrar toda ora da empresa que precisa de um negocio ir La atrás de dinheiro, então o que significa o fundo, vai ter um conselho do poder publico e da sociedade

Por exemplo, nos vamos investir aqui no turismo,daí nos vamos lá e discuti não esta relacionado com a empresa, ah nos vamos fazer um investimento das áreas atingidas, então para isso que é a criação do fundo único, que ao invés de ficar a entidade mendigando aquele dinheirinho, aquele dinheiro para ficar engessado ,não é uma discussão maior, inclusive hoje eu sou defensor dessa proposta por entender que ai vc tira o vinculo de pessoas para ficar lá, vc vai vincular pessoas com a sociedade civil as entidades organizados e o poder publico, então ai é o ministério publico, para vc ver eles tem R\$ 12 milhões no caixa por causa de um TAA que fez com a empresa, é um milhão por ano, um TAA para projetos ambientais e é essa mesma coisa que queremos fazer com a empresa

Rajiv: Mais o que o Ministério Publico vai fazer com esse dinheiro?

Max: diz que é para revitalização da bacia do Rio São Francisco, projetos ambientais, já é um avanço, tudo isso a partir do momento em que sociedade se mobiliza, não foi assim pq eles falaram ah vamos chamar o M P, vamos fazer isso

Rajiv: Eles não saem com a boa vontade, olha povo a gente quer.....

Max: não sabe pq, eu não acredito uma vez que ali não tem aquele vínculo familiar que tem os diretores da empresa que são todos de fora, eles não tem amizade por aqui a única a única é que eles tem aqui é relacionar e saber que a empresa esta tirando ouro, a direção da empresa não tem esse vínculo igual família que vive o dia a dia.

Rajiv: Aonde eles moram os diretores?

Max: Eles tem uma para vc ficar sabendo, que os gerentes deles não ficam muito tempo na cidade não, eles tem um rodízio, só esse ano já mudaram nessa relação de comunidade uns quatro, vc esta entendendo já é um coisa que eles não deixam as pessoas ficarem muito tempo não, relações com a comunidade, por exemplo vc que esta vindo agora se vc ficar muitos dias aqui vc vai acabar fazendo amizade com a população, e eles não gostam que eles fazem isso não, pq eles sentem que a sociedade vai dominando o gestor deles, então eles fazem esse rodízio, o gerente deles aqui tem pouco tempo os que ficam mais tempo aqui são os de operação, pq ai não tem vínculo

Rajiv: a pessoa de responsabilidade social, por exemplo a XXX ela não fica aqui sempre?

Max: Essa dona não bateu muito comigo não, tipo o perfil dela é de direita e tipo aquele que defende mais a questão do capitalismo o interesse da empresa, certo, ela joga muito mal com a população

Rajiv: A população não gostou dela?

Max: não, principalmente eu sou representante de todas as associações não há via com bons olhos, e falei para ela mesmo assim e com a imagem que ela tava chegando aqui de que eles estavam certos, tão tudo eu falei então vcs vão ficar com suas certezas e nos vamos

Rajiv: e o que ela respondeu?

Max: não me respondeu , não gostou também do meio jeito tbm não, pq eu tava em defesa e teve esse choque, pq ela chegou usando desse poder que a empresa quer implantar, olha aqui a lei, e nos vamos fazer desse jeito certo, e ai já encontrou nos a

população com todos esses aspectos de mal relacionamento de entendimento com a empresa, se a empresa no caso deixar a relação da comunidade direto com ela não avança muito as negociações.

Rajiv: Então não é só vc que achou isso dela, tem outras pessoas que acham que ela não é muito humana ?

Max: tem nesse meio nosso tem vereadores, se ta entendendo tem outras pessoas

Rajiv: Nesse cargo a qualidade da pessoa ter que mais é para relacionar, conversar ter mais empatia

Max: Ela chegou muito confrontando as idéias se esta entendendo,

Rajiv: ela esta aqui a pouco tempo..

Max: e eu mesmo assim como presidente da central eu não vejo ela como a pessoa indicada para ficar no cargo de relação social, pq social é vc mexer com o social e de ouvir , de tudo, social ,ela esta mais para de pessoa de interesse empresarial,

Rajiv: Corporativo

Max: corporativo

Rajiv: Ela mora aqui em Paracatu?

Max: Não ela fica mais em Belo Horizonte,

Rajiv: é mesmo, nossa

Max: hoje por exemplo, tinha o Marcelo Coelho é o que eu falei com vc quando eles perceberam que ele estava muito bem com a comunidade e daí veio a desculpa que ele pediu para sair , daí tinha o Guilherme Fontes lá em BH também pediu para sair não agüentou a pressão e agora já estou sabendo que o que ta ai tbm já esta com relação com a comunidade indo embora, não é o Pedro

Rajiv: eles tem uma rotatividade com muita frequência

Max: Quando tem o caboclo vem com a família e chegou e pegou nos em plena mobilização, pq SP é SP, e o ano que vem é um ano eleitoral, eleições municipais o assim o que vai estar na pauta do discurso em defesa será a Kinross, ou vai ser pessoa defendendo ou pessoa svc esta entendendo, o debate, um dos principais debate vai ser o futuro da kinross

Rajiv: e pelo que vc esta me contando o candidato terá que ter um olho mais critico

Max: Uma independência, tem que ser aquela pessoa que não pode ser radical mais ele tem que apresentar para a população que estará dialogando, sendo o elo em defesa tbm desses direitos

Rajiv: é entendi, então

Max: é assim, vou te falar uma coisa para vc é a população hoje , eu vejo que a relação ela vai ficar mais fervorosa não tem como hoje por exemplo, o cidadão esta com a família querendo criar os seus filhos em um meio ambiente limpo, ela não tem emprego na kinross ele trabalha fora muito até de bóia fria, aí o cara chega la de noite e vai para a sua casinha querendo descansar, aí chega a kinross extraindo ouro e fazendo aquele barulho e ele não consegue descansar, aí o cara não dorme e aí vc vai perguntar para um cara desse se ele vai defender a kinross! E ai quando nos vamos conversar com a kinross sobre isso e eles dizem que a kinross esta certa e que é o cara que não esta escutando bem, e não sou eu que estou falando e quando a população ela esta partindo para acabar com a paciência com a kinross e não é quem esta la trabalhando não ou quem tem algum beneficio é uma grande massa da população, vou te dar um exemplo a dona trabalha la o dia inteiro fora e a emprega dela saiu e deixo a casa limpinha e quando ela chega a noite ta la a casa cheia de pó, poeira da kinross daí a mulher já chega xingando, oh meu marido vamos vender essa casa daqui e vamos mudar, então isso nos estamos totalmente... nos temos isso.... vc esta entendendo? a empresa tem que reconhecer isso

Rajiv: No seu caso pessoalmente, vc presidente da organização bairro e com esse grande argumento que fez sobre a desvalorização o que motivou vc pessoalmente a com essa luta e por que vc mora também?

Max: Não, eu tenho parentes atingidos certo, mas como representante do povo uma vez que chegou para mim das associações essas demandas eu adotei, chegou para mim eu como presidente a central é a mãe das associações eu não tinha outra bandeira se não assumir a defesa do cidadão com isso não é vc pegar um arma, é vc estudar certo, tem que conhecer, passar a saber que a empresa nas leis omissas do país que se passou para ela esta cumprindo as licenças e tudo, mais assim, é passar a mobilizar a comunidade pq eles estão transcendendo as leis, lá quando eles vão pedir as licenças não consta nada disso que a bomba vai estragar a casa do cidadão, que a poeira...vc esta entendendo hj o que nos estamos cobrando é que eles estão fazendo os danos a mais e não estão reconhecendo...então

Rajiv: E qual é o fim da sua organização, objetivo, missão, qual o nome oficial?

Max: Hoje é o seguinte o nosso objetivo principal e par amenizar esses danos , sabendo que a empresa vai continuar é que ela reconheça os danos e indenize

Rajiv: Então o objetivo é Kinross vcs seu trabalho é em função da mineradora?

Max: Vc fala entidade? Nos trabalhamos em várias frentes

Rajiv: Qual seria a missão da identidade?

Max: A central ela é uma entidade tipo guarda chuva, as associações tem os seus estatutos e representam os seus moradores e defender os seus interesses na cultura, no esporte nos desenvolvimento a central é justamente defender os interesses das ONGs e das associações nessedas empresas e do poder público.

Rajiv: Sua preocupação é sobre a cidadania?

Max: É nos estamos mais na parte de critica, de cobrança e de desenvolvimento

Rajiv: Da cidade, dos moradores

Max: Hoje por exemplo, tudo que vc for pensar hoje tem que ser pensado para o desenvolvimento humano e sustentável, vc esta entendendo, se não for o que nos estamos fazendo aqui nessa terra, assim como as igrejas tem as suas limitações neh ...a central das

associações hj ela é uma entidade importantíssima ela politicamente é muito respeitada pela força que tem, por exemplo se sai o nome da entidade hoje mobilizando a sociedade não é nome o vereador tal ou deputado, é a própria população ali representada, inclusive hoje a única preocupação deles e isso, que nos conseguimos , se vc falar hoje vamos fazer uma assembléia hj com a população para discutir a questão da Kinross, eu pego o meu carro de som e vou para as rua

Rajiv: Ah, vc tem um carro e som

Max: Direto eu pego e vou para os bairros para levantar esses temas com a população e chego lá, para lá e falo olha gente vamos debater

Rajiv: Vc tem pensado em fazer algo assim nos próximos dias?

Max: Tenho, eu tenho pq agora nos vamos fazer as assembléias nos bairros para discutir essa questão da desvalorização imobiliária certo, provavelmente a partir da semana que vem eu devo fazer uma no Bairro Bela Vista

Max: a empresa esta fazendo um estudo sócio econômica, tudo isso é fruto do que da mobilização, a empresa esta fazendo esse estudo para saber a real situação do cidadão, do imóvel dele, o que que tem, quantos metros quadrados, eles estão fazendo isso para gastar dinheiro a toa, não , estão fazendo isso para o plano de desapropriação para eles agirem.

Rajiv: Se vc tivesse que descrever a identidade da empresa?

1:09

Max: Ela hoje é uma empresa que representa o capitalismo e que no momento esta causando grandes impactos e danos a comunidade, os impactos são maiores que os beneficios

Rajiv : Entendi

Max: O Custo beneficio , só para vc ver esta tirando ouro,e no futuro vai ficar para nós ali um abismo e com aquilo tudo de produto o que vai ficar ali de futuro para as próximas gerações, ali vai virar uma Serra Pelada, o povo vai atacar ali atrás cavar atrás de ouro, então o futuro não é bom pq eles estão tirando o ouro e ainda vão deixar para nos os danos

Rajiv : E depois que eles não querer saber nada de Paracatu

Max: Novas gerações , poder publico

Rajiv: è bom que seus netos lembre de vcs pelo menos fez algo.....

Max: eu quero ficar na história como alguém que ficou em defesa do cidadão

Rajiv: isso é interessante

Max: Não pq eu me vendi, inclusive é o que a maioria aqui faz

Rajiv: Pq se vendem para a empresa?

Max: é se vendem em troca de benefícios

Rajiv: é isso é interessante para mim saber o pq vc não se vendeu, tem os seus valores próprios

Max: eles usam desse artifício, de compra liderança

Rajiv: é isso aconteceu com Sergio Dani

Max: Isso pra mim, eu tenho esse carinho e qdo eles vêem esse carinho lá para cima já sabem que eu estou protestando ou eu to...e o povo no centro da cidade sabe que qdo eu estou aqui nessa avenida, o povo...o bom era vc pegar, hj é o seguinte a rejeição que a empresa tem é bem maior que a aceitação, a aceitação só é de quem é beneficiado

Rajiv: Eu gostaria de entender bem é..... vc acha que aqui no povo aqui moram 90 mil pessoas a aprovação da mineradora enquanto a sua responsabilidade social seria aprovada ou reprovada?

Max: Vc fala a população? Reprovada, pq hoje esta uma grande discussão, pq grande porcentagem da população esta com câncer,

Rajiv: Eles tem câncer

Max: e hoje , a população esta com uma epidemia então já se tem uma suspeita muito grande através de estudos que

Rajiv: é verdade que aqui epidemia de cancer ?

Max, é hoje o que mais tem em Paracatu é câncer, cancer do colo do útero, de mama de próstata de tudo entendeu

Rajiv: mais pq no seu caso vc age , essa luta pessoal, vem da sua de como vc foi criado por seus pais, ou vc não quer se vender para a empresa

Max: hoje eu sou socialista e tudo que nos estamos discutindo hoje no mundo é isso, vc esta entendendo

Rajiv: vc é do partido PT?

Max: Na verdade eu não sou partidário sou socialista

Interviewee Code C12 with Trade Union President of Kinross Paracatu workers – Paracatu –

Rajiv: What are your views on the relations with the workers at the mine?

Osvaldo: it has diverse cycles, some very hard ones. The mine has had different owners. When it was Rio Tinto we had a very friendly relationship. Towards the end of their time the relationship got better. When Kinross entered they brought new people. The relationship is more conflictive. The company has been very unethical in our opinion. In our assemblies they pressure our workers on how they should vote.

Rajiv: is that legal?

Osvaldo: no not at all it goes against the ILO and national legislation. They put psychological pressure on their workers, threaten them they'll be fired if they don't vote a certain way. We've reported these practices to the ministry of public.

We had a better relationship with the previous counterpart at the company but he was fired.

Rajiv: why do you think?

Osvaldo: the company doesn't like that sort of person who is friendly with the workers, recognizes their work. Unions need to be independent.

Rajiv: how many workers do you cover?

Osvaldo: we can't by law cover outsourced workers. We have a very high number of members, on average in Brazil only 25% of workers belong to unions we have 75% of the workers with us.

Rajiv: so you have a lot of power?

Osvaldo: Yes we do. But workers don't fight much they expect us to do all their fighting for them. They don't participate enough. We've never striked before. We did manage to stop the Kinross buses for 15 minutes on the main highway to demand higher wages.

Rajiv: what are the main complaints from your members?

Osvaldo: two things. Their salaries are very low. Paracatu historically has people from agriculture. Agriculture pays very low so the mine is good in comparison. Most skilled workers leave the company for other mines.

The company has managed to get workers to work 25% extra for no extra salary by getting more shifts. They pay an extra 8% only.

The company has a very strong image but that image doesn't consolidate. I'm going to a meeting today to represent a worker who was fired for whistleblowing to an international

organization for bad practices. He complained about verbal and physical abuse to SA8000. The company fired him before SA8000 even came here.

The company says they do things but they don't in reality. We have other companies here who have a much better conduct with participation. Where you have have breakfast and question the general manager.

Rajiv: how's the organizational climate there?

Osvaldo: it's not good. If you could do research there you'd see it would be well classified for a good place to work.

Rajiv: do you represent other companies?

Osvaldo: yes, and relations with workers there are better. For government actors the company is great as they have an interesting policy. However, in the local communities the relationship is bad.

The company just leaves crumbs in the community, they paint a church they put their name here and there. But they're taking our wealth. The best jobs are not for people from here they come from outside. There's no strong investment in the city. The Mayor is scared of offending the company.

The company can talk a lot about what they want to do but there's no action. there's no company commitment to anything they just send an employee to participate in community meetings, that employee will leave in the future, so there's no commitment.

Rajiv: how's your counterpart now?

Osvaldo: he doesn't accept responsibility. I don't like to criticise people. He never says no and says he'll do it later, later, later and it never happens he just "enrola" he enrola enrola enrola he never says no. it's one of the worst things that can happen. You think something will happen and it doesn't.

The community criticise the company a lot but workers won't in public as they're scared of losing their job. The mine is inside the city so it causes a lot of inconvenience to the community. The company doesn't seem worried. They could work on these things but they don't want to spend a bit of money to alleviate these problems.

We've only had one case of Silicosis where lungs are affected and we couldn't prove it. We have a common case of back and neck pain. The main concern in health is with arsenic from the dust. One worker had 6 times the national limit of arsenic in his blood. After 8 months away from arsenic he still has high limits.

Rajiv: what would you say their identity is?

Osvaldo: they run over anyone in front of them. They look for their objectives like a machine that runs over anyone who interferes in their path.

A job at the mine for someone from agriculture is like a dream job. However someone with more preparation isn't the same. We're not at a critical stage for a strike.

If relations continue as they are for 1 -2 more years we will have a strike. The workers want the company to stay but a better treatment. The community sometimes just wants the mine to leave.

I always speak about history at debates and meetings like in Holland. I always say we produce gold since 300 years the slave would come put it on a donkey send to Rio de Janeiro and then to Portugal, today the slaves take the gold, put it on a helicopter and send to Canada. Paracatu continues poor, the city has never benefited from this gold extraction.

There are several cities around without mining but have better development rates than Paracatu. The mine hasn't contributed significantly to the city. Comparing what they take from here and what they leave is very unequal

More than 80% of workers have a loan from the company which shows how low the salaries are as they can't make ends meet on the salary. It's rare that they don't have it. They pay interest on this. It's complicated.

Rajiv: is it possible to see workers or managers walking around the streets of Paracatu?

Osvaldo: before much more when it was Rio Tinto. They would go to parties and meetings for city events. Kinross is much more reserved. They have another policy. The General Manager doesn't ever meet us, the previous one did sometimes.

Rajiv: on the website they show Paracatu in a different way with more CSR

We have a phrase here called it's just for English to see (laughs). What exists here is a company that generates jobs, pays taxes, complies with law....and works hard to create a good image. The reality isn't that, the workers are penalized, when they make them work 25% more they don't even pay for that!

I think if you told people tomorrow Kinross will close and leave and your life will stay the same 95% of people here would like that. Their worry including mine is that we lose our jobs. The permanence of the company is important. If the company was further away 8-10km away conflict would be less. The company's moving closer to us. They got their license to expand and finish with an urbanized neighbourhood that had water and infrastructure.

Interview with Elano G – Well known Journalist in Paracatu at his house. 22nd November, 2011 – 1 hour 20 minutes C15

Rajiv: So what are your views on the mine and it's relationship with the town? Its' identity too as a mine?

Elano: Well mining forms part of Paracatu's identity. It was born into mining. My view today is different from four years ago I think it was very different under the English than under the Canadians?

Rajiv: Why is that?

Elano: The philosophy of those Canadians is more distant much COLDER they don't take into account our wishes in the community. I don't disagree with mine exploration we depend on it. (points to radio, camera, tv) All of this depends on mining. It needs to be done in a balanced way with the environment and social issues.

Rajiv: The company actually talks a lot about its CSR if you look on its' website you'll see they talk about doing a lot for the community.

Elano: I think when the company was English owned it was much closer to the people. So much so that throughout the years they managed to get close to the community. The previous managers of the company would go to cafes to have a coffee and bread with us. The Brazilian people like that, they're a warm people they like to be treated well and like to treat others well.

Rajiv: it's not just a business commercial relationship.

Elano: exactly, the Japanese is like that too. He's very distant and serious, however, when he does a first business with you he wants to see your face. After that he'll always do business with you. Brazilians have that too they always want personal contact. So, what the company's proposing in terms of community relations it's going downhill. There's no more dialogue, conversation, information exchanging.

Rajiv: that's interesting because on their website they say they do that.

Elano: they've done a few social things like funded the local hospital. But the worst thing is that they're closed for information. They say they're open but they're increasingly more distant

Rajiv: I spoke with the company about this and they said this is what they actually want, to be more distanced from the community. They told me that community perceptions are not what they'd hope for them to be.

Elano: The company is in a privileged situation. Just before the Canadians took charge of the company they were going through a period of huge conflict with the community when it was RPM and not Kinross. There was lots of divergence after announcing expansion plans due to environmental impacts. They managed to deal with that so well, the managers they managed to pacify the community they faced a stone in the shoe. A person you must have heard of already called Sergio Dani.

Rajiv: Yes I have, he wasn't very polite with me by email.

Elano: He was an obstacle for them. Today he's distant, so his influence is weakened.

Rajiv: I spoke to Max Mundin who said he might want to create a protest here.

Elano: Sergio Dani caused a lot of strife for the company. The company managed to overcome Sergio Dani and the community back then as they were very skilled and had a different philosophy back then so the Canadians have been really fortunate as Sergio Dani had left here when they arrived. If Sergio was still here they'd be finished by now and with their "low profile" policy (laughs).

Rajiv: is the management from Paracatu?

Elano: If you look at the senior level management none of them are from Paracatu. Back then before you had people from here in Paracatu, they lived here from before at least 15 years before and the new people who have arrived here now have come with the philosophy of the Canadians, a philosophy of keeping distance. Hardly anyone here knows the managers. They know how to be nice. When you're with them they incredibly nice but their policy is completely wrong.

Rajiv: One of their main principles is to be a good neighbour that should mean open dialogue.

Elano: When they first arrived here, and gave their first public introductions and meeting I noticed they would be different immediately because in their communications materials they'd left RPM completely out and all of Paracatu identifies them as RPM.

Rajiv: Yes that's something I've noticed too. I spoke with high school kids the other day and they only referred to it as RPM. The image of the mine isn't positive overall.

Elano: At 4pm they explode bombs for exploration. The other day I was close there and heard the sirens and my car started to shake a lot as they denotated their explosives. But it's alright as they're within the law.

Rajiv: but the definition of CSR is going beyond legal compliance I've read...I walked around with the councillor on Saturday to speak to the neighbours of the mine.

Elano: Sometimes I publically defended the company for free when it was RPM and Sergio Dani was attacking the company. I didn't agree with that it was terrorism. I protested in the streets. Today it would be difficult for me to do that again with these relations they have. Because I believed in those people in management back when it was RPM they seemed more committed, been here for a long time, their kids were born here. Today I can't defend them as I don't believe in them. I have reservations about their external policy.

Rajiv: It's just strange they're like this as they communicate on their website about all the social initiatives they have.

Elano: In relation to what they take and extract, what they give back is really very little there should be a higher return. If we demanded more from them.....I mean look at youtube and type Kinross you'll see their CEO and Directors living in luxurious mansions in Canada that's their wealth. They need to do more because in 20-30 years they'll be gone.

Rajiv: If you had to describe Paracatu's identity how would you express it?

Elano: what we see is exploration. It's just a desire for making profit, that's most important. Like most companies, they're after profit. But it should come via development to the community. They make a lot of money.

Rajiv: I spoke to the Ministry of Public who told me they have an agreement with the company who will give 1 million reais per year to the community in invement.

Elano: but that's nothing! The Ministry of Public can over go as far as the law permits them to.

Rajiv: the company told me they held a public assembly where they were highly criticized.

Elano: No I couldn't but I heard...I don't see that was positive, they have an audience just to show they comply with certain demands, and later propose nothing.

Rajiv: I keep hearing the company always likes to “enrolar” be nice and polite and always tell people they’ll get back to them but never do or never give them a concrete answer.

Elano: Yes that happens a lot these days. I see today they’re wrong, their policy is wrong. I even told them, I told Fadwa to her face their policy is wrong.

Rajiv: What did they say?

Elano: They said yes they’re trying to get closer to the community but I don’t see any proof. Fadwa is really nice and well intentioned. It’s the company policy that’s wrong.

Rajiv: I’ve heard that managers who get too close to the community are told to leave the company... such as Marcelo

Elano: Marcelo was the last remaining one of the nice managers. He had a Paracatu identity, he was one of the last Mohicans (laughs). Also Nadja, they defended the company and community. The company lost these key people who acted as links between the community and company. When the previous managers sold the company Luis Alberto and Victor Hugo gave an interview, and I asked them “what’s going to change with the sale”? and they said “nothing will change, we guarantee nothing’s going change”. The first change was that they were moved out! They said nothing would change and they were sacked...not a good sign. Since then, things just get worse.

Rajiv: Fadwa told me she thought the company was too active in the local press with adverts and she wanted to revert that as her first action.

Elano: but they went too far with that. The press and media are the connection between company and community we want to shed light over that.....the company has another big issue to deal with and that's the fact it's within the urban perimeter. For example Votorantin they contribute with social investment here even though there's no demand on them as they're 40km from here, but Kinross they're here on our doorstep...the dust gets everywhere, all the neighbouring residents used to call us informing us how the dust would constantly cover their houses and furniture after cleaning.

Rajiv: I'm seeing most people I've spoken to have the same opinion as you.

Elano: if you'd come here four years earlier you'd have heard different opinions so it's not just due to the people you've selected to talk to it's the company that have created these opinions. If you stop somebody randomly in the streets here and ask them you'll see they have the same opinion as me unless they are a company employee they have no choice but to defend the company.

Rajiv: that's another question I'd like to ask you about, the perception of the workers on the company.

Elano: I spoke to a friend who works there in a middle level such as supervisor and he said he was the only one still left there from the previous team from RPM and he's only staying as he's close to retirement. He said 'I'm just taking it on the chin for now, since

the new group took over they don't give us a moment's rest and anything and everything that can prevent profit maximization is being sidelined".

In terms of their social work they're doing to the absolute minimum necessary to "shut mouths up" and comply. Here in Paracatu the press is very ethical.

Rajiv: Really? Kinross told me they were giving workshops on ethics in journalism as they thought it necessary.

Elano: If we weren't ethical we would have turned the community against the company, it's like a timebomb. Nobody in the press is doing that. We have here in the city great sources of sponsors so the mining company makes no difference. The press here have been very ethical. We even give the company coverage for free at times. I heard a really awful comment from an employee of the mine recently who said it's better for us to do these social events and get free press coverage than paying the press money directly for advertisement. I defend all my colleagues on that. They're all ethnical here.

Rajiv: I heard about these ethical workshops on journalism...

Elano: they told you about that? (laughter). I don't agree much with it. They're underestimating us a lot. I already worked in the Globo Network and other national networks. I came to live here in Paracatu by choice I wanted a quieter life in the interior so when they say things like that its offensive to us.

Rajiv: maybe that happens due to a lack of dialogue

Elano: if they really understood the importance between press and company for society they would have a different approach and policy.....

Rajiv: I spoke to Max Mundin who said he's not far off from having a revolution here....

Elano: he's come to us a few times to speak on our show but due to my own ethics I don't let him speak live on air as he is very revolutionary and wants to use us as a platform and could cause serious conflict with the company so we record him and make the appropriate edits. I'm not defending the company (speaks to daughter about postgraduate course).....I'd tell anyone the same things I'm telling you right now even from the company.

These days information is really well accessible and even humble and modest people are not easily persuaded like before everyone has internet, radio, tv, it's easy today to form your own opinion.

Rajiv: what changes have you seen over the years in the city?

Elano: violence has increased a lot!

Rajiv: I heard about a shooting from the girlfriend of the victim

Elano: it's probably related to crack, it's a terrible problem here there's a war between druglords. 90% of cases of violence are related to crack, and it's a problem on a national scale. The main factor for growth I see today is that the city's becoming a centre for universities, a lot of new universities opening up here. That's bringing a lot people here and its positive. It shows that we have good alternatives apart from mining so we're not so dependent. We have lots of agriculture and milk production. Paracatu 2030 Sustainable development plan is really interesting.

With the 1 million reais per year the company will pay won't be enough to mitigate the environmental impacts of the company especially that huge crater they've got in the land.

Rajiv: What do you think about CSR?

Elano: It's all important, NGO's contribute here with great work. It's important to help them for companies.

If the company doesn't change its position and policy they're going to continue getting being attacked by the community.

Rajiv: I know of a specialist who says sometimes communities just want close relations with companies and are not obsessed with getting money from them

Elano: When the mining company started here it was lead by Eike Batista's MMX group. Their policy was closed like the current one. They say the English people are very closed, cold and methodological but they've combined an interesting mix between the Brazilian

“hip shaking” style with the freedom the English gave and they were great times. A lot fewer people back then had a negative perception of the firm.

Ana: people loved Vitor Hugo the ex CEO and Luis Alberto and all of a sudden they were fired.

Rajiv: the company told me the community liked them because they were paternalistic and gave away presents and gifts all the time.

Ana: No it wasn't like that. The company used to take part in most events in the city as they were an important actor, not always financially but they were present. Today you no longer see that. Before Fadwa you had easy access to talk to the company. Now to talk to Fadwa it's almost impossible to speak to her.

Elano: It's very hard to create trust from nothing. So you need to take time and let people get to know you and it takes times. However the company has managed to kill off all the ties the community had with them before. It's not a comfortable situation for the company. But they can solve it. But firstly they need to change their policy.

Ana: their contract is federal and not municipal.

Elano: I imagine the Canadians are doing the minimal not to let the community invade them, the bare minimum. The moment the community agree they feel exploited they will invade the company and stop it operating like back in the times of the “Confidence do Minero”. Back then in the 19th century Portugal charged 20% of all wealth found here it

caused conflict and a revolution. The Portuguese crown cut up the main protester and spread his body parts across the main Royal Highway so nobody else would try, however it caused a revolution instead. Today they're taking Everything, if they left just 20% it would be great! (Laughter). You'll see in youtube the Kinross management playing golf and their large mansions having banquets.....the percentage of tax that comes to the municipality from the gold royalties is very little.

Back in the times of the small scale mining there was much more money distributed in the city. I'm against this type of mining it's bad for the environment and other things but the city had a better vibe all the small scale miners had money in their pockets. It was a bad thing for health and environment without doubt.

There's no more distribution of income anymore like before. Though we don't have favela slums like in Sao Paulo, none of that misery here. But still there is a terrible difference between rich and poor.

When you come back count on me. We can have a radio show and call in. I'd very much access to your research results in the end.

Interviewee Code C37 – Jaime – Icaritas NGO – Paracatu – 21st November, 2011 – 1 hour 26 minutes

My thoughts: Was very suspicious at first about me and who I was. I explained everything and then showed him my profile on Cranfield website which put him at ease

Jaime: we are an international network organization, linked to the catholic church but work with everyone they don't have to be catholic. We're all over Brazil.

(Spent 10 minutes talking about historical context of land property problems in Brazil how few people have too much land and this causes social and environmental impacts. His organization are campaigning for a maximum size of land of 35 hectares per person. This would only impact 50 families in Brazil!! We would have millions of hectares for agrarian reform. The Governor of Mato Grosso do Sul has 1 million hectares of land. Brazilians need to understand it's not just about laws but that we need to change people.)

Rajiv: what do you think about Kinross and it's relations with the community?

Jaime: they came here imposing a lot of things on us in the 1980s. progress and development now depends on them they called us a small backwards town. The mine's vision here is all about profit maximization, just making profits. Now it's even stronger with Kinross. They're relationship with the community is about dominance. They leave very little behind. More moderate people here don't want the mine to leave. They should have more democratic relations here. They're not investing enough here.

Rajiv: I hear the company will invest 1 million reais here

Jaime: if you count the 30 years they mine here and consider 1 million reais it's very little. The agriculture here uses a lot poison but that's no excuse for the mine to poison here. One mistake doesn't justify another. The health of Paracatus population has worsened. We need doctors still here, the hospital doesn't have enough, it's just full of student doctors.

Kinross distributes crumbs to social projects. Each project gets around 10, 15, 20, 30 thousand reais per project it's very little for the amount of profits it takes from here in Paracatu. The Mayor has no power to get the company to pay more.

The company don't listen to the population on issues of pollution. A university found proof of it in the air but the company say it's an isolated incident. The company don't give us answers. The water here is polluted, the company then shows their research to show it's not polluted.

Rajiv: it's like a fight of research

Jaime: we need some neutral research. The local community need to know the truth about pollution. The other thing you must have perceived already is about compensation to those resettled.

The mine is not responsible for her acts or damages, cracks in houses, dust and the detonations. The mine doesn't relate well with the community. people with money can

get compensation but poor people can't. they don't negotiate with the community they negotiate with people as individuals. They divide the community.

Once I complained about the mine on a Saturday and a manager overheard me in Sao Domingos Quilombo talking and on Monday company representatives came over here to explain their policy to us. She never explained it was due to my criticism.

Sao Domingos is divided because of problems with water and pollution. The company want to invest there to win the community over so they can continue destroying their land near to the Quilombo. The company have their discourse that doesn't convince they say they are environmentally friendly and have good relations with the community, value people but it's not convincing. They don't give responses to the population.

Rajiv: what did you think of the people from the mine?

Jaime: everything comes from the top – down at the mine. They mine, destroy and profit. We saw the relationship and there is no friendly relationship with the, but from behind they defend a capitalist model of profit. They impose their ideas with force.

Rajiv: but the company says otherwise that they are responsible with the community.

Jaime: when they say they're helping the community? It's Crumbs! We shouldn't even call that help, it's our right. 15,20,30 thousand reais for projects is nothing. They need to take a certain percentage out of their profits and invest it into the community. That needs to be discussed with the population.

The company have a project of revitalizing the stream with a park and trees safety barriers here it's very nice but at the same time Foundation Joao Pinheiro...the geographer said they should have made this linear park along the whole extension of the stream. The company don't say anything to the locals about what they'll do with the mouth of the stream.

With reference to relations with employees. Those who work at the mine their lives transform into the mine they don't live much with us, the company have their own club. The miners practically live in the mine, we call that brainwashing. They defend the mine. If they heard me criticizing the mine they might even hit me.

You see that sign about how many days they've had no accidents. That's a lie. The managers are trained about silencing anyone who got injured there, they drive them home and stop them from saying anything. I've heard from reliable sources this is true.

The mine always wins international awards. Someone who was working there told me an international organization came here even the bosses start to clean up and those who are considered as the lowest skilled workers are put in a truck and taken to the forest and left there for the day so that the foreign visitors can assess the mine for the award. Once the foreigners leave the truck goes back for the low skilled workers. I was told this by someone who was taken to the forest.

The Paracatu population is not organized for confronting the mine or debating. This is a problem of Paracatu. The company got their environmental license recently for the tailings dam against the wishes of the Ministry of Public.

Doctor Onesio a prosecutor said the company should not have got the license due to their weak community relations. The ministry of public know that giving a license to the mine would put our city at risk.

The day before yesterday on the local tv station gave a report on the whole license issue.

One of the mine's biggest arguments is that they purchase internally and so develop and enrich the city. Due to them the city has grown a lot.

Our city has exploded, it exploded completely. Our population in the periphery is very poor. We have other problems with the city such as housing, transport, education and employment. The traffic here in hell!

Most of the intellectual workers are from outside and not the city. The workers from here do the basic simple manual work.

Rajiv: but the company told me they have a manager who's from the city and started as a manual miner and is now manager of strategy and he gives talks at the university.

Jaime: yes, that's what we refer to as brain washing, it s company strategy. There's no point in building a great hospital with equipment and doctors. The public transport is expensive and their owners get rich from this they charge a lot. The environment here, we're always fighting for a cleaner environment.

Rajiv: what would you say is the identity of Kinross?

Jaime: foreigner that's here to make profit and destroy the population. There's nothing more than that. They're controlled by shareholders around the world waiting for results and they have no idea of what's happening here. In the future we could have a destroyed city, without work, hunger and a sick population. We relate their identity to the tailings dam, they maintain it for now but what about when they leave? Who can guarantee they will look after it after 2044?

They have guaranteed anything to us about the mine closure. They haven't convinced the population at all.

Rajiv: what's the perception of the local community here on the mine?

Jaime: I think the city is divided. I'd say 40% defend the mine and 60% are against it. I'm part of the 60% in the 40% you'll find employees, their families and businesses.

I saw in the public assemblies this division. Those who didn't benefit from the mine throw stone at it and those who benefit defend it. Whoever makes a profit from the mine defends it. There's an issue of consciousness and morality too. Everyone has an opinion of the mine.

The company fires people for any small thing. I know someone was fired after working there for twenty years his boss told him he was unmotivated. Most people leave there with an illness due to chemical products.

When you see the communication from the mine it makes you cry it's so beautiful what they're doing. A friend of mine worked there for 10 years with headaches and they were cured once he left. A relative of mine went to work there and told me everything hurts once you work there. Lot of previous workers of the mine have an opinion against the mine, once they leave they then speak.

If you go to the Santa Rita community they'll reject you and suspect you're a spy or company consultant. They will mistrust to the maximise of any researcher.

These days people participate less they all just care about their own lives. People with money close themselves off to the world if they have a bed, house and car they don't care about other people's problems. People are becoming increasingly individualistic here in Paracatu

We have a problem with drugs here it's very big. At neighbourhood associations very few people will go to discuss problems. Councillors have told us they'll be receiving 200 million reais this years from tax revenue but yet we still have poor social assistance. The city is growing but not developing. It's exploding

Back in the 1980's the population survived without the mine. The people here had their own life before. We need more participation. The mine keeps imposing and not dialoge or listen.

They're sponsoring everything here in the town, football matches. They've managed to dominate the press. Elano Guiramaes always speaks well of the mine and he's even paid by them. Speak to him and you'll see how much he defends the mine you'll have a different conversation to this with him. He's very strategic.

A few years ago there were protests here about the mine and the company decided to make their own protest using uniforms and badges, trucks down the road and Elano was at the front shouting "enough of people protesting against progress and the mine!" It was quite a scary sight.

I have a master's thesis on the Santa Rita community. I'll send it to you by email. That community is divided between those who benefited from the mine and those that didn't. the rich farmers got good compensation. The small scale farmers got very little and moved to the city which changed their lives.

Interviewee Code C39 – Emails from former Kinross Paracatu Manager revealing confidential information (... Confidential material deleted to protect informants' identity)

12th March, 2014

Prezado Rajiv, bom dia!

FuiChefe de..... da Kinross e conheço ainda muitos problemas relativos à mineradora, suas praticas e métodos de trabalho (junto e contra a comunidade) onde tenho vários documentos a respeito.

Tenho documentos sobre vários assuntos, desde situações de meio ambiente e preocupações da mineradora com a comunidade, até as praticas de perseguições à empregados, ex empregados, sindicatos, movimentos sociais, acompanhamento da vida e ações de políticos e lideres comunitários, sindicatos , etc.

Se quiser conversar por skipe, o meu é....., me chama que te adiciono.

Me indique por favor o melhor horário para falarmos em virtude do fuso.

Um abraço

1st April, 2014

Vc conhece a historia dos grandes imperadores romanos: Pão e Circo.

A kinross distribui migalhas para um povo carente, que sedentamente as recebe recebe e ainda vai sendo enganado pela imprensa local - comprada(paga-se por espaços nos jornais e nas midias). Aliado a isso, temos a falta de transparencia da mineradora, que

mente, omite, manipula, disfarça e consegue vender a imagem de impoluta. Temos também um serviço de informações que denigre, intimida e achaca as pessoas contrárias à mineradora, que são acompanhadas diuturnamente e a qualquer deslize pessoal, sentimental, financeiro, moral, etc é coagido por essa força que aniquila qualquer iniciativa e acaba sendo desmoralizado na sociedade.

O número de empregados diretos não passa de 1300 (APROXIMADAMENTE) e o de indiretos fica na faixa dos 1000 acredito eu, a esta altura sem projeto de expansão.

A empresa se antecipa a qualquer ação e Abafa qualquer tentativa trazendo especialistas manipuladores , que se vendem por dinheiro, e em audiências públicas poucos vão ou tem conhecimento dos assuntos tratados de interesse da população, desta forma ela mata qualquer tentativa de insurgência.

A empresa 'negocia', influencia de todas as formas em todos aspectos da sociedade e pessoas de boa fé, são 'enganadas ou de tão necessitadas das migalhas, se curvam a este poderio.

Há pessoas má intencionadas que se vendem e ajudam a vender outras e há as maquiavélicas e especializadas em contra informações que trabalham para a empresa onde temos pontos interessantes que com seu conhecimento , com do Marcio (professor e geólogo) podemos em alguns casos pelo menos em colocar em dúvida a transparência tão propalada e divulgada na mídia.

Temos casos de assédio sexual, com demissões, sem demissões ...muita vergonha acontece na empresa.

Abraço

Interviewee Code D1 – Carlos and Jorge – Brothers and Local residents and activist resisting tailings dam from mining company in Los Caimanes, Chile

Carlos: The community has no relations with the Pelambres mine, everything we do with them is via the legal courts.

Me: how was life like before the dam was built?

Carlos: before the mine located the gigantic tailings dam the community was very much one and unified...very close knit and collective. Since the dam was installed the mine has divided the community between those who accept social benefits from it and payment from the mine for their water rights with those who did not.

Me: What did the you who didn't receive this payment do.

Carlos: Many things, taken legal, action, road blockades, street protests, made videos, travelled to France to make our story known and even had a hunger strike!

We used a lawyer to block that payment from the mine to 100 of our own neighbours. But at the same time many of the group who wanted payment for their water rights are also against the mine.

Me: Do you think the majority are against the mining company?

Carlos: yes definitely the vast majority around 90% of the community's 1700 inhabitants are against the mine and its dam.

Our defence committee has taken direct action many times such as creating road blocks with burning tyres, painting the whole village with graffiti messages against Pelambres mine and the hunger strike.

Me: What are your main grievances about this dam?

Carlos: Well, firstly fear of the dam breaking and wiping out the whole community as happened in El Melón a nearby town in the 1980s especially since we are located in a seismic zone.

The dam has severely cut off the village's water supply and also contaminated it according to the Head of Chilean Physicians tests on the water but according to the government tests the water is clean!! How can they argue with the head of Chilean Physicians?

.....The fact is that the Mine has divided what was once a very strong and united community.

Me: How has it divided you like this? So what exactly are you fighting for?

Carlos: The main reason is for my elderly parents I worry for them. I also need to fight for "what is right".

I also desire for a large financial payment from the mine as compensation for EVERYONE in the community whether they are with or against them in order for people to leave and set up new lives in safer environments.

We know we are powerless to stop the tailings dam from operating and shut it down.

That mining tailings dam is polluting the valley and many of us grow crops, avocados, courgettes, watermelons...so that dirty and polluted water from the dam will contaminate our crops and then who is going to buy them when they hear they come from Caimanes? Pelambres are offering lots of money to the municipality for us to have better public services if we accept then we become dependent on them! Then Pelambres will be able to do as they please with us and we will be dependent on them without our crops and livestock

They even manipulate information and systems to prove they are responsible. They (Pelambres) are tipped off when an environmental inspector is coming to assess the water in their dam to ensure it is not coming from our community's water table. They tamper with mechanical things there and manage to show that they are not using our water...they're very clever we know as we have insider information from the mine people there working who feel for us what we are going through inform us.

Interview with Carlos and elder brother Jorge

Jorge: we decided to take extreme measures with the hunger strike in the hope of getting media attention and therefore the Mine to stop the tailing dam operations or for the Mine to make a generous financial offer to all residents in terms of compensation so that they can leave and start new lives if they wish.

Me: how was the experience?

Jorge: It was a great feeling to receive the medals for our bravery and get the recognition. We have been fighting now for 12 years most of the local community are tired and fed up with this conflict and prefer to stay out of it.

Me: How did you get this activist element to your personalities?

Jorge: Our parents had been very active and vocal at first in the fight against Pelambres mine's dam but now as they are elderly and in their 70's have stepped down from such activities but they have been a huge influence in our lives.

Interviewee Code E1, Barbara, Local Indigenous Leader

Barbara: Inaugurated Barrick before ILO 169 knowing it would come.

Being a Campillay means a lot of history, oral tradition cosmovision.

We were here first now the government want the change the rules of the game, wanting to change ILO169

Barrick and the mines cannot be compatible with our identity as they are polluting the rivers.

Ignorant people are in favour of Barrick. They don't understand. They're naïve believing all the promises of work. Few people in favour.

Barrick just leave crumbs here.

"we are on a war path" but Barrick just divide us and put against one other like with OLCA.

Campusanos have a private for profit company with their Agricultural Cooperative.

The government in early 20th Century required ceding land to to the Huascoalinos as a community not to a single person or whoever comes along after.

As we know the mine won't ever leave they need to pay us compensation and comply with the RCA.

Doing this to defend their valley. Need water to survive.

Marlene – we don't need the mines, we're independent

The State is to blame for why we have no communications here, internet, poor radio, terrible health service

We feel shame receiving hand outs from the mine. We're independent.

Barbara Campillay President of Diaguita Community– Video Interview

Campillay means soul of a red heart of a Guanaco. Community leader of Diaguitas.

Majority of the 30-40 communities are against mining. All her generations are from her.

Beautiful valley.

We are farmers. This valley is not and never has been a mining one, of course there used to be artesanal mining without the chemicals that large scale uses. The glaciers are destroyed, there is no regulation.

We have water rights and the water has diminished, as you can see, the valley is becoming dry. There are people who get just 4 minutes of water use per week for their crops and I get 30 minutes.

We have older relatives who have never left this valley before so it's very important for them they have water like before.

They are trying to make a tunnel and breaking rocks up there in the glacier.

They say they're helping Diaguita culture, of course they take some Diaguita lady give her a bit of money, they buy her some clay however, for us in our culture the most important thing is Water, if you't have water, people used to plant their own vegetables in orchards before now we have to import. People use to exchange produce but we can't do that anymore due to the water.

Secondary aspects only what Barrick promotes for Diaguitas.

Lots of trees dying. Barrick send planes above to stop raining and kill the glaciers, the locals hear the planes. Once it rained lots in the nearby areas but hardly anything here, isn't that strange?

The water and land is most important.

The authorities have always tried to divide us, but we have stayed strong together. We are taking an approach similar to Nelson Mandela on a much smaller scale. We are rescuing our culture ourselves not from external intervention. We celebrate many different indigenous festivals.

Barrick do everything regarding our culture and identity for their own benefit image and take pics of it all.

I teach the more humble uneducated people in the community how to do accounts etc and about never signing anything and how our politicians are always trying to con us. Its easy to con the locals as all they care about is watching tv they are simple and uneducated. Many of them don't know how to read or write.

My cousin was robbed at the elections for being mayor. People here vote for benefits (just as in Brazil). Barrick paid for singers to come here. They once brought an erotic dancer here – Tati Merino.

Solution to our problems is that all the miners leave! Unfortunately the politicians in Santiago will not let this happen, this is El Dorado, for centuries they've looked for El Dorado and here it is! We want to defend the spirits of our ancestors and in our pottery you'll see the rivers and mountains so the mountains are sacred for us. Water, water, water.

Our lawyers defended the Mapuche sisters and nobody was willing to help us, we were asked to ask the mining companies for lawyers, we had no choice. We are defending our culture. This valley will turn into a mining one and our culture will die. We want the mining companies to leave save their identity, culture and water which is life. Barrack lie, they are only responsible for all our problems.

Campillays we always fought the Spanish and now the miners.

Sandra Candidate for Mayor – ecosystem is too fragile, divide the community, strengthen the community only in their terms via their CSR. They don't help the Culture, us Diaguitas don't need the mines to develop ourselves

Email correspondence with Indigenous Leader Barbara – El

29th May, 2013

Taphua Coñi Rajiv (Hola hermano Rajiv). Te aclaro algo un poquito.

Tú me debes decir Taphua Nai Barbara (Hola hermana Barbara) Coñi :

masculino Nai : Femenino. ya?

01. SI es efectivo Solange y Yo, como muchos Diaguitas conocemos el

tema minero, sabemos la estrategia del Buen Vecino,(de hecho

Codelco-Chile, imprimió un libro que yo no lo he podido conseguir) que se titula " Como engañar a la Comunidad "). Pero también hay Diaguitas que nunca han visto una mina, ni conocen como es una planta minera, pero el hecho de que ellos vengan a invadir tu territorio y por la intuición como Indígena, el amor a la Pachamamma, saben que les están mintiendo. En una charla, reunión, los Diaguitas te pueden decir si está bien, y te pueden dejar convencido de que entendieron todo lo que tú les dijiste o expusiste, y te dejaron convencido que van a aceptar los que tú les propusiste, , pero ellos saben (me refieron específicamente a los que son mas calladitos, que no tienen estudios, que son más humildes y más temerosos) que los están engañando, que les están mintiendo. Tú sabes que Barrick en los primeros estudios que presentó al Estado OCULTO LA EXISTENCIA DE GLACIARES, y eso jamás los hemos perdonado los Diaguitas. LO más sagrado para los Diaguitas son las Montañas, (Kakanchic : Montaña Buena, dnde se encuentran los espíritus de nuestros Tatai (Abuelos), ya que de Ahí baja la Vida, o sea La Co, Ko (Agua) (en la Ceramina Diaguita puedes ver que lo que más se plasma en ellas, son las Montañas, La Amaru (Deidad que representa El Río), y también el Valle, La escalera Blanca que va al cielo, etc). El AGUA es la subsistencia de nuestra Cultura. Ya no creemos en Ellos, porque si ocultaron lo máspreciado para cualquier

ser humano es fácil para ellos ocultar otras cosas de menos rango.

Respecto a la influencia,: La iglesia igual a tenido influencia en

esto, Los Párrocos que llegan a estos lugares son humildes también, no

son del Opus Dei..- La Cacica Solange, Paula, Orlando, y Varios

Caciques más. incluida Yo hemos tenido influencias. porque NO Tenemos

Temor, ya que siempre hubo Temor. PERO EN GENERAL LAS QUE LA LLEVAMOS

Y HEMOS SIDO MAS DECIDIDAS HEMOS SIDO LAS MUJERES DIAGUITAS, Y
HEMOS

ORGANIZADO A NUESTRO PUEBLO. Tampoco hay que ser mal agradecido, OLca

también hay ayudado. Luis Faura, sólo es UN OPORTUNISTA, SOLO ve el

bien propio y no el comunitario.

02. Nuestros Abogados, en 07 meses consiguieron lo que nadie en Chile

hizo porque ELLOS SON EXCELENTES, SON SON VENDIDOS, TIENEN UN
BUEN

PRESTIGIO, .NO SON CORRUPTOS. (En Chile hay mucha corrupción,)y Las

Autoridades firman Tratados Internacionales, pero los Standares en

Chile no son respetados, y Menos respetan a los Indigenas.En la TV.

muestran una realidad que NO es lo que vive el común de los habitantes

de este País. La fuerza que nos dá la Pachamamma, La Kakanchic, La KO,

El Wiracocha, seguramente fué para que todo fuera el 2013. porque era

YA EL MOMENTO, Y NO SE PODÍA ESPERAR MAS.

03. Con el dolor de mi Cai (Corazón) hay hermanos que les han hecho

talleres, en diferentes disciplinas, han trabajado allá, pero con salarios bajos a 4000 y 5000 msnm, otros han recibido dádivas, les dan dinero para cerámica, para instalar un kiosko bazar, muchas veces estos Diaguitas (por ignorancia) dicen que buena la minera que me dió esto, y les dan como mil veces las gracias, En mi caso yo no le doy las gracias a ellos, como les voy a dar las gracias, si están contaminando mi valle, el Agua, tengo 02 hrs de Agua al mes. suendo que hace 02 años yo rregamna mis arboles a la Hora que Hasta hace poco de mas de 02 años, yo regaba a la hora que yo quería mis árboles, en cambio ahora todo el Valle, está con Turno, porque hay poca AGUA.

Precisamente yo, tengo 02 horas de AGUA AL MES; HAY OTROS HERMANOS, QUE TIENEN 30, 40 50 mINUTOS AL MES. Nos tienen que repartir el EL aGUA para que nos alcance para todos.

Rajiv, CREO QUE REPRESENTO EL PENSAMIENTO DE LA MAYORIA DEL PUEBLO

DIAGUITA, YA QUE NO SE SI TE CONTE QUE SALI ELEGIDA "CACICA PRESIDENTA

PROVINCIAL DIAGUITA " Esto es de toda la Provincia del Huasco que va de Cordillera a Mar, EN el febrero de 2013, POR 02 AÑOS..

y Solange el Domingo 26, recién pasado, fue Reelegida Cacica

Presidenta Regional (Región de Atacama) y tu sabes que tenemos la

misms COSMOVISION DIAGUITA. .

Entonces tenemos el apoyo del 90%. y la Cacica Paula Alcayaga, es PDta

Comunal (Alto del Carmen),

23 May 2013

rajivmaher@hotmail.co.uk

TAPHUA RAJIV. HOLA COÑI (HERMANO), TAPHUA AMIGO. ES LO KE YO TE DIGO, QUE MIENTRAS HAYA CONFLICTO ELLOS RECIBEN DINEROS DEL EXTRANJERO. NO LE TRABAJAN UN DIA A NADIE SE LA LLEVAN EN PURAS MARCHAS, VIAJAN AL EXTRANJERO, TIENEN VEHICULOS. ELLOS SIEMPRE HAN

DICHO QUE NO QUIEREN DINERO, QUE SOLO LES INTERESA QUE LA MINERA SE

VAYA, PERO JAMAS SE PREOCUPARON QUE EL VALLE SE UNIERA, ELLOS HAN

HECHO SUS MARCHAS TODOS LOS AÑOS, IGUAL SE LO AGRADECEMOS, PORQUE

DEFIENDEN EL AGUA LA TIERRA, PERO SON UN GRUPO CERRADO, SON ELLOS

NOMAS.- A ELLOS LES INTERESABA MUCHO QUE SIGUIERAMOS DESUNIDOS. EN

CAMBIO NOSOTROS HICIMOS LO QUE HIZO EL Ex.Pdte.de SudAfrica, NELSON MANDELA. El Unió a SU PUEBLO CON EL DEPORTE Y NOSOTROS, lo hacemos CON nuestra CULTURA, RESCATANDO Y CELEBRANDO: El Inti Raymi (Año Nuevo

Indígena, se celebran entre el 21 y 24 de junio). La Mujer Indígena que se celebra el 05 de Septiembre. La Challa (lluvia fina) que la celebramos en Febrero de c/año, que es una fiesta de Culto al Agua y de agradecimiento. además de una fiesta de Enamoramiento. Hacemos Mateadas, Churrascas. etc. etc.

LOS DIAGUITAS NOS EMBESTIMOS, CON NUESTROS PONCHOS, CON LAS WILCHAS (

Cintillo que se pone en la cabeza), hacemos Veladas, hacemos

homenajes a los Taitas (Papás) a las Mammás (mamás) a los

Ancianos, a los Shamanes o Shamanas, o Meicos o Curanderos., a Los

Chinos que le bailan a la Virgen. Hacemos Nuestros Sahumerios. Hacemos

Agradecimientos siempre y Rogativas a la Pachamama. Bendecimos la

Kakanchic (Montaña Buena). Homenajearnos a nuestras Cacicas y

Caciques y a nuestras Matriarcas.

Para rescatar nuestra Lengua," el Kakán " hacemos juegos de Palabras

con los Niños y Niñas. EN CAMBIO A ELLOS LES DA VERGUENZA PONERSE UN

PONCHO, UNA WILCHA, Y CELEBRAR LAS FIESTAS ANCESTRALES O RESCATAR TU

CULTURA. .

rajivmaher@hotmail.co.uk 16th May, 2013

Taphua Rajiv, Hola.

01. Sabes que en general cronologicamente los acontecimientos tú los describes bien.

02. El Gobierno el 2006, le otorgó el 2do RCA a Barrick, ya que antes le habia otorgado la 1era RCA (me parece fue el 2001)

03. Cualquier Autoridad del gobierno que iba al Valle se le daba a saber la problemática con la Minera, pero todos se hacían los sordos y mudos y ciegos..

04. SE le entregó una carta personalmente al Presidente de Republica el Marzo 2011. Lo Hizo Solange Bordonos. Cacica'Presidenta Regional.Diaguita. Sólo Contesto por medio de Sernageomin que ya se había hecho la Consulta Ciudadana.

05. Por medio de un concejal de la Comuna de Alto del Carmen. El nos consiguió un cupo en el Congreso (Senadores y Diputados) en VALPARAISO. , En Novbre o Dic 2011 (el mes exacto no recuerdo en este momento),para la Comision de Recursos Naturales SOLO NOS DIO 05 MINUTOS PARA EXPONER NUESTRO CASO.Por lo cual redactamos una carta muy extensa, pero que se pudo leer el 05 minutos, de nuestra problematica con la Minera y tampoco no queremos ninguna minera más.. Y fue leía por SOLANGE EN ESA OCASIÓN.

06.LA COMISION QUEDÓ DE SESIONAR EN NUESTRA COMUNA DE ALTO DEL CARMEN

EN marzo 2012, despues en abril del 2012, y así paso todo el año 2012,

y NUNCA LLEGARON.A SESIONAR.LA PRESIDENTA DE ESA COMISION ES LA SRA

ANDREA MOLINA Y NOS ENVIO A DECIR POR MEDIO DEL CONCEJAL, QUE NO TENIA

MAYORES ANTECEDENTES AL RESPECTO.

07. COMO NUNCA LLEGARON Y SE PASABA EL TIEMPO, EL RIO SE ESTABA SECANDO, EL TRANQUE SE ESTABA SECANDO, Y TODA LA AGRICULTURA HA TENIDO

NEFASTAS CONSECUENCIAS.(POR LA DESTRUCCION DE LOS GLACIARES) NOS

DECIDIMOS CONTRATAR A LOS ABOGADOS . NOS PUSIMOS DE ACUERDO LAS

COMUNIDADES PREVIO A HABERLAS VISITADO POR TODO EL VALLE (tu fuiste

me parece a 1 o 2 reuniones), YA QUE LA AUTODETERMINACION ERA DE CADA

UNO DE NOSOTROS Y DE CADA COMUNIDAD Y ERA NUESTRO DERECHO A DEFENDER

LA VIDA Y EL AGUA..

Y ASI FUERON DECIDIENDOSE Y SE SUMARON AL " RECURSO DE PROTECCION

VARIAS COMUNIDADES.MAS. Somos 10 organizaciones.

08.CUANDO CONOCIO SOLANGE AL ABOGADO SR. LORENZO SOTO, SOLO FUE UNA

CASUALIDAD, YA QUE NADIE SABIA QUE IBA UN DIAGUITA AL CONGRESO.EL

CONCEJAL NOS AVISO COMO A LAS 15,00 HRS DE QUE TENIAMOS UN CUPO. Y NOS

EMPEZAMOS A MOVER. Y SOLANGE VIAJO ESA MISMA NOCHE DEL MISMO DIA. A

VALPARAISO. Y EL PAPA LA ESPERO EN STGO PARA LLEVARLA HABIA EL PUERTO.

09. RODRIGO VILLABLANCA EN ESTO MIENTE, MIENTE , YA QUE SOLANGE SE

ENCONTRO CON UN DOCTOR QUE ES DIPUTADO DE NUESTRA ZONA. ELLOS ESTABAN

CONVERSANDO, Y DE CASUALIDAD, PASO ALGUIEN Y SE DEVOLVIO A SALUDAR AL

DOCTOR. Y AHI SE LO PRESENTARON A SOLANGE. SOLANGE NO SABIA QUE ERA

ABOGADO Y LORENZO SOTO TAMPOCO SABIA QUE SOLANGE ERA DIAGUITA.

10. COMO VERAS EL DESTINO SE ENCARGA DE ESTAS COSAS INEXPLICABLES, YA

QUE EN PRINCIPIO NADIE PODIA IR A ESA REUNION, PORQUE HABIA QUE TOMAR

LA DECISION INMEDIATAMENTE. YO NO PODIA, PAULA TAMPOCO. Y PENSAMOS QUE

ALGUIEN DEBIA HACER OTRO SACRIFICIO POR LA PACHAMAMA, YA QUE ES LA

ULTIMA OPORTUNIDAD. Y SOLANGE PUDO IR POR FIN A VALPARAISO.

POR OTRA PARTE NOSOTROS DESCONOCIAMOS QUE RODRIGO VILLABLANCA IBA A

ESA REUNION,

11.A LAS COMUNIDADES DIAGUITAS O L C A NUNCA NOS APOYO JAMAS.

MENOS EL LUIS FAURAS. ELLOS LUCRAN CON LA DESGRACIA AJENA. MIENTRAS

HAYA CONFLICTO A ELLOS LES LLEGA DINERO DE LA ONG. DEL EXTRANJERO Y NO

SE DE DONDE MAS, YA QUE NO LE TRABAJAN UN DIA A NADIE Y ANDAN EN PURAS

MARCHAS, RECORREN CHILE COMPLETO, VAN A EXTRANJERO Y ESTO ES MUY CARO.

. Y NOSOTROS ESCASITAMENTE TENEMOS DINERO PARA HACER NUESTRAS

REUNIONES. Ellos. LLEVAN MAS DE 10 AÑOS HACIENDO MARCHAS Y QUE CONSIGUIERON?? QUE EL RIO SE SECARA QUE LA BARRICK SE INSTALARA. OLCA,

FAURA Y R.VILLABLANCA. SON APASIGUADORES DE MASAS. Muchas veces nos

estabamos organizando y Faura nos hechaba todo para atras y volviamos a retroceder Varias veces nos hicieron esto. Y UN DIA NOS DIMOS CUENTA DE ESTO. y empezamos a organizarnos y nos decidimos a contratar los abogados. NOSOTROS NOS DEMORAMoS MUCHO, PORQUE NO TENEMOS DINERO. SOMOS GENTE HUMILDE TU Conociste el valle.y a pesar de todo todavía es hermoso. Los 02 ABOGADOS QUE TENEMOS SON LOS UNICOS EN CHILE QUE NOS OFRECIERON SUS ASESORIAS.

12. LUIS FAURAS NOS OFRECIO UN EXCELENTE ABOGADO MAPUCHE PARA QUE NOS DEFENDIERA, PERO HASTA EL DIA DE HOY AUN NO LLEGA CON EL ABOGADO.

13. Nos desprestigian que le dimos PODER A LOS ABOGADOS. En Chile como te va representar un Abogado si no le das un Poder?? Así ES la Ley. TODO ABOGADO NECESITA DE UN PODER PARA REPRESENTARTE ANTE LAS FISCALIAS, LA CORTE DE APELACIONES, ANTE LA CORTE SUPREMA.. Son BIEN

ignorantes parece,

14.R. Villablanca, Faura y OLCA critican a nuestroS abogados y a nosotros. ELLOS No son DiaGUITAS. Y Nos Faltan el respeto. ya que los Derechos son Nuestros y No de Ellos. Y no tienen porque oponerse a

nuestra Autodeterminación.

15. FINALMENTE NUNCA HA HABIDO UN QUIEBRE CON FAURA Y OLCA:
Jamás

hemos trabajado con Ellos. Ellos hacen reuniones secretas, es un grupo cerrado. que sólo participan algunos , o sea los de Olca, Faura pertenece a una comunidad Diaguita y asistía a nuestras reuniones sólo para disolver todo lo nuestro.. El no es Diaguita se autoreconoció porque su ex' esposa es Diaguita. Lleva como 15 años separado de ella. y sólo la busco para que le diera la firma y autoreconocerse, (esto ya pasó a pelambre, pero es la verdad)

Chauuu. Kakanchic, Kakanchic, (Dios de la Montaña)

Jallalla, Jallala, : Voz de Triunfo.

Barbara

Cacica y Pdta Diaguita Provincial

29th April, 2013

Taphua Hermano (Coñi) Rajiv. ¿ Como estás?. espero estés bien junto a tus seres queridos. A tu consulta respondo:

01. La paralización del monstruo, por supuesto QUE SE DEBIO A NUESTRA FUERZA Y A DIGNIDAD DE NUESTRO PUEBLO, (nunca les recibimos limosnas, ni migajas, porque NUESTRO VALLE, NUESTRA PACHAMAMA es valiosísima, es

incalculable su valor histórico, material, y espiritual). Y ESTE
FUERZA VIENE DEL CORAZON DE CADA HERMANO, DE LAS
COMUNIDADES Y
ORGANIZACIONES QUE PUSIMOS EL RECURSO.
NO TUVIMOS MIEDO, (Ellos son tan poderosos, pero no nos dió miedo).
TU ME VISTE HACIENDO REUNIONES PARA TENER EL APOYO DE LOS
HERMANOS. Y
QUE LA GENTE TOMARA VALOR.- TOTAL NOSOTROS LOS DIRIGENTES
ESTABAMOS
PONIENDO PRACTICAMENTE NUESTRA CABEZA EN LA GUILLOTINA.

02. Olca NUNCA Nos ayudó, todo lo contrario en la misma Página de la

Olca hubieron declaraciones que: Solange, Paula, Orlando y YO,

practicamente estábamos vendiendo el VALLE, y que los Abogados

nuestros eran unos chantas.

03. LAS UNICAS PERSONAS EN CHILE, QUE NOS OFRECIERON APOYO
FUERON

NUESTROS DOS ABOGADOS. POR QUIEN REZO TODOS LOS DIAS, Y LE PIDO
AL

W IRACOA (Dios), LA PACHAMAMA, (Madretierra) AL INTI, (Sol)

A LA KO, (Agua) Y AL LUI (Viento)que los protejA

04.La Empresa JAMÁS SE RELACIONÓ CON LAS COMUNIDADES DIAGUITAS,
sólo

lo hacía con las Autoridades, Empresarios, y algunos hermanos

diaguitas, en forma individual, que de Indígena no tienen nada, ya que recibían limosnas, a cambio del AGUA.

05. Los Diaguitas, la mayoría somos, Micro Agricultores, también pesó esto. Estamos defendiendo nuestras plantaciones, nuestros arboles, que se nos están secando.

06. EN CUANTO A LOS GOBIERNOS Y SUS AUTORIDADES NADIE NO HA APOYADO.

SE HAN HECHO, LOS CIEGOS, SORDOS Y MUDOS.

El siniestro Peter Munk, en un documental que lo entrevistaron opinó

lo sgte : " La Comida tiene su precio " o sea quizo decir " Estos

muertos de hambre tienen que aguantarse, ya que yo les daré trabajo,

para que coman. ". Nosotros JAMÁS HEMOS SIDO MUERTOS DE HAMBRE, la

pachamama nos ha dado y nos seguirá dando para salir adelante. Cuantas

familias por generaciones y generaciones, sacaron a sus hijos adelante

de todo lo que la Tierra, les dió y seguira dando. Y JAMAS

NECESITAMOS MINERAS..

Un abrazo y cuídate, Bendiciones,. Añupi

23rd April, 2013

Taphua (hola),Rajiv, como te habrás enterado, Pascua sigue

paralizada, ellos presentaron otro recurso, pero la Corte nuevamente

se los rechazó, ya que NO ADJUNTARON NINGUN ANTECEDENTE NUEVO.-

Algo

inédito en Chile, que el Pueblo Diaguita, tenga detenido al monstruo.

Fuimos el primer pueblo conquistado por los españoles., éstos entraron

a estos territorios por Copayapu (Copiapó) desde el territorio que

hoy se llama Argentina, y nos mataron a nuestros 30 Caciques

Diaguitas. Hoy en el siglo 20y 21, nuevamente llegó el invasor (

Barrick-Peter Munk), como no nos pueden matar como ocurrió, en

aquellos tiempos de la conquista española, nos quieren eliminar

sustentablemente como ellos llaman (¿ Qué es desarrollo sustentable

?, nosotros no lo entendemos). Quieren eliminar y que se termine

nuestra Cultura Milenaria, dejándonos sin agua, además han contaminado

nuestra tierra y AGUA. (SIN AGUA y SIN TIERRA NO HAY CULTURA) Ellos

han destruido GLACIARES (ellos dicen glaciaretos),Bocedales;

Llaretas,etc, Pero no han destruido nuestra Fortaleza, Nuestras

Convicciones, No NOS PUDIERON DESUNIR).VIVA LA PACHAMAMA , VIVA
LA

KO. Añupi

Interviewee code E2 – Orlando – local politician and Community leader – 25 minutes

Orlando: Only speak to me as I'm not from Barrick. Born as raised there as Diaguita. Proud to be Campillay. Worked in many mines. Electrician. Came back because loves his Valley. Built his house and land from scratch with own hands. Doesn't need help from mines or government "when one wants to grow and to well in life one doesn't need to accept help from mines or governments" –

Pollution will be and is high, water was red in jan/feb due to mine testing.

The Mayor came from the Mine and therefore helps them with permits etc.

He is candidate for Councillor wants to defend being Diaguita and the Valley.

Diaguita = doesn't sell out or let anybody walk over him! Nobody can impose their ideas in them. Not scared of anyone. Will fight for his kids, grandkids who face mine.

Huascoaltinos receive service road from Mine and fighting company.

Orlando wants compensation for damages already made by Barrick

That's why they're group is fighting for the compensation.

Mine has disrespected sacred grave.

"Barrick is responsible for all the damages" – playing with slogan

We are strengthening and suing them.

Recognized as Diaguitas in 2006. Barrack had already taken over and bought the previous Mayor.

The Valley is very dispersed villages are remote unlike a city so its hard to bring together.

“we are becoming more united and closer”.

Its all lies about many jobs as I know having worked in mining many years need ISOs, exams etc. they wouldn't let a farm worker go up there.

“I don't sell my conscience, I would never work for Barrick” I would never sell myself as I'm Diaguita. Our identity is too strong. Do you think after all the hard work and sacrifice my wife and I have made on our house we would leave it all for the mine?

“Barrick go wherever they can get their teeth into” so they use people

“Once a girl from el Morro came here offering us social projects and economic help but I refused as I've always worked hard for things in my life, I don't need this help that's why I would sell myself”

“thanks to the lord my hands are good and my brain is in working order so why do I need that mine? I can sell a CD of my music and live off that so I'm not going to sell myself for something that would be bread for today and hunger for tomorrow”

“I don't need handouts from Barrick or from the government I brought up my kids by my own hard work. That's what being a Diaguita is about it is about hard work and not accepting handouts from others. We are independent people and proud we don't need mining companies and the government!”

“ we are 100% clear that they the mine have to compensate us for the damages already caused!!!” x3

“we have our right to demand compensation and we're not negotiating”

“we are fighting for everyone in the community”

“for being Diaguita I will want to stay here and not sell up and leave with compensation”

“the people in the countryside have been bribed, sold their goats for a truck to Barrick”

“us Diaguitas are united but unfortunately we those people who are Diaguitas but say they are and are not together with us such as Lucho Fauro who is married to a Diaguita

but doesn't have Diaguaita blood. Can he have the same feeling as me?" "No of course not he's not from here" there are 10 other eggs like him who shout about Barrick then get a coin and shut up.

Barrick use people and kids pay them to say good things about them.

I know the mines from personal experience in many different ones, they can't lie to me about what they're doing I know about mining. I was Union Leader and never sold out.

Barrick have people in the local government to change rural zones into urban ones, so they can build and construct here. If we become Urban according to the government we won't be able to continue with many of our customs such as cooking with wood, having chickens, rabbits.

The mine and government never tell the whole story about urbanizing the community always leave out the negative aspects.

I'm going to communicate everything to the community so that they're informed because people here are not informed. I like to speak with base and foundation, just like a house needs solid foundation.

I never go to events here because they are financed by Barrick so if I go they would take photos of me at folklore concerts and I'd be in the paper as a supporter of Barrick. It's the same as the Roman times they have a community party and everyone is happy. Its really sad in the 21st Century and our people are still used.

It's a atropello and injustice that's happening here.

We don't need to protest in the street anymore what we're doing is fairest, we have to go via legal channels because the mine is in partnership with the government, they will always support the mine. Do you think the guy sat with a tie in Santiago will care what happens here? They don't even know what its like here they never even come here.

For me all the mines should leave, we were brought up without mines and I brought my kids up without mines here, we care about the water, trees and land.

Interviewee Code E3 Dona Cristina – grape farmer, Huasco Valley – 15 minutes

Cristina: There is Not enough water for irrigation. The mines only help the rich and not the poor. I defend the poor humble people, its sad to see the valley dying. I'm sad because my grandkids will not get to see this valley.

Me: What is the mining company doing wrong?

Cristina: They don't practice what they preach. Their waste will contaminate the water supplies and end all of us here.

We need to get compensation from them if they dry our water supplies. We are divided, those with most power and wealth in the community are together with the mines. The valley will die. We have to fight for compensation from the mining companies. How else can we survive without water? Here we have peace and tranquility but Barrick will force us out of here when they finish our water supplies. We won't be able to stay here in our valley then, how can we? We don't want to leave this for a city and all the stress that comes with that life..NO of course not!"

Me: What can you do about this situation?

Cristina: We've marched, been on tv the mines don't take notice of us. The ones in favour of the mines are those who don't want to work, lazy ones who live off hand outs and accept lies but those of us who work like us are against

Interviewee Code E4 – Church Priest - Valle del Huasco – Interview Transcripts

Church priest – worst thing that can happen to valley, its like a cancer getting worse and worse. It will destroy the valley.

Certain chapels are in favour of church.

3 big invasions.

1. Incas – changed language
2. Spanish - changed language – lost their Identity
3. Miners –

The Incas taught locals about ceramics and agriculture, the Spanish left horses, sheep, seeds, so the mines should leave something.

Barrick lie, buy people.

Agrees that people with values, ethics, history and strong identity etc are against mine. Materialistic people with weak identities are in favour. Materialistic people = young, age-important. Older people = against.

El Morro offered him the pick-up.

Barrick buys silence and people.

Always been poor church, never needed rich people so why need the rich now? This place is now a symbol as a place that does not accept money from mines.

We are a symbol for Rome and rest of Church.

Give work to few people, the river and water give more employment. How do we eat lettuce etc without the word? TRADITIONS AND IDENTITY ARG

Priest – part II

They were named as Diaguitos by government and seen as beneficiaries and not for their Identity, which social benefits they can receive housing social.

BUT NOT FOR THEIR IDENTITY!! THAT MEANS TERRITORY AND WATER
Barrick in their Diaguita publications speak about ceramic and knitting. Manipulating their Identity for their own good. Barrick does it to desviar the attention the secondary elements of the Identity and not to teach the parts of territory and water and language. Barrick finance the Indigenous New Year of the sun

They've created 22 communities here from three to get more internal conflict going on.
DIVIDED THE THREE DIAGUITAS INTO 22, DIVIDING PEOPLE.

BARRICK ARE LIARS THEY WORK LYING ALL THE TIME ALWAYS
SUPPORTED BY THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT. They're not transparent. Utiliza las personas y los abandona, personas vulnerables utiliza y chao.

Barrick with Muni changed community from self-sufficient to dependent.

Identity was very collective and Diaguitas before went to hills hunted Guanaco and shared out in quarters. Started sheep farming then moved down to farm crops then they started salary jobs and then the mines came in and gave salaries. This became the Diaguita Urbano.

They don't have their own historical vision of them.

Diaguitas were no warriors but agriculture, they were dominated by Incas and Spanish and negotiated with them. Incas taught them ceramic, terraces.

As long as they stay divided they won't find their Identity. Their Identity is in their Collectiveness. You can't be Diaguita in an urban area.

Donde dice Mall vemos Mall donde tienen tan mal.

La Solange ha preguntado a los arboles, el rio si es justo? Los ancestros habrían preguntado si eso es justo?

Estamos perdiendo toda la identidad por quedarnos todos iguales.

Huascalotinos defenden el Lugar no se pierde eso el lugar la Identidad de las.

Padres salio de dar clases en la U cuando vio que sus alumnos que firmaron que la contaminación del rio era de algas

Car ride and Community Meeting

Not scarred of Barrick. Nearly killed Orlando by throwing nails on road.

The countryside wasn't dangerous before the mine arrived.

Created division in community since arrived.

The Huascoatinos get paid by Barrick and we don't so we want compensation.

Fighting for grandkids future. Learned that from ancestors and need to pay respect to them.

Barrick always do favours hoping for something in return they don't do anything for free

Biggest impact will be amount of cyanide. We have eg of Agrosuper nearby.

Ivan – Long Hair - We know they send 150 social and psychology workers to study us, what we're like, our quality of life to understand us and then use it to control us. A lot poverty, due to that some buy into the mine when it offers schools, hospitals etc.

Hopes the mines can create tourism project like Tasco and take advantage of all the gold by working as jeweller.

The government are trying to get indigenous to change ILO169 law to a Decree. Fought another Diaguita not to change ILO169 who wanted to change. Orlando = soy revolucionario.

Paula = wanted to give my dad and neighbours money so that they'd leave their land but they didn't accept they'd rather die happy there than leave their land and horses.

Peter Monk – “if you want to eat you need money and therefore need us” x4.

We have a paradise, clean water and glaciers – Orlando.

Meeting all about getting compensation for everyone = pure Framing.

Criticizing OLCA and Luis Faura for criticizing them, and trying to convince and frame their arguments and get this community on side before they side with OLCA and Luis Faura.

Using Diaguita Identity as argument, pachamama, explaining what it means.

Discussions criticising Huascoalinos. Always speaking of \$60m they got from Barrick.

Speaking about water scarcity in the world and how valuable a resource it is.

Refer repeatedly to Indigenous and ILO169 laws even citing them.

Solange Speaking about the credentials of the lawyer Lorenzo Soto how he has defended the Mapuche Sisters x7, framing it to get their support.

Argue that suing Barrick is the only choice they have.

Blaming OLCA for stirring up community.

Government and OLCA have never helped us with lawyers we have been accused of being sell outs but we're not we are the only hardworking ones here we have a right to this protection and compensation.

Not OLCA or the Campusanos have a right to tell us what to do.

We are fighting amongst ourselves over water and that's Barrick's fault.

Questioning OLCAs credentials that they live off Conflict with Barrick therefore if the conflict is over and the mine leaves or they get their compensation OLCA will be out of work.

Gave letter to government mining ministry wrote back arguing that the community participation for consultation already happened therefore they can't do much about that. Wanted Nancy Yanez as lawyer but shes with the Huascoalinos.

OLCA should fight against barrack and not against them.

A lot about "Vendidos"

Telling them repeatedly never to sign anything from anyone as Barrick and others have often taken advantage of them.

Explaining to them about the importance and power they have today due to ILO169.

One member of audience wants to fight the mines to get of rid of them as they never do as they promise anywhere in the world. But says it will impossible to get rid of them. Mentions water scarcity around world again.

Speaking a lot about lawyers and their speciality in indigenous and environmental law.

OLCA and environmentalists are trying to sue this group

Barbara: OLCA lives of conflicts they need conflict to exist and get funding but now we as indigenous people are exercising our right to defend ourselves, the damage done by

Barrick needs to paid and paid expensive. OLCA annoyed because they are negotiating. “los huevones vienen de Santiago, valeska recorre todo el mundo a méxico” Campusano recebe de la minera y nosotros nada!

They’re angry that we are suing. Campusano with OLCA is suing us now.

Han basurado nuestro abogado y nosotros.

169 is essential here but the Constitution Chilena says we have a right to live in a clean place without pollution. The mapuche sisters didn’t have ILO169 for Ralco and won.

Government asked to change to 124 from 169, Orlando got angry and shouted against this and left at the meeting in Arica. Was called a Roto for not listening to 124 but he defended himself.

International pressure forced Chile to ratify 169 but right wing demanded the decreto 124 on top of ILO169. 124 doesn’t demand consult.

The government offered good hotel, food but with other intentions.

We just want the mine to leave but 10 years protesting and marching for what> OLCA are not even from here. Vallenar 60,000 = 3 candidatos. Alto del Carmen 4,000=6 candidatos Alcalde.

El dano alguien lo tiene que pagar. JUST AFTER FINANCIAL COMPENSATION.

We fight neighbours for wáter use, land prices are going down and this is Barrick’s fault.

“we are the majority in our group”

Interviewee Code F1 – Local community resident campaigning against the opening of new mine

A young engineering professor who runs a blog against mining near the town, he is too afraid to reveal his name or any contact details on his blog because he would surely lose his job if he went public, as ALL his students work at the mining companies! People are fearful to speak badly about mining companies here as almost everyone works at one! He participated in direct action last year by holding an anti mining banner on a church at the city's anniversary party, however said everyone in the town is very passive, apathetic and fearful. Nobody is willing to put their neck on the line for this cause. In a town of 55000 there are only 6 or 7 activists against the mining proposal. He also took me to the mountain just 2.5 miles from the beautiful colonial historic centre where some mining has begun.

9th May, 2013

me: Oi Luís Claudio tudo bem? Como vai a luta contra a Mina del Rey? Ainda pretendem a construir-a?

3:52 PM

Claudio: Bom dia Rajiv. Tudo bem? Estamos lutando contra... mas parece que irá ser reativa ano que vem...

3:54 PM

me: que ruim isso! Queria-lhe pelo menos contar sobre a resistencia de uma outra comunidade em Minas contra a mineradora daí em Conceição de Mato Dentro eles tem o projeto de mineração maior do mundo e com a ajuda do Ministerio Publico estao criando-se muita uniao e força do Povo e gostaria que lá em Mariana pudessem fazer algo

parecido olha aqui de uns dias atrás
http://www.almg.gov.br/acompanhe/noticias/arquivos/2013/05/06_direitos_humanos_conceicao_do_mato_dentro.html

Claudio: ótimo... muito obrigado... olha como vão as coisas:
<http://cuidardemariana.blogspot.com.br/search?updated-max=2013-01-11T08:47:00-02:00&max-results=5>

3:57 PM

me: nossa é bem triste mas a resistencia do povo aumentou? ou é a mesma coisa de cada um só pensando em possiveis ganhos económicos de emprego e aluguel?

3:58 PM

tem tantas pessoas inteligentes e capazes ali em Mariana como vcs e os académicos que realmente dá para criar um movimento contra a reativação. Tem ajuda de um vereador pelo menos né?

4:00 PM

Claudio: Não temos apoio... a população é favor.... não se manifestam contra... Poucos se manifestam contra, desses poucos, menos ainda fazem algo concreto.... aqui em Mariana, o povo está muito individualista (cada um só pensa em si, e em seu benefício próprio a curto prazo.) Está muito triste.

4:01 PM

As assinaturas sobem devagar:
http://www.avaaz.org/po/petition/Contra_a_reativacao_da_Mina_Del_Rey_na_cidade_de_Mariana_Minas_Gerais_Brasil/?eJtYbbb

4:04 PM

me: é eu acabei de ver as assinaturas acho que já assinei mas vou tentar fazer de novo

é só ir até Congonhas para os Marianeses ver o que será o futuro com a reativação da Mina

Claudio: Pois é...

Em julho vamos espalhar panfletos por toda a cidade.

4:05 PM

Vamos tentar aumentar as assinaturas.

me: quem pode querer isso mesmo para eles? Congonhas foi u desastre

4:06 PM

ótimo mas preciso-lhe avisar de uma coisa olha só aqui a Vale trabalha com Espioes em ONGs ou grupos que estao em contra deles

<http://veja.abril.com.br/blog/radar-on-line/economia/ex-gerente-acusa-vale-de-espionagem/>

4:08 PM

Claudio: Nossa... temos que ter cuidado para trabalhar com isso...

4:09 PM

me: pois é mas vc já teve sucesso antes com as pamfletas entao acredito que consegue ter de novo mas seria melhor desconfiar de pessoas novas que "querem ajudar"

Claudio: ótimo.... muito obrigado...

4:10 PM

me: se vc consegue criar um grupo de pessoas em contra seria ótimo conseguir uma audiéncia pública e levar todos para lá

4:11 PM

para falar abertamente sobre os impactos que vai gerar a Mina da população

Claudio: Como podemos conseguir uma audiência pública?

4:12 PM

me: eu nao sei exatamente mas vale a pena ir a falar com algum Promotor de Justica lá em mariana melhor com aquele que está em contra da mina também

Claudio: ótimo....

4:13 PM

me: vou te passar os emails de dois Promotores de Justica em BH que estao ajudando muito a comunidade de Conceição de Mato Dentro sao de fortalecer os Movimentos Sociais na comunidade para resistir a mina

acho que vcs estao precisando do mesmo

Claudio: Ótimo....

me: sabe eu vou mandar o email com copia a vc para os promotores

Claudio: Muito obrigado.

4:14 PM

me: com Link a suas páginas para eles ver

Claudio: Muito obrigado mesmo...

<http://cuidardemariana.blogspot.com.br/2012/10/inicio-da-mineracao-da-mina-del-rey.html>

4:15 PM

me: legal mais tarde hj eu mando

um abraço e a gente se fala

Claudio: Muito obrigado. Um abraço...

8th May, 2013

Boa noite Rajiv.

Aqui está tudo bem. Quando irá voltar?

Não temos apoio... a população é favor.... não se manifestam contra... Poucos se manifestam contra, desses poucos, menos ainda fazem algo concreto.... aqui em Mariana, o povo está muito individualista (cada um só pensa em si, e em seu benefício próprio a curto prazo.) Está muito triste.....Muitos moradores da cidade trabalham nessa empresa, isso gera uma certa dependência.

Meu ponto de vista é: a cidade pode sobreviver sem destruir suas nascentes e seu entorno montanhoso. Para isso teria que se investir em turismo histórico e ecológico. Existe uma Universidade Federal na Cidade. Poderiam vir outras indústrias para as cidades (indústrias de transformação e tecnologia).

A principal estratégia adotada pela prefeitura da cidade é a geração de emprego. Esse é o ponto principal.

A empresa está distribuindo vários informativos (jornais) nas casas dos moradores sobre as "boas ações" que vem realizando. Mas na verdade percebo que é a obrigação social, pois é isenta de vários impostos.

A empresa não coloca o assunto da reativação da Mina Del Rey. A empresa não fala nada sobre a Mina Del Rey. A empresa fica somente fazendo propaganda de "coisas boas", geração de emprego, áreas preservadas, desenvolvimento...

Por favor, nos ajude.

http://www.avaaz.org/po/petition/Contra_a_reativacao_da_Mina_Del_Rey_na_cidade_de_Mariana_Minas_Gerais_Brasil/?eJtYbbb

[http://www.avaaz.org/po/petition/Contra a reativacao da Mina Del Rey na cidade de Mariana Minas Gerais Brasil/?eJtYbbb](http://www.avaaz.org/po/petition/Contra_a_reativacao_da_Mina_Del_Rey_na_cidade_de_Mariana_Minas_Gerais_Brasil/?eJtYbbb)

Fique à vontade para perguntar sobre.

Muito obrigado.

Interviewee Code F2 - University Professor in Social Sciences, Mariana

On Saturday morning I met a Uni professor who is very anti mining and has her own social movement in the town aimed at improving the quality of life through sustainability. She was very cross when I said Brazilians seem passive and submissive compared to others in terms of mining. She then gave me many examples of local social movements against mining, which are formed of highly educated and ecological minded people. Certainly not of normal, average Brazilians. She also conceded that here in Mariana the people would never protest as they're not critical enough, they are docile and simpletons. She also explained the historical importance of mining here, afterall the State is called General Mines and people from here are known as Mineiros which means Miners in English, and the Portuguese arrived here only to exploit the place for gold, next came the Brits and so forth always for minerals. She pointed to a location in the north of Brazil which has Chilean style social movements with direct action by the communities against the very same mining company here (Vale).

She believes its because there in the north they have no employment from Vale as its the world's longest train that creates the problems for the communities whereas here they can work in the mines. So employment and economic opportunities are key in terms of generating positive perceptions and relations and vice versa. People are more willing to accept the negative impacts it seems when they have financial stability from the mine.

From: Amanda [xxx@gmail.com]

Sent: Wednesday, August 07, 2013 3:34 AM

To: Maher, Rajiv

Subject: Re: Estrategias da Vale para sua aceitaçao da mina del rey

Olá Rajiv, tudo bem?

Sua colocação está correta. Sim, a cidade é dependente da mineradora (seja Vale, seja Samarco ou outras...), mas é uma dependência histórica, como havíamos conversado por aqui: trocou-se a mineração do ouro pela de minério de ferro...e as relações de exploração são as mesmas.

Quanto ao seu questionamento a respeito das estratégias, a Vale começou a esboçar uma aproximação com a comunidade, através de encontros com lideranças (é o nome que eles deram). Fui a dois deles e achei uma palhaçada. Mas tem pessoas daqui que "gostam", sentem importantes sendo chamadas para esses encontros, regados a salgadinhos, refrigerantes e brindes...Nós do movimento ambientalista, assim como os sindicalistas, quando vamos sempre questionamos sobre as ações impactantes, sobre a mina del rey, mas desde o ultimo, há um ano mais ou menos, nunca mais ouvi falar nesses encontros. Foi nesse ultimo que nós filmamos as falas deles e eles (a Vale) não gostaram.

Bom, acho que o trabalho que estou enviando em anexo pode te ajudar mais. Trata-se daquele trabalho de conclusão de curso de minha aluna de que te havia falado. Ela fez um livro reportagem sobre a questão da mina del rey. Atualiza todas as questões que você pergunta.

E aqui também tem links para matérias que fizemos no jornal laboratório do curso de Jornalismo, o Lampião, onde sou professora de reportagem. Tem algumas matérias sobre a questão.

<http://issuu.com/jornallampiao/docs/ed4>

"Mineradora promove encontro entre empresa e sociedade civil"

E materia na página 8 dessa edição <http://issuu.com/jornallampiao/docs/lampiao9>

"Mina Del Rey: a concretização de um destino a olhos nus"

Espero ter ajudado. Bom trabalho e nos mantenha informados quando tiver terminado para divulgarmos por aqui também.

Abraços,

Amanda

Interviewee code F3 – Director of social and cultural NGO, Mariana and Paracatu

Met at the Community Samba party the councillor introduced me to a guy called Tomas and he works with local communities of mines at Paracatu with Kinross (500km away from here) and also another mine in the amazon which has several Maroon communities and he lives here.

He explained that the Maroons in Paracatu being so close to the city and being dependent on mining historically make their identity weaker and mean they have naturally less opposition to Kinross. He explained how the Maroon community up north is much less accepting of the large mine there because they have lived alone in the jungle for many many years isolated from society and developed their own identity and culture they even sound more African when they speak! This group is also much better organized with leadership compared to in Paracatu and therefore they get much more out of the mining company (backs up other data I have too). The Maroons up north (like in my Chile cases) don't work at the mine so therefore don't have this dependence on it either.

Tomas also explained that Maroons with a strong identity i.e. not the Paracatu ones have a stronger and prouder identity than normal afro-brazilians who make up the vast majority of the local population here in this town. That is because the Maroons are proud of their history of escaping slavery and setting up new settlements and communities whereas the other majority of afro-brazilians had to wait until 1888 to be freed from slavery.

Also, Mariana which is a historical city recognized by the government for its patrimony has more related government institutions here to help protect it from such aggressive mining as in Paracatu. Paracatu is more isolated in that sense. Therefore by having more

public institutions with teeth Mariana is safer and therefore the local population can be at ease whereas in Paracatu they are more on their own. The fact that Mariana has Federal Universities and just 10 miles from here has even more considered among the best in the country with students from all over also means there is naturally more questioning of any urban mine projects. In Paracatu the universities are more like technical colleges and therefore have less critical capacity.

**Interviewee code F4 – Email exchange with research questions to a Mining company
Trade Union Leader – Mariana.**

14th December, 2012

RESPOSTAS AO RAJIV

Na verdade existe uma grande distância entre a realidade vivida pelos Marianenses nas últimas três décadas (da mina mais próxima estar a 30 km) e agora, há que se apresenta, com a possibilidade de passar à conviver com uma Mina há 1,5Km do centro da cidade.

Mesmo tendo experiências muito próximas, como as comunidades das cidades de Congonhas e Itabira, que convivem com esta precária situação nos últimos 60 anos e principalmente com a expansão da produção nos últimos 10 anos (2002/2011), sintoma da histórica alta de preços do minério de Ferro no mundo.

Mesmo assim são realidades muito distantes da maioria da população de Mariana, não pela distância, mas sim pelo baixo acesso a informação que a imprensa produz sobre estes problemas ou por parte dos governos e empresas que sempre preferem divulgar sobre o sucesso do negócio e nunca dos problemas gerados pela atividade. No Brasil o que vale é a urgência do negócio e seus resultados financeiros, atividades desta magnitude sempre estiveram acima das necessidades dos trabalhadores ou da população atingida pela mineração, meio ambiente modificado para servir ao negócio, ocupação de grandes áreas com incentivo fiscal e até mudanças de comunidades inteiras para servir a mineração são comuns.

Para se ter uma idéia a Vale em 2011 obteve 40 bilhões de reais de lucro líquido, 20% deste lucro foi arrancado daqui da região do chamado complexo mineral de Mariana.

Por tudo isso, acho que o poder econômico do setor da mineração exerce uma influencia muito forte na comunidade, principalmente no que tange o controle econômico e político

da cidade. Ao ser uma atividade com um peso industrial muito forte no estado, no país e principalmente nos municípios mineradores, cria-se uma dependência quase de sobrevivência da economia local por falta de políticas de governo há longo prazo. As mineradoras mandam nas cidades.

Questões básicas como saúde, educação, saneamento básico, poderiam estar resolvidos se um pouquinho deste enorme lucro ficasse para a cidade e para os marianenses, mas vivemos sob a ótica de uma política covarde e submissa, líderes, políticos, comunitários, sindicais, movimentos, são cooptados ou mesmo comprados.

A propaganda da empresa é muito forte, além de jornais escritos na comunidade e em todo país que não são poucos, têm ainda há mídia televisiva e de rádio. Mas não é só isso, dados do IBGE constam que mais da metade da população de Mariana vive com menos de um salário mínimo, temos 17 mil desempregados, sendo que entre estes 10 mil são mulheres, ou seja ambiente propício para que toda e qualquer oportunidade vire questão fundamental na vida das pessoas. Sem falar sobre uma forte cultura de exploração extrativista e não de desenvolvimento social, que vem desde a colonização, ou seja, mais de três séculos de servidão.

Dados algumas explicações é necessário também quebrar alguns mitos, a Vale fala que a Mina em questão vai ser pequena, no entanto vai produzir inicialmente mais de 1 milhão de toneladas/ano. Mesmo que produzisse menos teria os mesmos efeitos, gerando poeira, consumindo muita água, aumentando o trânsito dentro da cidade.

A Vale alega que vai gerar empregos, também concordo que vai gerar empregos, só que; na obra vai gerar milhares de empregos precários de baixa remuneração e ocasionando mais um aumento da população local, temporariamente sem logística e infra-estrutura para isso. Depois vai ser 200 empregos fixos, só que a empresa mesmo confirma que este empreendimento vai ser terceirizado, mantendo baixos salários e falta de condições de trabalho, como já é hoje em todos os empreendimentos da empresa deste tipo.

Por isso acredito que vai ser um empreendimento muito ruim para a comunidade, pois as contradições continuam, não é possível concordar com este tipo de investimento onde só uns poucos saem beneficiados pela exploração de nossas riquezas naturais. Temos de

discutir que este tipo de exploração muito próximas as cidades não são necessários e só se explicam pela ganância dos verdadeiros donos da Vale, bancos internacionais e de executivos que nunca pisaram em locais próximos a estas minas.

Para mineração, é necessário ter um projeto que inclua a população e trabalhadores como o centro das preocupações de empreendimentos como este e não ao contrário como hoje. Para isso temos um caminho longo, em primeiro lugar temos uma disputa em andamento que é a consciência da maioria. Em segundo é manter os que já têm essa consciência formada, organizados e mobilizados, pois na conjuntura atual tudo pode acontecer. Quando falo da conjuntura política e econômica, digo da crise internacional, que começa a abalar a economia brasileira e em particular a mineração.

Há três anos atrás, ninguém imaginava o que vem acontecendo na Europa e o que vem acontecendo nos países Árabes. Por isso pergunto, alguém pode prever que no Brasil ou em Mariana vai continuar tudo como antes? Acho que não e acho que a consciência muda muito adivindas das dificuldades e necessidades da maioria. Por enquanto a empresa têm uma certa zona de conforto e mesmo assim enfrenta uma resistência por parte de seus trabalhadores que conhecem os seus métodos e parte da população mais consciente, Vamos continuar trabalhando para desmascarar este tipo de projeto que não serve a maioria.

Espero que tenha ajudado e só peço que quando completar seus estudos envie uma cópia para o Sindicato Metabase dos Inconfidentes, no qual sou diretor. Se precisar de mais alguma coisa continue fazendo contato.

Abraços

18th December, 2012

Concordo sim, com o seu paragrafo abaixo, não se esquecendo do numero enorme de lideranças cooptadas ou contrrompidas ligadas a comunidade ou ao próprio movimento sindical da mineração.

Mas em breve poderemos ter mudanças reais, nesta conjuntura atual. As férias estão ótimas, obrigado. Tendo novidades mantereí contato.

Um abraço.

Interviewee Code F5 – Local Woman Councillor, Mariana

Met a city councillor (the only female and Afro-Brazilian one in a town which has a vast majority of Afro-Brazilians). She is the only political figure against mining for all the negative impacts it causes and the exploitation of workers she argues. In fact she believes that reason nobody protests is because they work in mining and secondly due to cultural and educational reasons. People have very poor quality education, they don't question anything. She also invited me to a samba party the next night to meet more locals.

Interviewee code – G1 Interview with Miguel, Manager at Anglo American, Barro Alto.

After a year the construction phase of the mine started in 2007 this meant an influx of several thousand male manual workers from all over Brazil. The workers were housed several kilometres from Barro Alto. This according to Miguel was an intelligent decision looking back in hindsight as it mitigated conflicts and tensions. Unfortunately on weekends some construction workers would go to Barro Alto and get intoxicated at the bars and there were several violent clashes involving knives and at least one fatal stabbing of a construction worker by a local resident. This construction stage was the most delicate and with most potential to harm company - community relations according to Miguel. However, interestingly local community interviewees did not make any reference to the days of construction and conflict with the workers, instead they chose to focus on the CSR and economic footprint of Anglo American in Barro Alto.

Agreed that their jobs would be much easier in terms of community relations if they could engage in old fashioned philanthropy and hand outs, however, the values of the company are that of capacity building and teaching communities to become self-sufficient and independent and this takes time and patience to also convince communities it is the best option for them.

The English and South Africans (sad version of the English) are too rigid and unflexible. They say they understand the importance of understanding the the peculiarities of each local context yet when it comes to asking for the SEAT and Anglo Social Way reports they choose not to understand and ask for them. The people in HQ are very obsessed with compliance.

The locals were all obsessed about the mine since the late 1960s and it all finally happened in 2007 40 years later. They created crazy expectations lead by the previous Canadian mine. When Anglo finally started with the large construction site they made sure the workers stayed over the other side of the mountain to keep any local community conflict low. Moreover, Leonardo, and others did a lot of community relations by living there for a year before operations getting to understand how the locals are.

Nevertheless, as the locals saw they were not getting a rain of money as hoped they got very aggressive and verbal at the Forums and even physical at times. The municipal government and Mayor also made life very difficult for them protesting at times outside their main office. However, the most important factor was being ALWAYS TRANSPARENT no matter what. That way Anglo was able to get across their Ethical principles of working to the community and also their philosophy of sustainable development and capacity building. Of course (as argued by Liomar) life for them would be much easier if they could engage in philanthropy than sustainability as per AA.

Politics in BA is extremely important as with any small town in Brazil. People's livelihoods depend on it. Either they work in a farm or they work for the municipal government. If you support the winning candidate you have a chance of getting a job. If a Mayor or candidate criticizes Anglo then they get lots of support. Its very important to know how to negotiate and communicate with this group of people that way you can turn a potential conflict into a benefit for the relationship as happened with the Mayor and municipality.

With time AA were able to transmit their philosophy of working in partnerships with local associations and cooperatives only. The people who criticise AA still have self interests and are not trustworthy, they are not willing to work collectively and with AA. Locals are very simple they don't even have access to newspapers nobody even reads.

Only way of communicating is via car loudspeaker. People here are not willing to take courses and learn they are stubborn even on training courses such as the milk production one they refuse to be instructed on how to deal with their cows.

SEAT is a tool and just that. London tries to make out it is the holy book which will save the nation but it is not. By doing a rigorous SEAT you won't create good relations, as you need to have the extensive ground work from before. You need to get locals to partner with everything in terms of social investment. You need to learn about the local context as it is very special and locals need to identify with you. In BA Leroy and Miguel have been in the region for many years. You can't have people from other places from different cultures as they won't be accepted by locals with such low education and cultural levels. Civil society is very weak here. The reason why people act the way they do is because of the local context and the level of mining company's community relations and investment – transparency is important!

Minas – Rio is having lots of problems due to the fact that they didn't do the heavy baseline relationship building and MMX were very irresponsible. Furthermore, the area is close to Cerro de Cipó and the highest waterfall in MG it's the pride and joy of Mineiros and environmentalists they will not give up without a fight. It needed much more studying before going ahead, perhaps should not even have gone ahead. It is partly to blame for Cynthia's resignation. They are investing socially like crazy but don't have detailed plans of how the projects should be run in the future with community participation. (REPROLATINA – its all about the culture and education of the locals there they are different, much better prepared and therefore resisting the project more.)

M-R has an Aussie or South African leading the social investment work there, she doesn't understand the context. Lots of the workers are from Vale, an arrogant company. Workers are near the communities and behave irresponsibly unlike at BA where they were kept far away. In short, they haven't done their background and prior due diligence research regarding the community properly.

Interviewee code G2 – Head of and Officer of NGO partner of Anglo American, Barro Alto

With the local government supplying most jobs the community is very passionate about politics, as supporting and helping certain candidates gain power during elections means a good chance of gaining a job this is known as “*clientelismo*” or simply clientelism in English. The term refers to an exchange of goods or services for political support.

Local businesses are very bitter that Anglo not doing enough for infrastructure in the community or buying enough from their shops. They want much more from the mine.

Interviewee code G3 – Local Supermarket owner, Barro Alto

Anglo American are not ethical in their treatment of the community. They only hire people recommended by workers and friends there, there is nepotism. The company should do much more for the town to develop it so it can grow. The managers don’t live here otherwise they would spend more money and help the economy. Why do they live in Goianianese?

They never reply to my complaints to their grievance hotline.

Their manager XXXXX is corrupt and you can quote me on that. He was here buying up houses cheaply using public funds. I mobilized the local community back in 2008 with banners to go and protest at their annual forum so they don’t like me.

Interviewee code G4 – Local community Woman resident and leader with husband and daughter

Anglo American are not ethical in their treatment of the community. They only hire people recommended by workers and friends there, there is nepotism. The company should do much more for the town to develop it so it can grow. The managers don't live here otherwise they would spend more money and help the economy. Why do they live in Goianianese?

Daughter has been applying for jobs for many years she is qualified and never gets an interview. They never reply to my complaints to their grievance hotline about this situation.

Annoyed Anglo just bring in workers from outside of the local community instead of training locals to do the well paid jobs.

Gave up protesting against the mine but believes it should do much more.

Interviewee Code G5 – Leroy – Community relations officer, Anglo American, Barro Alto

When Anglo American finally arrived to the town in 2006 having decided they would be able to use their expertise to mine the nickel they spent a year building community relations before constructing their mining operations. Building these relations involved Leroy the current day community relations officer who is from the nearby city of Nickelandia, where Anglo American have another Nickel mine in operation, becoming acquainted and integrating with the local community. another one of Leroy's objectives was to align community expectations with Anglo American's philosophy and strategy regarding community investment. Leroy explained that during the years pursuing previous? to Anglo American's arrival that the local community had created huge and unrealistic expectations about how they would all become rich once the mine would be open, and further the community understood and still view the minerals as "theirs" despite legally all sub-soil minerals belonging to the Brazilian State.

Agreed that their jobs would be much easier in terms of community relations if they could engage in old fashioned philanthropy and hand outs, however, the values of the company are that of capacity building and teaching communities to become self-sufficient and independent and this takes time and patience to also convince communities it is the best option for them.

Interviewee code G6 - Ju – taxi driver for Anglo American, Barro Alto

It's all about corruption. All politicians and public sector workers are corrupt including the police. The only reason people complain against AA is because they want money from them – and lots. Everyone wants money including he who doesn't want more taxis there.

Interviewee Code H1 – Interview transcripts Conceição de Mato Dentro

- Skype conversations with Community Leader Fernanda

[3/5/13 6:05:30 PM] Fernanda: olá Rajiv. Nenhuma melhora, ao contrário, na última reunião (todos os meses temos reuniões dos atingidos com a empresa e ministério público) a empresa faltou tanto com respeito que no meio da reunião , todos se levantaram e saíram. Literalmente bateram em retirada. O promotor ficou boquiaberto. Outra coisa, a comunidade da água quente, está literalmente sem água e a qualidade das águas dos cursos d'água está cada vez pior. A situação está complicada e tensa. Na próxima segunda, dia 11 de março, temos a próxima reunião.

[3/5/13 6:13:45 PM] Fernanda: Pelo que sei da história do Peru, a coisa por lá é mais grave, pois os atingidos enfrentam até ameaça de morte e conseguem barrar empreendimentos.

[3/5/13 6:14:55 PM] Fernanda: Em CMD a coisa está muito complicada. Tenho medo da comunidade se revoltar verdadeiramente e recorrer a vias mais violentas, com o que não concordo, mas o abuso é grande demais

[3/26/13 1:05:49 PM] Fernanda: Rajiv, estou a 4 km da entrada da empresa. A distância da entrada até as estruturas exatamente eu não sei, pois não entrei lá. Se precisar posso perguntar.

[3/26/13 1:31:13 PM] Fernanda: com as reuniões da reasa a comunidade está mais unida, mais junta, mais ciente dos seus direitos e o que é mais importante, mais disposta a reivindicá-los.

[3/26/13 1:34:08 PM] Fernanda: Mas falta um pouco para a classificação muito unidos. A distância física e a própria desagregação das relações e o distanciamento físico e social

imposto pela empresa quando dos reassentamentos, fez estas dificuldades se agravarem. As comunidades de Munbuca e Ferrugem, por exemplo, não existem mais. Existem famílias dessas duas comunidades aqui e ali, espalhadas

[3/26/13 1:34:59 PM] Rajiv Maher: entendi, muito obrigado Fernanda

[3/26/13 1:36:52 PM] Fernanda: ok

[3/26/13 1:52:51 PM] Fernanda: vou te dar um exemplo, na minha comunidade, a empresa depois de meses de problemas com instalação das fossas, a empresa se reuniu com a comunidade e pediu uma chance. A comunidade deu e tem mais de 01 ano que não consegue resolver a questão da instalação das fossas sépticas. Nada que fazem funcionam. Estão desacreditados e desmoralizados perante a comunidade

[3/26/13 2:09:04 PM] Fernanda: se ele não sabe, tem inúmeros atingidos que amam o lugar e querem continuar lá, mas precisam da garantia mínima para continuar, conforme previsto inclusive em condicionante. Garantias das águas é das primeiras coisas. AQLém das garantias da fertilidade do solo, pois temos uma preocupação com o rebaixamento do lençol freático (que vai ocorrer com o aprofundamento da cava da mina).

[3/26/13 2:11:02 PM] Fernanda: agora as pessoas estão aparecendo doentes com verminoses. Como estamos recebendo relatos de que caminhões de empresas terceirizadas, que recolhem os dejetos das fossas dos acampamentos, estão despejando as fezes nos cursos d'água, a contaminação é certa

5/7/13 4:06:40 PM] Fernanda: isso mesmo. O povo de Conceição vai se empodeirando, tendo noção do poder que tem e os políticos de providências que precisam tomar

[

5/7/13 4:31:02 PM] Fernanda: O eixo estrutural do desenvolvimento de Conceição do Mato Dentro sempre foi o turismo baseado na riqueza natural da região - cachoeiras, montanhas, além das tradições - festas, queijo, farinha, biscoito.

[5/7/13 4:31:32 PM] Rajiv Maher: então a mineração NAO é compatível com isso

[5/7/13 4:31:33 PM] Fernanda: A mineração feriu o "coração" do povo

[5/7/13 4:32:03 PM] Fernanda: A cidade que sempre foi capital do ecoturismo, está vendo sua maior riqueza - o ecoturismo -seriamente ameaçado

[5/7/13 4:48:34 PM] Fernanda: ontem ouvimos na depoimentos de pessoas que disseram que não precisam e nunca precisaram dos empregos que a Anglo tem a oferecer, que a tranquilidade não tem preço

[5/9/13 3:08:19 PM] Fernanda: quantos aos marcos, pensando hoje, entendo que a criação da reasa e sua caminhada até hoje foi um marco e um grande avanço

[5/9/13 3:11:32 PM] Fernanda: temos um grupo de poucas pessoas que vem lutando e fazendo a resistência

[5/9/13 3:11:50 PM] Fernanda: desde 2006/2007

[5/9/13 3:12:49 PM] Fernanda: teve um período de grande união, chegamos a fazer uma comissão de atingidos que a anglo com estratégias conseguiu desarticular - isso foi em 2010

[5/9/13 3:13:21 PM] Fernanda: a criação da reasa preencheu esse anseio de união que estava vazio

[5/9/13 3:13:40 PM] Rajiv Maher: entendi....e isso está no seu arquivo? Acho que seria muito importante publicar algo sobre dessa estratégia de desarticular vcs

[5/9/13 3:13:54 PM] Fernanda: você tinha que ver a união dos atingidos e a participação nesta audiência pública, foi emocionante

[5/9/13 3:15:08 PM] Fernanda: estou localizando e vou ver... sabe é que tenho milhares (milhares mesmo) de arquivos, emails, documentos, que me perco

[5/10/13 4:12:36 PM] Rajiv Maher: quantas pessoas lideram na Reasa?

[5/10/13 4:13:18 PM] Rajiv Maher: porque tira muito tempo e energia

[5/10/13 4:14:02 PM] Fernanda: a Reasa não tem líderes

[5/10/13 4:15:33 PM] Fernanda: Toda a comunidade participa. Nós formamos um pequeno grupo que seríamos como os representantes....Ninguém ganha nada, só gasta. Agora para essa audiência pública, gastamos com aluguel do ônibus, alimentação de 50 pessoas, faixas, cartazes e banners, etc....

[5/10/13 4:15:52 PM] Rajiv Maher: bastante dinheiro

[5/10/13 4:16:21 PM] Fernanda: além de eu, por exemplo, só agora estar conseguindo colocar meu trabalho em dia, pois passei dias divulgando, fazendo camisetas, etc., tudo o que foi preciso

[5/10/13 4:17:05 PM] Rajiv Maher: isso imaginei...é muito sacrificio mas sinceramente acho que se vc nao tivesse feito o sacrificio nao teriam causado tanto impacto

[5/10/13 4:20:16 PM] Fernanda: faço por amor a minha terra, por amor a água, por amor a causa, somente por isso....

[5/10/13 4:22:13 PM] Fernanda: pode parecer piegas, mas é isso

[5/10/13 4:28:37 PM] Fernanda: A Professora Denise, estive na F.Rança visitando as comunidade dos atingidos pela mineração que encerraram as atividades fazem décadas....

[5/10/13 4:29:09 PM] Fernanda: Deixam os buracos, a sujeira, a poluição, todos os problemas e se vão....

[6/12/13 2:57:24 PM] Fernanda: ao ler a matéria do Wall Street Journal, a sensação que me deu é que temos imprensa chapa branca tanto no Brasil quanto nos USA.

Os repórteres passam a impressão de que a Anglo fez mais do que precisava fazer, e fizeram caricatura quer com as ações do MP quanto com as declarações do Sandro.

Espremendo, veja o que fica dos depoimentos do Sandro e do Dr Marcelo:

Sandro: "The project is the result of much bigger, global forces. There came a point where we realized we weren't going to stop a global force, so we decided to try to impose as many conditions as possible so we could get what we could."

["decidimos tentar impor o maior número de condicionantes possível, de modo que pudéssemos ganhar o que fosse possível"]

Their list of complaints, drawn from residents in monthly town-hall meetings, included the allegation that Anglo American had not carried out a sufficient cataloging of prehistorical drawings, spear tips and other archeological artifacts. They also demanded that a construction-free zone around a cave containing blind albino spiders be expanded to 820 feet from 328 feet.

[As comunidades [...] também reivindicaram que uma zona (raio) de proteção em torno de uma caverna com aranhas albinas e cegas fosse ampliada de 100 para 250 metros"].

Obs: Engraçado é que ocorreu exatamente o contrário. A Anglo é que sapateou durante quase um ano em cima da norma (de 250 metros mínimos de raio de proteção), até conseguir o 'de acordo' absurdo do órgão teleguiado pelo governo estadual.

Mr. Machado, a 39-year-old lawyer from Belo Horizonte, the state capital city of two million, supports the company's right to mine "as long as it's done right." He describes his lawsuit as "a precautionary measure, we decided that work on the project couldn't go

forward until the archeological studies were actually finished." He shows off an archeological report as thick as a phone book, the fruit of Anglo American's, and his, work.

["O Sr. Machado descreve sua ação como uma 'medida preventiva, que, decidimos, deve impedir que o projeto avance enquanto os estudos arqueológicos não estiverem concluídos'. Ele se gaba de um relatório arqueológico tão grosso quanto um catálogo telefônico, fruto do trabalho dele e da Anglo American".]

Veja ainda que o verbo "pressuposição" é empregado uma vez, reportando-se à versão das comunidades que se reúnem na Reasa. A visão dos dirigentes da Anglo, não são pressuposições, ao que parece!?????!! E, curiosamente, as reivindicações dos moradores locais são ao que parece estritamente de ordem biológica e arqueológica, quando, muito bem sabemos, o foco maior destas reuniões tem sido outro e, ao que parece, à pauta das comunidades não comparecem nenhum dano social, nenhum impedimento ao direito de ir e vir, nenhum abuso ao direito de propriedade, nenhuma implosão de cachoeira e nenhuma degradação crônica dos recursos hídricos locais. Daqui a pouco vão falar que os atingidos pelo projeto Minas-Rio, formam um complô comunista, financiado por Cuba e orientada por mensagens psicografadas do "Comandante" Chaves.

E tudo isso, apesar do projeto ter sido "concebido por alguns dos maiores geólogos e engenheiros do mundo" ("the project, conceived by some of the best geologists and engeneers in the world")! Grandes bostas!

O John Miller e o Paul Kiernan precisam levar mais a sério essa situação e conhecer o que não conhecem, antes de chegar e fazerem-se porta-vozes das conclusões dirigidas pela empresa - que desde sempre fez vistas grossas às situações que denunciemos, como se seu acordo com os governantes - ao que parece, da república de bananas do Brasil - fosse suficiente para descartar a democracia e os direitos da sociedade de defender-se e assegurar um mínimo de justiça.

Além das informações requeitadas e algumas sobre o contexto internacional, a única declaração mais razoável que constou da notícia é a do representante do MME, que lembrou que a MMX fez pouco caso dos procedimentos de licenciamento no Brasil.

Agora pergunto - será que as entrevistas dadas pelo Marcco e o Sandro Lage resumiram-se às passagens pinçadas e coloridas pelos amigos do WSJ??

Se quiser, pode transmitir estas impressões para eles. Acho que deveríamos juntar outros comentários, traduzir para o inglês e tb enviar para o conselho editorial do jornal, nos Estados Unidos.

Sugiro ainda ajuntar aos comentários, a nota de esclarecimento dos atingidos.

Abraço,

Gilberto

[6/12/13 3:11:26 PM] Fernanda: Os absurdos são tantos que às vezes penso que aí na Inglaterra não sabem bem o que ocorre aqui em Conceição do Mato Dentro

[6/12/13 3:26:21 PM] Fernanda: Os impactos continuam exatamente os mesmos e cada vez ficando mais graves

[6/12/13 3:27:27 PM] Rajiv Maher: e adianta ligar no "fala conosco" da Anglo? Ou será que estou sendo muito ingenuo?

[6/12/13 3:29:59 PM] Fernanda: Não adianta, já ligamos inúmeras vezes

[7/16/13 4:25:20 PM] Fernanda: A poucos dias atrás, tivemos um protestos violento de funcionários de empresa terceirizada. Pela primeira vez a população urbana ficou frente a frente com a insegurança, em virtude de mais de 300 funcionários ficarem andando pela avenida principal, sem nada, sem roupa para vestir, sem documentos e lugar para ficar. O

efetivo policial de Conceição não passa de 01 dúzia de policiais para conter 300 funcionários. O comércio fechou as portas. As pessoas da cidade estão chamando para paralisar a empresa.

[7/16/13 4:28:49 PM] Fernanda: veja aí

<http://g1.globo.com/videos/minas-gerais/mgtv-1edicao/t/edicoes/v/protesto-com-cerca-de-800-pessoas-termina-com-alojamento-incendiado-em-mg/2672327/>

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yRdxEkUc9MQ&feature=share>

[7/16/13 4:30:59 PM] Fernanda: aceitação???? é de rir, na minha comunidade, que é da água quente, a empresa deve contar com 10% de aceitação, ou até menos..... Está sendo feito esta semana, um trabalho pela universidade federal lá na minha comunidade. Vai ficar fácil de responder com dados mais precisos daqui a poucos dias. Estão toda a semana lá na comunidade fazendo pesquisas

[7/16/13 4:39:05 PM] Fernanda: o descontentamento quase unânime é, principalmente, pelas atitudes da anglo que denunciamos e que estão se concretizando a cada dia de forma mais grave

[7/16/13 4:40:45 PM] Fernanda: eles estão "cavando um buraco", mas vão acabar caindo lá dentro...

[7/16/13 4:44:17 PM] Fernanda: como a situação das empresas mineradoras não anda muito boa, a china não está comprando tanto, o eike batista está despencando, a anglo já gastou demais, estou assistindo onde essa história vai parar....

[7/30/13 10:38:17 PM] Fernanda: Sim, já tentou "influenciar" na minha comunidade oferecendo benefícios, em outras comunidades também e se vallendo desses benefícios concedidos para poucos, para implantar a discórdia entre vizinhos e até mesmo parentes.

[7/30/13 10:39:05 PM] Fernanda: Ameaças também já ocorreram

[7/30/13 10:50:26 PM] Rajiv Maher: é isso imaginava pois é a mesma historia que vejo em muitas comunidades

[7/30/13 10:50:58 PM] Rajiv Maher: vc lembra que tipo de beneficios que eram? projetos sociais? capacitação de curso? emprego na empresa? ou outros?

[7/30/13 10:53:05 PM] Fernanda: emprego

[7/30/13 10:53:11 PM] Fernanda: renda em dinheiro

[7/30/13 10:53:15 PM] Fernanda: cesta básica

[7/30/13 10:53:31 PM] Fernanda: promessas de aquisição de terra de forma mais rápida

[7/30/13 10:53:49 PM] Rajiv Maher: deve ser dificil para alguns rejeitar e resistir e nao cair na tentação

[7/30/13 10:54:04 PM] Fernanda: alguns resistiram

[7/30/13 10:54:10 PM] Fernanda: alguns aceitaram

[7/30/13 10:54:21 PM] Fernanda: mas a maioria se arrependeu

[7/30/13 10:54:38 PM] Fernanda: ou até mesmo se conformou com o destino

[7/30/13 10:55:10 PM] Rajiv Maher: mas vc acha que alguns que aceitaram foram com voces para o Ministerio Publico em Maio a reclamar contra a empresa?

[7/30/13 10:55:56 PM] Rajiv Maher: é dizer que arrependeram dps de aceitar as "migalias" da Anglo e até protestar contra ela

[7/30/13 11:02:39 PM] Fernanda: sim, alguns já fizeram isso

[8/1/13 4:29:31 PM] Fernanda: Na grande maioria das vezes, os valores e demais benefícios não foram observados

[8/12/13 8:59:07 PM] Fernanda: O córrego passa sete (corta a comunidade da água quente e jassém), ficou impróprio para o consumo e hoje corre em vazão mínima

[8/12/13 8:59:41 PM] Rajiv Maher: as pessoas bebiam do córrego passa sete?

[8/12/13 9:00:00 PM] Fernanda: O córrego pereira (córrego vargem grande) corta a minha propriedade e outras) tem suas águas impróprias para o consumo e utilização

[8/12/13 9:00:16 PM] Rajiv Maher: entendi

[8/12/13 9:00:43 PM] Fernanda: bebiam, tomavam banho, lavavam roupa, utilizavam para fazer comida, lavar louça e vasilhas, para tudo mesmo....

[8/12/13 9:01:08 PM] Rajiv Maher: então é o sustento da vida daí

[8/12/13 9:01:59 PM] Fernanda: sim, por isso a anglo foi obrigada a colocar água para a comunidade da água quente por determinação da supram

[8/12/13 9:02:20 PM] Rajiv Maher: não sabia então foi culpada

[8/12/13 9:02:43 PM] Fernanda: sim

[8/12/13 9:03:06 PM] Fernanda: nós da água quente somos consideradas atingidos emergenciais em caráter de água

[8/12/13 9:12:55 PM] Fernanda: a anglo, para atender a determinação fez um sistema muito pouco eficiente de distribuição de água. Fez um poço artesiano e colocou uma mangueira com torneira na porta de cada casa que permitiu. Muitas vezes, por falta de luz ou porque a bomba de água estraga, todos ficam sem água. Já ocorreu da comunidade ficar sem água por até 10 dias e a anglo levando garrafas de água mineral. Como sobreviver (tomar banho, banho crianças, comida, lavar vasilhas e roupas) com água em garrafas????? A anglo não tem classificação.

[8/12/13 9:15:34 PM] Fernanda: é muito difícil e desumano

[9/6/13 7:06:39 PM] Fernanda: A Anglo vai nas reuniões da reasa e ouve todas as queixas dos atingidos, que vão desde porteiras quebradas, mataburros que caíram e outras pequenas questões até problemas enormes e não conseguem dar saída, nem solução para absolutamente nada.

[9/6/13 7:10:25 PM] Fernanda: não se dão ao trabalho nem de prometer em alguns casos

[9/6/13 7:10:39 PM] Fernanda: outros prometem e nunca cumprem

[9/6/13 7:13:42 PM] Fernanda: tem um caso hilário: na água quente, prometerem plantar citronela nas casas e passados 12 meses, sem ter mais o que falar, pediram um "voto de confiança" que eles iriam importar mudas de citronela. Eu não aguentei e perguntei se queriam mudas e daria a eles de graça, pois tenho essa planta em casa

[9/19/13 2:19:07 PM] Fernanda: A comunidade indicou 03 empresas de notório saber e a Anglo escolheu a Diversus

[9/19/13 2:23:05 PM] Fernanda: As duas comunidades são Mumbuca e Ferrugem

[10/14/13 9:15:37 PM] Fernanda: A comunidade demandou o trabalho e a Supram assim determinou, que a comunidade indicasse 03 empresas de notório saber que a Anglo iria escolher 01 delas e pagar pelo trabalho

[10/14/13 9:16:47 PM] Fernanda: Essa empresa é de um exfuncionário da Anglo

[11/11/13 6:31:47 PM] Fernanda: As novidades é que estão fazendo uma fiscalização das condições de trabalho nos alojamento da anglo

[11/11/13 6:33:35 PM] Fernanda: sim pelo ministério do trabalho. Em Conceição do Mato Dentro estão os fiscais do ministério do trabalho e a polícia federal

[11/11/13 6:33:51 PM] Fernanda: Parece que as condições de trabalho são bem graves

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cEorAlteUWA&feature=youtu.be>

Interviewee Code H2 – Mr. Da Silva, Elderly Maroon Resident in village near Conceicao de Mato Dentro affected by the mineduct – 35 minutes

Rajiv: I wanted to hear your thoughts about the mineduct project.

Mr Da Silva: this mine has massacred us completely massacred us! The Brazilian authorities are massacrating us via this company.

Me: What is your biggest complaint about the mining project?

Mr Da Silva: We are Maroon people and we're being ejected from our own land!

Me: how can that be if you're protected by law?

Mr Da Silva: but we haven't been recognized by the State as official Maroons. We believe we have all the application process done we've submitted all our papers to be recognized as Maroons, but of course they are not responding because they don't want us to be officially certified as Maroons for this mining project!

Me: So how is it you were ejected from your land?

Mr Da Silva: some of our relatives sold their land but I and others didn't and now we are being accused of being illegal settlers on our own land!! We don't get help from any lawyers as they all want us to sell our land. Nobody is helping us! We're being massacred! The mining company invaded our land together with the Brazilian authorities and police. It's a Massacre that's taking place here we are being massacred.

I'm not complaining about the company, I'm sure that company Anglo American from there in England doesn't want to hurt anyone. It's the Brazilian authorities who are behind this.

There was a negotiation deal about taking Maroon families out of their land to a new land bought by Anglo American. They are just like slaves again. They left threatened by security forces with guns. I'm speaking about Brazilian justice it doesn't exist!

Most people are not brave enough to say anything publically about this. They are scared about the consequences from the authorities and on their loved ones.

Me: what would be the ideal solution for you?

Mr Da Silva: that we get our dignity back. I'm outraged by how they are treating nature, the environment and our people! It's a huge massacre! We don't ever get answers to any of our questions! Its pure terrorism that they are doing.

Me: How are you in terms of collectiveness in resisting this destruction and problems? How united are you as a community?

Mr Da Silva: There is no union! Everyone is scared and uninformed! They don't want to say a word! They will only get me out of here via a tractor or by killing me. I'm not scared!

I work together with my brother trying to educate and create awareness amongst our communities. but most others are still not brave enough to do this. We believe in god that things will come through. He will ensure we are victorious!

Me: How did you become so strong willed and such a strong defender of your community?

Mr Da Silva: I learned via observing nature and living with it. The main concern is with water today in the world! Water is life!

Me: How has it been working with others from outside such as NGOs and other authorities who have gone to help you in your struggle?

Everyone including NGOs, lawyers etc who have come to help have left because they've been silenced in my view! Seems like they are scared about telling the truth, of losing their jobs etc.

Me: It seems the mining company has a lot of power is this true?

Mr Da Silva: the government and justice is stepping all over us! This is a national heritage site with our caves, waterfalls, mata atlantic forests. I believe when the English find out whats going on they will try to help and tell the government to stop.

We also proved that Miguel Mata, representing Anglo American is a liar! He lied in front of a public audience with the State prosecutor about not taking armed guards to evict me and my family off our land! He's a liar and deceitful!

Me: do you feel very much alone in your resistance against the mine?

Mr Da Silva: yes very lonely. Nobody helps nobody does anything until now! We've been asking about the water problem for over a year now and without a response and it just gets worse. We're abandoned and neglected here.

Me: do you sometimes think about leaving and just giving up?

Mr Da Silva: I will only leave here if the justice department evict me. Otherwise they will have to evict me out by pieces.

Me: Do you know of this certain NGO? Are they helping?

Mr Da Silva: yes of course they come over and give us presentaitons and tell us about our rights but it makes no difference as we're always getting run over by the authorities!

I bet English authorities would never permit a Brazilian company to do the same in the UK!

Everyone is silenced. Nobody says a word!

Me: What do you think about all the social responsibility and community relations work the mine does?

Mr Da Silva: I brought up my kids perfectly well without the help of Anglo (American) so why would I need them to help raise my grandchildren? We don't need them here for their help. We are well and better off without them here causing great impact to our lives."Company doesn't have any respect for the human rights of those impacted.

The company is always saying how responsible and respectful it is but in practice its not. They are always polite when they deal with you.

We just want the company to respect the agreements we have had so far.

Interviewee code – H3 – Pamela – Local community activist opposing mineduct

Its all about politics, we don't have any political clout. Lawyers refuse to represent us when they discover we are fighting the Federal government, the State and a huge multinational mining company over issues such as land and planning.

Most lawyers would not risk their careers in being associated with such a litigation so therefore we are left with some civil society actors to help us.

Anglo doesn't really engage with us they have come to a few meetings to participate but never give us any concrete answers. The "bolsas" (social benefits) they give to a few in our communities only ends up dividing us as those who receive benefits refuse to speak out against the mine. Some have family members with jobs linked to the mine so they stay quiet. Relations are non-existent with the Anglo from our side. They don't acknowledge us and only look to other communities who are easy to co-opt.

Interviewee Code – H4 – Coordinator State Public Prosecution department

Mobilização correu a partir Audiência pública do MP mas existia o reclamo antes. Muitas reuniões em várias comunidades. MP Marcelo Mata machado.

Mina tá numa serra com várias comunidades ali. Uma vez por vez realizam reunião na comunidade. Essas antes da mineração tradicional foram pegos de surpresa. Perdeu a Confiança na Empresa. Houve muitos enganos no começo, compras de terra, terra no bolo terra que a família que deixa dividida a família fizeram famílias brigar entre eles. Grandes conflitos familiares. Primeiras 4 reuniões não permitiu empresa falar com MP. Pelas mentiras e enganos não cumpriam. A percepção dos Urbanos é muito diferente dos Rurais em CMD, movimento comércio, trabalho etc, alguns críticos. No rural é outra. A Mina é muito longe da cidade. Acontecem no ambiente. Relação foi boa no começo houve marketing. Não tem educação nos estudos, alguns se tem. Não são organizados, são várias lideranças. Tem várias posições ali nada consolidado. Alguns querem que AA despoluam rios como antes que fosse mais transparente e cumprir a lei. Quilombolas querem que fosse embora. Existem pessoas locais que têm acesso a advogados.

Sem MP seria mais difícil para comunidades rurais pq não tem educação. AA adota estratégia para debilitar e enganar. Comunidades foram para MP várias vezes. Eles vão até órgãos governo, buscam redes de apoio.

Estudo grande de uma consultoria que fez estudo na comunidade por pressão da comunidade. MMX tem muita culpa do começo.

Tem um rio Perreira e Corrego Passa Sete totalmente contaminado ali por só AA não a MMX. MP paralizou. Pessoa de Comunicação da empresa é puro Marketing. Fizeram 40 reclamações. Outro projeto de mineração Manabi Holdings – Japonesa com MMX.

Interviewee code H5 – Head of local State Prosecution department - Michael

There is very little trust from the rural communities towards Anglo American. The mining company and the State are together as partners. Anglo has invested a lot in the urban centre but that's not where the impacts of their mineduct will be, they will be mainly in the rural areas to their water.

There will also be and are now social and economic impacts. We have had an influx of thousands of low educated low skilled men move to this regional eco-tourism capital. Now the rents are very high, all prices of goods and services have hyper inflated and there are more social related crimes.

Interviewee Code – H6 – Jim – Corporate Head of Social Performance, Anglo American

Relations between community and ourselves seemed very good when I walked around there with community relations team.

We have invested millions in the urban centre for training locals to work at the mine works.

Those who complain are only doing so for financial related reasons they want to sell their land and property to us for multiple times their market value – nothing else.

(referring to photos I show him of impacts to water sources) none of that is related to our mining project its construction work by the State building new roads so we are not to blame.

Our project was only halted due to an internal source who leaked some dubious documents to the State prosecutor. The State prosecutor has his own political interests and ambitions hence he is campaigning against us.